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ABSTRACT
This thesis examines the factors influencing the variation 
in the leadtimes to site and construct nuclear and fossil- 
fuelled power plants in Japan. It develops a framework for 
evaluating the times necessary to reach social and political 
agreement over the construction of power plants. The study 
stresses the importance of distributional influences and, 
hence, the need to examine the effectiveness of compensation 
mechanisms in evaluating why some projects take longer to 
implement than others. Several hypotheses, which take into 
account the relative importance of distributional factors 
and other 'non-economic' influences on the speed at which 
agreement can be reached over the development of energy 
projects, are investigated.
The empirical analysis is based on an examination of 
quantitative data covering all large-scale power plant 
sitings in Japan from 1960-1979 and four case studies on 
siting disputes. It allows generalisation about the 
critical influences on project leadtimes. Four major 
conclusions emerge from the study. First, the variation in 
public acceptance times contributes more significantly to the 
variation in total power plant leadtimes than licensing and 
construction times. The predictability of project leadtimes 
increases substantially after public acceptance has been 
negotiated. Second, econometric models which consider 
distributional effects, defined as: expected electricity
iv
shortages, the extent of regional social and economic 
opportunities, the size of the rural sector, the ability of 
local government to provide public goods, the strength of 
prefectural leftist political parties, prevailing local 
community and social attitudes and relative risk of 
different types of projects are useful in explaining a major 
part of the variation in settlement times. Models which 
capture these influences at the beginning of the negotiating 
process are useful, but the evaluation of settlement times 
can be improved by monitoring carefully these variables 
during the course of settlement. Third, the development of 
a comprehensive framework for explaining siting delays 
requires going beyond the use of simple statistical models. 
It requires an assessment of political and institutional 
factors, changing expectations and uncertainty about 
outcomes. The predictability of public acceptance times can 
be enhanced by taking these factors in account explicitly. 
Fourth, the approach adopted in the thesis and the 
identification of the more general influences suggest that 
it is possible to develop better ways of evaluating 
leadtimes for economic projects in general than have been 
commonly used in the past.
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THE ANALYSIS OF PROJECT DELAY
This study is concerned with the assessment of dfelay in 
locating and constructing major energy facilities. The 
particular focus is on the variation in times required to 
reach social and political agreement over the development of 
large-scale electric power stations in Japan. The thesis 
sets out to examine the patterns of resistance to and 
support for such developments, their impact on construction 
start-up times, the effectiveness of economic and other 
policy instruments in shortening delay, and the effect of 
these factors on the relative rates of expansion of 
different types of facilities.
The leadtimes required to develop large-scale nuclear and 
fossi1-fue11ed power stations in Japan display two 
important behavioural characteristics. The first is that 
they have, over time, become increasingly longer. The 
second is that they have a high degree of variability. 
These two characteristics suggest a considerable amount of 
unpredictability in the leadtimes involved in the 
implementation of major energy facilities. It is important 
to ask what are the causes of longer leadtimes and leadtime 
variations and whether, indeed, there may be more 
predictability in these variations than appears at first 
sight.
The Japanese electric power industry has a dual function; to 
site and develop power plants and to purchase fuels which 
are used to generate electricity at those plants. The power
2industry in Japan is responsible for the installation of all 
major energy facilities. The industry has a legal mandate 
to supply electricity to meet national demand for electric 
power. The industry is a major user of energy fuels in Japan 
and its role in energy use has tended to grow.
The major portion of the fuel which is used to generate 
electricity at power plants in Japan is secured from 
international energy commodity markets. Japan is not well 
endowed with energy resources and is 75 per cent dependent 
on energy imports, such as oil, coal and uranium.'*' The time 
required for electric power companies to develop energy 
facilities has important implications for the trade in 
energy fuels. The rate of capacity expansion, or the speed 
at which projects can be developed, is one major determinant 
of the size and pattern of energy fuel demands. Accurate 
assessment of energy fuel use in Japan requires, among other 
things, an ability to estimate the leadtime necessary to 
site and construct energy power projects.
Japanese energy planners, both in private power companies 
and in government, have had substantial difficulty in 
assessing the leadtime necessary to site power facilities. 
This is reflected in continued revisions of overall capacity 
targets in periods of both high and low energy demand growth. 
For the period 1966-1973, capacity targets were revised upwards 
The predicted average annual rate of increase in the period
1. The remaining energy supply is made up of hydro­
electric power, geothermal power, electricity 
generated from domestic coal and renewable sources of 
energy such as wind and solar energy.
3w a s  7 . 9 p e r  c e n t .  U n e x p e c t e d  i n c r e a s e s  i n  e l e c t r i c i t y  d e m a n d
g r o w t h  f o r c e d  e n e r g y  p l a n n e r s  t o  d e v e l o p  c a p a c i t y  a t  a n
a v e r a g e  r a t e  o f  1 1 . 6  p e r  c e n t  a n n u a l l y .  I n  c o n t r a s t ,
c a p a c i t y  t a r g e t s  w e r e  r e v i s e d  d o w n w a r d  i n  t h e  p e r i o d  1 9 7 4 -
1 9 8 1 ,  a p e r i o d  c h a r a c t e r i s e d  b y  r e c e s s e d  e l e c t r i c i t y  d e m a n d
g r o w t h .  The  p r e d i c t e d  a v e r a g e  a n n u a l  r a t e  o f  i n c r e a s e  wa s
5 . 4  p e r  c e n t .  An u n e x p e c t e d  d e c l i n e  i n  t h e  g r o w t h  o f
e l e c t r i c i t y  d e m a n d  l e d  t o  c a p a c i t y  o n l y  b e i n g  e x p a n d e d  a t  a n
2a v e r a g e  a n n u a l  r a t e  o f  3 . 7  p e r  c e n t .
S u p p l i e r s  o f  e n e r g y  f u e l s ,  s u c h  a s  t h o s e  i n  A u s t r a l i a ,  h a v e  
h a d  n o  l e s s  d i f f i c u l t y  i n  t h e  a s s e s s m e n t  o f  c a p a c i t y  
e x p a n s i o n  i n  J a p a n .  T h e y  h a v e  r e l i e d ,  t o  a  l a r g e  e x t e n t ,  on  
c a p a c i t y  p r o j e c t i o n s  s u p p l i e d  t o  t h e m  b y  t h e  J a p a n e s e  
a u t h o r i t i e s .  R e v i s e d  c a p a c i t y  g r o w t h  r a t e s ,  p a r t i c u l a r l y  
s i n c e  1 9 7 3 ,  a  p e r i o d  o f  r e c e s s e d  e n e r g y  d e m an d  g r o w t h ,  h a v e  
c a u s e d  m a j o r  p r o b l e m s  f o r  s u p p l i e r s  o f  e n e r g y  c o m m o d i t i e s .  
A u s t r a l i a n  s u p p l i e r s  h a v e  b e e n  c o n f r o n t e d  w i t h  r e d u c e d  
p r i c e s  a n d  t h i s  h a s  a d v e r s e l y  a f f e c t e d  t h e  p r o f i t a b i l i t y  o f  
t h e  i n d u s t r y  a n d  h e i g h t e n e d  u n c e r t a i n t y  a b o u t  t h e  e c o n o m i c  
v i a b i l i t y  o f  e x i s t i n g  a n d  new m i n e s .
T h e  t r a d e  i n  e n e r g y  c o m m o d i t i e s ,  i n  m a n y  c a s e s ,  i s  
c h a r a c t e r i s e d  b y  t h e  e x i s t e n c e  o f  l o n g  t e r m  c o n t r a c t u a l
3
a r r a n g e m e n t s .  T h e  i n a b i l i t y  o f  c o n s u m e r s  a s  w e l l  a s  
s u p p l i e r s  t o  a s s e s s ,  w i t h  a  r e a s o n a b l e  d e g r e e  o f  p r e c i s i o n ,  
p r o j e c t  d e l i v e r y  s c h e d u l e s  h a s  b e e n  o n e  f a c t o r  l e a d i n g  t o  
t h e  r e - n e g o t i a t i o n  o f  c o n t r a c t s .  T h e s e  r e - n e g o t i a t i o n s  h a v e
2 .  T h e s e  f i g u r e s  w e r e  c a l c u l a t e d  f r o m  d a t a  o b t a i n e d  f r o m  
t h e  T o k y o  E l e c t r i c  P o w e r  Company ,  1 9 8 3 .
4been costly and have caused some concern in Australia about 
the value of such arrangements. There is, therefore, a 
strong interest in the provision of a better and more 
reliable basis for assessing capacity expansion targets 
published by authorities in countries reliant on traded 
energy fuels.
There is no standard or general framework within which the 
assessment of leadtime can be analysed. There is, 
therefore, a considerable interest in the development of an 
adequate framework within which the assessment of delay in 
implementing proposals for the placement of economic 
projects can be analysed in general. From this analytical 
perspective, the thesis aims to extend to the existing 
literature on project siting problems by developing a more 
comprehensive cost-benefit framework within which these 
problems can be studied. The approach developed focusses on 
the social and political factors that influence energy 
project leadtimes. The analysis stresses the importance of 
distributional effects and, hence, the need to examine the 
effectiveness of compensation mechanisms in assessing why 
some projects take longer to develop than others.
3. For an extensive discussion of these arrangements, see 
Smith B., 'Long-Term Contracts for the Supply of Raw 
Materials' in Crawford J.G. and Okita S., eds., 
Australia-Japan and Western Pacific Economic Relations, 
Australian Government Publishing Service, 1976, Smith 
B., 'Export Price Bargaining and Bilateral Monopoly in 
the Minerals Trade', Economic Record, March 1977, Smith 
B. and Drysdale P.D., Stabilisation and the Reduction 
of Uncertainty in Bilateral Minerals Trade, Australia- 
Japan Research Centre, Paper No. 65, Canberra, 1979 and 
Smith B., 'Bilateral Commercial Arrangments in the 
Energy Coal Trade' in Harris S. and Ikuta T., eds., 
Australia, Japan and the Energy Coal Trade, Australia- 
Japan Research Centre, Canberra, 1982.
5Within this generalised framework, the study assesses the 
factors that cause variation in leadtimes in the development 
of electric power plants in Japan and analyses whether there 
is any predictability in these variations. It examines 
approximately ninety power plants in Japan. The types of
energy projects considered are limited to large-scale
\
nuclear and fossil-fuelled facilities which were developed 
in the period 1960-1979. The thesis covers a large 
proportion of existing large-scale energy power plants in 
Japan and, therefore, provides an extensive coverage of the 
problem.
Achievement of capacity targets
A major factor influencing the demand for a particular
energy fuel is the amount of installed capacity that
4consumes that fuel. The time necessary to develop energy 
facilities influences the rate at which capacity is capable
I
of being increased. The leadtime to site energy projects is 
of crucial importance in assessments of future market 
opportunities for energy goods. The rate at which capacity 
is capable of being increased is, therefore, likely to be an 
important element determining market opportunities for any 
given type of fuel.
4. For a more detailed discussion of the host of factors 
that are likely to influence the demand for energy 
fuels, see Supply Demand Committee, The Balance of 
Supply and Demand 1978-1990, The Uranium Institute, 
London, 1 979, and Neff T.L. and Jacoby H.B., The 
International Uranium Market, MIT Energy Laboratory 
Report, MIT-EL 80-014, Massachusetts Institute of 
Technology, December 1980.
6Power plant leadtimes can also influence choices about the
substitution of energy plants and, therefore, the mix
embodied in capacity growth. The lengthening or variability
of leadtimes can create uncertainty about the ability to
meet expected increments to electricity demand and the cost
of unexpected inflation and interest rate burdens. Promoters
facing long and variable leadtimes may prefer to turn to
alternate energy facilities or sources of electricity with
5shorter and more certain delivery times.
This study addresses the question of the extent to which 
there is any predictability in the leadtimes involved in the 
siting of nuclear and fossi1-fuelled power facilities in 
Japan. It sets out to measure leadtimes, and then to 
identify and analyse factors contributing to variation in 
leadtimes. A major objective is to provide a better and 
more reliable basis for assessing capacity expansion targets 
published by authorities in countries reliant on traded 
energy fuels.
Energy planners in Japan confront a considerable number of 
known and unknown hurdles in siting energy plants. The 
placement of power stations involves site selection; 
electricity supply-demand forecasting; and an implementation 
process, which comprises public acceptance, licensing and
5. See Lester R.K., 'Nuclear Power Plant Leadtimes' in 
Smart I. eds., World Nuclear Energy - Toward a Bargain 
of Confidence The John Hopkins University Press, 
Baltimore, 1983, initially published as a paper under 
the direction of the International Consultative Group 
on Nuclear Energy under the title of Lester R.K., 
Nuclear Power Plant Leadtimes, The Rockefeller 
Foundation and the Royal Institute of International 
Affairs, 1978.
7construction. At some phases of this siting process, there 
is a considerable degree of predictability; at others there 
appears to be a higher degree of unpredictability.
Planning involves the selection of minimum cost sites, at 
least from the power company's perspective, when electricity 
supply-demand analyses suggest the need for additional 
capacity. Public acceptance of development of a facility at 
a particular site is then required. The public acceptance 
process involves settlement between the project promoter and 
the community in which the project is to be located. Public 
acceptance is characterised by bargaining between and among 
the promoters and the regional communities over the 
distribution of costs and benefits expected to accrue from 
project development. Licensing involves the settlement of 
finer points, such as regulation by government covering 
expected risks and benefits of developing facilities and, in 
many cases, the completion of actual negotiations over the 
transfer of property rights and compensation arrangements. 
Private companies then try to minimise construction costs 
subject to technical, engineering and manpower constraints.
The major source of unpredictability in project leadtimes 
stems from the variation in times at the front end of the 
siting process, where social and political settlements are 
reached. Leadtimes at the back end of the process, which 
involve licensing and construction, are relatively constant 
and do not appear to influence markedly variation in total 
leadtimes. Confidence in the prediction of leadtime 
increases substantially after public acceptance has been 
negotiated.
8Hence, the attainability of capacity targets appears to be 
influenced heavily by the outcome of social and political 
bargaining processes at the regional level. This provides a 
focus for interpretation of the nature of bargaining between 
and among promoters and regional communities over the 
construction of electric power stations. A major interest 
is in identifying and analysing the social, economic and 
political conditions which determine the pattern of 
resistance to and acquiescence in project development, their 
impact on settlement times, and the effectiveness of 
economic and political instruments in influencing 
bargaining outcomes and the speed of settlement.
Analytical interest
There is an interest in developing a framework which will 
allow for the assessment of delay in the implementation of 
proposals for economic projects in general. The existing 
literature on the siting of economic projects, such as 
energy facilities, provides an incomplete framework for the 
analysis of these problems. The literature on the siting of 
energy projects covers a wide range of issues, reflecting 
the many dimensions there are to this issue, but there is no 
general or standard approach. Analyses, in both English and 
Japanese, range from examinations of the engineering 
feasibility of locating plants on offshore flotillas to the 
risks of potential environmental hazards. Over the past 
decade, there has been a proliferation of studies on energy 
project siting. Very few of these studies, however, have
9asked what factors determine the leadtimes necessary to 
locate and construct energy facilities.^
In 1976, Jopling^ developed a model of public resistance to 
the siting of nuclear power plants in the United States. 
Jopling identifies seven stages which he considered useful 
in assessing social resistance to the siting of nuclear 
energy facilities. They are public disclosure of the 
proposal, expert inquiry, information distribution, 
organisation of citizens, technical disagreement, 
uncompromising conflict and legal confrontation. Four case 
studies are used to develop generalisations about the stages 
involved in locating nuclear power plants.
Jopling's major conclusion is that the occurrence of 
political conflict over nuclear power plant siting at any 
one particular location can have important spillover effects 
onto other areas where plants are being located or are to be 
subsequently located. This implies that resistance to a 
particular nuclear plant in one locality is likely to lead 
to a similiar type of resistance at other areas toward the 
construction of nuclear plants. Indeed, disputes over the 
siting of a nuclear project at any one specific location 
can influence the outcomes of settlement at other regions.
6. For a comprehensive survey of the literature on energy 
plant siting, see Hamilton M.S., 'Power Plant Siting: A 
Literature Review', Natural Resources Journal, Vol.19, 
January, 1979.
7. Jopling R.G., et al., 'Forecasting Public Resistance to 
Technology; The Example of Nuclear Power Reactor 
Siting' in Bright J.R. and Schoeman M.E.F., A Guide to 
Practical Technology Forecasting, Prentice Hall, New 
Jersey, 1973.
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For example, regional interests may use tactics employed in 
previous siting disputes to try to influence bargaining 
outcomes.
The empirical evidence presented by Jopling, however, is 
limited to nuclear projects ultimately abandoned. There are 
a number of nuclear projects which have been withdrawn in 
Japan and there is an interest in considering the factors 
which caused their abandonment. The model developed by 
Jopling, however, appears to be of limited use in explaining 
the operation of a large number of nuclear projects in the 
United States and elsewhere and in predicting the varying 
degrees of difficulty in reaching settlements over the 
development of projects and the leadtimes involved in their 
placement.
In a seminal study, Lester compares leadtime experience in 
siting nuclear power plants in Japan, West Germany, Canada 
and the United States. Lester suggests that trends towards 
longer leadtimes can increase the cost of nuclear plants and 
reduce the economic competitiveness of nuclear power 
relative to other energy sources. Lester provides some 
measure of average total leadtimes, but these are rough in 
the sense that total leadtime is not clearly defined. Also 
he does not distinguish clearly different stages involved in 
siting nuclear plants. He clearly defines and provides data 
on a composite licensing-construction stage, but only 
provides rough estimates of public acceptance times. 
Lester does not highlight important behavioural patterns
8. Lester, R.K., op.cit., pp.3-5.
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for different stages of the siting process and the relative 
importance of these stages in contributing to increased 
leadtimes and variation in those leadtimes.
ILester provides a useful taxonomy of the host of complex and 
interrelated factors which appear to determine leadtimes. 
He concludes that trends towards increasing leadtimes are 
attributable to technical factors, such as expanded plant 
size, increased safety and environmental regulations and the 
growing involvement of local authorities in decision-making 
processes. Lester notes that his study does not attempt to 
measure the relative importance of these factors in 
explaining increased nuclear power plant leadtimes.
Since Lester's work, two studies have attempted to consider, 
explicitly, the factors influencing variation in leadtimes 
for energy projects in Japan. The first was by the present
Qauthor in 1980. The second was a study commissioned by the 
National Institute of Research and Advancement (NIRA) to the 
Japan Statistical Centre (JSC) which was completed under the 
direction of Tamura of Kobe University^ in 1981. Both 
these studies develop approaches for providing quantitative 
estimates of the important factors associated with leadtime 
behaviour in Japan; the former concentrating on public
9. Lesbirel S.H., Factors Influencing Long Term Uranium 
Demand in Japan with Special Reference to Nuclear 
Siting, unpublished Honours Thesis, Griffith 
University, Brisbane, 1980.
10. Nihon tökei sentaa, Enerugii shisetsu no richi o meguru 
funso no kenkyu [Research on_Di_sputes over the Siting 
of Power Plants in Japan], Sogo kenkyu kaihatsu kiko 
josei kenkyu: NRS-80-6, San arima, Tokyo, 1981.
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acceptance leadtimes and the latter focussing on total 
leadtimes.
Lesbirel correlates a public acceptance leadtime variable 
with a variety of explanatory variables which illustrate the 
social, economic and political characteristics of regions 
where nuclear power plants have been sited. The work 
concludes that the nature of the prefectural economy is the 
most important variable explaining variation in public 
acceptance times. Evidence is provided to support three 
major hypotheses. First, public acceptance appears to be 
longer in prefectures where the economic outlook is 
relatively optimistic. Second, settlements tend to be more 
difficult in areas which are relatively rural. Third, 
approval for additional reactors in areas where at least one 
reactor is operating appear to be shorter since regional 
economic development becomes dependent on continued plant 
construction.  ^^
The JSC study uses more sophisticated multiple regression 
techniques to provide estimates of the factors associated 
with variation in total leadtimes for both nuclear and 
fossi1-fuelled power projects in Japan. The JSC study 
concludes that design features, such as the type of power 
plant, and locational characteristics are the major 
determinants of leadtime variation. The results of the
11. Richard Suttmeier of Hamilton College in New York has 
carefully summarised Lesbirel's major conclusions in 
'The Japanese Nuclear Power Option: Technological
Promise and Social Limitations' in Morse R., ed., The 
Politics of Japan's Energy Strategy, Berkeley, 1981, 
Chapter 5.
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analysis support three major propositions. First, leadtimes 
for nuclear projects are longer than those for fossil- 
fuelled projects. Second, leadtimes tend to be shorter for 
siting reactors and boilers in areas which already have at 
least one operating. Third, total leadtime tends to be 
longer in situations where power plants are located on the 
boundaries of administrative units since the development and 
construction of those projects requires approval by more 
than one local authority.
The approaches developed by Lesbirel and the JSC contain a 
number of shortcomings and the results of both studies are 
ambiguous. There is no adequate or complete framework laid 
out in either study. Lesbirel attempts to conceptualise the 
siting process into supply and demand components; the supply 
side being the response of regional communities to 
delivering a power site and the demand side being the 
response of power companies to the development of projects 
on those sites. The study considers the factors influencing 
the community response to projects and the impact of that 
response on settlement times but does not consider the 
impact of promoter response on public acceptance outcomes. 
The JSC provides no explicit framework for the analysis and, 
like Lesbirel,only uses data which reflects the community 
response towards accepting energy projects. Both studies, 
by focussing solely on community responses and their impact 
on the variation in leadtimes, represent only partial 
analyses. The responses of promoters, such as private power 
companies and the national government, will presumably 
influence settlement outcomes. There is a need to extend
14
these analyses to provide a more complete assessment of the 
factors influencing the variation in settlement times 
required to develop energy facilities.
In both studies, there are important measurement and 
specification problems with the leadtime and explanatory 
variables. The public acceptance leadtime variable used in 
the Lesbirel analysis is not measured accurately. Public 
acceptance was considered in terms of rank order of 
difficulty based on information received in interviews. The 
JSC study, in contrast, uses a total leadtime variable. 
This leadtime variable is, however, regressed against 
explanatory variables which appear to only relate to the 
public acceptance stage. For example, the number of persons 
employed in the rural sector is likely to influence public 
acceptance negotiations, but it will not affect the speed at 
which energy projects are capable of being constructed. 
Furthermore, the values of many explanatory variables are 
taken at only one point in time. For instance, the variable 
indicating the number of persons employed in the fishing 
industry is taken for the year 1978. This will not be a 
suitable proxy measure for assessing the role played by 
fishing communities on leadtimes in the 1950s and 1960s 
when agreement for a majority of power projects was reached. 
There is, therefore, a need to specify a more accurate and 
complete model which will be of use in the assessment of the 
variation in electric power plant leadtimes in Japan.
An important analytic interest in this study is in an 
attempt to develop a framework which will be of more general 
use in the assessment of settlement times. While the study
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is limited to energy projects developed in Japan, the
approach developed should be of more general use in the
assessment of settlement times for projects of other kinds
in other countries. For example, the siting of mining
projects in minerals and fuel supplying countries should be
susceptible to the same kind of analysis. Whether one is
studying the siting of highly sophisticated technological
complexes, refuse tips or energy plants, the tools of
analysis developed in this thesis should assist in an
understanding of the determinants of delay in their 
placement.
A model of project delay
Cost-Benefit Analysis (CBA)1  ^ provides a useful theoretical 
entry point into the analysis of project delay. This 
technique specifies and then aggregates all relevant 
benefits and costs associated with the development of a 
project. It would then suggest that a project should go 
ahead on efficiency grounds providing a potential Pareto 
improvement (PPI) existed. In this context, a PPI exists if 
aggregate benefits exceed costs, or there is an expected 
economic surplus, and individuals disadvantaged by the 
project could, in principle, be compensated by those who 
were advantaged by it and still remain at least as well off
12. See Pearce R.W., Cost—Benefit Analysis, MacMillan, 
London, 1971, and Mishan E.J., Cost-Benefit Analysis: 
An Informal Introduction, Allen and Unwin, London, 
1972. For a survey of the literature on CBA, see
Prest A. and Turvey R., 'Cost-Benefit Analysis: A
Survey', Quarterly Journal of Economics, December 
1965, reprinted in Surveys of Economic Theory, Vol.3, 
MacMillan, London, 1966.
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as before the change. This approach would yield a 
theoretical ordering of project development; projects being 
scheduled in accordance with net benefit-cost ratios.
A standard treatment of CBA is useful in selecting high 
return projects independently of the requirement for the 
delivery of compensation necessary in reaching social and 
political settlements. It would measure costs and benefits 
in the same way no matter to whom they accrued and would 
assume that compensation mechanisms were only required to 
take into account costs and benefits measured in this way 
and were operating effectively. This implies, among other 
things, that settlement processes are instantaneous. 
Settlements do, however, take time, some taking longer than 
others, and an important objective of the study is to ask 
why there is substantial variation in settlement times.
The need for a settlement process arises out of a disparity 
between the value of a facility to project promoters and the 
value to regional communities being asked to accept those 
projects. If both interests have veto power over placement 
decisions, then a settlement will involve bargaining over an 
acceptable distribution of costs and benefits expected to 
accrue from project development. Promoters will be 
required to redistribute some of their expected gain to 
regional communities who expect to lose as a result of 
project development. Bargaining is essentially a 
distributive process which determines who gains from project 
development and the extent to which losers are compensated.
13. See Schelling T.C., The Strategy of Conflict, 
University, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1979.
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The development of projects confers costs and benefits on 
parties at various levels. These include constituencies at 
the national, state or prefectural and local levels of 
government. Those affected by project development may 
attempt to use economic markets, such as property rights 
markets, as well as political institutions to increase their 
share of the economic surplus expected to be generated from 
project development. A key objective of the study is to 
develop a more comprehensive cost-benefit framework which 
focusses on the social and political factors influencing the 
variation in settlement times. The framework emphasises the 
importance of the distribution of costs and benefits and, 
hence, the need to examine the adequacy of compensation 
mechanisms in assessing why public acceptance for certain 
projects takes longer than for others.
The importance of compensation in the bargaining process is 
that it is a major social mechanism for redistributing some 
of the benefits from promoters to regional communities so as 
to enable a settlement to be reached. Compensation in Japan 
is actually paid through institutional and political 
mechanisms aimed at facilitating the settlement process. 
These mechanisms take a variety of forms. First, there are 
institutional arrangements by which power companies pay 
compensation directly, either in monetary or non-monetary 
form, to interests, such as property right owners, who 
expect to be affected by a particular project. Second, 
there are mechanisms by which promoters, such as prefectural 
governments, can provide subsidies to local government in 
order to facilitate settlements. Third, there are
18
arrangements by which the national community is taxed on the 
consumption of electricity and funds so derived are 
redirected to local communities to compensate for losses 
expected to be incurred as a result of project 
development.^
The work of Bacow suggests that, although both developers 
and opponents of economic projects can gain from negotiating 
compensation arrangements, such arrangements are rarely 
observed in practice. He argues that compensation 
agreements are rare because developers find it difficult to 
identify interests whose consent to projects requires 
compensation; many of the adverse consequences of projects, 
such as health effects, are not easily compensatable; and, 
in most cases, it is impossible to bind parties to 
agreements that are negotiated. Bacow, therefore, suggests 
that compensation mechanisms do not operate effectively. 
The observed variability in times required to reach 
settlements over the development of ene'rgy projects in Japan 
suggests, however, that compensation mechanisms operate more 
or less effectively in some circumstances than in others. 
An important aim is to examine the nature of compensation 
mechanisms and the social and political factors which impede
14. See Chapter 2 for a more detailed explanation ofthe 
nature of institutionalised compensation arrangements 
in Japan.
15. See Bacow L.C., 'Creating Markets for Development
Externalities', MIT Energy Laboratory Working Paper, 
MIT-EL 80-030WP, July 1980, and Bacow L.C. and 
Sanderson D.R., 'Facility Siting and Compensation: A
Handbook for Communities and Developers, MIT Energy 
Laboratory Working Paper, MIT-EL 80-037WP, September 
1980.
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or facilitate their use in settlement processes necessary to 
construct energy projects.
In standard CBA, the calculation of the economic surplus 
expected to be generated by a given project assumes that 
costs and benefits are treated and measured in the same way 
no matter to whom they accrue. Costs and benefits may, 
however, be evaluated differently in different contexts. 
Therefore, an understanding of how costs and benefits are 
measured and evaluated by promoters and regional communities 
will be important in determining the true economic surplus 
and the disparity in the value of projects to promoters and 
regional communities.^
The economic surplus which is available to be redistributed
in order to gain approval for project development and the
structure of the distribution of costs and benefits on
different interests will shape the broad bargaining
environment within which the settlement process takes place. 
That environment may act as a positive or negative catalyst
in the settlement process. Compensation mechanisms are
likely to operate more effectively in situations where there
is a large economic surplus available for redistribution and
where the mechanisms are effectively tuned to the structure
of compensation claims consequent upon a particular project
16. A numerical example comparing two projects A and B may 
help to illustrate this point. Assume that promoters 
of both projects value the net discounted benefits to 
be $20. Now suppose that, for some reason, the 
community being asked to accept project A weighs the 
costs at $15 which is 1.5 times greater than the costs 
of $10 assessed by the community being persuaded to 
accept project B. The economic surplus expected from 
project B will be $10 whereas the economic surplus 
anticipated from project A will only be $5.
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development. There is considerable interest in attempting to 
identify the distributional effects which are likely to 
shape the bargaining environment and to consider their 
impact on settlement times.
The structure of the bargaining environment within which
settlements are negotiated will be determined jointly by the
value that regional communities and project promoters place
on accepting and developing projects. A critical factor
influencing the importance attached to projects will be an
assessment and evaluation of the costs involved in the
implementation of projects compared with the costs of not
going ahead with those projects. The supply of project sites
will be influenced by an evaluation of costs and benefits by
regional communities and groups comprising those communities
involved in accepting energy power plants. The demand for
project sites will be affected by the value that power plant
promoters, such as private power companies and the national
government, place upon the development of energy projects.
The disparity between the value of projects to regional
communities and the value to project promoters will shape
the bargaining environment in a way which either facilitates
or impedes a settlement. For instance, approval may be
relatively quick in situations where both promoters and 
regional communities assess the value of a particular
project to be relatively high.
The distributional effects of projects will influence the 
value that is placed on the costs and benefits expected to 
accrue as a result of project developments. These effects 
will cause interests participant to the settlement to
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evaluate costs and benefits differently and not necessarily
in a similar way as measured in standard CBA. The
distributional influences, as defined in the thesis include,
on the supply side: expectations about regional social and
economic opportunities, the risks involved in different
power plants, opportunities- in the rural sector, the extent
of leftist political party representation and social
attitudes toward preservation of the environment and, on the 
demand side: expected electricity shortages.
The supply of project sites will be influenced, among other 
things, by the value that regional communities attach to the 
preservation of the prevailing state of the natural 
environment as well as the state of social and economic 
activity. The theory of environmental economics'1 provides 
a useful starting point for the analysis of distributional 
effects of energy projects and their impact on settlement 
times. It suggests that economic activity with potentially 
hazardous effects is generally found to be located in areas 
where social and economic opportunities, such as might be 
measured by the level of incomes, are relatively low. It 
assumes that environmental quality is a normal good, in the 
economic sense, so that less of that good is demanded the 
lower the level of social and economic opportunities. Less 
importance is attached to environmental costs of projects in 
areas where economic opportunities are low and more weight 
is given to the expansion of income opportunities arising
17. Baumol W. and Oates W., The Theory of Environmental 
Policy: Externalities, Public Outlays and Environmental 
Policy, Prentice-Hall, Inc., New Jersey, 1975, 
Chapter 13.
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out of project development. Consequently, it might be 
expected that settlement times would be relatively shorter 
in these areas.
The structure of distributional effects may not only be a 
function of the prevailing levels of social and economic 
opportunities. Other factors, such as expectations 
regarding future social and economic opportunities, 
differential effects on the various communities comprising 
the regional polity, the risk involved in different types of 
projects, the ideological orientation of regional 
communities and prevailing social attitudes toward 
preserving the environment, may influence the way in which 
communities evaluate the costs and benefits of projects and, 
therefore, have an impact on settlement times.
The importance attached to the environment may also be 
affected by expectations about social and economic 
opportunities. The proposition that energy projects are more 
readily located in areas where opportunities are relatively 
low assumes that expectations about those opportunities are 
similar in all such areas. However, it is also likely that, 
other things being equal, communities would receive power 
stations with less enthusiasm in areas where opportunities 
are expected to grow rapidly independently of project 
development. Communities may argue that there is no need to 
burden themselves with additional environmental bads 
associated with the development of projects. Consequently, 
there may be more resistance to the siting of power
stations.
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There is, however, an alternative hypothesis that settlement 
times may be shorter in areas where social and economic 
opportunities are expected to rise rapidly. Such areas may 
be undergoing rapid economic growth and indeed may even be 
experiencing a boom in economic activity. Having 
experienced the benefits of growth, these communities may 
wish to see further expansion of rapid development. Given 
the prominence of benefits associated with economic growth, 
there may be a lag in anticipating any impairment of the 
environment associated with project development. An 
important issue addressed in this thesis is the extent to 
which projects are more or less easily accepted in areas 
undergoing rapid economic development.
Project implementation may also affect various community 
sectors in different ways. Site availability for large- 
scale nuclear and fossi1-fue11ed plants in Japan is 
generally limited to coastal areas. In these areas, rural 
interest groups have vested property rights which need to be 
exchanged in order to site energy facilities. These 
interest groups tend to oppose project development, 
sometimes adamantly. Rural interests see themselves 
incurring large costs, such as possible damage to primary 
productive capacity. At the same time, they tend to place 
little emphasis on the benefits of projects, such as the 
expansion of employment opportunities in the non-rural 
sector. The role of the rural sector and whether it inhibits 
energy facility siting is an important interest.
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The risk involved in nuclear or fossil-fuelled projects may 
be weighed differently by regional communities. Nuclear 
settlement times would be expected to be longer than 
comparable times for the siting of fossil-fuelled plants, 
because of the nature of nuclear technology and historical 
experience with the wartime use of nuclear technology in 
Japan. The importance of perceptions of risk as an element 
influencing the relative ease or difficulty in reaching 
settlements deserves exploration.
The perceived riskiness of projects may also depend on the 
degree of familiarity with power plant technologies. Power 
plants in Japan are concentrated in certain localities 
because of a general land scarcity and strong competing uses 
for that land. In most cases, more than one plant is 
located at any given site. The extent to which familiarity 
of project technologies affects resistance in the siting of 
plants in areas which already have one or more existing 
plants is of interest.
The structure of political party representation in regional 
communities may influence the relative ease or difficulty in 
winning agreement to locate and construct energy power 
plants. Leftist political parties in Japan, such as the 
Japanese Communist Party (JCP) and the Japanese Socialist 
Party (JSP) generally place a high weight on the 
environmental risk associated with nuclear projects and, in 
many cases, develop resistance movements to the siting of
18. For a theoretical analysis of risk, see Lowrance W., Of 
Acceptable Risk: Science and the Determination of
Safety, William Kaufmann Inc., Los Altos, 1970.
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those facilities. The JCP and the JSP has an important 
support base in the coal industry and there appears to be 
less leftist resistance to the development of fossil-fuelled 
projects. The extent to which political and ideological 
conflict between leftists and conservative elements is 
important in the determination of settlement outcomes for 
both nuclear and fossil-fuelled power plants is an issue to 
be examined.
Broad community attitudes toward the preservation of the 
environment and changes in those attitudes may also affect 
settlement times. Settlement times were relatively short in 
the high growth period but showed steep increases from the 
early 1970s. The community in Japan generally placed less 
emphasis on protecting the environment in the rapid economic 
growth period. From the late 1960s and early 1970s, there 
emerged a significant number of pollution problems and these 
problems heightened the awareness of the community in Japan 
toward the adverse effects of economic growth. The 
relationship between attitudinal changes and trends and 
increasing settlement times needs consideration.
The demand for project sites will be influenced by the 
importance promoters attach to power plants. Promoters, 
whether private power companies or national governments, are 
generally concerned with equilibrating supply and demand in 
electricity markets. It is likely that promoters would 
place a relatively high value on projects in situations 
where the failure to supplement existing capacity was 
expected to lead to electricity shortages. Where, for this 
or for other reasons, demand for new sites is strong,
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promoters could be more prepared to compensate regional 
communities in order to obtain their approval for project 
execution. Consequently, settlement times will be shorter. 
The relationship between expected electricity shortages and 
the speed at which settlements can be reached is a critical 
issue to be addressed.
The structure of the distribution of costs and benefits, or 
the way regional communities and project promoters evaluate 
the costs and benefits of projects, is likely to influence 
the speed at which settlements can be negotiated. An 
analysis of the distributional effects, as outlined above, 
will improve the understanding of the types of bargaining 
environments which are likely to be more or less conducive 
to reaching agreements over the construction of energy 
facilities. For example, compensation mechanisms may work 
more effectively in situations where promoters expect large 
electricity shortages and where communities evaluate the 
costs, including risk, associated with projects to be 
relatively low. Under these circumstances, there would be a 
larger economic surplus which could be available for 
redistribution from power plant promoters to regional 
communities.
It is useful to provide a measure of the importance of these 
distributional influences on the variation in settlement 
times required to reach agreement over the construction of 
energy projects. Regression methods help to model and 
quantify these influences which are believed to be important 
in the determination of settlement times. It is possible to 
regress a settlement leadtime variable on a number of
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explanatory variables which measure social and economic 
opportunities and promoter needs in situations where 
settlements have been reached. For example, it is possible 
to regress on leadtime, a variable indicating the share of 
persons employed in primary industry as a proportion of 
total persons employed in a particular region. This 
variable might be used as a proxy measure of employment 
opportunities in the rural sector. It might be expected 
that settlements would take longer in areas where the 
primary sector is an important source of employment in the 
regional economy. Under these circumstances, rural 
interests may place less weight on the expansion of non- 
rural employment opportunities arising out of project 
development and give more weight to the potential adverse 
effects on rural production due to the construction of 
proj ects.
The regression analysis provides a way of testing hypotheses
relating to the impact of these distributional influences on
settlement times. It indicates the proportion of variation 
in approval times explained by the set of explanatory
variables. The analysis allows for an assessment of the
importance of distributional influences in the determination
of settlement times and the overall statistical significance
of models aimed at explaining why agreement for some
projects takes longer than for others. A necessary interest
in the thesis is considering the extent to'which general
factors, as opposed to site-specific factors, can be
identified and used in the prediction of settlement times.
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The settlement process takes time. Expectations about the 
distribution of costs and benefits prior to the commencement 
of the process as well as expectations during the course of 
settlement are likely to be important in determining the 
speed of settlement. Interests involved in the settlement
will assess and respond to the distribution of costs and
\benefits expected to accrue from the project development at
a point in time when they are asked to accept a project. In
the course of settlement, the expectations of those
interests may change. A model can be set up to consider the
responses of affected parties at the beginning of the
settlement process as well as during the course of
settlement and the effect on approval times. A critical 
question that the thesis addresses is the degree to which it
is possible to assess settlement times given information
about expectations prior to or at the beginning of the
process and the extent to which the assessment of approval
times requires the monitoring of expectations during the
course of settlement.
The degree of difficulty in reaching settlements will be a
function of distributional factors, such as the importance
attached to environmental quality and the need to supplement
existing energy capacity, which can be quantified as well as
other factors which are not capable of being quantified.
The regression analysis provides a way of identifying areas
where distributional factors appear to be good predictors of
delay and areas where they do not. It, therefore, provides
a critical entry point into the analysis of the relative 
importance of other factors, such as uncertainty, the
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allocation and use of political bargaining power, strategies 
employed by participants in the settlement process and 
revised expectations, which are among the other determinants 
of project approval times. These factors are likely to 
facilitate or impede the use of compensation mechanisms and, 
therefore, influence the speed of settlement in a way which 
may not be fully or even partially capturable in any 
quantitative analysis. These factors are not easily 
susceptible to statistical measurement and can only be 
readily explored through detailed case history studies.
Even if the distribution of costs and benefits are fully 
taken into account, expected costs and benefits may not be 
known with certainty. Uncertainty as to the expected value 
of projects may influence the response of parties who are 
required to give their approval for project implementation. 
Promoters, for example, may not be willing to compensate 
regional communities in situations where there is 
uncertainty as to expected electricity demand increases and 
the costs of constructing projects. They may prefer to 
delay intentionally projects or attempt to develop 
alternative projects which have a more certain value. An 
important question the study seeks to address is the extent 
to which uncertainty inhibits settlements over the 
development of energy projects.
The variation in settlement times may not be fully explained 
by the structure of distributional effects even if account 
is taken of the effect of uncertainty. The spread of costs 
and benefits across interest groups needs careful analysis. 
Rural interest groups, such as fishing and farming co-
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o p e r a t i v e s ,  p o s s e s s  p r o p e r t y  r i g h t s  and,  t h e r e f o r e ,  a 
d i s p r o p o r t i o n a t e  i n f l u e n c e  i n  p o l i t i c a l  and  e c o n o m i c  
b a r g a i n in g  power r e l a t i v e  to  o th e r  r e g io n a l  i n t e r e s t s .  The 
i d e n t i f i c a t i o n  of powerful  i n t e r e s t  groups and the  a n a l y s i s  
o f  f a c t o r s  which d e t e r m i n e  t h e i r  b a r g a i n i n g  c a p a c i t y  i s  
e s s e n t i a l  in  making a s s e s s m e n t s  of  l i k e l y  s e t t l e m e n t  
outcomes.
The e f f e c t i v e n e s s  of  c o m p e n s a t i o n  mechanisms  w i l l  a l s o  be 
in f lu en ced  by the s k i l l  wi th  which v a r ious  i n t e r e s t s ,  e i t h e r  
f o r  or  a g a i n s t  s i t i n g  p r o p o s a l s ,  can s u c c e s s f u l l y  employ 
s t r a t e g i e s  a imed  a t  i n f l u e n c i n g  s e t t l e m e n t  o u t c o m e s .  
Promoters  and organ i sed  r e s i s t a n c e  movements in Japan employ 
a v a r i e t y  of  s t r a t e g i e s  t o  c r e a t e ,  p r e v e n t ,  and d i s r u p t  
nece ssa ry  b a rg a in in g  over compensat ion ar rangements  and the 
t r a n s f e r  of p ro p e r ty  r i g h t s .  These s t r a t e g i e s  a re  economic,  
p o l i t i c a l ,  t e c h n i c a l  and i n f o r m a t io n a l  in c h a r a c t e r .  I t  i s  
i n t e r e s t i n g  and impor tan t  to  exp lo re  the na tu re  and success  
of  v a r io u s  b a rg a in in g  s t r a t e g i e s  and the impact  they  have on 
the speed of the s e t t l e m e n t  p rocess .
The im por tan t  pa ram e te r s  i n f l u e n c i n g  ba rg a in in g  outcomes may 
not remain co n s tan t  dur ing  the s e t t l e m e n t  p rocess  and t h i s  
may i n j e c t  i n s t a b i l i t i e s  i n to  the  b a r g a in in g  p ro ces s .  For 
e x a m p l e ,  c h a n g i n g  e x p e c t a t i o n s  a b o u t  e n e r g y  p o l i c y  
p r i o r i t i e s  or  e l e c t r i c i t y  demand g r o w t h ,  c o n s e q u e n t  upon 
some e x t e r n a l  e v e n t ,  may i n c r e a s e  th e  v a l u e  of  p r o j e c t s  t o  
p r o j e c t  p r o m o t e r s  and,  h e n ce ,  enhance  t h e i r  a b i l i t y  to  
c o m p e n s a t e  a d e q u a t e l y  r e g i o n a l  i n t e r e s t  g r o u p s .  An 
i m p o r t a n t  e l e m e n t  i n  t h e  s t u d y  i s  c o n s i d e r a t i o n  o f  t h e  
s t a b i l i t y  o f  p r i o r i t i e s  and p r e f e r e n c e s  d u r i n g  t h e
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settlement process and the way in which this affects the 
management of compensation.
The argument in outline
Chapter 2 sets the background to understanding the siting 
process in Japan. It describes the main interests and steps 
involved in planning, public acceptance, licensing and 
constructing power plants and provides measures of average 
leadtimes and variation in leadtimes required for each stage 
of project development for ninety plants in Japan. In this 
chapter, a way of defining accurately the major sources of 
unpredictability in power plant leadtimes is developed.
Chapter 3 presents more fully the framework which is used to 
analyse settlement times. A more comprehensive cost-benefit 
approach focussing on the social and political factors is 
outlined. The analysis stresses the importance of the 
distribution of costs and benefits and, hence, the need to 
examine the effectiveness of compensation mechanisms in 
understanding why some projects take longer or shorter than 
average times to implement. It demonstrates the possibility 
of quantifying the importance of distributional influences, 
and analysing the relative importance of other factors, such 
as the allocation and use of political power and changing 
expectations, in the determination of settlement times.
Chapters 4 to 8 comprise the empirical body of the thesis. 
They present quantitative results of the regression analysis 
and qualitative findings of the case studies. Chapter 4 
presents the results of the quantitative analysis of
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distributional influences on the determination of settlement 
times. It examines the relationship between expectations 
about regional social and economic opportunities, the size 
of the rural sector, the strength of leftist political 
parties, the risks involved in different types of power 
plants and social attitudes toward the preservation of the 
environment and expected electricity, shortages and the time 
required to reach agreement over the implementation of power 
plants in Japan. This chapter examines the extent to which 
the model developed is useful in the assessment of 
settlement times and details qualifications which need to be 
made to quantitiative analysis. The quantitative analysis 
sets a context for the case studies which incorporate a 
range of other influences, such as the allocation and use of 
political power, the skill with which strategies are 
employed, changing expectations and uncertainty, which are 
not readily quantifiable, yet may also be important in 
determining the speed at which settlements can be reached.
The subsequent four chapters present detailed case histories 
of bargaining over the construction of electric power plants 
in Japan and analyse why these settlements took longer or 
shorter than average settlement times. Chapter 5 examines a 
project which was delayed and ultimately abandoned because 
promoters could not compensate adequately powerful regional 
interests groups which expected to be adversely affected by 
the development of the project. Chapter 6 considers the 
importance of the social value of projects in allowing 
project promoters and the prefectural political organisation 
to negotiate a settlement quickly and effectively with
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r e g i o n a l  i n t e r e s t s .  C h a p te r  7 a n a l y s e s  t h e  im p a c t  of  
r e v i s e d  e n e r g y  p o l i c y  p r i o r i t i e s  and how t h e  n a t i o n a l  
go v e rn m en t  r e s p o n d e d  to  t h e s e  changes  in  f a c i l i t a t i n g  a 
s e t t l e m e n t  b e t w e e n  a power company and r e g i o n a l  i n t e r e s t s  
which opposed  t h e  d ev e l o p m e n t  of  t h e p r o j e c t .  C h a p t e r  8 
h i g h l i g h t s  the  impact  of in c re a s in g  p r o j e c t  c o s t s  and how a 
p r o j e c t  d e v e l o p e r  i n t e n t i o n a l l y  d e l a y e d  r e a c h i n g  an 
agreement  wi th  a r e g io n a l  e l e c t o r a t e .
The c o n c l u d i n g  c h a p t e r  e x a m i n e s  t h e  d e g r e e  t o  w h i c h  
s e t t l e m e n t  t i m e s  a r e  p r e d i c t a b l e  and o u t l i n e s  t h e  
q u a l i f i c a t i o n s  w h i c h  n e e d  t o  be  made t o  t h e  u s e  o f  
q u a n t i t a t i v e  a n a l y s i s  in the  assessment  of s e t t l e m e n t  t imes .  
This chap te r  p r e s e n t s  a summary of the  major f in d in g s  of  the 
study and co ns id e r s  the i m p l i c a t i o n s  of t hese  f i n d in gs  for  
t h o s e  i n t e r e s t e d  in  making a s s e s s m e n t s  of  power p l a n t  
s e t t l e m e n t  t i m e s .  I t  c o n c e n t r a t e s  on how t h e  a p p r o a c h  
developed in the  t h e s i s  i s  of  more g ene ra l  use in a s s e s s i n g  
d e l a y  in  r e a c h i n g  s o c i a l  and p o l i t i c a l  s e t t l e m e n t s  and 
sugges t s  improvements and some ways in which f u tu r e  r e s e a r c h  
might be developed.
2
THE PROCESS OF ENERGY FACILITY SITING
The placement of power stations involves a planning process 
which involves electricity supply and demand forecasting and 
site selection; and an implementation process which involves 
public acceptance, licensing and construction. Planning 
involves the selection of minimum cost sites, at least from 
a power company's perspective, when electricity supply- 
demand analyses suggest the need for additional capacity. 
Public acceptance of development of the facility at a 
particular location is then required. The public acceptance 
process involves settlement between the project promoters 
and the community in which the project is to be located. 
This settlement process is characterised by bargaining 
between and among the promoters and the regional communities 
over the distribution of costs and benefits expected to 
accrue from project development. Licensing involves the 
settlement of finer points, such as regulation by government 
covering expected risks and benefits of developing 
facilities and, in many cases, the completion of actual 
negotiations over the transfer of property rights and 
compensation arrangements. In the construction phase, 
private companies try to minimise the cost of constructing 
facilities, subject to manpower, technical and engineering 
constraints.
It is possible to identify and define starting and finishing 
points for each stage of project implementation. The
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average times and variation in those times for these stages 
can be measured to provide a way of assessing accurately the 
stage of project development which contributes most 
significantly to variation in total leadtimes. Judgements 
can then be made about the major source of unpredictability 
in assessing the leadtimes to locate and construct energy 
power plants.
Evidence is provided to support the proposition that the 
confidence in the assessment of leadtimes increases 
substantially after public acceptance has been negotiated. 
Energy project planners in Japan face increasingly long and 
highly variable leadtimes in the siting of power projects. 
The major source of unpredictability stems from the 
inability to assess accurately the outcome of bargaining 
processes between and among promoters and regional 
communities over the construction of power projects. The 
back end of the siting process, which involves licensing and 
construction, is less subject to political processes and 
does not appear to be a noticeable contributor to thie 
difficulties in energy project leadtime assessment.
Major steps in energy facility siting
In principle, it is possible to identify starting and 
finishing points for each stage of project development, 
which may be regarded as decision or veto points. They 
represent major decisions that have to be made by relevant 
participants to enable a process to commence or continue
2.
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for including a particular location in a pool of candidate 
sites:
. the existence of flat and stable terrain;
. the availability of cooling water;
. a relatively low population density;
. accessability to transportation routes; and
2. proximity to load centres.
An important feature of the siting process in Japan is that 
appropriate sites are generally only found in the coastal 
regions. This is because mountainous inland areas offer 
little in the way of flat and stable terrain, and the 
shallow inland rivers cannot provide sufficient cooling 
water. Furthermore, location in non-coastal regions is 
generally impractical because of difficulties in fuel 
loading and transporting large components necessary for 
construction. In this respect Japan differs from the 
United States and some East and West European countries, 
where both nuclear and fossi1-fue1led power plants are 
located inland. ^
2. OECD., Siting of Nuclear Facilities - Proceedings of a 
Symposium, 9-12 December 1974, IAEA., Vienna, 1975, 
Toyoda M., Genshiryoku hatsuden gijutsu dokuhon [All 
You Need to Know About Nuclear Power], Oomusha, Tokyo, 
1976, pp.9-12 and Information received from the Tokyo 
Electric Power Company, 1982.
3. The only exception to this rule is to be found in 
Hokkaido where some coal-fired plants are located 
inland. This reflects the existence of coal deposits 
in Hokkaido and a preference for locating some plants 
as close as possible to those deposits. Interviews 
with personnel in the Hokkaido Electric Power Company, 
1983.
See Nihon Genshiryoku sangyo kaigi, Genshiryoku 
hatsuden sho-ranhyo [Japan's Nuclear Power Plants], 
Nihon genshiryoku sangyo kaigi, Tokyo, 1978, pp.13-16.
4 .
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A second feature of energy plant siting in Japan is the 
relatively high concentration of plants at any one given 
site. Even though Japan has a longer coastline than the 
United States, site availability is limited because of 
competing land uses in coastal areas, so that Japanese 
power companies tend to concentrate plants more than is the 
case in other countries. For example, whereas the highest 
concentration of plants in England and other European 
countries appears to be around three to four plants per 
site, it is not uncommon for Japanese power companies to 
locate as many as eight plants at a single site. Map2.1 
illustrates the coastal location of major power plants in 
Japan and gives some indication of the degree of 
concentration of plants.
A major factor motivating a power company to locate
additional capacity is its expected electricity supply and
demand balance. Power companies make continual predictions
of electricity demand, and capacity plans are based
initially on these forecasts. To this forecast demand, a
risk component is added to cover unexpected shortages
arising from plant malfunctions and unanticipated increases
in electricity demand. On the supply side, present
installed capacity and capacity that will have to be shut
£down during the forecast period are calculated. When
5. ibid.
Shin denki jigyö koza henshu iinkai, Denryoku keito 
keikaku to unyo [Planning and Management of Electrical 
Systems], Denryoku shinposha, Tokyo, 1980, pp.63-77.
6 .
MAP 2.1
MAJOR ENERGY FACILITIES IN JAPAN
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supply and demand forecasts indicate the need for 
additional capacity, a power company selects a site from its 
pool of candidate sites.
The final choice of a site from the current pool involves
selection of a minimum cost site by attaching, implicitly or
7explicitly, relative weightings to site selection criteria. 
For example, where the characteristics of two candidate 
sites are similar except for their relative proximity to 
load centres, the site closest to those centres will be 
preferred because of the lower cost of constructing 
transmission lines.
Public acceptance
The site selection process culminates in a decision by the 
company to place a power plant at a particular location. 
This decision can come in a variety of forms and generally 
includes:
. a decision at an internal board of directors 
meeting;
. a declaration of intent by a power company to a 
regional government;
. an application for a preliminary investigation 
permit;
7. See Jopling D.G., 'Plant Site Evaluation Using 
Numerical Ratings', Power Engineering, March 1974, 
pp.56-59 and Amano H., Dengen richi keikaku an sakusei 
shuho no kaihatsu [Development of a Planning Model for 
Power Plant_Siting] , Kenkyu hokoku: 577004, Denryoku 
chu5 kenkyüjö, Tokyo, October 1977.
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the appearance of a particular location in a power
Qcompany's construction plan; 
an invitation by a regional government.^
These events usually indicate that a particular location has 
been selected and that an attempt will be made to reach 
agreement with the relevant electorate to site a power plant 
there.^
The period from a power company's decision to build an 
energy facility to the issue of Denchöshin approval may be 
regarded as the public acceptance stage. Public acceptance 
involves reaching broad agreement on the proposed 
development. More specifically, public acceptance of a 
project at a particular site involves settlement between the 
project promoters and the community in which the project is 
to be located, and this is achieved through a process of 
negotiation between and among the promoters and the regional
I
communities. These negotiations are concerned with how the 
benefits of project development will be shared. Bargaining 
occurs between various interests on national, prefectural 
and local constituency levels and involves the use or
8. Electric power companies are required by law to submit 
details of construction plans to the Ministry of 
International Trade and Industry (MITI) on an annual 
basis.
9. An invitation by a regional government generally 
indicates that a power company has discussed the 
proposal with local authorities and has decided to 
locate a plant in that locality. Interviews with local 
government officials and power company personnel, 1982.
10. ibid.
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attempted use of economic markets, such as electricity and 
property rights markets, and political institutions.^
Power company project proposals are considered by the
_  i n _Denchoshin Council. The significance of Denchoshin
approval is that agreement has been reached on the necessity 
for the construction of the power plant to meet expected 
electricity demand increases, and that there is broad 
consent to the proposal at the regional level. Proposals 
can then proceed to the licensing stage.
An important criterion for Denchoshin approval is agreement
between the national government and power companies on
project development. From the perspective of the supply and
demand of electricity, Japan is divided into eastern,
13central and western spheres. The national government is 
concerned with expanding capacity to meet expected 
electricity demand increases in these broad regional 
spheres, in contrast to power companies which are concerned 
with the supply of electricity to more narrowly defined 
power company electricity spheres. Map2.2 illustrates 
regional and power company electricity spheres in Japan. 
Projects can therefore be delayed if there are differences 
between regional and power company requirements for 
additional capacity.
11. This argument is developed more fully in Chapter 3.
12. The Denchoshin Council, located in the Economic 
Planning Agency (EPA), is chaired by the Prime Minister 
and consists of relevant ministers, bureaucrates, 
businessmen and academics.
13. These spheres each consist of three electric power 
companies which possess monopoly rights with respect to 
the supply of electricity to those respective spheres.
MAP 2.2
ELECTRICITY SPHERES IN JAPAN
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The agreement by both prefectural and relevant local
governments is also a necessary requirement for Denchoshin 
14approval. This is conditioned by negotiations over
property right transfer and community compensation 
arrangements and by the degree of broad regional 
acquiescence in and resistance to proposals.
Denchoshin approval does not require the completion of
formal transfer arrangements over the relinquishment of
property rights. It only requires regional authorities to
make political judgements that there are good prospects for
the eventual settlement of such a r r a n g e m e n t s . ^
Furthermore, there are no explicit criteria requiring
community compensation arrangements to be finalised before
the issue of the permit. Acceptance by local authorities
may, however, be influenced by the demands of property right
owners and communities for compensation to be paid in return
17for their acceptance of the proposal.
I
A salient feature of the settlement process in Japan is the 
existence of institutionalised arrangements which provide a
14. Prefectural governors, in approving proposals for 
submission to Denchoshin, seek the responses of local 
mayors and village headmen to proposed power stations.
15. In many cases, more than one local mayor or village 
headmen will be required to give consent to proposals 
for power plants. Power plants are proposed, in some 
circumstances, on boundaries of administrative units. 
In other areas, property rights owners reside in 
neighbouring administrative units. Under these 
circumstances, agreement by heads of surrounding 
cities, towns and villages will also be required for 
Denchoshin approval.
16. Information received from MITI, 1982.
17. Information received from EPA, 1982, and local 
government officials, 1983.
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framework for bargaining between power companies and 
regional communities over the transfer of property rights 
and the payment of compensation to regional communities. 
The first is contained in Dengen kaihatsu to ni tomonau 
sonshitsu hosho kijun [Compensation Standards Accompanying 
Electric Power Development, hereafter referred to as 
Compensation Standards]. The second is contained in Dengen 
sanpo [Three Electric Power Development Laws, hereafter 
referred to as Three Laws]. The third are subsidies 
provided by the national and prefectural governments to 
power companies and local governments.
The Compensation Standards were established in 1963 by the 
Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI) amidst 
continued difficulty over the transfer of property rights 
necessary for the construction of hydro-electric and fossil- 
fuelled power plants. Table 2.2 presents a summary of the 
main aspects of the Compensation Standards. Their objective 
is to facilitate electric power development by standardising 
procedures and criteria for bargaining processes involved in 
the sale of property rights and community compensation 
arrangements. They provide institutional mechanisms by 
which power companies are required to provide property right 
owners with monetary compensation based on certain criteria,
18. The Compensation Standard^ for_ electric power 
facilities are based on the Kokyo yochi no shutoku ni 
tomonau sonshitsu hosho kijun [Compensation Standards 
Accompanying the Ac_qu i_s i t i on o f Publ ic Lands]. See 
Kobayashi T. ed., Kokyo_yo chi no shutoku ni tomonau 
sonshitsu hosho kijun yoko no kaisetsu [Compensation 
Standards Accompanying the Acquisition of Public 
Lands], Kindai tosho kabushiki gaisha, Tokyo, 1983 for 
a more detailed exposition of these Compensation 
Standards.
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and they also allow flexibility if required, in the 
provision of community compensation. These standardised 
procedures and criteria are also applicable to siting of 
nuclear power and associated fuel cycle facilities.
Table2.3 contains a digest of the Three Laws, which were
established by MITI in 1974 against a background in the
early 1970s of expected electricity supply shortages and the
need to increase the availability of sites for large-scale
power plants. They act as a mechanism for redistributing
some of the benefits of project development, in the form of
social overhead capital, from the national community to
1 9regional communities which accept projects. Although
power companies are taxed on the sale of electricity, the 
national community ultimately bears the burden in the form 
of higher electricity prices.
The third major type of compensation is that provided by 
national and prefectural governments in the form of 
subsidies to power companies and local governments. These 
subsidies, act in a way similar to the Compensation 
Standards and the Three Laws and provide a mechanism for 
redistributing some of the gains of project development from 
government to affected parties in order to facilitate the 
settlement process. They may take a variety of forms, such 
as the payment of funds to power companies to develop
19. See Tsusho sangyo sho and Shigen enerugii cho, Dengen 
sanpo kankei horei shu,[A Collection of Laws Governing 
the Application of the Three Laws], Tsusho sangyo sho 
and Shigen_ enerugii cho, Tokyo,_ 1982, and Shigen 
enerugii cho Dengen sanpo no gaiyo, [An Outline of the 
Three Laws] Shigen enerugii cho, Tokyo, 1982.
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certain types of projects or payment to local governments to
20assist in local development policies.
Licensing
The period from Denchoshin approval to the issue of the 
Construction Planning Permit may be regarded as the 
licensing stage of project development. This stage involves 
a regulatory process whereby national and prefectural 
government are required to issue permits and licenses. 
Regulation is in the form of the government's use of its 
licensing power to strike an acceptable balance between the 
interests of the national community in terms of the benefits 
of increased electricity supply and the interests of 
regional electorates in terms of the risks of developing 
that capacity.
The Construction Planning Permit is important because it 
signifies that agreements on property right transfer 
arrangements have been completed and that all relevant 
permits and licences have been issued. Construction
proper can then commence. Dench5shin approval, as noted 
earlier, requires only broad agreement on the transfer of 
property rights, but negotiations must be finalised before 
the issue of the Construction Planning Permit. In many 
cases, negotiations continue throughout the licensing stage, 
but they are generally concerned with finer points, such as 
the exact amount of compensation to be paid, or negotiations
20. Information received from MITI, 1982.
21 . ibid.
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with additional demands, such as compensation for the use 
of port facilities.^
There is thus considerable scope for the public acceptance
Iprocess to continue into the licensing stage, and the 
regulatory process of licensing is likely to be influenced 
politically in circumstances where negotiations over 
property rights or community compensation arrangements are 
not yet finalised. For example, the Ministry of 
Agriculture, Fisheries and Forestry may be unable, to issue 
certain permits if negotiations over fishing rights are 
incomplete. Furthermore prefectural governments may be 
reluctant to grant certain licenses if political opposition 
still exists at the local level.
Some fifty to sixty permits and licences are usually 
required during the licensing stage. Some of these, such as 
permits relating to the use of roads and railway facilities, 
will be required in all circumstances, irrespective of 
location or type of power plant. The need for other 
licences depends largely on site-specific characterisitics 
and on the type of power plant proposed. The natural 
environment constitues an important site-specific factor. 
For example, if a power plant is proposed in or near a 
national park the power company will have to obtain permits 
under the National Park Law. Similarly, if a power company
22. An example of this is where power companies wish to use 
port facilities which fishing co-operatives utilise. 
The co-operatives usually demand compensation 
suggesting that large vessels entering ports will 
increase the risk of accidents and may affect fishing 
prospects in coastal areas where vessels pass. 
Information received from various electric power 
companies in Japan, 1983.
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company wishes to locate a plant in an area endowed with 
prefectural forests, relevant permits must be obtained under 
the Forest Law.^
There are also other licences and permits that apply to
particular types of power plants. For example, additional
permits are required for nuclear power plants, the most
important one being the Genshirö setchi kyoka [Nuclear
Reactor Permit]. The major criterion for the issue of this
permit is that safety investigations concerning design
specification and radiation emissions be complete. MITI
conducts a safety investigation and holds a public hearing
to ascertain the views of local residents toward the
proposal. The MITI investigation and responses by local
residents are then assessed by the Atomic Energy Safety
Commission, and, if necessary, design specification changes 
24are suggested.
Construction
The time from the issue of the Construction Planning Permit 
to the commencement of commercial operation can be regarded 
as the construction stage. It is mainly an economic 
optimisation process where construction costs are minimised
23. See Shakai keizai kokumin kaigi, Enerugii kanren 
shisetsu no richi taisaku, [Siting Policies for Energy 
Related Facilities], Shakai keizai kokumin kaigi, Tokyo, 
1981, pp.1-40 for a brief discussion of the range of 
licenses and permits required in the siting of energy 
power stations in Japan.
24. Inaba Y., Paburikku akuseputansu [Public Acceptance], 
Nihon denki kyokai shinbun bu, Tokyo, 1977, pp. 192-196 
and pp.203-205.
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subject to resource input, such as labour and capital, and 
technical constraints and the need to deliver capacity to 
meet expected demand.
The construction stage can be sub-divided into the
preliminary construction stage and the stage of construction
proper. Preliminary construction involves preparing the
site by the clearing, and, in some cases the reclamation of
land, and the provision of port facilities. Preliminary
construction can begin before the issue of the Construction
Planning Permit, provided that land negotiations have been 
25completed.
Construction proper commences with the excavation of the 
land on which the boiler or reactor is to be placed, which 
can only take place after the issue of the Construction 
Planning Permit. As noted earlier, the Construction 
Planning Permit requires that all negotiations involving 
property rights and compensation arrangements be complete, 
and thus the construction stage of energy power plant 
development is, less subject to political influences than 
the earlier stages of public acceptance and licencing.
Construction involves, excavation, preparation of the
2 6foundations, construction of the reactor or boiler, 
installation of turbines, fuel loading and trial operations.
25. This will, of course, also depend on the political 
feasibility at the regional community level of 
commencing preliminary construction during the 
licensing stage.
26. In the case of nuclear power plants, it is also 
necessary to construct a containment vessel which 
houses the reactor.
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After these procedures have been completed a power company
can be formally licensed to supply commercial power to the 
grid.27
The measurement of leadtime
The analysis of leadtimes for the development of energy 
facilties requires a measure of the average leadtimes and of 
the variations in those leadtimes for each stage in the 
implementation of projects. A major interest is the 
identification of the stage of project development that 
appears to contribute most markedly to variation in total 
leadtimes and, hence, presents the most difficulty to energy 
planners in terms of leadtime assessment.
Data sources and definitions
Data for the analysis were obtained by sending 
questionnaires to Japanese electric power companies. They 
were designed to gather information about the stages at 
which major decision points were reached in the siting of 
large-scale power plants in Japan. Appendix 1 contains an 
English translation of the questionnaire sent to the power 
industry. Questionnaires were sent to the nine electric 
power companies, to Dengen kaihatsu [The Electric Power 
Development Company], and to Nihon genshiryoku hatsuden [The 
Japan Atomic Power Company]. All the companies responded to 
the questionnaire, and approximately 90 per cent were used
27. Information received from the Tokyo Electric Power 
Company and the Institute of Energy Economics, 1983.
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in the analysis. The remaining responses could not be used 
because the questionnaire had not been properly completed or 
because company records did not supply sufficient data. The 
SPSS statistical package was used in the processing of the 
statistics.
The beginning of the siting process, for the purpose of 
providing a measure of leadtime, is taken to be the point 
when a power company makes a formal decision to locate 
facilities at a particular location. As noted earlier, 
there are a number of decisions which can be made in the 
context of deciding upon a site. An examination of the 
data obtained from the questionnaire suggests that there 
were no substantial differences between the times taken to 
make any combination of those decisions. The earliest
28. Nil N.H. et al., Statistical Package for the Social
Sciences, second edition, McGraw Hill Inc., New York, 
1970. 1
29. Extensive interviews with personnel from several 
electric power companies revealed that it would be 
extremely difficult for power companies to provide 
information on when particular locations were initially 
included in candidate site pools. Candidate sites can 
stay in pools for many years waiting to be selected 
and, therefore, are not relevant to an analysis of the 
leadtimes necessary for the implementation of power 
stations.
30. See Table 2.1.
31. An examination of the data reveals that any difference 
appears to be in the range of between zero to four 
months. These discrepancies are likely to influence 
measurements plants with relatively short leadtimes. 
They will not affect significantly measurements where 
leadtimes are exceptionally long. These differences 
reflect the difficulty of identifying an unequivocal 
starting point from which to measure leadtime. While 
they prevent precise measurements, they are not likely 
to alter the overall pattern that emerges from the 
analysis.
56
time that was registered in the questionnaire was taken for 
each case.
Denchoshin approval, as noted earlier, does not necessarily 
imply that all relevant bargaining processes are complete. 
These processes may continue into and influence licensing 
processes. Therefore, in addition to considering public 
acceptance times and licensing times seperately, it is also 
necessary to consider pre-construction leadtimes, defined 
as public acceptance plus licensing leadtimes, to provide a 
measure of the times necessary to reach settlements over the 
construction of power plants.
The study covers the period from 1960-1979 and includes 
facilities still in the planning stage or under construction 
in 1979. Facilities which had not obtained Denchoshin 
approval by 1979 are given arbitrary public acceptance times 
(taking 1979 as the cut-off point) and average licensing and 
construction times. Power stations that had received 
Denchoshin approval by 1979 but had not commenced commercial 
operation at the time of the questionnaire are similarly 
given arbitrary average licensing or construction times or 
both.
The analysis divides energy power plants into the two 
categories of nuclear and fossil-fuelled power plants. In
32. For example, after taking five years to obtain public 
acceptance, a particular fossil-fuelled project may, 
have been given Denchoshin approval in October 1979. 
If the average licensing and construction times for all 
fossil-fuelled plants were one and three years 
respectively, that particular fossi1-fuelled project 
would be assigned an arbitrary total leadtime of nine 
years.
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t h e  c a t e g o r y  o f  n u c l e a r  p o w e r  p l a n t s  a r e  l i g h t  w a t e r  a n d  
h e a v y  w a t e r  r e a c t o r s  and g a s - c o o l e d  r e a c t o r s .  O i l ,  c o a l  and  
l i q u e f i e d  n a t u r a l  g a s  p l a n t s  and p l a n t s  u s i n g  a c o m b i n a t i o n  
o f  t h e s e  a n d  o t h e r  f u e l s  ( s u c h  a s  n a p t h a )  a r e  g r o u p e d  
t o g e t h e r  i n  t h e  c a t e g o r y  o f  f o s s i 1 - f u e 1 1 e d  p l a n t s .  
I n s u f f i c i e n t  d a t a  p r e v e n t  a more r e f i n e d  c l a s s i f i c a t i o n  o f  
f u e l  c a t e g o r i e s .
Power  f a c i l i t i e s  a r e  n o t  c o n s i d e r e d  a s  i n d i v i d u a l  u n i t s  b u t
a s  p a c k a g e s ,  a p a c k a g e  c o n s i s t i n g  o f  o n e  o r  m o r e  p o w e r
p l a n t s .  E l e c t r i c  po we r  c o m p a n i e s  i n  J a p a n ,  i n  t h e  m a j o r i t y
o f  c a s e s ,  r e a c h  a g r e e m e n t  w i t h  r e g i o n a l  c o m m u n i t i e s  t o
l o c a t e  a n d  c o n s t r u c t  s e v e r a l  p o w e r  p l a n t s ,  r a t h e r  t h a n
p r o c e e d i n g  on  a s e q u e n t i a l ,  p l a n t - b y - p l a n t  b a s i s .  I n
c o n t r a s t ,  l i c e n s i n g  and c o n s t r u c t i o n  a r e  u s u a l l y  u n d e r t a k e n
o n a p l a n t - b y - p l a n t  b a s i s .  The  t i m e s  u s e d  i n  t h e  a n a l y s i s
f o r  l i c e n s i n g  and c o n s t r u c t i o n  s t a g e s  a r e  a v e r a g e  t i m e s  f o r
33t h e  g i v e n  p a c k a g e .
Power  c o m p a n i e s  u s u a l l y  s i t e  more t h a n  o n e  p a c k a g e  a t  a n y  
o n e  l o c a t i o n .  When p l a n t s  a r e  s i t e d  a t  a l o c a t i o n  w h e r e
3 3 .  T h e r e  a r e  t w o  a l t e r n a t i v e  w a y s  o f  m e a s u r i n g  p u b l i c  
a c c e p t a n c e  t i m e s  g i v e n  t h e  n a t u r e  o f  p o w e r  c o m p a n i e s '  
s i t i n g  p o l i c i e s .  One i s  t o  g i v e  a l l  p l a n t s  i n  t h e  
p a c k a g e  e q u a l  p u b l i c  a c c e p t a n c e  t i m e s ;  t h e  o t h e r  i s  t o  
g i v e  t h e  f i r s t  p l a n t  i t s  t r u e  p u b l i c  a c c e p t a n c e  t i m e  
a nd  t o  a s s i g n  a z e r o  p u b l i c  a c c e p t a n c e  t i m e  t o  o t h e r  
p l a n t s  i n  t h e  p a c k a g e .  T h e  c h o i c e  o f  a p p r o a c h  
s u b s t a n t i a l l y  a f f e c t s  a v e r a g e  l e a d t i m e s  and v a r i a t i o n  
i n  t h o s e  t i m e s .  In c o n t r a s t ,  t a k i n g  a v e r a g e  t i m e s  f o r  
l i c e n s i n g  a n d  c o n s t r u c t i o n  s t a g e s  f o r  p l a n t s  i n  t h e  
p a c k a g e  d o e s  n o t  l e a d  t o  l a r g e  d i f f e r e n c e s  i n  r e s u l t s  
c o m p a r e d  w i t h  t h e  u n i t  p l a n t  a p p r o a c h  t o  t h e  
m e a s u r e m e n t  o f  t h o s e  t i m e s ,  a n d  a t  t h e  s a m e  p r e v e n t s  
d i s t o r t i o n s  i n  t h e  m e a s u r e m e n t  o f  p u b l i c  a c c e p t a n c e  
t i m e s .
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there are no existing plants in the planning stage, under 
construction or operating the package is defined as the 
first or initial package; when plants are located at a site 
where there are existing plants in the licensing stage, 
under construction or operating, the package is defined as a 
subsequent package.
Patterns of leadtime behaviour
Figure 2.1 depicts trends in average leadtimes for both 
nuclear and fossil-fuelled power plants, both of which 
increased over the period. Average nuclear leadtimes were 
relatively constant during the period from 1965 to 1975, but 
started to show comparatively large increases after 1975, 
lengthening from 90 months in 1975 to approximately 160 
months by 1980. In contrast, fossi1-fuelled plant leadtimes 
increased steadily from approximately 40 months in 1960 to 
90 months by 1980. Trends in leadtime lengths after 1980 are 
also presented. Nuclear leadtimes continued to show an 
increase after 1980, but the increase in fossil-fuelled 
power plant leadtime appears to have tapered off and there 
is even a slight decline. This suggests that while there 
appears to be a continued trend toward increasing nuclear 
plant leadtimes, the trend toward longer leadtimes for 
fossi1-fuelled plants seems to have been checked.
The statistical analysis involves the construction of three 
measures. The first is a measure of mean leadtime for each 
stage of the siting process. The second is a measure of the
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co-efficient of variation, which indicates the relative
3 4degree of dispersion around those averages. These two
measures are then used to assess the relative contribution
3 5of each stage to variation in total leadtime.
A two-way analysis of variance is used to test for the 
statistical significance of differences in average leadtimes 
between fuel categories (nuclear and fossil-fuelled plants) 
and within each of those categories (initial and subsequent 
packages) for each stage of the siting process. 
Interaction effects, which test whether the proportional 
differences in leadtimes for nuclear and fossi1-fue1led 
plants are the same for initial and subsequent packages and 
vice-versa, are also considered.^
Table 2.4 illustrates average total nuclear and fossil- 
fuelled plant leadtimes and variation in those leadtimes 
calculated in this analysis, and compares them with two 
other published results on power plant leadtimes in Japan. 
The results of the present study appear to be in general 
agreement with the estimates by Lester and the Japan 
Statistical Centre (JSC). Both Lester and JSC, however, are
34. See Kane E.J., Economic Statistics and Econometrics: An
Introduction to Quantitative Economics, A Harper 
International Edition, New York, 1969, p.78.
35. For example, two stages may have a similar degree of 
variation, but the first stage may be significantly 
longer than the second stage. It is possible to 
suggest that the first stage is a more important 
influence on total leadtime variation. The second 
stage, while having a large variation, is shorter and, 
therefore, has a less significant impact.
36. Wonnacott R.J. and Wonnacott T.H., Econometrics, second 
edition, John Wiley and Sons, New York, 1979, pp.101- 
115.
/TABLE 2.4
ESTIMATES OF POWER PLANT LEADTIMES IN JAPAN
Plant Category
Study Estimates Nuclear Fossi1-fuelled)
Lester3 mean*3 108-144 -
COVc - -
nobs1^ - -
JSCe mean 143.8 76.6
COV 0.47 0.35
nobs (24) (19)
Present study mean 153.4 75.4
COV 0.35 0.50
nobs (35) (55)
a. Lester, R.K. , op. cit ., p. 134.
b. Measured in months
c. Co-efficient of variation
d. Number of observations
e. Nihon tökei sentaa, op. cit., p. 7.
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only concerned with total leadtimes; they overlook important 
behavioural variations in leadtimes for each stage of the 
siting process.
Table2.5 presents the major patterns of variation in 
leadtimes that emerged from the analysis. The average total 
leadtime for nuclear power plants (153.4 months) appears to 
be roughly twice as long as leadtime for fossi1-fue1led 
plants (75.4 months), and the same pattern is observable for 
all stages of the siting process.
Furthermore, the F-test provides evidence that these 
differences in leadtimes for all stages of the siting 
process are statistically significant. An important 
characteristic of leadtimes is relatively short licensing 
leadtimes: licensing leadtimes for both nuclear (21.7 
months) and fossil-fuelled plants (11.7 months) appear to 
contribute relatively little to total leadtimes. This 
contrasts markedly with average public acceptance and 
construction times, which appear to be major components of 
total leadtimes.
Leadtimes to locate initial nuclear and f ossi1-fue1led 
packages (165.5 months and 86.1 months, respectively) seem 
to be longer than leadtimes for subsequent nuclear and 
fossil-fuelled packages (112.5 months and 51.4 months). The 
F-test indicates that the shorter leadtimes for subsequent 
packages relative to initial packages are statistically 
significant. The relative ease in locating subsequent 
packages is attributable to shorter public acceptance times 
for subsequent packages, whether nuclear or fossil-fuelled
c
* H  0)
E
Ü  *H 
P
U TjJ
O  vO 
O  rH
O  CP 
rH  <N
o  r*r- rH O  rnC 0 rH O  CO CO CN O  rH  cm co
&
S S
CN
mo
W  OJ 
C  *"H
<N O 
vO
(N O  
m 3  o er» o  m CN O  m rH  Om s
d d
0 rH
0*H
U  D ^  
3  E (N s, %> vo
>H *H  w  
4 J  4 J
o  <p
m in
o
CM 0 0
O  ro 
co in
o  r -  
vo m
o  r-  
m
O ^  
rH  r- d CNVD CNCNw *c + c m
O  (D -
U  H  r l
M O
c p
co o
o  °
rH
CN o  
m
co o  
m
co o
CM
CN
CN
in d
i
£
L
ic
en
si
n
g
le
ad
ti
m
e
(2
)
o  c p  
r *
O  rH  
rH
O  rH
go m
o  ^ O  vo 
CP O
O  CN
O  vo 23
3* vo
CN
mer»in
rH  d
CN
r H  rH d  d
(N
d  d
(N
*  rH d  d co
d
d
o rH
Ü
VM
1
£
P
u
b
li
c 
ac
ce
p
ta
n
 
le
ad
ti
m
e 
(1
)
O  TT 
vO
O  CO
in o
O  CN 
O  VO
O  rH  
CO CO
O  rn 
m  o
O  OV 
CN o v
ID
m ,5
35
*
s
vO
cn<0
c
•H
AB
LE
 
2
.5
 
lN
T 
l
e
a
d
t
i
d  o  
vO
rH  rH
m
CN O  
CO
d  o
CN
C0 rH
m
rH  O  
CN
CN m U
£
C0
h  3
P u CD B
o' o vD m •o
»00)
1 - H  £
o  m 
m
O  O  
in
in  co • m O  ^  in cm o  or H  in o  m TT rn 0%(P s
in
O
p i
604
4 J  V  
0 *0 E-c <0
m  o  
in
m  o in •VO O
rH
CM O vo o  
co
d  d
m
m
vo
rn O
M Uh
VM
X
8
0)
rH
rH rH 0)CP<0
0
cn
0)
Bw
to •
c O'0)
q »o
S
ta
ti
st
ic
CO 
CO >
<u o  
s  u M
ea
n
C
O
V
M
ea
n
C
O
V
M
ea
n
C
O
V
M
ea
n
C
O
V
M
ea
n
C
O
V
F
-r
a
ti
o
F
-r
a
ti
o
F
-r
a
ti
o 1
ft
0j
3
§4J
c
5
cn
§
ft
rH
o
co
0 °
E
s
J3
jn
0
in
co
in
in CN
co
m
CN
CN
IH W0 c
UH 0
•H 0)
4J Mc0 co
•H
M cn in
i
£
z in hj 
41 m 
HJ > 
<0 u
J  s
C0 rH  •
>  0) CP 
>  CP 
4H 0)
O H  |J
c0
4 J
<0
T3
4J JQW o CDC U rH
0) 0) C C
cm cn -H co cocn o o u o
(D 4 J  *H  *H  *H
c
H
c
•§ M c  UH UH UH 0  UH -H -H 
E 4) C C 
1 O' O'
£ V 0 rH  b
:
>n
&0)
13
1 T 3
rH  Q)
rH  M
c0 c0
0)
P  M 
D 1 <0 
Q) 0) 
W rH
rH  | T 3  
CO rH  0»
3  1 T> 
O ' rH  4) 
41 - H  rH
U) W r-t
0)
CP
>1 o 
<0 «
•S c c o -n -H -H o m in
S
o
u
rc
e:
rH
• H  rH  
0 )  rH
• H  0) 
4 J  rH
• H  *H  rH  
; J  W  H rH
JO » u
1 4)
4 J
<0 U
2
V) 0) 
0  3  
U* 4H
• H  Ü  
C  P  
M  C
■3 3
in c
•H  W  Q> 
C O P
M  UH UH
b  in 4> 
d  0  3
0 )  UH UH
0)
2
1
a i s 1« A O T3 4) •
64
(27.8 months and 21.2 months), compared with initial nuclear 
and fossi1-fue11ed packages (82.0 months and 38.3 months). 
In contrast, licensing and construction times for both fuel 
categories do not appear to vary significantly between 
initial and subsequent packages.
Major patterns that emerge are that nuclear plant leadtimes
are longer than fossil-fuelled plant leadtimes and that
initial package leadtimes are longer than subsequent package
leadtimes. In proportional terms, the leadtime differences
between fuel categories are also similar for package
categories irrespective of the type of fuel used. This
suggests that, in general, the proportional differences are
relatively stable irrespective of fuel or package 
37category.
There is a high degree of dispersion around average total 
leadtimes for both nuclear and fossil-fuelled facilities in 
the siting of both initial and subsequent packages. These 
measures can be used to gauge the variation in times for 
various component stages of project development and to 
identify the stage of project development which contributes 
most significantly to variation in total leadtimes.
37. The F-ratios for public acceptance and licensing times 
are 3.624 and 4.595 and appear to be relatively high. 
This suggests that subsequent nuclear public 
acceptances are proportionally shorter than fossil- 
fuelled public -acceptance times when compared with 
initial packages. On the other hand, licensing times 
are shorter for subsequent fossil-fuelled packages when 
compared with initial packages. These proportional 
differences are not, however, statistically 
significant. The F-ratio decreases to 0.226 when pre­
construction times are grouped together.
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Pre-construction times appear to be considerably more 
variable than total leadtimes. This contrasts markedly with 
construction times, which seem relatively stable compared 
with total leadtimes. Given that both pre-construction and 
construction stages, have, in general, similar average 
leadtimes, the results strongly suggest that variation in 
the pre-construction times accounts for variation in total 
leadtimes. There is some variation in construction times, 
but this does not appear to have an important influence on 
the variation in total leadtimes.
A breakdown of the pre-construction stage into a public 
acceptance component and a licensing component reveals 
substantial variation in both stages. The co-efficient of 
variation appears to be relatively high and roughly the same 
for both public acceptance and licensing stages irrespective 
of the plant category considered. However, since licensing 
times are generally shorter than public acceptance times, 
they make a less significant contribution to the variation 
in total leadtimes.
Sources of unpredictability
Japanese energy planners, after selecting minimum cost sites 
on which to schedule energy project developments to balance 
electricity supply and demand, face a high degree of 
unpredictability in times necessary to site and construct 
energy power facilities. The unpredictability stems mainly 
from the variation in times at the front end of the siting 
process, where social and political settlements are reached. 
The back end of the process which involves licensing and
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construction, does not appear to have a marked influence on 
the variation in total leadtimes.
Confidence in the prediction of leadtime appears to increase 
substantially after public acceptance has been negotiated. 
This is because public acceptance is the outcome of a highly 
volatile process of bargaining between and among the 
promoters and regional communities over an equitable 
distribution of costs and benefits expected to accrue from 
project developments; thus the bargaining process itself and 
the variability in its outcomes, are the major factors in 
the unpredictability of the leadtimes for implementing power 
projects.
The bargaining process continues during the regulatory 
stage, but is mainly concerned with finer points such as 
the completion of negotiations with property right owners 
and the issue of various licences and permits. The settling 
of these finer points only accounts for a small part of the 
siting process, and therefore is unlikely to be as critical 
in the determination of leadtime variations as the times 
necessary to reach broad agreements over the development of 
power stations.
In the final stage of project development, power companies 
try to minimise the cost of constructing power plants. The 
construction stage is commenced only after all regional 
bargaining has been completed, and is less subject to 
political processes than the public acceptance and licensing 
stages. Construction times are relatively stable and
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therefore are not likely to exert a significant influence on 
the variation in total leadtimes.
The variability in public acceptance times implies that 
compensation mechanisms are not operating in the same way in 
all circumstances. Institutionalised compensation 
arrangements, which are designed to redistribute some of the 
benefits of project development to regional communities and 
facilitate the settlement process, do not appear to 
guarantee predictability in times necessary to win approval 
for the construction of power projects. Chapter 3 develops 
an extended cost-benefit framework which will be of use in 
the assessment of settlement times. It stresses the 
importance of distributional effects and, hence, the need to 
examine the effectiveness of compensation mechanisms in 
analysing why approval for some projects takes longer than 
approval for others.
3
THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF DELAY
Standard Cost-Benefit Analysis (CBA) ranks the development 
of projects in terms of economic efficiency criteria. This 
approach is useful for identifying high return projects, 
independently of the management of compensation requirements 
and other ' non-economic' factors. It can, however, be 
extended analytically, focussing on the importance of 
distributional effects and the effectiveness of compensation 
mechanisms, to provide a more comprehensive framework which 
will allow for the assessment of the times necessary to 
reach social and political settlements over the development 
of projects.
The need for a settlement process arises out of a divergence 
between the value of a project to promoters and regional 
communities. The process is characterised by bargaining
I
over a politically acceptable allocation of costs and 
benefits expected from the project; it takes time and it, 
therefore, influences the order in which projects are 
delivered. Settlements will require that promoters 
compensate regional communities for losses expected to be 
incurred as a result of project development. Where 
compensation mechanisms do not operate effectively or 
cannot be developed easily, delay may be expected in project 
implementation.
Settlement times will be determined jointly by the 
willingness of promoters and regional communities to develop
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and accept projects. The extent of the divergence in the 
value of projects will be influenced by distributionally 
weighted benefits and costs. The distributional effects of 
projects will influence the value that is placed upon the 
costs and benefits of project development. These effects 
will, therefore, be important in determining the extent to 
which benefits exceed costs, or the economic surplus which 
is available for redistribution from project promoters to 
affected interests. Project implementation is likely to be 
delayed in situations where there is little surplus 
available for redistribution to regional communities and 
where compensation mechanisms are not and cannot be 
effectively tuned to take into account distributional 
effects consequent upon a particular project development.
A model is developed for the purpose of providing some 
quantification of the importance of distributional effects 
on the variation in the times taken to reach settlement in 
the implementation of projects. The value that regional 
communities place on accepting projects will depend on 
factors such as: the expected environmental costs of 
projects, the size of the rural sector, the ideological 
orientation of the community, the risks of different types 
of projects and prevailing social attitudes. The 
willingness of developers to implement projects will depend 
on, amongst other things, the need to meet expected demand 
for project output. These influences can be measured and 
can be regressed on a public aceptance leadtime variable in 
order to consider their relative importance in explaining 
the variation in settlement times.
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The model provides a reference point and allows for the 
analysis of other factors, such as the allocation and use of 
political power, the skill with which bargaining strategies 
are employed, uncertainty about outcomes and changing 
expectations, which are also likely to influence settlement 
times. These influences may act to impede or facilitate 
bargaining in a way which may not be captured fully in 
quantitative analysis of distributional influences, yet need 
to be considered in developing a comprehensive model which 
will be of use in the evaluation of settlement times.
CBA and project delay
Assume private promoters know exactly the rate at which 
demand for output of a particular type of project will 
increase. Suppose that financial appraisals'*' suggest that 
only one additional unit is required to meet the expected 
increase in demand. If promoters are acting in a world 
where there are no distributional effects or compensation is 
delivered appropriately without the need for bargaining, and 
political settlements are not necessary, then there will be
some economically optimal rate at which they would invest
*
resources to construct the project in the planned time.
This optimal timing will be determined by a trade-off 
between the marginal costs of investing resources too slowly
See, for example, Turvey R., 'On Investment Choices in 
Electricity Generation', Oxford Economic Papers, 
November 1963, and Anderson D., 'Models for Determining 
Least Cost Investments in Electrical Supply', Bell 
Journal of Economics and Management Sciences, No.3, 
1972, for analyses of the various factors influencing 
investment decisions in the electric power business.
1 .
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and investing resources too quickly. The expenditure of 
resources too quickly would require paying higher prices for 
inputs into the construction process and would temporarily 
result in idle capital from which no return could be 
derived. Utilising labour and capital too slowly would lead 
to higher interest rate charges and forgone benefits of not 
being able to supply output to a future market on time. In 
the model developed here, all projects are presumed to have 
similar optimal construction times.^
After determination of the rate at which resources will need 
to be invested, a promoter would choose a site on which to 
construct that project.^ In principle, candidate sites 
might be located near consumption areas or placed on 
offshore islands. Promoters wishing to minimise cost would 
prefer to locate projects as close as possible to 
consumption areas. Placement in other areas, such as on 
offshore islands, may be technologically possible but it may 
necessitate the construction of relatively expensive
2. In principle, it would be possible to construct a power 
project in a very short period of time, say, a few 
weeks. This would, however, require huge amounts of 
labour and capital resources being employed very quickly. It would, other things being equal, increase 
substantially the prices of those resource inputs.
3. Because of the huge capital costs involved, power 
companies usually borrow finance to construct energy 
facilities. Interest repayment charges would increase 
if projects were overly delayed.
4. See Chapter 2 for data on average construction times 
and variation in those times.
5. Refer to Chapter 2 for an analysis of site selection 
criteria in the development of energy power plants.
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distributional systems for project output, and may involve 
higher cost in transporting components needed for the 
construction of projects.
Promoters would rank candidate sites in terms of cost
minimisation, at least from their perspective. It would be
possible to line up all projects in terms of efficiency
measured in this way, and to calculate, through assessing
costs and benefits, the array of project ordering. 
Assuming that construction times are relatively constant, it
would be expected, other things being equal, that the
project at the first selected site would start operation
before the second and so on. Given these assumptions, the
schedule of project commencement would be closely associated
with the schedule of project completion. Such circumstances
are, however, hypothetical, since social and political
factors not included in promoter cost-benefit calculations,
will influence the schedule of project completions. These
hypothetical circumstances can, therefore, be used as a
yardstick against which to consider the social and political
factors influencing the variation in settlement times.
The development of a project brings social and economic 
benefits and costs to a host of community interests or 
actors. These actors include communities at different 
constituency levels, such as national and regional 
communities, in addition to private companies. To the 
national community, there may be benefits, such as improved 
energy self-sufficiency, which may reduce the cost from
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disruption of strategic imports. There may also be costs to 
the national community, such as the use of public resources 
that could be used for the attainment of alternative 
national policy objectives. Regional communities may have 
separate interests. To regional communities, there may be 
merits, such as the expansion of development opportunities. 
At the same time, there may also be an increased potential 
of exposure to hazardous environmental pollutants.
As outlined in Chapter 1, standard CBA asks whether or not 
projects should go ahead based on economic efficiency 
criteria. It specifies and aggregates all relevant benefits 
and costs. These costs and benefits are treated and 
measured in the same way no matter to whom and under what 
circumstances they accrue. It suggests that a project go 
ahead on efficiency grounds providing a potential Pareto 
improvement (PPl) exists. In this context, a PPI exists if 
aggregate benefits exceed costs, or there is an expected 
economic surplus, and individuals disadvantaged by the 
project could, in principle, be compensated by those who
6. There is a substantial body of literature on Cost- 
Benefit Analysis. See, for example, Dasgupta A. and 
Pearce D.W., Cost—Benefit Analysis, MacMillan, London, 
1978, Little I.M.D. and Mirrless J.A., Project 
Appraisal and Planning for Developing Countries, Basic 
Books, New York 1974, Layard R., Cost-Benefit Analysis: 
Selected Readings, Penguin Education, Sugden R. and 
Williams A., The Principles of Practical Cost-Benefit 
Analysis, Oxford University Press, London, 1978, Pearce 
D.W., Cost-Benefit Analysis, MacMillian, 1971 and 
Mishan E.J., Cost—Benefit Analayis: An Informal
Introduction Allen and Unwin, 1972. For a survey of 
the Cost-Benefit literature, see Prest T. and Turvey 
R., 'Cost-Benefit Analysis: A Survey', Quarterly 
Journal of Economics, December 1965, reprinted in 
Surveys of Economic Theory, Vol.3, MacMillian, 1966.
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were advantaged by it and still remain at least as well off 
as before the change.
Compensation is, however, paid by project promoters to 
regional community interests in order to conclude a 
settlement over the construction of projects. This payment 
may be in monetary form or in non-monetary form, such as in 
the provision of employment opportunities or public goods. 
Whatever the form, compensation is paid through a variety of 
political and institutional mechanisms. Private promoters 
may pay compensation directly, through established 
mechanisms or, secretly, in under the table deals. 
Alternatively, compensation may be paid indirectly to 
regional communities. For example, the public at the 
national level may be taxed on the consumption of project 
output and that revenue may be redistributed, in the form of 
a subsidy to regional communities.
Even if benefits exceed costs in aggregate or there is an 
economic surplus, there may well be a disparity between the 
value of a project to promoters as measured alongside the 
value of a project to regional communities. In reality, 
the divergence in the value of projects, as perceived by 
different interests in the community, will infuence the 
speed and success with which projects are implemented. If
7. See Pearce D.W., and Sturmey S.G., 'Private and Social 
Costs and Benefits: A Note on Terminology', Economic 
Journal, Vol.76, March 1966, Turvey R., On Divergences 
between Social Costs and Private Costs, Economica, 
Vol.30, August 1963, and Coase R.H., 'The Problem of 
Social Cost', The Journal of Law and Economics, Vol.3, 
October 1960.
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communities have veto power over placement decisions then 
the settlement process must involve bargaining over a 
politically acceptable distribution of costs and benefits 
expected from the project.
Figure 3.1 illustrates, schematically, the multiplicity of 
interests at various constituency levels that can become 
involved, directly or indirectly, in bargaining over the 
development of energy projects. Figure 3.1a contains the 
major actors involved in macro-bargaining. Agreement from 
actors at different constituency levels, such as power 
companies, national prefectural and sub-prefectura1 
electorates and other interests, such as ideologically 
motivated anti-nuclear movements, will be required in the 
course of settlement. Bargaining will also occur on a sub- 
prefectural or on a micro-level and the actors involved in 
this level of bargaining are shown in Figure 3.1b. Within 
the local electorate that is asked to accept the project, 
the consent of interests, such as property right owners, the 
local assembly and the public, is necessary to win approval 
to develop an energy project. As the social and physical 
environmental impacts of projects may not be confined to the 
local electorate accepting the project, surrounding 
electorates may also become involved in agreement processes.
Figure 3.1 also illustrates the complexity of the 
relationships among and between actors involved in 
bargaining. In the course of settlement, various interests 
will use economic markets, such as electricity and property 
right markets, as well as political institutions and power
FIGURE 3.1
THE STRUCTURE OF BARGAINING OVER PROJECT DEVELOPMENT
Figure la: Macro-bargaining
Power
Company
Prefectural National
GovernmentElectorate
Sub-prefectural Ideological
Electorate Interests
Figure lb: Micro-bargaining (Regional Level)
Electorate Accepting Project
Surrounding
Electorates
Prefecture
Local
Assembly
Notes: a. The interests in the surrounding electorates are the same
as the interests in the electorate accepting the project.
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and influence, to increase their share of the surplus 
expected to be generated as a result of a project
development. A settlement will require social and political
/agreement over the distribution of costs and benefits 
expected to accrue from the implementation of a project. 
For example, a settlement will necessitate an agreement 
between a power company and property right owners over the 
relinquishment of property rights. In the course of that 
settlement, the prefectural and the local mayor may also 
attempt to persuade property right owners to accept the 
project.
Project promoters will be required to compensate regional 
communities for losses expected to be incurred in order to 
effect a settlement. Where compensation mechanisms do not 
operate effectively or cannot be developed easily, delay may 
be expected in project agreement. The effectiveness of 
compensation mechanisms is likely to be related to the 
pattern of expected distributional impacts, uncertainty 
about outcomes, the allocation and use of political 
bargaining power, strategies employed by actors, and 
changing expectations of parties in the course of 
settlement.
The extent of the divergence between the value of a project 
to promoters and regional communities may not necessarily be 
reflected fully in simple benefits and costs. Simple costs 
and benefits as used in standard CBA, may not reflect the 
true valuation that is placed on those costs and benefits. 
Distributional effects may not be neutral; promoter and 
regional community interests may under different
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circumstances and for a variety of reasons evaluate
pdifferently costs and benefits. As noted in Chapter 1, the 
distributional effects of projects will depend on factors 
such as: expectations about social and economic
opportunities and will influence the value that is placed 
upon the costs and benefits of project development. The 
value that interests participant to the settlement place 
upon project development will shape their responses to 
reaching a settlement. For example, there will be 
resistance to projects if distributional impacts are not 
neutral and compensation mechanisms are not capable of 
taking adequately into account unfavourable effects expected 
from project development.
Even if compensation mechanisms are able to cope adequately 
with distributional effects on actors, the degree of 
resistance to and support for projects may also depend on 
' the spread of costs and benefits among either different
8. For analyses of distributional issues as they relate to 
the measurement of costs and benefits, see Hettich W., 
’Distribution in Cost-Benefit Analysis: A Review of 
Theoretical Issues’, Public Finance Quarterly, Vol.4, 
December 1969, Weisbrod B.A., ’Income Redistribution 
Effects and Benefit-Cost Analysis' in Chase S.B., ed., 
Problems in Public Expenditure Analysis, The Brookings 
Institution, Washington D.C., 1968, Musgrave R.A.,
' Cost-Benefit Analysis and the Theory of Public 
Finance', Journal of Economic Literature, Vol.7, 
September 1969, Skolnik M.L., 'A Comment on Professor 
Musgraves Separation of Distribution from Allocation', 
Journal of Economic Literature, Vol.8, June 1970, 
MacGuire C.B. and Garn H.A., 'The Integration of Equity 
and Efficiency Criteria in Public Project Selection', 
Economic Journal, Vol.43, 1975, and Nash C., Pearce D., 
and Stanley J., 'An Evaluation of Cost-Benefit Analysis 
Criteria', Scottish Journal of Political Economy, 
Vol.22, 1975.
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promoters or interests within regional electorates. 
Settlements are likely to be highly contentious if, for 
instance, certain community groups are expected to make 
large gains at the expense of large losses by others. Under 
these conditions, it may be more difficult for promoters to 
effect the necessary compensation payment and this may 
influence the speed of settlement.
The costs and benefits expected to accrue from a particular 
project development may not be known with certainty. There 
may be uncertainty as to the value of projects. 
Compensation mechanisms may not work effectively if 
participants to the settlement place different weights on 
uncertainty and have different attitudes towards risk. 
Certain community interests, because of a lack of or 
incorrect information, may be concerned about the value of a 
particular project development and this may prevent a quick 
settlement over the construction of a project.
The degree of difficulty in reaching settlements may not be 
reflected simply in the distribution of benefits and costs, 
even if they are evaluated accurately. Distributional 
effects on promoter or community interests may not be 
closely related to the political capacity of those interests 
to influence settlements. Certain community actors, such as 
those who possess legally recognised property rights, are 
likely to possess disproportionate political power, and may 
use this power to impede or facilitate the use of 
compensation mechanisms and settlement in project 
implementation.
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The skill with which various community interests employ 
bargaining strategies will affect the settlement process. 
Bargaining strategies will include economic, political, 
technical and informational strategies or some combination 
of them. Whatever the strategy employed, it will be 
designed to alter the distributional effects of projects or 
the political capacity of interests participant to the 
settlement. For instance, a technical strategy, such as 
project design modification, may reduce the costs that 
particular regional interests expect to incur or the need to 
negotiate with those interests and, thus, facilitate a 
settlement.
The revision of expectations about the value of projects 
will also affect settlement outcomes. During the settlement 
process, changes may occur and lead to a divergence between 
what was expected to occur and what actually occurs. 
Preferences may not be stable and changes in economic, 
political or policy related factors may introduce 
instabilities into bargaining. These changes may alter 
benefit-cost ratios and bargaining positions of interests 
participant to the settlement and may, therefore, affect 
approval times.
The distribution of costs and benefits
The distribution of costs and benefits, and the way in which 
compensation can be affected among various interests in the 
community, will be an important factor influencing 
settlement times. Resistance to projects is likely to be
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stronger in situations where distributional effects are not 
neutral and there is expected to be little economic surplus 
to be redistributed in order to reach a settlement between 
promoters and regional communities. The effective operation 
of compensation mechanisms requires that distributional 
effects are taken fully into account.
It is possible to develop a model which will allow for the 
assessment of the settlement times by considering the 
importance of distributional effects on the variation in 
times that are required to win approval over the 
installation of electricity projects. The model can be set 
up to consider regional community and project promoter 
responses to the development of energy stations and the 
impact of those responses on the relative ease or difficulty
in reaching agreement over project developments.
)
I
Regional community and promoter responses
The time required to reach a settlement over the development 
of projects will be determined jointly by the willingness of 
regional communities to accept those projects and the 
willingness of promoters to develop those projects. The 
response of regional electorates to offering sites on which 
projects can be developed will be a function of, amongst 
other things, the expected environmental costs of projects, 
the size of the rural sector, the risk involved in accepting 
projects, the structure of political party representation 
and prevailing social attitudes toward preservation of the 
environment. The willingness of promoters to develop
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projects will be determined by factors such as the need to 
develop additional capacity to meet expected electricity 
shortfalls.
The degree of difficulty in reaching a settlement can be 
associated with the extent to which regional communities at 
various constituency levels expect to incur net social 
benefits from the development of projects. The construction 
of projects might be expected to bring benefits, such as 
expanded developmental opportunities to regional 
electorates. It might also be presumed to affect 
environmental quality adversely. An important factor 
influencing the time to reach settlements is likely to be an 
assessment, in a broad sense, of the expected environmental 
costs involved in the construction and operation of projects 
compared with the costs of other forms of social and 
economic development.
Even if all benefits and costs of projects are similar in an 
objective and technical sense, they may be evaluated 
differently in terms of their distributional effects. For 
instance, particular regional communities'may weigh highly 
the adverse environmental effects expected to accrue from a 
project; others may not be so concerned about those 
environmental costs. The importance that regional 
communities attach to the expected environmental costs of 
projects will be a function of the extent of social and 
economic opportunities and expectations about those 
opportunities and is likely to influence settlement
outcomes.
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Suppose environmental quality is a normal good in the 
economic sense that more of that good is demanded as social 
and economic opportunities expand. Assume that 
expectations are only a function of prevailing levels of 
those opportunities when communities are approached and 
asked to accept projects. Under these conditions, it might 
be expected, other things being equal, that economic 
projects would be more readily accepted in areas where 
social and economic opportunities are relatively low. On 
the benefit side, those areas are likely to attach more 
weight to the marginal increase in opportunities arising out 
of project development. On the cost side, they are likely 
to attach less weight to the incremental impairment of 
environmental quality. A community attaching less weight to 
costs and more weight to benefits is likely to offer less 
resistance in supplying a location for a project.
Expectations are likely to be shaped by past experience of 
social and economic opportunities in addition to the 
prevailing levels of those opportunities. Expectations 
about future opportunities may also change cost-benefit 
calculations by regional communities and, consequently, may 
influence agreement times. Assume there are two areas with 
the same relatively low levels of opportunities at the time
9. Baumol W.J. and Oates W.R., The Theory of Environmental 
Policy, Public Outlays and Environmental Policy, 
Prentice-Ha 11 Inc., New Jersey, 1975, especially 
Chapter 13, and Freeman A.M., 'The Distribution of 
Environmental Quality' in Kneese A. and Bower B. eds., 
Environmental Quality Analysis: Theory and Method in 
the Social Sciences, John Hopkins Press, Baltimore, 
1972.
84
when they are asked to accept a project. Suppose that in 
one area there had been a relatively large increase in those 
opportunities over a certain period before the approach, 
while in another area there had been a relatively low 
increase. Based on the proposition above, it would be 
expected that a settlement would be more difficult in an 
area where social and economic opportunities had been 
expanding relatively quickly. The community would likely 
place less weight on the expansion of social and economic 
opportunities as it would be expected that those 
opportunities could be expanded without the need for 
projects. They would also place more weight on the expected 
environmental degradation associated with project 
development.
An alternative hypothesis might suggest that settlements may 
be easier in areas where social and economic opportunities 
are expected to rise rapidly. Those areas are likely to be 
undergoing relatively rapid economic growth. They may even 
be experiencing a boom in economic activity. Having 
experienced the benefits of growth, these communities may 
wish to see a continuation of rapid economic development. 
Given the prominence of the benefits associated with growth, 
there may be a lag in anticipating any adverse environmental 
effects from project development. Consequently, there may 
be less resistance to project development.
Regional communities may not be homogeneous and 
distributional impacts may vary from one region to another. 
Projects may be less readily accepted in areas where, for 
example, the rural sector is relatively large because
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primary producers may attach high weights to the costs of 
projects which are perceived to have disruptive effects on 
factors of production, such as land and water. Primary 
producers may be hesitant to part with their land and, 
therefore, may attach less weight to the expansion of non- 
rural employment opportunities generated by project 
development.
Projects may not be similar and settlement times may vary 
because of differences in anticipated environmental risk 
associated with the development of projects. The nature of 
and familiarity with different types of risk may influence 
the community response to accepting a particular type of 
project.^ Higher expected risk, given equivalent benefits 
may increase the cost of projects to affected communities 
and lead to relatively more community resistance.
The nature of the risk involved in different types of 
projects, such as nuclear and non-nuclear, may influence the 
willingness of a regional community to deliver a site on 
which to build that project. Because of historical 
experience, such as the wartime experience in the use of 
nuclear technology, communities may attach relative 
importance to the risk of nuclear projects compared with
10. See Starr C., 'Social Benefit Versus Technological 
Risk', Science, Vol.165, September 1969, Meleis M. and 
Erdman R.C., 'The Development of Reactor Siting Based 
on Risk Probability', Nuclear Safety, Vol.13, 1972,
Salem S.C., et al., Issues and Problems in Inferring a 
Level of Acceptable Risk, R-2561-DOE, Rand, Santa 
Monica, August 1980 and Lowrance W., Of Acceptable 
Risk: Science and the Determination of Safety, William 
Kaufmann Inc., Los Altos, 1970.
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that of fossi1-fuelled projects. Even if the benefits of 
both types of plants are similiar, there may be more 
resistance to concluding a settlement with promoters over 
the installation of a nuclear projects.
The perception of risk may vary in a way which is related to 
the familiarity with projects. There is usually more than 
one energy station located at any given site. Initial 
concerns about risk may be high. Perceived risk may fall 
after local communities have become accustomed to the 
environmental risks and the economic benefits associated 
with the construction and operation of projects. As a 
result, there may be less resistance in accepting additional 
projects in localities which have at least one project.
The structure of political party representation in regional 
assemblies may act to impede or facilitate settlement 
processes. Political party ideology affects attitudes 
towards such things as: interest in economic development, 
type of fuel used, and the desired structure of economic and 
social activity. Leftist political parties may oppose 
projects, on ideological grounds, even if there are expected 
to be economic benefits associated with such projects. In 
some situations, leftist groups may be more capable of 
sensitising risk and environmental issues. Consequently, 
regional electorates may be presuaded that the costs of 
projects is high and there may be more resistance to project 
development. It might be expected, other things being 
equal, that settlements would take longer in areas where 
leftist political parties have relatively strong 
representation in regional assemblies.
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Prevailing social attitudes toward the preservation of the 
environment and changes in those attitudes may also 
influence settlement outcomes. Approval times are likely to 
be relatively short in periods where there is strong 
emphasis placed upon high economic growth objectives. The 
emergence of pollution problems associated with industrial 
development generally may change community attitudes so that 
more stress is placed on potential environmental impacts of 
energy facilities. Consequently, approval times would be 
expected to increase.
The time necessary to reach settlements will also be 
influenced by the importance that promoters, such as power 
companies and national governments, place on the development 
of projects in servicing markets for their output. 
Promoters, all other things being equal, are likely to have 
a stronger incentive to develop projects in situations where 
shortages of output from projects are expected to be 
relatively high. Under these conditions, they will, 
presumably, attach high weight to the benefits of developing 
additional capacity so that expected shortages can be 
averted. Project developers that value highly the 
implementation of projects are likely to be more capable of 
providing compensation in order to reach settlements with 
regional electorates.
Modelling distributional influences
The interaction of these distributional effects of project 
implementation will be important in shaping the broad
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bargaining environment within which settlements are 
negotiated. That environment may be more or less conducive 
to rapid settlement, depending on the strength and direction 
of these various influences and the ability of promoters to 
compensate adequately disadvantaged interests.
The relationship between these distributional and other 
influences outlined in the previous section and the 
variation in settlement times can be stated, formally, in 
the following general model:
PAT = f(CRS,PRd,OIsd) (3.1)
where PAT is the public acceptance time or time necessary 
to reach a social and political settlement over the 
development of energy projects,
CRS are the factors that will shape the community 
responses to supplying sites on which to construct 
proj ects,
PR^ are the elements that will influence promoter 
responses to demanding sites on which to develop 
projects, and
0Isd are other factors, such as uncertainty about 
outcomes, the allocation and use of bargaining 
power and changed expectations, which will also 
influence the regional community and promoter 
responses to the development of projects.
The supply of sites will be a function of the factors
isolated above.
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CRS = g(EC,R,RS,LI,SA,OIS) (3.2)
where EC is the environmental cost expected to be incurred 
by the regional community,
R is the perceived level of risks of different types 
of projects,
RS is the effect of the rural sector,
LI is the effect of leftist political party 
representation,
SA is the effect of prevailing social attitudes 
towards the development of projects, and
01s are other factors, such as defined in (3.1) that 
will influence a community's response to reaching a 
settlement.
The demand for sites is, in turn, a function of two main 
elements.
PRd = h(ES,0Id ) (3.3)
where ES is the effect of expected electricity shortfalls 
on a promoters willingness to develop a project, and
0Id are other factors, such as defined in (3.1) that 
will determine a promoter's response to concluding a 
settlement.
It is possible to provide a measure of the relative 
importance of these distributional and other influences on
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the variation in settlement times required to reach social 
and political settlements over the construction of projects. 
Quantification of these distributional elements would allow 
explanation of the variation in settlement times based on 
(3.1) through the use of regression analysis.11 For 
example, it is possible to regress a settlement leadtime 
variable against explanatory variables which provide some 
measure of social and economic opportunities and promoter 
needs in situations where settlements have been reached. A 
per capita income variable may be used as a proxy measure of 
the level of social and economic opportunities. It might be 
expected that settlement times would be longer in situations 
where incomes are relatively high. One hypothesis is that 
communities would likely place relatively less weight on the 
marginal expansion of income and relatively more weight on 
the incremental impairment to the environment arising out of 
project development.
Regression analysis can be employed to indicate the 
proportion of variation in approval times explained by a set 
of quantifiable explanatory variables. Some measurement of 
distributional and other influences, and the regression of a 
leadtime variable on them will allow the estimation of the 
overall strength and direction of a quite complex set of 
influences working in different ways upon project delivery
11. For a discussion of regression techniques, see Draper 
N.R. and Smith H., Applied Regression Analysis, John 
Wiley and Sons Inc., New York, 1966, Kane E.J., 
Economic Statistics and Econometrics: An Introduction
to Quantitative Economics, A Harper International 
Edition, 1969, and Wonnacott R.J.-, and Wonnacott T.H., 
Econometrics, second edition, John Wiley and Sons, New 
York, 1979.
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times. For example, settlement times may tend to be short 
in situations where there are relatively large expected 
electricity shortages. This influence may be qualified by 
the perceived risk involved. Pro- or anti-development 
parties within the community will, in turn, qualify these 
two influences. Hence, on balance, it may be possible to 
estimate the strength and structure of these influences 
through regression analysis.
It is useful and interesting to identify, if possible, the
importance of general distributional influences, as distinct
from site-specific factors, on project settlement times. 
For example, the expected electricity shortage is likely to
be a factor influencing the willingness of promoters to 
develop projects and the speed of settlement at all sites. 
This influence is, therefore, likely to be a general factor 
associated with the degree of difficulty of reaching 
settlements. In contrast, there may be a certain pattern of 
property right ownership unique to a particular site which 
either impedes or facilitates bargaining at that site in a 
way which is not evident at other sites.
A model can be set up with the aim of providing results 
which will assist in the assessment of settlement times. 
The settlement process takes time and, therefore, expected 
distributional influences at the point in time when a 
community is asked to accept a project as well as during the 
settlement process are likely to affect the speed at which 
settlements can be negotiated. Models which examine
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expectations about the distribution of costs and benefits 
during both time periods will be necessary in the assessment 
of settlement times. This approach will provide a way of 
analysing the extent to which approval times can be 
predicted accurately at the point in time when communities 
are asked to accept projects and whether it is also 
important to monitor carefully expectations during the 
settlement process in the assessment of approval times.
The results of the regression analysis could provide a way 
of identifying sites where distributional influences appear 
to be good predictors of delay and areas where they are not. 
The model could be set up with the aim of predicting 
settlement times for each observation based on a fitted 
equation, and to line predicted values up against actual or 
observed settlement times. The residual, the difference 
between the fitted and actual time, provides information on 
the extent to which and the direction in which, the model is 
under- or over-estimating settlement times for each 
observation. The residual, therefore, provides a starting 
point for the analysis of the extent to which other factors, 
such as uncertainty about outcomes, the allocation and use 
of political power, the skill with which bargaining 
strategies are employed, and changing expectations, appear 
to be important in explaining shorter or longer settlement 
times than might be inferred simply from any general 
association between distributional influences and leadtimes. 
These factors are not easily susceptible to quantification 
and cannot be readily incorporated into an econometric model
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yet will influence settlement times in a complex way. It is 
necessary to supplement the regression analysis with case 
history studies. These case studies will allow 
generalisations to be made about the nature and importance 
of a variety of other factors which are likely to impede or 
facilitate settlement processes.
Uncertainty
Distributionally weighted benefits and costs may not be 
known with certainty. There may be a lack of knowledge or 
information about the value of projects. Settlements will 
be affected by uncertainty regarding the expected costs as 
well as the benefits of developing projects. Promoters may 
be uncertain as to the extent of expected economic benefits 
that will accrue as a result of the construction of a 
project. Particular regional community interests may be 
uncertain as to the expected environmental costs that will 
be incurred as a result of the development of a project.
Uncertainty as to expected benefits and costs is likely to 
influence the effectiveness of compensation mechanisms which 
presume known outcomes. If there is a high level of 
uncertainty about costs, higher benefits or more 
compensation may be required to justify the project. It is 
likely that, all other things being equal, settlement 
processes would be longer in situations where uncertainty 
prevails than in situations where community interests are 
completely certain about the expected value of projects. 
Under conditions where a high level of uncertainty prevails,
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regional parties may not be willing to negotiate with 
promoters over the implementation of a project. They may 
demand more information on the nature of costs or more 
compensation to offset those uncertain costs.
The allocation of political resources
\
Even if distributional impacts and the level of uncertainty
were the same for all projects the speed at which the
settlement is reached will be influenced by the allocation
and use of bargaining power. All settlement processes are
biassed because the structure of social and economic power,
however it is ordered, favours some actors over others.
These biasses will confer privileges on some interests in
the use of economic and political resources and this will
determine their ability to influence the settlement 
12process.
The nature and pattern of these biasses will depend on the
I
history of a region's social and economic development ahd 
the decision-making structures that have emerged as a result 
of that history. There will be a structure of property 
right ownership, historical relationships between various 
regional interests, and institutional procedures, such as 
access to decision-making centres, which will give more
12 . See Schattsehneider B.E., The Semi-Sovereign People, 
Holt, Rinehart and Winton, New York, 1960 for a general 
discussion of biasses in political systems.
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weight to certain actors than to others in regional
13decision-making processes.
The structure of property right ownership may confer more 
bargaining power on certain actors than others. Certain 
economic groupings may have legally defined property rights 
which need to be relinquished prior to the development of 
projects. Property right owners are likely, in general, to 
be economically and politically influential in settlement 
outcomes. The ability of these and other interest groups to 
influence bargaining outcomes will be determined by factors 
such as: size, value of output derived from the property 
right; the relative importance of output in the local 
economy; economic structure of the group and established 
relationships with other interests. Approval is likely to
13. Bachrach P., and Baratz M.S., Power and Poverty: Theory 
and Practice, Oxford University Press, London, 1972. 
For analyses of the structure and determinants of 
political power, influence and authority, see Dahl 
R.A., 'The Concept of Power', Behavioural Science, 
Vol.2, July 1957, Dahl R.A., 'The Analysis of Influence 
in Local Communities' in Adrian C.R., Social Science 
and Community Action, East Lansig, Michigan, 1960, 
Schulze R.O., 'The Role of Economic Dominants in 
Community Power Structure', American Sociological 
Review, Vol.23, February 1958, Polsby N.W., 'Three 
Problems in the Analysis of Community Power', American 
Sociological Review, Vol.24, December 1959, Polsby 
N.W., Community Power and Political Theory, second 
edition, Yale University Press, New Haven, 1980, Polsby 
N.W., 'How to Study Community Power: The Pluralist
Alternative', Journal of Politics, Vol.22, August 1960, 
Rossi P., 'Community Decision Making' in Young R., ed., 
Approaches to the Study of Politics, Evanston, 
Illinois, 1958, Wolfinger R., 'Non-Decisions and the 
Study of Local Politics', American Political Science 
Review, Vol.65, December 1971, Merelman R.M., 'On the 
Neo-Elitist Critique of Community Power', American 
Political Science Review, Vol.62, June 1968, Anton T.J. 
'Power, Pluralism and Local Politics', Administrative 
Science Quarterly, Vol.7, March 1963, and Banfield 
E.C., Political Influence, Free Press, New York, 1966.
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be longer in situations where large and powerful property 
right owners expect to incur substantial losses as a result 
of project development.
The structure of the relationships between various community 
actors may also impede or facilitate settlement processes 
independently of interests affected by a particular project. 
Some regional actors may have conflictual relationships with 
others and these relationships may not be related directly 
to issues around settlement on a particular project. 
Factionalism within top echelons of regional decision-making 
units may delay settlement processes even if all the actors 
place a high social and economic value on developing 
projects. In other situations, relationships among 
influential actors in regional political systems may be 
structured in a way which facilitates economic and political 
accommodation, among regional interests with very different 
preferences about particular projects.
Access to key decision-making centres may affect bargaining 
over the development of energy projects. Some interests 
have institutional or political access to regional decision­
making structures. The extent of this access will depend on 
such factors as: the magnitude of electoral support to 
regional and national politicians, the importance of those 
interests in regional economic activity, and relationships 
with other interests. Community interests may be capable of 
influencing directly the settlement process. Access in 
other cases may not be direct and actors may be privileged 
with indirect access by virtue of economic and political 
relationships with others who have direct access to decision
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centres. Affected parties, who have either direct or 
indirect entry into regional decision-making, may be able to 
delay or facilitate bargaining. For example, interests who 
do not stand to incur large losses from project development 
may, be able to, by virtue of their access to political 
decision-making, impede settlement processes.
The effectiveness of bargaining strategies
The effectiveness with which community interests can develop 
and employ economic, political, technical, and informational 
strategies will also be a factor influencing the speed at 
which settlements can be negotiated. These strategies will 
be aimed at altering distributional effects of projects, the 
distribution of social and economic power or both in a way 
which either impedes or facilitates settlement on a 
particular project development.
Suppose there is only one property right owner or that 
regional distributional concerns have been taken into 
account by redistributive mechanisms which are operating 
perfectly. Assume that all bargaining processes are 
independent of each other and that there is no extraneous 
interference in the negotiating process. In principle, 
there could be two extreme bargaining outcomes, or a range 
of outcomes intermediate between the two outcomes. At one 
extreme, there might be an instantaneous settlement where 
promoters value a project very highly and, therefore, could 
be capable of compensating a property right owner 
immediately. At the other extreme, a property right owner
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may not wish a settlement. A property right owner who 
expected very large unfavourable effects from project 
development and had the political capacity to influence the 
settlement process indefinitely would delay to the point 
where the incremental cost of delay to a promoter would be 
so great that alternative locations would be preferred. 
Under these circumstances, a property right owner would not 
wish to reach a settlement, and delay would, in effect, be 
infinite.
In most cases, however, the time necessary to reach
settlements will be somewhere in between these two extreme
cases. Promoters are likely to wish to minimise the amount
of compensation they pay while property right owners are
likely to wish to maximise the amount they receive in return
for relinquishing their property rights. Both private
promoters and regional interests may not be prepared to
reach settlements if they perceive that they can, by
delaying the process, increase their share of the expected
economic surplus generated from the project. For instance,
private promoters would not be willing to negotiate a
settlement quickly with a property right owner if it
assessed that demand for project output was not likely to 
increase in the future.
Scheduling negotiations between regional interests
There will usually be more than one property right owner 
with whom a private promoter has to negotiate. There may, 
say, be two actors with legally defined property rights. 
Under these conditions, promoters will need to consider the
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scheduling of negotiations between, and allocation of the 
compensation among these actors. If negotiations were 
completely independent of each other then, all other things 
being equal, the only factor that would influence settlement 
times, would be the ability of the promoters to organise 
concurrent negotiations.
Bargaining processes may not, however, be totally 
independent and actors may have different bargaining 
strengths. The scheduling of negotiations may have 
important economic and strategic impacts on the positions of 
promoters and property right owners. Promoters may decide 
to negotiate with the weaker actor first. This strategy 
will be advantageous and reduce opposition to the 
settlement.^ The amount paid to a weaker party may act as a 
benchmark for negotiations with the stronger property right 
owner. It will also allow a relatively larger compensation 
pool to be used in reaching a settlement with the stronger 
party.
This strategy may, however, inject instability into 
bargaining and influence the speed of the settlement 
process. The payment of compensation to a weaker interest 
may influence the bargaining relationship between the 
promoter and the stronger property right owner. It may 
strengthen a promoter's position by isolating the stronger 
actor. At the same time, the stronger party may perceive 
that its position is being threatened and may seek to
O'Hare M., 'Not on My Block, You Don't....Faci 1 ity 
Siting and the Strategic Importance of Compensation', 
Public Policy, Vol.25, Fall 1977.
14.
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mobilise resistance to project development. The way in 
which groups respond to potential or actual compensation 
offers injects dynamic bargaining elements into the 
settlement process.
I
Promoters or regional community interests may respond to the 
potential or actual payment of compensation by the 
employment of various strategies aimed at improving their 
bargaining positions. These strategies may include 
economic, political, technical, informational or some 
combination of those elements. These strategies will aim to 
alter the expected distribution of benefits and costs, 
including perceptions of risk and uncertainty, and the 
allocation of political bargaining power.
Third party intervention
Community interests may attempt to alter the existing 
allocation of economic and political biasses by bringing 
third parties who are able to influence bargaining, in a way 
more or less consistent with their preferred outcomes, into 
the settlement process. Whoever they may be, third parties 
will act to mediate between uncompromising interests or to 
exert economic or political pressure on those interests in a 
way which either speeds up or slows down settlement 
processes.
The extent to which third parties, such as government 
officials or politicians, are prepared to enter the 
bargaining process is likely to be determined by the social 
and political value that they place upon the development of
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projects. For instance, prefectural governments, even if 
they place a high social and economic value on projects, may 
not be prepared to promote project implementation because of 
potential political ramifications, such as widespread local 
resistence to prefectural policies or loss of support in 
forthcoming elections. In other cases, national governments 
may enter regional decision-making arenas and attempt to 
facilitate a settlement because of the social and economic 
consequences of not being able to achieve regional and 
national policy objectives.
Alliance and committee formation and maintenance
Community interests will not usually be able to influence
compensation processes unilaterally. They may attempt to
improve their bargaining positions by forming alliances or
developing other forms of organisational relationships, such
as committees, with other regional interests. Community
interests are likely to enter into such arrangements, when
they, in conflict or competition with others, expect to be
able to improve their bargaining positions more effectively
15by joining forces than unilaterally.
15. See Groennings S., Kelley E.W., Leiserson M., eds., The 
Study of Coalition Behaviour: Theoretical Perspectives
and Cases From Four Continents, Holt, Rinehart and 
Winston Inc., New York, 1970, Kelley E.W., 'Techniques 
for Studying Coalition Formation', Midwest Journal of 
Political Science, Vol.12, 1968, Ricker W.H., The
Theory of Political Coalition, Yale University Press, 
New Haven, 1962 and Hinkley B., eds., Coalitions and Time: Cross-Disciplinary Studies, Sage Publications, 
London, 1976, for various analyses of coalition 
formation and maintenance.
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For such arrangements to be formed and maintained, the 
anticipated benefits will need to be greater than the 
costs.^ There are four main elements in the formation and 
maintenance of such relationships. They are situational 
elements, motivational elements, compatibility elements and 
strategic and tactical elements.^ The willingness to make 
trade-offs between or compromise on these four elements is 
likely to be important. For instance, two or more regional 
groupings might be opposing a project independently. 
Entering into an alliance relationship may be expected to 
lead to costs, such as political isolation from mainstream 
interests in the regional electorate and the cost of 
compromise on other issues. The expected benefits in terms 
of being able to delay or cause abandonment of the project 
by joining forces, would need to be greater than the 
potential costs of compromising on other issues for the 
arrangement to be formed. Conversely, such arrangements are 
likely to dissolve when the costs of maintaining them 
exceeds the benefits.-^
The extent to which such organisational arrangements are 
successful in influencing bargaining processes is likely to 
be influenced by their ability to appeal simultaneously and
16. See Groennings S., op.cit., pp.447-457.
17. Refer to Lipsky M., 'Protest as a Political Resource', 
American Political Science Review, Vol.67, December 
1968, for a fuller analysis of the factors which 
determine the effectiveness of protesting.
18. Groennings S., op.cit., pp.447-457.
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effectively to constituencies which actually or potentially 
possess political clout in regional decision-making. These 
include the organisation's own membership base, regional and 
national assemblies, the public at those levels, and other 
regional groups who support the interests of the 
organisation. Efforts to appeal to any of these 
constituencies may be affected by relationships with other 
constituencies.^ For instance, certain members may be 
dependent financially on outside resources, such as 
sub-sidies from prefectural and national government budgets. 
The need to consider the costs of government pressure and 
potential discontinuation of those funds may influence 
positions on a particular project development.
The formation and maintenance of alliance arrangements is 
likely to have a bearing on settlement processes in four 
ways. First, it may isolate certain actors from actual or 
potential negative agents with different preferred 
outcomes.^ Second, it may serve to provide a forum in 
which to discuss and agree on compromises relevant to the 
bargaining process. Third, it is likely to be important in 
managing conflictual relationships within or amongst groups 
which may prevent bargaining. Fourth, it provides a base 
from which to influence actors within the alliance who may 
be affecting adversely the settlement process.
19. Lipsky M., op.cit., p.1144
20. See Bachrach P., and Baratz M.S., op.cit., pp.44-47.
The supply of information
The extent to which community actors can supply relevant
21information may be important in the settlement process. 
The supply of information, depending on the nature and 
content of that information may assist in reducing or
exacerbating uncertainty about the costs and benefits of
\
project development. Information may be supplied by 
interests promoting as well as protagonists opposing 
projects. It may be propagated by a variety of means such 
as through the distribution of pamphlets, personal 
discussion, the media and lecture series.
An important factor influencing the success of information 
strategies will be the ability to use the demonstration 
effect. This is likely to be critical in changing 
perceptions about risks and uncertainty given possible 
confusion about the reliability of divergent sources of 
information. Regional community interests may be more 
prepared to mak,e judgments on the costs and benefits of 
projects after seeing similiar projects in operation than 
through relying on conflicting information which is abstract 
in nature and which may be regarded as more open to 
falsification.
21. The work of Dorothy Nelkin is particularly relevant in 
the area of the role of experts and the supply of 
information in the siting of nuclear power stations. 
See, for example, Nelkin D., 'Technical Expertise as a 
Political Resource: A Power Plant Siting Controversy',
The Bulletin of Atomic Scientists, September 1974, 
Nelkin D., 'The Political Impact of Technical 
Expertise', Social Studies of Science, Vol.5, January, 
1975, and Nelkin D., 'The Politics of Participation and 
the Nuclear Debate: A Comparative Study', Public
Policy, Vol.25, 1977.
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Interests involved in the settlement process may take 
certain individuals and groups within communities to other 
localities where projects are operating or under 
construction and expose information in a way which is 
conducive to the perceptions they are attemptng to 
formulate. For example, promoters will prefer to show 
individuals and groups projects which have relatively good 
safety records. Under those circumstances, they may be able 
to demonstrate to certain individuals and groups that the 
risks of the project are not as great as had been expected 
and that other similiar communities were willing to accept 
those risks in return for the benefits derived from project 
development.
Project design modification
The bargaining strengths of actors may be influenced by the 
extent to which technical and engineering fixes, such as 
design changes, are possible. These may include small 
changes, such as modifying the size of, say, water inlet and 
outlet pipes, to substantial modifications, such as changes 
in plant location within the electorate and the scale of 
projects. Promoters are likely to assess the cost of such 
changes in relation to the benefits in terms of an improved 
bargaining position vis-a-vis certain interests who may be 
delaying project implementation. For example, changes in 
plant location may require purchasing additional land and 
reclamation. At the same time, it will necessitate 
compensating other actors in order to reach settlement. The 
cost of these modifications may be less than the cost of
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delay in negotiating with relatively strong opponents at the 
original location. Changes in plant location may 
substantially weaken the political capacity of actors at an 
original location.
Power project design modifications will increase the 
bargaining position of interests at the new location. The 
extent to which those changes facilitate bargaining at the 
new location will depend on factors such as: the
distribution of costs and benefits; the allocation of 
bargaining power and relationships between communities at 
the old and new locations. There may be resistance by local 
communities to promoters moving projects into other 
administrative units, because of a decline in benefits, such 
as taxes, which accrue from project development. Taxes, 
such as fixed assets taxes and road taxes, are usually 
confined to the administrative unit in which the reactor or 
boiler is located. In these situations, the extent to which 
promoters are willing to compensate communities for loss of 
expected benefits may be important in the determination of 
settlement outcomes.
Regional redistribution
The payment of compensation to property right owners may not 
only influence a promoters bargaining position vis-a-vis 
those interests. It may also affect the bargaining position 
with the local public or sections of that public who may 
argue that certain groups are gaining from project 
development at the expense of the regional community in 
general. Private promoters may not have the capacity to
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bargain with and compensate the whole regional community, 
particularly if there is more than one local electorate 
involved in the settlement process. The extent to which 
other redistributive mechanisms are operating effectively 
may, therefore, have an important impact on the time 
necessary to reach settlements.
Private promoters may not be the only actors capable of 
compensating regional communities for losses expected to be 
incurred as a result of project development. Other 
communities, such as prefectural or state, or national 
communities, may be willing to redistribute some of the 
expected surplus from projects to regional communities in 
order to speed up settlement processes. This may be in the 
form of direct compensation or subsidies to regional 
communities. Alternatively, it may be in the form of 
indirect subsidies to private promoters who can use the 
funds to increase their compensation pools. These 
mechanisms, whether direct or indirect, act to increase the 
share of the economic surplus which can actually be 
redirected to regional communities.
A major objective of such subsidies is to reduce potential 
or actual community resistance to project development by 
providing funds for the purpose of developing social 
community capital such as road, parks and hospitals. Public 
resistance to projects may emerge during property right 
negotiations. The community may argue that property right 
owners are receiving benefits from project development at 
their expense. It may, therefore, require benefits, such as
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the provision of public goods, in return for their approval 
of the project. The willingness of promoters to respond to 
such community demands may influence the speed of 
settlement.
Even if payment is guaranteed by institutional arrangements, 
the degree to which it is effective in shortening settlement 
times may also depend on the timing of payment. For example, 
these mechanisms may be designed to facilitate community 
acceptance by providing payment after settlement has been 
reached. Regional communities may be able to argue 
effectively that such mechanisms only provide potential 
benefit and that prior benefit will be required to secure 
community approval. They may take into account the 
increased compensation pools of private promoters and delay 
may occur while they pressure private promoters into 
negotiating separate community compensation arrangements.
The revision of expectations
During the settlement process expectations about the value
of projects and the bargaining positions of actors may 
change. Revised expectations may occur as a result djf
events exogenous to and, therefore, not under the control of 
interests participant to bargaining process. These changes 
may lead to a divergence between what was expected to occur 
and what actually occurs. The extent to which actors are 
capable of taking into account such changes may influence 
expected benefit-cost ratios and, consequently, may 
influence the speed at which settlements take place.
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Those with property rights, for example, may, for some 
reason, revise their estimates of the future value of their 
rights. The benefits of receiving compensation may then be 
seen in an important mechanism for diversifying into 
alternative forms of employment. The speed at which 
property right owners revise expectations about the value of 
property rights may influence the time required to reach a 
settlement. All other things being equal, it might be 
expected that owners will wish to reach settlements more 
quickly in situations where expectations about the value of 
property rights are revised downwards.
Promoters may also revise their expectations about the value 
of projects. The demand for project output may change due 
to market forces. It may also change due to revised 
promoter or national policy objectives with respect to the 
development of projects. Economic or policy related factors 
may lead to a downward revision expected demand for project 
output. Under these conditions, promoters may prefer 
intentionally to delay reaching settlements with regional 
communities.
Scheduling negotiations between projects
The settlement process at any particular locality may not 
simply be a function of economic and political bargaining 
between promoters and regional communities at that location. 
Project promoters may be attempting to reach settlements 
simultaneously with communities in other localities in order 
to develop projects to meet demand for project output. 
Delay in reaching a bargain with any one electorate may be
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influenced by the scheduling of projects at alternative 
locations.
The extent to which promoters are prepared to reschedule 
project development is likely to depend on the re-assessment 
of the relative costs of the development of projects at 
alternative locations. Among other factors, this will be 
influenced by the size of the project in relation to 
expected demand for output, the availability of purchasing 
output from alternative sources, the relative construction 
costs of competing projects, broad promoter project 
management policy, and the relative compensation 
requirements in reaching a settlement with the other 
electorate.
Promoters may delay settlement processes at a location if 
they re-assess that the costs of locating and constructing 
projects at alternative locations are smaller. For 
instance, a promoter, after revising benefit-cost 
calculations, may prefer to attach priority to developing an 
alternative project with a relatively smaller construction 
cost or a shorter leadtime. This may influence the 
settlement process at the former site because promoters 
could delay the process while not compromising on the supply 
of project output.
The assessment of delay
Standard CBA, while useful for some purposes, such as 
ranking the development of projects in terms of economic 
efficiency criteria, does not provide an adequate and
Ill
reliable framework for assessing settlement times or the 
social and political factors influencing varation in those 
times. The approach can be extended to incorporate 
compensation management and other 'non-economic' factors and 
to provide a more comprehensive framework for examining the 
times taken to reach settlement over the construction of 
projects. A critical element is focussing on the 
distributional effects of projects and, hence, the 
effectiveness of compensation mechanisms in explaining why 
public acceptance at some sites takes more or less longer 
than at other sites.
The need for a settlement process arises out of a disparity 
between the value of projects to promoters and regional 
communities. The process takes varying amounts of time, and 
is characterised by bargaining between promoter and regional 
community interests over an acceptable distribution of costs 
and benefits expected to accrue as a result of project 
development. The distribution of social and economic costs 
and benefits will determine the extent to which aggregate 
benefits exceed costs or the economic surplus which is 
available for redistribution from promoters to regional 
interests in order to conclude a settlement. Compensation 
mechanisms are not likely to work effectively and 
settlements are likely to take longer where there sis little 
economic surplus available for redistribution and where 
those mechanisms do not or cannot take into account fully 
the distributional influences on affected parties consequent 
to a particular project development.
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It is possible to develop a model for providing some measure
of the overall importance of distributional effects such as:
the expected environmental costs of projects, the size of
the rural sector, the ideological orientation of the
community, the risks of different types of projects,
prevailing social attitudes toward preservation of the
environment, and the need to install additional capacity to
meet expected electricity demand on the variation in times
taken to reach settlements over the construction of energy
projects in Japan. The model can be set up to identify
areas where distributional influences appear to be good
predictors of delay and areas where they are not. It,
therefore, provides a useful starting point for the analysis 
of other factors, such as uncertainty about outcomes and the
allocation and use of political power, the effectiveness
with which bargaining strategies are employed and changing
expectations which will assist in the assessment of why some
projects take longer or shorter times than average
settlement times to implement. These latter factors are not
readily susceptible to statistical measurement, yet may be
important in determining settlement outcomes in certain
situations.
The following chapter attempts to quantify and provide a 
statistical measure of the relative importance of 
distributional and other influences on project construction 
start-up times. It considers the extent to which 
econometric models are useful in the evaluation of public 
acceptance times. The chapter also identifies areas which 
will be subject to case history study analyses, considers
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the extent to which they are predicted accurately by the 
model and sets the focus for the case studies in chapters 5 
to 8.
I
4
THE MEASUREMENT OF DISTRIBUTIONAL INFLUENCES
Expectations about the distribution of costs and benefits 
affect the responses of both promoters and regional 
communities toward developing or accepting energy power 
projects. These responses act to facilitate and impede 
settlement processes over the construction of both nuclear 
and fossi1-fue1led energy facilities. It is possible to 
measure quantitatively the social and economic factors which 
are likely to shape promoter and regional community 
responses to energy projects and, through regression 
analysis, to provide a measure of the relative importance of 
distributional influences on settlement times. The 
development of siting models which aim to examine 
systematically these and other influences, such as political 
influences, will be useful in assessing the degree to which 
sensible predictions about settlement times can be made.
Despite the complexities of the relationship between the 
distribution of benefits and costs and settlement times, 
there are important generalisations which can be made about 
the nature and importance of distributional influences on 
settlement times. The responses to the development of 
energy projects will depend on the structure of the regional 
political economy and the need for promoters to install 
projects to meet forecast electricity demand increases. 
Evidence is presented to support five major propositions. 
First, settlement times will be shorter in prefectures 
where incomes are rising relatively quickly and there are
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e x p e c t a t i o n s  f o r  c o n t i n u e d  e x p a n s i o n  o f  t h o s e  i n c o m e s .  
S e c o n d ,  a p p r o v a l  t i m e s  t e n d  t o  b e c o m e  l o n g e r  a f t e r  t h e  e a r l y  
1 9 7 0 s ,  a p e r i o d  w h e r e  s o c i a l  a t t i t u d e s  s t a r t e d  t o  p l a c e  
e m p h a s i s  on e n v i r o n m e n t a l  q u a l i t y  and w e l f a r e .  T h i r d ,  t i m e s  
f o r  w i n n i n g  c o n s e n s u s  a r e  l o n g e r  i n  s i t u a t i o n s  w h e r e  
e l e c t r i c i t y  s h o r t a g e s  a r e  f o r e c a s t  t o  b e  r e l a t i v e l y  
i n s i g n i f i c a n t .  F o u r t h ,  s e t t l e m e n t  t i m e s  a r e  g e n e r a l l y  
s h o r t e r  f o r  s u b s e q u e n t  p a c k a g e s  b e c a u s e  t h e  l o c a l  e c o n o m y  
b e c o m e s  d e p e n d e n t  on c o n t i n u e d  p l a n t  c o n s t r u c t i o n  a nd  t h e  
c o m m u n i t y  b e c o m e s  f a m i l i a r  w i t h  e n e r g y  p r o j e c t s  o p e r a t i n g  i n  
t h e i r  e l e c t o r a t e s .  T h i s  i s  q u a l i f i e d  b y  r e l a t i v e l y  m o r e  
r e s i s t a n c e  i n  s i t u a t i o n s  w h e r e  t h e  r u r a l  s e c t o r  i s  
r e l a t i v e l y  l a r g e ,  b e c a u s e  o f  a d d i t i o n a l  p e r c e i v e d  
e n v i r o n m e n t a l  d e g r a d a t i o n  f ro m s u b s e q u e n t  p a c k a g e s .  F i f t h ,  
a p p r o v a l  t i m e s  f o r  n u c l e a r  p r o j e c t s  a r e  l o n g e r  i n  s i t u a t i o n s  
w h e r e  t h e  r u r a l  s e c t o r  i s  r e l a t i v e l y  l a r g e  a n d  w h e r e  
l e f t i s t  p o l i t i c a l  p a r t y  r e p r e s e n t a t i o n  i s  r e l a t i v e l y  h i g h .  
The  r e s i s t a n c e  t o  n u c l e a r  p r o j e c t s  a p p e a r s  t o  b e  c o u n t e r ­
b a l a n c e d  b y  c o m m u n i t y  s u p p o r t  f o r  t h o s e  p r o j e c t s  i n  
s i t u a t i o n s  w h e r e  t h e r e  a r e  s t r o n g  e x p e c t a t i o n s  f o r  c o n t i n u e d  
e c o n o m i c  g r o w t h .
T h e s e  g e n e r a l i s a t i o n s  a p p e a r  t o  e x p l a i n  a c o n s i d e r a b l e  
p r o p o r t i o n  o f  t h e  t i m e  r e q u i r e d  t o  r e a c h  s o c i a l  a n d  
p o l i t i c a l  a g r e e m e n t  o v e r  t h e  c o n s t r u c t i o n  o f  e n e r g y  p r o j e c t s  
i n  J a p a n .  The  m o d e l s  d e v e l o p e d  i n  t h i s  c h a p t e r  a p p e a r  t o  
p r o v i d e  a r e a s o n a b l y  g o o d  b a s i s  u p o n  w h i c h  t o  e v a l u a t e  
s e t t l e m e n t  t i m e s .  P r e d i c t i v e  m o d e l s ,  w h i c h  a t t e m p t  t o  u s e  
i n f o r m a t i o n  a b o u t  e x p e c t a t i o n s  p r i o r  t o  or  a t  t h e  t i m e  o f  a 
d e c i s i o n  t o  l o c a t e  p o w e r  p l a n t s ,  a r e  u s e f u l  i n  a s s e s s i n g
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public acceptance times. These assessments can be improved 
if influences upon expectations during the settlement 
process are also taken into account and monitored carefully.
These models can be set up to allow for the analysis of 
other factors, such as uncertainty, the allocation and use 
of political power, the effectiveness with which bargaining 
strategies are employed and changing expectations, which are 
not readily quantifiable, yet will also presumably influence 
the speed at which settlements can be negotiated. The 
models identify areas where distributional influences are 
good predictors of delay and areas where they are not. The 
extent to which these models under- or over-estimate 
settlement times can be examined by considering the 
residuals between fitted or estimated times and actual 
times. These residuals provide a useful starting point for 
the analysis of other factors, such as changing 
expectations, which will also affect settlement processes. 
Case study analysis will allow generalisations to be made 
about the nature and importance of these other factors and 
this will improve the ability to evaluate energy facility 
construction start-up times.
Modelling distributional influences
There are three steps in the regression analysis introduced 
in Chapter 3 which aims to assess the importance of 
distributional influences on the variation in public 
acceptance times. The first is the formal specification of 
the variables which provide surrogate measures of 
distributional influences. The second is developing
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hypotheses as to their expected relationships with 
settlement times. The third is estimating the co-efficients 
of the variables and testing the hypotheses developed. In 
the development of a comprehensive siting model, a number of 
different regression models will need to be considered. The
models will take into account power plant characteristics,
\
such as fuel type and package number, and the value of the 
variables at distinct stages, such as before the 
commencement of negotiations and during the settlement 
process.
A Model for assessing public acceptance times
The factors which are expected to influence settlement times 
and outlined in Chapter 3 in 3.1 can be specified in the 
following way:
PAT =f[EC(IN,LFI),RS(PC,PE),R(F,PN),LI,SA, 
I ES(ESn9,ESPc ),0Isd] (4.1)
where PAT is public acceptance time measured in Chapter 2 
and, defined as the time from a company decision to 
locate a power plant to the time of Denchoshin 
approval,
EC is the expected environmental cost associated with the 
development of energy projects and will be a function of two 
main elements
EC = fh (lN,LFl) (4.2)
where IN is per capita income,
LFI is a local financial index, or the ratio of tax
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revenue from regional sources to expenditure on public 
goods by regional government;
RS is the response of the rural sector to accepting an 
energy project and will be determined by the following 
function:
RS = f^PC^PE) (4.3)
where PF is the number of persons employed in the rural 
sector as a proportion of the total number of persons 
employed, and
PC is primary product per capita as a ratio of total 
product per capita,
R is the risk involved in accepting different types of 
projects and will be determined by the following equation:
R = f3(f ,PN) (4.4)
where F is fuel category such as nuclear or fossil-fuelled 
and
PN is package number such as initial or 
subsequent package, ^
LI is the ratio of Japan Communist Party (JCP) and Japan 
Socialist Party (JSP) assembly seats to total assembly 
seats,
It will be recalled from Chapter 2 that power projects 
in this study are not treated as individual units but 
as packages where a package can consist of one or more 
power plants. The first package of plants at any given 
site is defined as an initial package. A subsequent 
package is where project development is attempted at a 
location where there is at least one plant in the 
licensing stage, under construction or operating.
1.
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SA is the time period in which the settlement was 
negotiated,
ES are promoter expectations about future electricity 
shortages, and will be determined by the following function:
ES = fk (ESPc,ESn9) (4.5)
where ESPC is the expected electricity shortage in power 
company spheres,
E S n 9 is the national government's expected 
electricity shortage in regional electricity
spheres, 2 and
O I sd is the residual or the summary measure of the 
importance of other factors influencing the willingness and 
ability of regional communities and promoters to negotiate 
over the development of power projects and includes factors 
such as: changing expectations, uncertainty about outcomes,
the allocation and use of political power, and the 
effectiveness with which bargaining strategies are employed.
The backward regression technique, contained in the SPSS 
statistical package was used to estimate the co-efficients 
of the variables expected to influence public acceptance 
times and to test the hypotheses developed. Backward 
regression enters all the selected variables into the model, 
deletes the most insignificant variable and continues this 
process until only variables with a significance level of 90 
per cent or above remain in the model.
2. Refer to Map 2.2 in Chapter 2 which shows power company 
and national government electricity spheres.
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Table 4.1 illustrates the extensions of (4.1) that will be 
considered. The first distinction which is made is that 
between predictive and explanatory models. The predictive 
model considers how much of the variation in public 
acceptance times can be explained in terms of the conditions 
at the point in time when a power company makes a decision 
to locate an energy project in a particular area, given 
available information about expectations at that time. This 
model takes the value of the variables prior to or at the 
time of the decision to locate a power plant.3 The 
explanatory model, in contrast, takes into account 
conditions during the settlement process and considers the 
proportion of variation in public acceptance times which can 
be explained in terms of these.4 The evaluative model takes 
into account pre-site selection conditions as well as 
conditions which change during the course of settlement.
3. In the predictive model, information relating to social 
and economic conditions is considered for a three year 
period prior to a power company decision to locate a 
project in a particular area. An alternative ana, 
perhaps more appropriate period for assessing social 
and economic conditions, is from the time of the 
previous election prior to the decision to locate the 
project. This may provide a better assessment of 
regional expectations before the commencement of the 
negotiating process as those expectations would likely 
be shaped by the electoral process of deciding between 
alternative leaders. There are, however, several 
measurement problems with this approach to assessing 
regional expectations. Prefectural and local elections 
are not held concurrently; many elections on the 
regional level are uncontested; and in some cases data 
for the relevant explanatory variable is not available 
in the election year. While the three year cut-off 
point is arbritary, it does give some indication of 
trends in social and economic conditions prior to the 
settlement process.
Expectations during the settlement process are 
considered from the year a power company decided to 
locate a project to the year when Denchöshin approval 
was given to develop that project.
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In the basic predictive and explanatory models, the 
influence of the variables on public acceptance times is 
presumed to have the same direction and magnitude 
irrespective of the characteristics of energy projects, such 
as fuel type and package number. Certain variables may, 
however, have stronger or weaker influences on settlement 
times when facility characteristics are taken into account.5 
There is, therefore, a requirement to allow for different 
plant characteristics such as fuel category and package 
number.
The development of the comprehensive model consisted of a 
number of steps. The first was the development of a basic 
predictive model which used data prior to or at the time of 
a decision to locate a power project at a particular site. 
The second was the elaboration of two models which took into 
account effects of both fuel category and package number. 
The models which allowed for the effects of fuel category 
and package number were then considered together with
5. Ideally, projects with different characteristics should 
be treated in separate regression models. A relatively 
small number of observations for each plant category in 
this study prevents this separate treatment. However, 
it is possible to consider facilities with different 
characteristics within the one general model. This is 
done with the use of dummy variables which indicate 
plant types such as fuel category and package number. 
For example, to consider nuclear and fossi1-fue1led 
projects, a value of zero and one are assigned to a 
dummy variable (F) which indicates nuclear and fossil- 
fuelled projects respectively. This is multiplied by 
the value of the relevant explanatory variable, say the 
per capita income variable, and then the regression is 
run. The final result will show the effect of income 
on fossi1-fue1led projects, as the value of income 
multiplied by zero (the dummy variable for nuclear 
projects) will be zero. By comparison with the nuclear 
case, the effects of the income variable on fossil- 
fuelled projects can, therefore, be considered.
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statistically significant variables remaining in the basic 
predictive model. Statistically significant variables in 
each of the three models were pooled to generate the 
intermediate predictive model. The same procedure was used 
to yield the explanatory model which incorporates post-site 
selection data. The intermediate predictive and explanatory 
models were then pooled to generate the evaluative model.
Quantifying distributional influences
The next step in the analysis is specifying fully the 
explanatory variables, considering ways of measuring the 
variables and developing hypotheses about their 
relationships with public acceptance times. There is a need 
to consider variables identified in 4.1 together with the 
added variables which take into account facility 
characteristics such as fuel type and package number. Two 
points need to be noted with respect to the development of 
the hypotheses. The first is that because of the large 
number of variables only the statistically significant 
variables will be discussed. The second is that a number of 
hypotheses cannot be posited appriori. Under these 
circumstancs, competing propositions are discussed.
The time required to reach settlements over the construction 
of energy power stations will be influenced by the 
willingness of regional communities and promoters to accept 
and develop those projects. These responses will be 
determined by the distribution of costs and benefits 
expected to accrue from a particular project development. 
The distribution of costs and benefits will shape the broad
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bargaining environment within which settlements take place. 
The bargaining environment will act as a positive or 
negative catalyst in the negotiating process.
Basic influences
Prefectural per capita income (IN) can be used as a measure 
of the wealth of an electorate. The hypothesis is that 
settlement times would be longer in areas where incomes were 
relatively high. The communities in those prefectures are 
likely to place less weight on a marginal increase in 
income. At the same time, they will, presumably, place more 
weight on the destruction of the physical and social 
environment which might be expected from the development of 
a project. Prefectural communities, are likely to be less 
willing to offer sites for energy projects where incomes are 
relatively high. Consequently, other things being equal, 
settlements are likely to take longer.
The trend rate of growth in prefectural per capita income 
(R.IN) may be used as a measure of expectations about future 
income opportunities.6 As noted in Chapter 3, there are two
6. The trend rate of growth for the income and other 
variables is a measure of the average annual rate of 
growth in the relevant variable, say x, over a period 
between, say t1, the starting year and t2, the 
finishing year. The formula that is used to calculate 
the trend rate of growth is as follows:
Trg
where
t 1
t 2
„1
Trg is the trend rate of growth, 
is the starting year, 
is the final year,
is the value of the relevant variable in t1, and 
is the value of the relevant variable in t2.(cont)
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alternative hypotheses about the relationship between the 
growth in per capita income and public acceptance times. 
This first is an extension of the above proposition and 
would suggest that settlement times are likely to be longer 
in situations where incomes are expected to rise rapidly. 
The second proposition is that income growth is associated 
negatively with public acceptance times. In prefectures 
where incomes are growing rapidly, the community may come to 
expect a continued expansion of those incomes. They may 
direct their attention to the benefits of rapid growth and 
there may be a lag in anticipating any environmental 
degradation associated with project development. 
Consequently, there may be less opposition to the 
construction of projects.
The local financial index (LFI) or the ratio of tax revenues 
from regional sources to expenditure on public goods by 
regional government can be regarded as a proxy measure of 
the ability of regional government to deliver public goods, 
such as administrative services and social overhead capital, 
to their respective electorates independently of outside 
financial assistance.7 a relatively low value of the
6 . In the predictive model, t^ is a point in time three 
years prior to the decision to locate a power plant and 
t^ is the year the negotiating process began. In the 
evaluative model, t^ is the year the power company made 
a decision to locate the particular project and t^ is 
the year Denchoshin approval was given to construct 
that project.
See Ishibara N., eds., Shichöson no tame no sögo zaisei 
shindan no shuhö [A Diagnosis of Financial Measures for 
Regional Electorates], Daiichi höki, Tokyo, 1979, 
pp.65-67.
7 .
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financial index would suggest that a regional government 
does not have autonomy in providing public goods despite a 
community demand for them.
Large revenues in the form of fixed assets tax and other 
taxes accompany the construction of energy projects. It 
would, therefore, be anticipated that communities would be 
persuaded more easily to accept projects in areas where the 
value of the financial index was relatively low. In those 
areas, there may be a relatively strong incentive to offer 
energy sites in order to improve the ability of regional 
government to fulfill community expectations for public 
goods and services. The need for such goods may dominate 
the expected physical and social environmental costs of 
projects, and, therefore, there is likely to be less 
resistance to the development of energy projects.
The ratio of prefectural primary product per capita to total 
prefectural product per capita (PC) may be taken to indicate 
the productive capacity of the rural sector relative to 
other sectors in the regional economy.® Settlement times 
would be expected to be longer in areas where rural sector 
productive capabilities were relatively high. The rural 
sector in these areas is likely to give higher priority to 
preventing damage to factors of production, such as land and 
water resources, and less to the benefits of increasing the
It should be noted that the level of prefectural 
primary product per capita can be influenced by 
subsidies and other support programs. Nonetheless, it 
does provide a relatively good indicator of the 
productive capacity of the rural sector.
8 .
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productive capacity of the economy in general. The rural 
sector would be less tempted to offer energy sites in 
relatively productive rural areas.
The ratio of persons employed in primary industry to total 
persons employed (PE) may be considered as a measure of the 
level of employment opportunities in the rural sector 
relative to non-rural sectors. Public acceptance times are 
likely to be longer in communities where rural employment 
opportunities are relatively high. The rural sector in 
these areas would be expected to place less importance on 
the expansion of employment opportunities arising out of 
project development and more weight on the anticipated 
environmental impairment which may affect adversely existing 
employment opportunities in that sector. Consequently, 
there is likely to be more resistance to offering energy 
sites in areas where there are relatively good employment 
opportunities in the primary sector.
The ratio of JCP and JSP to conservative prefectural 
assembly seats (LI) may be used as a measure for the 
relative strength of leftist parties to conservative parties 
in prefectural assemblies.9 Negotiating public acceptance
9. The JCP and JSP are not the only opposition parties 
that become involved in and sometimes oppose the 
development of energy and, in particular, nuclear 
projects. In some cases, the Komeitö [Clean Government 
Party] and the Minshatö [Democratic Socialist Party] in 
addition to a wide range of other smaller regional 
political parties, oppose the development of energy 
projects. These opposition parties are, however, 
relatively small and, in general, do not play critical 
roles in establishing anti-siting movements. This 
observation is based on extensive interviews with 
officials of political parties in Japan about their 
attitudes and responses toward the development of 
energy projects during ±982 and 1983.
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is likely to be more difficult in electorates where leftist 
party representation is relatively high.^ The JCP and JSP 
and their respective constituencies usually attach higher 
significance to the environmental costs of energy projects 
and usually act to sensitise the public to those costs. 
Electorates with higher leftist party representation are 
likely to be more opposed to reaching settlements with 
promoters over the construction of energy facilities and, as 
a result, settlement times are likely to be longer in areas 
displaying these political characteristics.
The characteristics of energy projects, such as the type of 
plant and package number, may be used as proxy measures of 
the level of perceived community risk involved in accepting 
power plants. The plant fuel type (F), indicated by a dummy 
variable of zero for nuclear and one for fossi1-fue1led 
plants may be used as a proxy measure of the nature of risk 
involved in the development of nuclear and fossil-fuelled 
power stations. It would be expected, other things being 
equal, that the settlement process would take longer in 
communities being asked to give approval for nuclear energy 
projects. Because of the Japanese historical experience
10. This proposition presumes that the number of seats a 
particular political party occupies in a regional 
assembly is closely associated with their political 
strength, In Japan there is disproportionate 
representation between the Liberal Democratic Party 
(LDP) and opposition parties. The LDP can therefore 
win a relatively large number of seats even though 
their electoral strength may be relatively low. The 
ratio of JCP and JSP to conservative prefectural 
assembly seats does, however, provide some measure of 
the overall political strength of leftist political 
parties in regional politics.
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with atomic weapons, regional electorates are likely to 
place a higher weight on the risks of nuclear projects 
relative to their fossil-fuelled counterparts. As a result, 
there is likely to be less enthusiasm for providing sites 
for the development of nuclear energy stations.
The package number (PN), indicated by a dummy variable of 
zero for initial packages and one for subsequent packages 
may be regarded as a surrogate measure of the familiarity 
with the risk involved in energy projects. It would be 
anticipated that public acceptance times would be shorter 
for subsequent packages relative to initial packages. There 
is likely to be more familiarity with the risk of energy 
projects after they have been operating for some time. At 
the same time, there is likely to be concern about the 
reduction in benefits, such as employment opportunities, 
after initial projects have been constructed. Consequently, 
other things being equal, there is likely to be a stronger 
community incentive to offering sites for subsequent power 
plants.
Different climates of opinion about environmental costs at 
different times (SA) will affect settlement times. The 
particular period in which settlement were reached may be 
measured by a dummy variable of zero for projects completed 
before 1969 and one for projects completed after that year. 
Other things being equal, settlement times are likely to be 
longer in the post 1969 period relative to the period prior 
to 1969. After the late 1960s, there was a marked shift in 
Japanese attitudes away from high economic growth toward
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stress on welfare and the environment.il This change in 
community attitude was attributable directly to the more 
general emergence of pollution problems and a number of 
nuclear accidents which increased the concern about thermal 
pollution and the safety of nuclear energy. It would be
expected that regional communities/ after 1969/ became less
\
willing to offer sites for the development of energy 
facilities.
On the site demand side, expected electricity shortages (ES)
are likely to influence the willingness of both private
power companies and the national government toward the
development of energy projects. Predicted five year
electricity demand minus projected three year supply
capacity may be used as a surrogate measure of expected
electricity shortages. During any one year, there are
likely to be a number of plants either in the licensing
stage or under construction. As noted in Chapter 2, there
is a reasonable amount of preditabi 1 ity in energy power
plant leadtimes after Denchöshin approval and electricity
planners are usually confident that three year projected
capacity targets will be met. The divergence between
expected five year demand and projected three year supply,
therefore, provides some measure of the magnitude of
12expected electricity shortages.
11. This shift in Japanese attitudes did not occur 
instantaneously; it occured over a period of time from 
the late 1960s. The year of 1969 does, however, 
provide a reasonably good indication of when attitudes 
toward the environment in Japan started to change.
12. Five year demand and three year supply projections 
were the only data available to the author. The (cont)
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It would be expected, other things being equal, that 
settlement times would be shorter in situations where 
estimated three to five year electricity shortages were 
relatively high. Under these conditions, promoters are 
likely to attach more weight to the rapid implementation of 
energy projects to equilibrate electricity markets. Because 
of this they would presumably be prepared to incur greater 
costs in persuading regional communities to accept those 
projects and are likely to be more willing to pay 
compensation to regional communities. Consequently 
settlement times would be expected to be shorter.
Influence of fuel type and package number
The basic influences outlined above are presumed to 
influence settlement times in the same way for all types of 
energy facilities. Certain variables may, however, have a 
stronger or weaker influence on settlement times when 
facility characteristics are taken in account. There is, 
therefore, a need to consider, within both the predictive 
and explanatory models, effects of these influences on 
energy stations with different characteristics, such as fuel 
type and package number.
12. use of these projections presumes that power company 
capacity expansion plans are based on a five year time 
horizon. It is likely that power companies would have 
longer time horizons as average fossi1-fuelled and 
nuclear leadtimes are 75 and 153 months respectively. 
Nonetheless, five year expected electricity shortages 
do provide some indication of the need for power 
companies to install new capacity. Imformation 
obtained from the Tokyo Electric Power Company in 1983.
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Fuel type
The influences significant to fuel category are per capita 
income, the share of primary product per capita to total 
product per capita and the ratio of JSP and JCP prefectural 
assembly seats to total assembly seats. The variable IN*F 
indicates the effects of per capita income with respect to 
different fuel categories. The weight attached to the 
immediate environmental impairment by communities directly 
affected is likely to be greater in the case of fossil- 
fuelled projects than nuclear projects. Fossil-fuelled 
plants have been located close to large cities and towns 
with comparatively high levels of pollution. Those 
communities will presumably place more emphasis on the 
adverse effects of projects on the environment and less on 
the increase in income opportunities. In contrast, nuclear 
projects are generally located in rural areas with 
relatively low levels of pollution.-*-3 There is, therefore, 
likely to be a higher weighting placed on developmental 
benefits from the construction of nuclear projects and less 
on the potential immediate environmental costs of those 
projects.
The variable PC*F may be used to consider the varying 
response of the rural sector to nuclear and fossil-fuelled 
power plants. There is usually concern within the rural
13. See Seisaku kagaku kenkyujC, Chiiki betsu enerugii 
kosuto no chiiki kaihatsu köka ni kansuru chösa 
[Research on the Effects of Energy Costs and Regional 
Development by Prefecture], Seisaku kagaku kenkyujo, 
Tokyo, CR-80-30, 1981 for an analysis of the location 
of energy power plants in Japan in relation to the 
social and economic characteristics of those locations.
133
sector that an accident at a nuclear installation will lead
to rumours about the contamination of rural produce grown
and distributed in the prefecture and that those rumours
1 4will reduce the economic value of the produce. 
Consequently, there is likely to be stronger resistance by 
the rural sector to delivering sites for nuclear power 
projects as compared to fossi1-fuelled projects.
The variable LI*F can be used to measure the relative 
importance of leftist party influence in the determination 
of nuclear and fossil-fuelled project public acceptance 
times. It might be expected that leftist party opposition 
would be stronger in lengthening settlement times in the 
case of nuclear relative to fossi1-fue1led power plants. 
Leftist groups generally place a high emphasis on the risks 
associated with nuclear energy stations. In contrast, they 
tend to place less emphasis on the environmental cost 
associated with fossil-fuelled power plants. Other things 
being equal, there is likely to be more resistance to 
nuclear plants compared to fossi1-fue1led plants in areas 
where JCP and JSP political party representation is 
relatively high.
Package type
The variables which are significant to package number are 
the local financial index, the number of persons employed in 
the prefectural primary industry as a proportion of total
14. Information received from officials in MITI, the 
electric power industry, and Zenkoku gyögyö rengökai 
[Federation of Fishing Co-operativesQ in 1983.
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persons employed, the year in which the settlement was 
negotiated and expected electricity shortages in national 
government electricity spheres. The relative importance of 
the financial capacity of regional government in the 
determination of settlement times for initial and subsequent 
packages can be measured by the variable FI*PN. It would be 
expected that the incentive to accept power stations would 
be stronger for subsequent packages relative to initial 
packages. The construction of initial packages sets into 
motion a revenue surge which is mainly used for the 
development of public facilities. The financial benefits, 
such as fixed asset taxes, decline rapidly after the 
construction of initial power plants. Consequently, the 
capacity of regional government to provide funds for the 
further development of public facilities and the 
maintainence of those facilities declines. ^  As a result, 
the financial incentive to accepting energy projects is 
likely to be a stronger influence associated with shorter 
public acceptance times for subsequent packages.
The variable PE*PN can be used to illustrate the relative 
importance of rural sector employment opportunities in the 
determination of settlement times with respect to initial 
and subsequent packages. The response of the rural sector 
toward initial and subsequent packages will depend on 
perceptions of the risk involved in accepting those 
different packages. The primary sector employment influence
See Seisaku kagaku kenkyujC, op.cit., for a discussion 
of the problem of declining fixed assets taxes after 
the completion of construction of energy power plants 
in Japan.
15 .
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is likely to be a stronger influence in lengthening public 
acceptance times for subsequent relative to initial 
packages, if accidents occur and rural producers learn that 
power plants are more dangerous than initially feared. On 
the other hand, if no accidents occur, rural producers may 
judge that they were, initially, unrealistically fearful of 
projects and may become familiar with power plants operating 
in their vicinity. Consequently, they may be less concerned 
about the risks of subsequent packages.
The variable SA*PN can be taken as a measure of the relative 
importance of the change in regional social attitudes toward 
environmental quality after the late 1960s in the 
determination of public acceptance times for initial and 
subsequent packages. As noted in the previous section, the 
emergence of pollution problems in the late 1960s heightened 
concern about the quality of the environment. The extent to 
which public acceptance times for subsequent packages are 
shorter than for initial packages after the late 1960s will 
depend on the degree to which the familiarity with risk is 
offset against in general concern about the quality of the 
environment. In general, subsequent packages are likely to 
be more readily accepted if communities felt that they had 
become familiar with the risks involved in having projects 
operating in their vicinity despite a concern about the 
possible environmental degradation associated with the 
development of additional packages. Public acceptance times 
for subsequent packages are likely to be longer in 
situations where communities judged that they could not
136
become familiar with the higher risk involved in accepting 
additional projects.
The variable R.ESn9*PN may be used as an indicator of the 
relative impact of the growth of electricity shortages in 
national government electricity spheres on public 
acceptances times with regard to initial and subsequent 
packages. The response of the national government towards 
initial and subsequent packages in situations where 
electricity shortages are forecast to be large is likely to 
be a function of the relative value attached to developing 
those projects. The costs of initial packages are likely to 
be higher than subsequent packages because of the need to 
acquire property rights, complete community compensation 
arrangements and develop the necessary infrastructure. 
Initial packages are, however, more important in the longer 
term because they increase the site pool on which subsequent 
packages can be developed. On the other hand, in situations 
where electricity shortages are expected to be large, the 
national government may seek to develop less costly 
subsequent packages in order to meet shorter term supply 
objectives.
Results of the analysis
Tables 4.2 and 4.3 illustrate the results of the predictive 
and evaluative models. The variables contained in the 
predictive model, which takes into account social and
16. These include the development of port facilities, roads 
and electricity transmission networks.
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economic conditions at the beginning of the settlement 
process, explains 55.0 per cent of the variation in public 
acceptance times. The evaluative model, which' considers 
social and economic conditions at the beginning of the
I
settlement process as well as the conditions during the 
course of settlement, explains 76.0 per cent of the 
variation in public acceptance times. Those results imply 
that the assessment of public acceptance times can be 
enhanced considerably if conditions during the settlement 
process are taken into account and monitored carefully.
The F-ratio, a test on the joint statistical significance of 
all the co-efficients, shows that the null hypotheses of no 
relationship between public acceptance times and the 
explanatory variables can be rejected for both models. 
These results suggest that both models are statistically 
significant and can be used in the assessment of settlement 
times.
The responses of both promoters and regional communities to 
the development of energy projects appear to be critical in 
the determination of settlement times. These responses will 
be conditioned, importantly, by expectations about the 
distribution of costs and benefits involved in the 
implementation of power facilities. The distribution of 
costs and benefits will be determined by the economic and 
political structure of the regional community and the need 
for both power companies and the national government to 
install new capacity to meet expected electricity demand
increases.
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In the predictive model, prefectural per capita income 
appears overall to be associated negatively with settlement 
times. This result does not support the hypothesis that, in 
general, settlement times are likely to be longer in 
prefectures where there are relatively high levels of per 
capita income. Nuclear plants are usually located in low 
income areas while fossi1-fue1led plants are located, 
generally, in relatively high income areas close to major 
electricity consumption centres. It is therefore necessary 
to consider nuclear and fossil-fuelled plants separately in 
order to understand the relationship between income levels 
and public acceptance times.
A separate consideration of nuclear and fossi1-fue1led 
plants suggests that the importance placed upon social and 
physical environmental impairment appears to be higher in 
the case of fossil-fuelled relative to nuclear facilities. 
Fossi1-fuelled projects are located in high income areas 
which already display relatively high levels of pollution. 
Communities in those areas will, therefore, be less 
enthusiastic about accepting fossil-fuelled projects which 
will add to existing levels of pollution. As incomes are 
relatively high in these areas, the communities will place 
less weight on income expansion expected to arise out of the 
construction of a fossil-fuelled project.
The rate of change of prefectural per capita income during 
the settlement process is negatively associated with public 
acceptance time. In the evaluative model, the level of per 
capita income at the time of a decision to locate a project 
is statistically insignificant. This suggests that
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expectations about future income growth during^ the 
negotiating process appear to be a more important 
determinant of settlement times than expectations about 
those opportunities at the commencement of the settlement 
process. In prefectures where incomes are growing rapidly, 
communities are likely to give more attention to the 
benefits arising out of that growth; they may wish to see a 
further expansion of that growth. Under these 
circumstances, there may be a lag in anticipating the 
adverse effects of project development. Consequently, they 
may be more easily persuaded to accept energy projects.
The ratio of tax revenues from regional sources to 
expenditure on public goods by regional government or the 
local financial index of the city, town or village at the 
time when it is asked to accept an energy project is 
associated negatively with public acceptance times. This 
relationship does not support the hypothesis that public 
acceptance times are longer in situations where the ability 
of local government to supply public goods and services is 
relatively high. The local financial index variable does 
not appear to capture some important effects of the 
development of initial energy projects on the financial 
autonomy of local government. One of the benefits of 
accepting energy projects is the increase in local 
government tax bases. A major part of the financial 
benefits are used to develop social overhead capital such as 
roads and hospitals. These financial benefits tend to 
decline after the construction of initial projects has been 
completed. The effect of the local financial index appears
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to be stronger in the case of subsequent packages relative 
to initial packages. Public acceptance times are likely to 
be shorter in the case of subsequent packages because of 
difficulties expected by local government in maintaining 
levels of expanded public expenditure. Local governments 
are likely to attach a relatively high weight to the 
benefits of continuing to fulfill community expectations for 
the provision of public goods and less to the environmental 
costs associated with additional projects.
The relationship between the ratio of primary product per 
capita to total product per capita and public acceptance 
times is positive, but not statistically significant. 
Primary sector opposition does appear, however, to be 
stronger in lengthening settlement times in the case of 
nuclear relative to fossil-fuelled plants. There appears to 
be more concern amongst the rural sector at the prefectural 
level about the risks of adverse effects from nuclear energy 
on the productive capacity of that sector. A nuclear 
accident and the discharge of radioactive substances is 
perceived by the rural sector to have widespread effects on 
primary industry within the prefecture. The environmental 
effects of fossil-fuelled projects are likely to give rise 
to less concern amongst the prefectural rural community as 
the impact of pollutants discharged is likely to be expected 
to be more localised and temporary.
The relative importance of employment opportunities in the 
rural sector is associated positively with public acceptance 
times, but not a significant factor influencing the
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variation in those times. Employment opportunities in the 
rural sector do, however, appear to be more important in 
lengthening settlement times in the case of subsequent 
packages relative to initial packages. The rural sector 
appears to be initially fearful of the development of power
plants. These results suggest that primary producers become
\
more fearful of the continued development of energy 
projects. They appear to be concerned that the construction 
of subsequent packages at any one site will cause further 
environmental degradation to factors of production, such as 
land, and will increase the risks of accidents.
The proportion of JSP and JCP seats in pref ectural 
assemblies is associated positively with the degree of 
community difficulty in offering energy sites. Leftist 
political parties will place more emphasis on protection of 
the environment and, therefore, will offer more resistance 
to energy projects in situations where leftist party 
representation is relatively strong v in prefectural 
assemblies. As expected, the importance of the leftist 
political party influence appears stronger in lengthening 
public acceptance in the case of nuclear compared to fossil- 
fuelled power plants. The JSP and JCP is likely to attach 
more weight to the risks of nuclear plants relative to the 
broad environmental costs of fossil-fuelled energy projects. 
Leftist political parties are likely to oppose more strongly 
the development of nuclear projects. Consequently, 
negotiating public acceptance for nuclear plants will be 
more difficult in prefectures with strong JSP and JCP 
representation in prefectural assemblies.
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The time period in which settlements were negotiated is 
positively associated with public acceptance times. This 
supports the hypothesis that changes in local community 
attitudes after 1969 to placing a stronger emphasis on 
environmental quality appears to be associated with the 
lengthening of settlement times. The effect of the 
transformation in such attitudes seems to have been less 
important in lengthening approval times for subsequent 
packages. Although accidents and pollution problems emerged 
at several sites, the community tended to become more 
familiar with the risks involved in having power stations 
operating in their vicinity. Consequently, there appears to 
be relatively less resistance to accepting subsequent 
packages in areas where there is already at least one plant 
operating.
As expected, settlement times are likely to be shorter in 
situations where both private power companies and the 
national government expect forecast electricity shortages to 
be relatively large. Expected electricity supply shortages 
during the settlement process are more important in 
determining public acceptance times than expectations about 
those shortages at the time of a decision to locate a 
project in a particular region. The effects of expected 
electricity shortages in national government electricity 
spheres apears to vary between initial and subsequent 
packages. The national government appears to attempt to 
reduce settlement times for initial site pools in situations 
where capacity shortages are expected to occur. This 
suggests that the national government takes a longer term
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view of site management when electricity shortfalls are 
expected. The government seems to give more emphasis to the 
longer term benefits of the development of initial sites on 
which subsequent packages can be installed if necessary. It 
places less priority to the relatively higher set-up costs, 
such as infrastructure development, for initial projects.
The responses of both project promoters and regional 
communities are important in the determination of the times 
required to reach settlements over the development of energy 
power plants. The pattern of support for and resistance to 
energy project siting appears to have a reasonable degree of 
predictability. The models developed in this chapter 
explain a relatively large proportion of the variation in 
public acceptance times and are useful in the assessment of 
why the development of some projects take longer than 
others.
Applications and qualifications
The discussion above suggests that the distribution of 
benefits and costs from project development affects the ease 
or difficulty in siting energy projects. A necessary step 
in the analysis is testing the models developed for their 
predictive and explanatory power, specifying the assumptions 
upon which those models are based and detailing the 
qualifications which need to be made to their use in the 
analysis of the factors influencing the variations in 
settlement times.
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An application to unlicensed nuclear plants
One method of testing the degree to which the models 
developed in the chapter are useful in the assessment of 
public acceptance times is to estimate settlement times for 
plants which had not received Denchöshin approval during the 
period of analysis. There are a number of nuclear plants 
which fall into this category and, therefore, were excluded 
from the regression analysis.17 These observations can be 
used to test the general applicability of the models in the 
assessment of settlement times.
The test consists of an examination of the residuals between 
arbitrary public acceptance times and those times estimated 
from the models. Arbitrary public acceptance time is 
defined as the time from when a decision is made by a power 
company to locate a nuclear plant in a particular year to 
1979, the cut-off point for the regression analysis.1  ^
Predicted times are calculated by using the estimated co­
efficients of the models and the relevant values of the 
explanatory variables in those cases.
17. Inclusion of these observations into the analysis would 
distort the results as they can only be given arbitrary 
as opposed to actual public acceptance times. The 
regression, therefore, makes the assumption that all 
projects in Japan have received Denchöshin approval, 
and does not include or take into account many projects 
which have been substantially delayed or abandoned. 
The development of a model for assessing settlement 
times requires that consideration be given to those 
cases. An appropriate way of doing this is to use the 
model developed in this chapter to make assessments of 
the public acceptance times for those projects.
18. Or, as in some cases, the time when the project was 
officially abandoned.
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The applicability of the models can be assessed by 
considering the magnitude and sign of the residual. A model 
can be said to be assessing public acceptance times 
relatively well if the residual is large and negative. This
I
would imply that the settlement process would be reached at 
a time substantially later than 1979. Considerable over­
estimation of public acceptance times for unlicensed plants 
would suggest that the models could have been used in making 
some assessments of the times for those plants. On the 
other hand, the models can be said to be not capturing 
important influences affecting settlement times if the 
residual is positive or arbitrary public acceptance times 
are greater than predicted times.
Table 4.4 presents the results of arbitrary public 
acceptance times and estimated times for nuclear power 
plants which had not received Denchöshin approval by 1979 
for both the predictive and evaluative models. The results 
support the thrust of the argument in the preceding section. 
The predictive model appears to under-estimate substantially 
arbitrary public acceptance times. The evaluative model 
which takes into account changed conditions during the 
settlement process, also appears to under-estimate public 
acceptance times but to a lesser extent and, therefore, 
would have been relatively more useful in making some 
assessments of public acceptance times.
The residuals derived from the predictive model are, in 
general, positive and relatively large. While the residual 
for Hikigawa is -10 months, the magnitude is relatively 
small. These results suggest that the predictive model is
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not capturing some of the major factors that influence the 
variation in settlement times. The calculated residuals 
from the evaluative model are also in general, positive but 
their magnitude is relatively smaller. This provides 
evidence to the effect that monitoring conditions during the 
negotiating process is critical in assessing accurately the 
times required to win approval for the development of energy 
projects. These results suggest that the evaluative model 
appears to capture a larger proportion of the major factors 
influencing public acceptance times compared with the 
predictive model.
Qualifications
The analysis to date has identified a number of 
statistically significant variables which will be of use in 
the assessment of settlement times. The residual 0IS^ 
identified in 4.1, which is a summary measure of the 
importance of other factors not captured in quantative 
analysis, is still large.19 This conclusion was confirmed 
when applying the models to unlicensed nuclear power plants. 
As expected, other factors, such as uncertainty, changed 
expectations, the allocation and use of bargaining power and 
the effectiveness with which bargaining strategies are 
employed, will also influence settlement times. The 
residual provides a starting point for the analysis of the 
importance of these factors which need to be qualified in
19. The analysis also provides a measure of the importance 
of such factors in explaining why specific projects 
took in shorter or longer time to reach a settlement 
compared with other projects.
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providing a more comprehensive framework for the examination 
of the variation in settlement times and in developing 
generalisations which will enhance the predictability of 
settlement times based solely on quantitative models.
Before discussing those factors in more detail in the case 
studies, it is necessary to briefly review them in the 
context of the assumptions of the regression model. The 
major assumption of the quantitative models is that the 
operation of compensation mechanisms in economic and 
political bargaining over an acceptable distribution of cost 
and benefits expected from project development is the same 
in all situations. While the effectiveness of compensation 
mechanisms will depend on how they are tuned to the 
structure of the distribution of costs and benefits, other 
factors, such as changing expectations and uncertainty, may 
affect settlement times in a way which can not easily be 
understood from the foregoing analysis of influences on 
settlement times.
As noted in the previous section, the evaluative model 
compared with the predictive model, takes into account more 
fully the impact of expectations formed during the 
settlement process as an influence on the outcomes of those 
processes. It does, however, presume that expectations, 
while potentially different from those prior to the 
settlement process are changing constantly. 20 rp^ e expected
20. The formula for calculating the trend rate of growth is 
contained in footnote 6 of this chapter, and assumes a 
exponential rate of growth during the relevant time peri
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costs and benefits of projects may, for whatever reason, 
fluctuate during the settlement process and this may lead to 
revised expectations. Such changes are likely to influence 
settlement processes in a way which is not taken into 
account adequately by the assumption of constantly changing 
cost-benefit ratios.
\
The analysis presumes that costs and benefits are known with 
certainty and, therefore, there is perfect information about 
the value of energy projects. Uncertainty about the 
benefits and costs of projects is likely to alter cost- 
benefit calculations. For example, project promoters may 
not be willing to negotiate compensation arrangements with 
regional interests in situations where they are uncertain 
about future electricity demand increases and project costs 
are increasing. The degree of riskiness attached to project 
development is, therefore, likely to have an impact on the 
settlement processes between promoters and regional 
communities over the development of energy projects.
In the analysis to date, it has also.been assumed that the 
rural sector is internally homogeneous. The variable which 
considers the rural sector response implies that the 
distribution of benefits and cost is evenly spread amongst 
different rural interest groups and that those impacts are 
the same in all situations. Rural interests groups may not 
be internally homogeneous and, therefore, the extent to 
which compensation mechanisms take into account an uneven 
spread of costs and benefits amongst such regional interests 
is likely to influence the settlement process.
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The distribution of benefits and costs, even if revised 
expectations, uncertainty and the spread of those benefits 
and costs are taken into account, may not be the only major 
influence affecting settlement times. The allocation of 
economic and political bargaining power between and amongst 
regional interests and promoters and the skill with which 
bargaining strategies are employed is treated as similiar in 
the model for all cases. These political influences are 
likely to influence the time necessary to reach settlements 
in a way which is not represented fully in the quantitative 
model developed for analysing the impact of distributional 
influences on settlement times.
Selected case studies
The development of generalisations about the nature and 
importance of influences affecting the residual will be 
important in providing better assessments of public 
acceptance times than would be obtained by simply relying on 
quantitative models. An analysis of the residuals for a 
number of selected observations will be useful in developing 
generalisations about the nature and relative importance of 
these other influences in facilitating or impeding the 
settlement process.
Table 4.5 presents the observations which have been selected 
for detailed case study analyses. It shows public 
acceptance times projected by power companies and times 
estimated from the models developed in this chapter. The 
residuals for company assessments as compared to those for 
the predictive and evaluative models provide useful
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references for the case study analyses. Company assessments 
have, in all the cases, under-estimated the time necessary 
to obtain community approval for the development of energy 
projects. The predictive model, while generally under­
estimating public acceptance times, appears to be capable of 
assessing the times equally well or better than power 
company assessments. The evaluative model also generally 
under-estimates settlement times to a lesser extent and, 
therefore, provides better estimates than both company 
assessments and the predictive model.
A convenient starting point for the case study analyses is 
an examination of the Ashihama nuclear power plant which was 
abandoned by Chubu Electric in 1967. The planned location 
for this plant was on the border of Kisei and Nanto towns 
in Mie Prefecture. Ashihama was the first commercial 
nuclear plant scheduled in Japan; it was also the first 
nuclear plant which confronted substantial siting 
difficulties and was ultimately abandoned. Chubu Electric 
assessed that public acceptance for the project would take 
25 months and this represented an under-estimation of 154 
months. The magnitude of the residual in the predictive and 
evaluative models is 165 months and 92 months respectively. 
Ashihama represents an outlier case in both the predictive 
and evaluative models, and there is a substantial interest 
in exploring the reasons why the project was so 
substantially delayed and ultimately abandoned.
This case study examines the influence that powerful 
economic and political regional interest groups can have on 
delaying the settlement process. Regional interest groups,
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who are adversely affected by a particular project 
development, if effectively mobilised, can gain access to 
decision-making centres. This access allows those interests 
to impede bargaining processes even if promoters place a 
relatively high value on the development of energy projects. 
A careful analysis of the nature and structure of regional 
interests groups, is important in assessing whether 
settlement times for particular projects will take shorter 
or longer than average times.
As a result of continued difficulties at Ashihama, Chubu 
Electric decided to attempt to place its first nuclear power 
plant in Hamaoka town in Shizuoka Prefecture. Community 
approval at Hamaoka took 23 months and this was among the 
fastest public acceptance time for a nuclear power plant in 
Japan. Chubu Electric under-estimated the time to submit the 
project to Denchöshin by 17 months. The company assessment 
in this case was, however, substantially better than in the 
earlier Ashihama case. The predictive model appears to 
predict the settlement time relatively well. The residual 
for the evaluative model is -9 months and appears to over­
estimate public acceptance time a little.
The Hamaoka case study explores the importance of the social 
value of projects in the siting of energy plants. 
Promoters, such as regional governments and project 
developers, who place a high priority on the installation of 
projects can act together in weakening ideological 
resistance and creating a bargaining environment in which 
promoters and regional interests can negotiate a settlement.
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The provision of reliable assessments as to whether public 
acceptance times at particular sites will be shorter than 
average times requires an analysis of the value that 
interests participant to the settlement place on the 
development of projects.
The third case history study details the settlement process 
involved in the siting of the Matsushima coal plant by the 
Electric Power Development Company (EPDC) from 1973-1976. 
This plant, the first coal plant which used imported coal, 
developed after the 1973 oil crisis, is located on a small 
island called Matsushima off Ooseto town in Nagasaki 
Prefecture. The EPDC under-estimated the time to reach a 
settlement by 24 months. The predictive and evaluative 
models, in contrast, both over-estimate the time to win 
community approval by 24 months.
The Matsushima case study focusses on the impact that the 
national government, in pursuit of energy policy objectives, 
can have on regional settlement processes. Changes in 
energy policy, which stress economic security and regional 
electricity sharing can allow a national government to 
intervene in regional political processes, thus facilitating 
a settlement. A national government can do this by providing 
subsidies to develop the project and acting as a mediator 
between conflicting and uncompromising interests. An 
important factor in the assessment of settlement times is 
monitoring energy policy priorities and changes in those 
priorities at both the national and regional levels and 
considering the willingness of national government to 
intervene in regional settlement processes.
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The final case study considers the siting of the Kyowa- 
Tomari nuclear power plant. This plant, which is presently 
under construction, is located in Tomari village in 
Hokkaido. Hokkaido Electric assessed that the settlement 
time would take approximately 40 months. While that 
assessment was out by 116 months, the residuals for the 
predictive and explanatory models are 46 months and 25 
months respectively. The siting models appear to be capable 
of assessing more accurately than Hokkaido Electric the time 
needed to win agreement over the installation of the project.
This study stresses the importance of high economic costs as 
a determinant of a promoters lack of willingness to 
negotiate a settlement over the development of a project. 
High economic costs can occur as a result of uncertainty 
about expected electricity demands increases and the 
increased risk about the reliability of regional electricity 
grids associated with the installation of large projects. 
Promoters confronted by high economic costs in the 
development of projects are not likely to be willing to 
negotiate rapid settlements with regional communities They 
may intentionally delay costly projects and develop 
alternative projects with shorter leadtimes and smaller 
costs. It is important to consider the economic costs of 
projects when assessing why some projects take shorter or 
longer than average times to develop.
Distributional influences and project delay
Expectations about the distribution of costs and benefits of 
energy power plants appear to be crucial in the
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determination of public acceptance times. The social and 
economic conditions which are likely to influence promoter 
and community responses to energy power plants shape the 
bargaining environment in which settlements are negotiated. 
The bargaining environment acts as a strong positive or 
negative catalyst in the settlement process.
Quantitative models are useful in providing a measure of the 
importance of the distribution of costs and benefits on the 
variation in settlement times. They suggest that it is 
possible to quantify important influences and develop 
generalisations about the impact of those influences on the 
speed at which settlements can be reached. Predictive 
models which use information about expectations prior to the 
commencement of the settlement process provide some 
predictability in settlement times. Changed expectations 
during the settlement process also influence promoter and 
regional community responses toward the development of 
energy projects. The assessment of public acceptance times, 
therefore, requires monitoring carefully social and economic 
conditions that emerge during the negotiating process.
The structure of the regional political economy and of power 
company and national government electricity supply-demand 
forecasts appear s to be critical determinants of the 
variation in approval times. Evidence was presented to 
support five major hypotheses. First, settlement times are 
likely to be shorter in situations where expectations for 
continued income expansion are strong. Second, community 
approval seems to be more difficult in time periods where
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social attitudes place a relatively high emphasis on 
protection of the environment. Third, settlements tend to be 
won more quickly in periods where promoters expect 
electricity shortages to occur. Fourth, public acceptance 
appears to be negotiated more easily for subsequent packages 
because the local economy becomes dependent on continued 
construction for the provision of public goods and because 
of more familiarity with the risks involved in the operation 
of power plants. The rural sector, however, acts to impede 
the settlement process for subsequent packages. Fifth, 
approval for nuclear projects appears to be more difficult 
in prefectures where there is a relatively large rural 
sector and strong leftist party representation in 
prefectural assemblies. This resistance to nuclear projects 
is offset by community support for nuclear projects in 
prefectures where there are strong expectations for economic 
development.
These factors are useful in predicting and explaining a 
large proportion of the variation in settlement times. 
However, the residual is large enough to warrant additional 
analysis of factors, such as: uncertainty, the allocation 
and use of political power and changed expectations, which 
are not capable of being captured in general quantitative 
analysis, yet will influence the speed at which settlements 
can be reached. It is necessary to examine these influences 
and try to develop generalisations as to why certain cases 
have taken longer or shorter than average public acceptance 
times to implement. Such an analysis will enable more
accurate assessments of settlement times to be made.
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Chapters 5 to 8 attempt to develop broad generalisations 
about the relative impact of these other influences which 
are likely to be important in making assessments of the 
relative ease or difficulty in locating energy power plants.
5
THE EFFECT OF ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL INTEREST GROUPS
The nature and structure of interest groups and their 
responses to projects is likely to be a critical element in 
assessing the speed at which approval is given for the 
development of energy projects. Project promoters generally 
face intense opposition where projects are likely to have 
large adverse effects on regional interests, such as 
property right owners, who have or can acquire political 
access to decision making. In those situations, promoters, 
even if they place a relatively high value on project 
installation, are not likely to be capable of adequately 
compensating regional interests in order to strike a 
settlement. Consequently, projects are likely to be delayed 
and may sometimes be abandoned.
The Chubu Electric Power Company attempted to locate the 
Ashihama nuclear power plant on the border of Nanto and 
Kisei towns in 1963. Project implementation was delayed by 
local property right owners in Nanto and factional interests 
within the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) in Kisei and was 
ultimately abandoned in 1967. It was one of the first 
nuclear projects for which planning was commenced in Japan. 
At the same time, it was the first project that was 
abandoned because of intense resistance by powerful local 
interest groups.
The power company estimates and the statistical models 
developed in the previous chapter would have provided an 
unreliable basis from which to assess the settlement time at
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Ashihama. Chubu E l e c t r i c  had p r e d i c t e d  t h a t  i t  would take 
25 months  t o  r e a c h  an a g r e e m e n t  w i t h  t h e  e l e c t o r a t e  a t  
Ashihama. The p r e d i c t i v e  and e v a l u a t i v e  models developed in 
t h e  p r e v i o u s  c h a p t e r  e s t i m a t e  t h a t  a g r ee m e n t  would have 
taken 14 and 87 months r e s p e c t i v e l y .  Al l  t he se  assessments ,  
t h e r e f o r e ,  s u b s t a n t i a l l y  u n d e r - e s t i m a t e  t h e  t i m e  t h a t  t h e  
power  company was r e q u i r e d  t o  spend t r y i n g  t o  r e a c h  a 
s e t t l e m e n t  a t  Ashihama. More impor tan t ,  the  as sessments  do 
not  r e v e a l  any i n d i c a t i o n  t h a t  the  p r o j e c t  would u l t i m a t e l y  
be abandoned.
The s t a t i s t i c a l  m o d e l s  s u g g e s t  t h a t  t h e  e x p e c t e d  
d i s t r i b u t i o n  of c o s t s  and b e n e f i t s  were s t r u c t u r e d  in a way 
which would have f a c i l i t a t e d  a r e l a t i v e l y  quick s e t t l e m e n t  
a t  A s h i h a m a .  Chubu E l e c t r i c  f a c e d  r e l a t i v e l y  l a r g e  
e l e c t r i c i t y  sh o r t ag es  between 1963 and 1969 and the company 
w i s h ed  t o  d e v e l o p  a n u c l e a r  p l a n t  q u i c k l y .  In  t h e  C e n t r a l  
E l e c t r i c i t y  S p h er e ,  t h e  n a t i o n a l  g o ve rnmen t  e x p e r i e n c e d  
d e c l i n i n g  e l e c t r i c i t y  s h o r t a g e s  and,  t h e r e f o r e ,  d id  n o t  
p l a c e  a h i g h  s o c i a l  and  e c o n o m i c  v a l u e  on t h e  r a p i d  
im p lem en ta t ion  of the  p r o j e c t . 1 Incomes in Mie p r e f e c t u r e  
were  g ro w in g  v e r y  q u i c k l y  and t h e  communi ty  wished  to  
develop a p r o j e c t  to f u r t h e r  expand t h a t  growth.  Community 
a t t i t u d e s  p l a c e d  r e l a t i v e l y  l i t t l e  em p h as i s  on t h e  s o c i a l  
and p h y s i c a l  env i ronmenta l  d eg rada t ion  t h a t  was expected to  
accrue  as a r e s u l t  of the  p r o j e c t  development .
The models  which  t a k e  i n t o  a c c o u n t  t h e s e  f a c t o r s  do n o t  
a d eq ua te ly  e x p l a in  the  a c t u a l  t ime t h a t  Chubu E l e c t r i c  spent
1. See Chapter  4 fo r  a f u l l e r  a n a l y s i s  of the  r e l a t i o n s h i p  
between th e se  f a c t o r s  and p u b l i c  acceptance  t imes .
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trying to persuade the Mie electorate to accept the project; 
nor do they explain why the power company withdrew its plan 
to site a nuclear power plant at Ashihama. The statistical 
analysis fails to adequately account for the structure and 
representation of interests groups who were opposing the 
project. The structure of interests, as measured through 
the quantitative analysis, may not coincide with 
representation of those interests and, therefore, the 
effectiveness with which interest groups are represented and 
other aspects of their structure has to be considered in 
explaining actual settlement times. The provision of 
reliable assessments of public acceptance times requires 
fuller analysis of the structure and representation of 
interest groups and the way they respond to the development 
of energy projects.
Chubu Electric faced considerable resistance to the Ashihama 
project by local fishing cooperatives in Nanto town. The 
local fishing industry was experiencing a boom in activity 
and expected to incur large losses as a result of the 
development of the project. The structure of the pearl 
industry, which required specialisation in the production 
process, facilitated the formation of an alliance amongst 
fishing interests and they were able to acquire strong 
representation in the local assembly. The power company 
was not willing to compensate these fishing interests 
adequately and prefectural and national government pressure 
was unsuccessful in weakening their opposition to the plant. 
The power company in response to local opposition attempted 
to change the location of the plant to an area solely within
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Kisei town. Factions within the Kisei LDP were competing 
over the acquisition of political power and took 
diametrically opposed positions on the project. Chubu 
Electric did not structure its compensation policy to take 
into account the structure of local factional conflict. 
This conflict culminated in a recall movement which ousted 
the incumbent faction from power and the company was forced 
to abandon the project in 1967.
Mobilising support for the project
The Chubu Electric Power Company approached the Mie
government in late 1963 about a proposal to locate a nuclear 
2power plant. Although there was no urgency to develop the 
project to balance electricity supply and demand, the power 
company wished to commence preparations in order to obtain 
subsidies from the national government. The prefecture 
responded quickly and within a month had won agreement from 
local mayors in Nanto and Kisei towns to accept the project.
Inducing competition
On 15 November 1963, the Chubu Electric Power Company 
approached the Mie prefectural government and discussed a 
proposal to locate a nuclear plant in that prefecture. The 
governor, government and, in particular, Tanaka Satoshi, 
then governor, were very eager to accept one of Japan's 
first commercial nuclear power plants. Mie prefecture had
See Appendix 3 for a chronology of events from 1963 
when the power company decided to locate the project at 
Ashihama to 1967 when it was forced to give up its 
plans to locate the project.
2 .
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been left behind neighbouring prefectures in economic 
development. Tanaka, previously an official of the Ministry 
of Finance, had a strong development ethos and believed that 
the construction of a nuclear power plant was essential for 
Mie's economic development, especially as a source of power 
supply to other neighbouring prefectures.
During the post-war period, Mie had been left behind 
neighbouring areas, such as Kanagawa prefecture and Tokyo, 
but in the late 1950s entered a period of relatively high 
economic growth which continued into the early sixties. 
During the period from early 1963 to 1967 the average annual 
rate of growth was 20.0 per cent and this was substantially 
higher than the average of 12.7 per cent at other regions 
which accepted energy projects.4 Within the community there 
was a strong desire for continued growth in economic 
activity and there was a high demand for the development of 
projects, such as energy plants.
Energy plants were a particularly attractive proposition 
because of Mie's proximity to the major consuming regions of 
Tokyo and Kanagawa prefectures. With high economic growth 
in both Tokyo and Kanagawa, electricity demand had started
3. See Nakamura K., et al., Genpatsu: kumano gyöiin
kaisenki, [Nuclear Power: The Sea Battle at Kumano], 
Gijutsu to ningen, Tokyo, 1982, pp.10-18.
4. Calculated from Sorifu tokei kyoku, Nihon tokei nenkan 
[Japan Statistical Yearbook] Nihon tokei kyokai and 
Mainichi shinbun sha, Tokyo, various issues, 1963-1967.
5. Information received in an interview with officials 
from the Ministry of Finance (MOF), Tokyo, 1983.
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to outstrip supply capacity. Not only was the market
attractive but Tanaka also felt that he could enhance Mie's
status with neighbouring prefectures by developing a nuclear
7project which could supply electricity to them.
Tanaka ordered officials to investigate the Kumano region in
the southern part of the prefecture. This region consist's
of Nagashima city and Kaiyama, Nanto and Kisei towns and was
economically underdeveloped compared with the rest of the
prefecture. It had been historically prone to typhoons
which had on numerous occasions devastated the areas in the
region. The consequent reconstruction efforts had led to
financial difficulties and this had drawn resources away
from the development of social and economic infrastructure
qnecessary to facilitate economic growth and development. 
The region had been a drain on the prefecture's financial 
resources, and Tanaka felt that the development of a nuclear
6. In 1963, Mie was approximately 90 per cent self-­
sufficient and the construction of the nuclear plant 
would have allowed the prefecture to export excess 
electricity, particularly to Tokyo, which was only 48 
per cent self-sufficient in 1963. At that time, 
Kanagawa was 75 per cent self sufficient in the supply 
of electricity. See Nihon enerugii keizai kenkyujo, 
Chiiki betsu energuii juyo tokusei no bunseki 
[Characteristics of Energy Supply and Demand _in Japan 
by Prefecture], Nihon enerugii keizai kenkyujo, Tokyo, 
1980.
7. Information received from a consultant to the electric 
power industry, 1982.
8. Mie's financial index was relatively low at 0.66, and 
the prefecture was relying very heavily on outside 
finance from the national government to develop 
necessary regional infrastructure to facilitate 
economic development. Data compiled by the Ministry of 
International Trade and Industry (MITI), 1983.
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plant in one of those areas would alleviate an important
9part of the financial burden on the prefecture.
On 28 November, Tanaka held discussions with the mayors of 
Nagashima, Kaiyama, Nanto and Kisei about the feasibility of 
the proposal. He was interested in obtaining a quick 
settlement. The four mayors were, however, concerned about 
the safety of -nuclear technology. It was decided that they 
should visit the Tokai nuclear plant so that they would be 
persuaded that peaceful uses of nuclear energy would cause 
no risk to the local community.1  ^ Tanaka, after convincing 
the mayors between 5 and 6 November on the safety of the 
project, persuaded them to consider the project within two 
weeks.
Tanaka's strategy was to induce competition amongst the four 
mayors so that a suitable location could be identified and 
selected quickly. There emerged considerable resistance from 
fishermen in Kaiyama town and this was expected to prevent 
the town from issuing an investigation permit to Chubu 
Electric. It also became clear that there was no suitable 
location in Nagashima city as there was a relatively high 
population density in that city. In contrast, the mayor of 
Kisei town, Yoshida Tamenari, and the Mayor of Nanto town,
9. In 1959, the Ise typhoon devastated, extensively, 89 
public facilities and caused damage worth approximately 
218 million yen. In 1960 and 1962, a tidal wave and 
typhoon Number 14 cost the region approximately 90 
million yen in reconstruction. Information obtained 
from data provided by the Chubu Electric Power Company, 
1982 .
10. See Chapter 6 for a fuller analysis of the impact of 
this strategy in reducing concern about the risk of 
nuclear technology.
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Nomura Junnosuke, adopted positive attitudes toward the 
development of the nuclear project.^ By the middle of 
November, the Ashihama site, which bordered Nanto and Kisei 
towns had been selected and the mayors agreed that they 
would issue an investigation permit on 13 December 1963.
The Ashihama site is located in a desolate area overlapping 
the boundaries of Nanto and Kisei towns.Map 5.1 illustrates 
the location of the site and the structure of property right 
ownership. The productive capacity of the land was very low 
and the area was one of the few areas in the locality not 
suitable for the production of agricultural crops. Both 
Yoshida and Nomura wished to put the land to good use. Both 
towns had been experiencing an outflow of population and 
were relying heavily on external finances for the 
development of social and economic infrastructure. In 1963, 
the financial index for Kisei and Nanto was 0.25 and 0.32 
respectively. Yoshida and Nomura felt that the
development of a nuclear project and the consequent 
employment and tax benefits would reduce the outflow of 
population and enable the region to become financially 
independent.
Electricity supply-demand projections
On 1 December, the Chubu Electric Power Company announced 
that it wished to commence construction of the Ashihama
11. See Nakamura K.,op.cit., p.20.
12. See Jichi sho zaisei kyoku shido ka, Shichoson betsu 
kessan jokyo shirabe_[An Examination of Local Financial 
Accounts], Jichi sho zaisei kyoku shido ka, Tokyo, 
1964.
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plant by 1966 and to start supplying power to the grid in 
1970, thereby setting a seven year deadline to develop the 
project. Company planning allowed approximately two years 
to reach agreement over the construction of the plant, and a 
year to license the plant before commencing construction. 
The planning horizon for reaching an agreement with the 
local electorate was directly related to Chubu Electric's 
expected electricity supply and demand situation.
The Ashihama plant was not in the Company's 1963 five year
electricity supply-demand projections. In 1963, Chubu
Electric experienced a relatively low excess capacity ratio
of 4.2 per cent. In the same year forecast demand for 1968
increased to 6290 Megawatts (MW) an increase of 13.1 per
cent on forecast demand from the previous year. Despite
this increase in expected demand, supply capacity had
increased to 4122 MW, up 19.3 per pent from the previous
year. In addition, there was 2720 MW of capacity in the
licensing and construction stages, resulting in an expected
15five year supply surplus of approximately 552 MW .
The power company thus had sufficient capacity to meet five 
year expected demand increases, and there appeared, in 1963, 
to be no strong electricity supply-demand justification for
13. Information received from the Chubu Electric Power 
Company, 1982.
14. See Chubu Electric's construction plan for 1963.
15. Data compiled by the jTokyo Electric Power Company, and
Shigen enerugii cho koeki ^i^Y0 ku, Dengen kaihatsu no 
gaiyo: sono keikaku to kiso shiryo [An Outline of Power 
Plant Development in Japan: Plans and Basic Data],
Tokyo, various issues, 1967-1969.
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rapid implementation of the project. There was, however, an
incentive to commence planning for a nuclear power plant.
In the early 1960s, Japan entered a nuclear energy boom and
there was a strong incentive amongst power companies to
compete for national government subsidies for the
1 6development of nuclear energy. This incentive was
particularly strong in the case of Chubu Electric,
historically the third largest power company in Japan after
the giant Tokyo and Kansai Electric Power Companies. The
management of the Chubu Electric wished to secure a larger
part of those subsidies which had traditionally gone to
Tokyo and Kansai Electric Power Companies. This required
showing the national government that planning for the
17Ashihama plant had commenced.
Economic resistance and access to political power
Chubu Electric commenced drilling investigations at Ashihama 
on 6 January 1964. The company's plans now sparked a 
response from the local fishing industry in Nanto. Fishing 
co-operatives in the town argued that there would be adverse 
effects from the project on the local fishing industry. 
Subsequently, they formed an alliance to oppose the project
16. Sato H.,' The Politics of Technology Importation in
Japan: The Case of Atomic Power Reactors. Paper
delivered to SSRC Workshop at Kona, Hawaii, September 
1978, pp.33-35. See also Nihon genshiryoku sangyo 
kaigi, Genshiryoku kaihatsu 10-nenshi [A Ten Year 
History of Nuclear Power in Japan], Vols. 1 and 2, 
Nihon genshiryoku sangyo kaigi, Tokyo, 1965 for a more 
detailed analysisof the history ofthe nuclearpower 
industry in Japan.
17. Interviews with officials from MITI, and personnel from 
the Chubu Electric Power Company, 1982.
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development collectively. They exerted pressure on the 
prefectural government and persuaded local farmers to oppose 
the plant. By August 1964, they had successfully gained 
electoral access to the local assembly. This direct access
I
to local political power placed them in a very strong 
position to impede project implementation.
Alliance formation
Between 7 and 9 March the Kowaura Fishing Co-operative, the
motivating force behind the emergence of opposition,
established the Genpatsu hantai kyoto iinkai [Fisherman's
Struggle Committee for Opposing Nuclear Energy]. The
Kowaura Fishing Co-operative was the closest co-operative to
18the proposed site. They were particularly concerned about 
the impact of the project on the marine environment given 
their proximity to waste water outlet pipes which would 
discharge waste water into the ocean. After discussing the 
effects of the project with the Mie Prefectural Fishing Co­
operative, the members of the Kowaura Fishing Co-operative 
decided to oppose the project.
The Fisherman's Struggle Committee appealed to other fishing 
co-operatives in Nanto town to oppose the project jointly. 
This was successful. On 16 March, the Kowaura and other six 
co-operatives in Nanto town, Asoura, Tachigaura, Nieura, 
Kamisaki, Naya and Hozu Co-operatives, formed the Genpatsu 
hantai gyogy5sha kyoto chu5 iinkai [Central Fishing Struggle 
C-ommittee for Opposing Nuclear Energy; hereafter Central
18. See Map 5.1.
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Committee]. In the short period between January and March 
1964/ the local fishing industry had established an alliance 
which was to form the basis of resistance to the placement 
of the Ashihama nuclear power plant.
The formation of the alliance resulted from fears about the 
effects of the project on the fishing industry and the 
economic and historical relationships between fishing co­
operatives in Nanto. Nanto town was built upon the fishing 
industry. Yellowtail fishing had been important there from 
before the Pacific war. By the late 1950s# climatic 
changes had led to a high incidence of typhoons, and this 
had substantially reduced the catch of yellowtail. The 
fishing industry, however, shifted its efforts to pearl 
cultivation. The existence of a rias coastline with several
calm and shallow water inlets provided a suitable natural
19environment for the cultivation of pearls. In the early 
1960s, there was a pearl boom in Nanto and the value of 
pearl production had increased to 3000 million yen per 
year. A majority of the households in Nanto employed in
19. Interview with consultant to the electric power 
industry, 1983.
20. Nakamura K.,op.cit., p.23. Nakamura's book provides a 
detailed discussion of the resistance by Nanto Fishing 
Co-operatives to the siting of the Ashihama nuclear 
power plant. It is the only major published work on 
the dispute. Nakamura was a member of the Kowaura 
Fishing Co-operative and was involved in the opposition 
movement. His analysis focuses on the events in Nanto 
and he argues that resistance by Central Committee was 
the critical element forcing the abandonment of the 
project. This chapter draws on Nakamura's work in 
considering opposition by fishing interests in Nanto, 
but extends his analysis by considering the impact of 
factional conflict between political interest groups in 
Kisei on the settlement process.
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the fishing industry were engaged in the production of
pearls. There was substantial concern about the economic
impact of waste water, on the local fishing industry. The
fishing sector argued that the effects of temperature
changes in the marine environment would affect stationary
molluscs, such as pearls, more than fish, which are capable
of migrating to other areas to escape temperature changes.
They also argued that any adverse impact on pearl
22cultivation would have- severe employment consequences.
The structure of the fishing industry also facilitated the 
formation of the Central Committee which brought together 
the seven fishing co-operatives from Nanto. Pearl 
cultivation requires specialisation in the production 
process. There are three major steps in the process, which 
takes approximately three years. The first is cultivating a 
seedling which is attached to stationary nets. The second 
is growing an oyster shell. The third is inserting the 
seedling into the oyster. In Nanto town, the Naya Fishing 
Co-operative produced the seed pearl. The five fishing co­
operatives from Kowaura to Tachigaura grew the oysters, and
the Asoura Fishing Co-operative undertook the insertion 
2 3process. Given this industrial structure, any adverse 
impact on the Kowaura Fishing Co-operative would have
21. By 1965, there were 1400 households employed in the 
Nanto fishing industry. Of these householders 1350 
were engaged in the production of pearls. Information 
received from the Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and 
Fisheries (MAFF), 1983.
22. Information obtained from consultant to the power 
industry, 1983.
23. Nakamura K., op.cit., pp.25-28.
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affected, negatively, the entire local pearl industry. 
Established historical relationships between the fishing co­
operatives in Nanto town were also an important factor in 
the formation of an alliance. There had been a long history 
of protecting their fishing grounds from attempts by other 
neighbouring fishermen to utilize those grounds. During the 
Tokugawa and Meiji periods, there were major conflicts 
between fishermen from Nanto and from Aichi prefecture over 
the right to fish in the waters off the Kumano coastline. 
Fishermen from Aichi prefecture would go periodically to the 
area and attempt to fish. Nanto fishermen would resist 
these incursions and several sea battles occurred. There 
was, thus, a strong consciousness of the need for collective
defence against outsiders who were perceived to be damaging
24Nanto fishing interests.
The structure of local interest groups, who expect to be 
adversely affected by energy projects, is a critical element 
in reaching settlements over the construction of energy 
power stations. In Nanto, the operation of the pearl 
industry, which required specialisation in the production 
process, meant that the project would affect the entire 
pearl industry and this facilitated the formation of a 
powerful alliance to oppose the Ashihama project. Chapter 6 
considers the relative ease in reaching a settlement at 
Hamaoka where the effects of a nuclear project were not 
evenly distributed amongst local fishing interests. The 
promoters of the project were able to weaken the basis of an
24. Interview with personnel from the Chubu Electric Power 
Company, 1982.
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alliance opposing the project by appealing to those 
interests who did not expect to be adversely affected.
Gaining access to political decision-making
A critical element in the Central Committee's opposition
strategy was to have its concerns registered through
\
political channels at both prefectural and local levels. On 
the prefectural level, the committee used established 
political connections to oppose the project in the assembly. 
On the local level, they won the support of farmers and used 
this additional power base to gain electoral access to the 
Nanto assembly. The Central Committee was, therefore, able 
to strike, directly and effectively, at the nerves of 
regional government.
On the prefectural level, the committee appealed to Satonaka 
Masahira who was speaker of the Prefectural Assembly and who 
had fishing connections in Nanto. Satonaka was born in
I
Nanto and a majoi? part of his electoral support originated 
in that town. He had promoted the development of the pearl 
industry in its early stages and in return the Nanto Fishing 
Co-operative supported him in elections. As Speaker of the 
Assembly, Satonaka was able to exert considerable influence 
on prefectural politics by shaping the nature of debate in 
the assembly. The Central Committee through its 
relationship with Satonaka had a critical entry point to the 
prefectural political arena and used his influence to have
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their concerns about the nuclear project voiced in the 
assembly.^
The Central Committee established its decision-making 
headquarters in the Mie Prefectural Fishing Co-operative. 
The Director of the Co-operative was Ishikawa Maruyoshi, who 
had been a LDP prefectural assemblyman and a member of the 
House of Representatives. Ishikawa had close connections 
with prefectural politicians and was able to exert pressure 
on the prefectural government. The continued success of the 
pearl industry was important to the prefectural Fishing Co­
operative. Ishikawa was also concerned that prefectural 
economic development policies were not adequately taking 
into account fishing interests. Backed by the Mie 
Prefecture Co-operative, he appealed to governor Tanaka to 
stop the project.^
Fishing interest groups in Nanto thus had direct access to 
decision-makingcentres at the prefectural level, and this 
appeared to have an immediate impact. On 13 April, 1964, 
Tanaka, while debating the nuclear issue in the prefectural 
assembly declared that the project would not be developed 
unless it could facilitate regional development and enhance 
the welfare of the regional community. This statement 
reflected the politicisation of the nuclear issue at the 
prefectural level. The proposed development of the Ashihama 
project had caused a split in the LDP between interests 
wishing to protect the fishing industry and those wanting to
25. Information received from consultant to the electric 
power industry, 1983.
26. Nishimura K., op.cit., pp. 49-51.
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accept the project. Tanaka was forced to modify his 
earlier attitude of strongly promoting the project. He 
adopted a more cautious stance on the project while leaving 
open, and postponing a decision on, the option of developing 
or not developing the project.
The Central Committee also exerted pressure on the Nanto
town assembly and, in particular, by recruiting to their
cause assemblymen representing the farming sector. A
strategy of appealing to farmers was critical to changing
2 8the assembly's neutral position on the project. In
Nanto, assemblymen represented fishing, farming and 
commercial interests. Historically, local politics had 
been dominated by farmers. In the post-war period, fishing 
had emerged as the major industry in Nanto and this led to 
the emergence of the fishing sector as a new political force 
in the affairs of the town. The agricultural sector, 
nonetheless despite a relative decline in economic power, 
still retained influence in local politics. The commercial 
sector, represented by mayor Nomura, had only minor 
representation in the local assembly.
The emergence of the fishing industry in the post-war period 
had led to conflict between fishing and agricultural
27. Information received from Chubu Electric Power Company, 
1982 and a Diet member, 1983.
28. The information in this section on the Nanto farmer's 
response to the project and their role in the siting 
dispute was based on extensive interviews with the 
Chubu Electric Power Company and a consultant for the 
power industry in 1982 and 1983.
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interests over the acquisition of political power and the 
distribution of spoils from local government. Nomura came 
to power in the late 1950s, at a time when this conflict 
was particularly intense, because of his ability to mediate 
between fishing and farming interests. During 'the initial 
stages of the conflict, farmers in Nanto had adopted a 
neutral position toward the project. The continued 
resistance by fishermen had the effect of changing their 
attitudes toward the development of the plant. Farmers in 
Nanto were persuaded that the nature and extent of benefits 
from the project were unclear. At the same time, they became 
concerned about the risk of nuclear energy and the 
potentially harmful effects on their agricultural produce. 
It was not farmer-fisherman calculation of the benefits and 
cost of the project that led farmers to adopt a position of 
opposing the nuclear plants.
The appeals of the fishing industry to the farming sector 
and local politicians representing that sector were 
successful. On 17 June, the town assembly decided to oppose 
the project. Nomura, despite the change in the town 
assembly, continued to promote the Ashihama nuclear plant. 
In response, the Central Committee together with the farming 
sector commenced a recall movement on 30 July, and Nomura 
was ousted as mayor of Nanto town. On 30 August, after 
discussions between fishing and farming interests, Yamamoto 
Tenzo, a farmer from Naya hamlet, came to power in a non- 
contested election. Although Yamamoto was a farmer, all the 
assemblymen in his cabinet were fishermen. Yamamato's 
selection represented a compromise between fishing and
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farming politicians in Nanto. The Central Committee felt 
that their ability to oppose the project would be weakened 
should the farmer-fisherman conflict, which historically had 
characterised local politics in Nanto, re-emerge in the 
context of deciding on a suitable mayor. This division of 
power resolved that conflict and, at the same time, closed 
political channels via Nomura which had been open to both 
Chubu Electric and the prefecture to influence local 
decision-making processes. The Central Committee, 
therefore, gained complete political control over the town 
assembly and were in a powerful position to oppose the 
project.
Political factionalism
On 27 July, soon after the Central Committee started the 
recall movement to oust Nomura, Chubu Electric consulted 
with Tanaka and formally decided on the Ashihama site. On 
the same day, the Kisei town assembly accepted the proposal. 
The economic incentive to accept the proposal was much 
stronger in Kisei town than in Nanto town, since unlike 
Nanto, Kisei had no major industry to sustain local 
development. Paradoxically, however it was precisely because 
the project was so appealing that it was delayed, as 
opposing factions in the local LDP squabbled over credit for
the development.29
29. This section on political factionalism in Kisei was 
based on extensive interviews with and information 
gathered from the Chubu Electric Power Company, a 
consultant to the power industry and a Diet member.
181
Kisei had been formed in 1957 by an amalgamation of Sasaki 
town and Kashinozaki town. The Sasaki town economy was 
based on fishing, but on a much smaller scale than in Nanto 
town. The major part of fishing income was derived from 
deep sea fishing which had developed in the 1950s. The 
development of the deep sea fishing industry with its need 
for larger boats, port facilities and processing facilities 
had left the Sasaki Fishing Co-operative with large debts. 
Since Sasaki was no more than a base for fishing operations 
conducted at some distance members of the fishing co­
operative believed that the project would not adversely 
affect the fishing industry in Sasaki town. They also saw 
the sale of property rights and the payment of compensation 
as a means of getting money to keep pay off their debt.
Kashinozaki town, located in a mountainous area inland of 
Sasaki had even fewer reasons to object to the project. The 
major industry in the town was forestry, but this industry 
was not capable of sustaining local development. As a 
result, there was a severe lack of social and economic 
infrastructure, such as roads, a major problem for an area 
located in relatively mountainous terrain. The construction 
of the project was seen by the local electorate to be 
beneficial for promoting local development and the provision 
of necessary economic infrastructure to facilitate that 
development.
30. The value of the fishing industry in Kisei was 
approximately 300 million yen. Imformation received 
from MAFF, 1983.
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Y o s h i d a  T a m e n a r i ,  t h e  m a y o r  o f  K i s e i  w a s  a b l e  t o  u s e  t h e s e  
e c o n o m i c  i n c e n t i v e s  t o  p r o m o t e  t h e  A s h i h a m a  n u c l e a r  p o w e r  
p l a n t .  He was ,  h o w e v e r ,  c o n s t r a i n e d  i n  h i s  s u p p o r t  f o r  t h e  
p r o j e c t  b e c a u s e  o f  t h e  e x i s t e n c e  o f  an o p p o s i t i o n  f a c t i o n  
w i t h i n  t h e  l o c a l  LDP h e a d e d  b y  S a k a g u c h i  Y u z o ,  t h e  S p e a k e r  
i n  t h e  K i s e i  t o w n  a s s e m b l y .  The  c o n f l i c t  b e t w e e n  Y o s h i d a  
a n d  S a k a g u c h i  w a s  n o t  o v e r  t h e  s a f e t y  o f  t h e  n u c l e a r  p o w e r  
p l a n t ;  i t  was  o v e r  t h e  a c q u i s i t i o n  o f  p o l i t i c a l  p o w e r  w i t h i n  
K i s e i  t o w n .  The S a k a g u c h i  f a c t i o n  a r g u e d  t h a t  Y o s h i d a  w o u l d  
be  a b l e  t o  s t r e n g t h e n  h i s  p o w e r  b a s e  i n  t h e  t o w n  s h o u l d  t h e  
p r o j e c t  g o  a h e a d .  T h e y  f e l t  t h a t  Y o s h i d a  w o u l d  b e  a b l e  t o  
c o n t i n u e  j u s t i f y i n g  h i s  p o s i t i o n  a s  m a y o r  g i v e n  t h e  l a r g e  
e c o n o m i c  b e n e f i t s  t h a t  w o u l d  a c c r u e  f rom t h e  d e v e l o p m e n t  o f  
t h e  p r o j e c t .  T h i s  f a c t i o n a l  c o n f l i c t  i m m o b i l i s e d ,  t o  a 
c e r t a i n  e x t e n t ,  d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g  o v e r  t h e  p l a c e m e n t  o f  t h e  
p r o j e c t .
The o r i g i n s  o f  t h e  Y o s h i d a  and S a k a g u c h i  f a c t i o n s  l a y  i n  t h e  
p e r i o d  b e f o r e  t h e  a m a l g a m a t i o n  o f  K a s h i n o z a k i  a n d  S a s a k i  
i n t o  K i s e i  t o w n ,  w h e n  i n  t h e  e a r l y  1 9 5 0 s ,  t h e  n a t i o n a l  
g o v e r n m e n t  e s t a b l i s h e d  a p o l i c y  o f  l o c a l  a m a l g a m a t i o n s  t o  
e n h a n c e  t h e  a d m i n i s t r a t i v e  e f f i c i e n c y  o f  r e g i o n a l  
e l e c t o r a t e s .  In  1 9 5 3 ,  M i e  p r e f e c t u r e ,  i n  a c c o r d a n c e  w i t h  
t h a t  p o l i c y ,  d e c i d e d  t h a t  S a s a k i  t o w n  w o u l d  a m a l g a m a t e  w i t h  
N a g a s h i m a  t o w n  and t h a t  K a s h i n o z a k i  t o w n  w o u l d  a m a l g a m a t e  
w i t h  O u c h i y a m a  t o w n .  The  r a t i o n a l e  f o r  t h i s  p r e f e c t u r a l  
p l a n  was  t h a t  t h e  f o r m e r  t w o  a r e a s  w e r e  f i s h i n g  a r e a s  w h i l e  
t h e  l a t t e r  t w o  w e r e  f o r e s t r y  a n d  f a r m i n g  a r e a s .  The  p l a n
3 1 .  P r e f e c t u r a l  o f f i c i a l s  f e l t  t h a t  t h e  a m a l g a m a t i o n  o f  
t o w n s  w i t h  s i m i l a r  i n d u s t r i a l  s t r u c t u r e s  w o u l d  e n h a n c e  
a d m i n i s t r a t i v e  e f f i c i e n c y  o f  t h e  n e w l y  f o r m e d  t o w n s .
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was supported by the ruling Sakagachi faction, but opposed 
by the Yoshida faction. Map 5.2 illustrates the prefectural, 
Yoshida and the Sakaguchi amalgamation plans.
Yoshida's father was a large yellowtail fisherman and had 
considerable influence within Sasaki. Yoshida was concerned 
that an amalgamation with Nagashima city would affect his 
father's influential position in Sasaki, and he set out to 
persuade the assemblymen and fishermen in Sasaki to oppose 
Sakaguchi. He argued that amalgamation with the larger 
Nagashima town would affect adversely Sasaki in two ways. 
First, the Sasaki assembly would be absorbed into the 
Nagashima assembly and many of the Sasaki assemblymen would 
lose their positions of influence. Secondly, he argued that 
the Sasaki Fishing Co-operative would lose its fishing 
rights to the bigger and more powerful Nagashima Fishing Co­
operative. These arguments were sufficient to create 
opposition amongst assemblymen and fishermen to Sakaguchi's 
plan of amalgamating with Nagashima.
At the same time, Ouchiyama rejected the prefectural plan of 
an amalgamation with Kashinozaki. As noted earlier, 
Kashinozaki, was an economically underdeveloped area and 
had financials difficulties. It represented a financial 
burden which the Ouchiyama assembly did not want to carry. 
The assemblymen argued that an amalgamation with 
Kashinozaki would’ divert resources away from Ouchiyama and 
would impede their local development plans.
Yoshida saw the problem that Kashinozaki faced in trying to 
find a partner with which to amalgamate. He persuaded his
MAP 5 .2
AMALGAMATION PLANS FOR SASAKI AND KASHINOZAKI (19 53 )
Mie Prefecture
Oouchiyama
NANTO
Sasaki
Nagasmma
Yosnida plannea amalgamation and end result 
Prefectural planned amalgamation
185
father to approach the Kashinozaki assembly and propose an 
amalgamation with Sasaki. The Kashinozaki assembly was more 
than willing to amalgamate with Sasaki town when Yoshida's 
father approached them with the proposal. This plan was 
readily accepted by the electorate in Sasaki as their 
positions of influence would not be jeopardised by 
amalgamating with the smaller Kashinozaki town.
After the amalgamation in 1957, conflict emerged within the 
Sakaguchi faction over the question of leadership in the 
coming 1959 Kisei town election. There were two other 
influential people in the Sakaguchi faction. They were 
Taniguchi Tomomi, Deputy Speaker of the Sasaki town assembly 
and a powerful figure in the Sasaki Fishing Co-operative, 
and Nakaseko Bunji, head of the Sasaki Fishing Co-operative. 
Sakaguchi, Taniguchi and Nakaseko were all classmates in 
the Sasaki primary school. Both Taniguchi and Sakaguchi 
wanted to become mayor of Kisei town. Taniguchi also was in 
conflict with Nakaseko over the leadership of the Sasaki 
Fishing Co-operative. Taniguchi, a large boat owner who 
had, in the past, laid off fishermen during recessed periods 
in the fishing industry, was not popular amongst fishermen 
and decided to change to the Yoshida faction. Yoshida 
accepted the support of Taniguchi as his father, the major 
source of his support, had died soon after the amalgamation. 
Nakaseko, fearing that Taniguchi's position in the Sasaki 
Fishing Co-operative would be enhanced with strong support 
from Yoshida, decided to back Sakaguchi. In the 1959 
election, the Yoshida-Taniguchi faction came to power.
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In this way, the ruling Yoshida-Taniguchi and opposition
Sakaguchi-Nakaseko factions were formed in Kisei. The
Sasaki Fishing Co-operative was a major source of political
support to both Yoshida and Sakaguchi. Neither could
formulate nor implement town policy without the consent of
either Taniguchi or Nakaseko who represented their
respective electoral bases in the Sasaki Fishing Co- 
32operative.
The Sasaki Fishing Co-operative, under the leadership of 
Taniguchi, announced a policy of opposition to the project 
on 17 June, approximately two months before the Kisei town 
assembly accepted the project. Sakaguchi and Nakaseko knew 
that Taniguchi was supporting Yoshida in the promotion of 
the nuclear plant. They were not, however, ' capable of 
preventing the assembly accepting the project as Yoshida had 
obtained the support of the Kashinozaki area and, therefore, 
had the numbers to push the proposal through the assembly.
The balance of power in Kisei laid with assemblymen from the 
Kashinozaki area. They had eight members in the Kisei town 
assembly and Yoshida was able to persuade them to accept the 
project by arguing that the development of the project would 
facilitate social and economic development in the 
Kashinozaki region. Despite political resistance by the 
Sakaguchi-Nakaseko faction, Yoshida was able to promote the 
project given expectations in Kashinozaki about the economic 
benefits which would accrue from the development of the 
nuclear project.
• I32. Nishimura K op.cit., pp. 58-60.
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Revised expectations and promoter responses
During the period 1965-67, Chubu Electric's expected supply 
and demand situation changed, and the Ashihama project 
became important in averting anticipated electricity 
shortages. The power company tried to influence the Central 
Committee's stance on the project by appealing to the 
national and prefectural government. The national 
government, however, was not willing to support the project 
strongly because of a favourable supply-demand situation in 
the Central Electricity Sphere. The power company could 
only rely on the prefecture to assist in facilitating a 
settlement. The prefecture was, however, split over the 
development of the project and, therefore, constrained in 
exerting pressure on the Central Committee.
Revised expectations
From 1965, changes in the power company's supply situation 
led to revised expectations about the need to develop the 
project at Ashihama. In 1965, the power company expected a 
shortage of approximately 163 MW by 1970. During the 
subsequent two years, this expected shortfall increased to 
885 MW. Continuing expectations for expanded economic 
activity, particularly in Mie, Shizuoka and Aichi 
prefectures, led to a re-estimation of projected electricity 
demand trends. It became essential for the power company to 
expand capacity to meet that projected demand. The original
33. Calculated from data compiled by the Tokyo Electric 
Power Company, 1983
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objective of developing the project, which had been to 
compete for subsidies with other power companies from the 
national government, was overshadowed by the objective of 
averting electricity 'shortages.
The power company began by revising its completion schedule 
for the Ashihama plant. In July 1965, it announced that it 
wanted to reach a settlement with the local electorate 
within a year so that construction could commence by early 
1967. Chubu Electric assessed that the project could start 
supplying commercial power to the grid by 1972. The power 
company, however, was not in a position to control the 
situation locally. It perceived that any attempt to 
approach the fishing co-operatives in Nanto directly would 
only intensify opposition to the project.*^
Chubu Electric could not rely on substantial support from 
the national government in reaching a settlement with the 
community. The electricity supply and demand situation in 
the Central Electricity Sphere did not justify the speedy 
development of the project. From 1963 to 1967 the expected 
electricity shortage declined at an annual rate of 37.7 per 
cent from 6833 MW to 1896 MW .^5 The national government 
took the view that the benefits of rapid implementation of 
the project were not great as Chubu Electric could purchase
34. Interview with personnel from the Chubu Electric Power 
Company, 1982.
35. Calculated from data received from the Tokyo Electric 
Power Company, 1984.
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O (i
e l e c t r i c i t y  from Kansa i  E l e c t r i c .  The gove rnmen t  a l s o
f e l t  t h a t  t h e  l o n g e r  te rm p o l i t i c a l  c o s t s  of  p u s h in g  t h e
p r o j e c t  t h r o u g h  q u i c k l y ,  in  t e r m s  of  i n t e n s i f y i n g  l o c a l
r e s i s t a n c e ,  were too  h ig h .  C o n s e q u e n t l y ,  t h e  n a t i o n a l
g o v e r n m e n t  was n o t  w i l l i n g  t o  g iv e  s t r o n g  s u p p o r t  t o  t h e  
37p r o j e c t .
\
A ma jo r  c o n c l u s i o n  of  C h a p te r  4 was t h a t  a g r e e m e n t  over  
e n e rg y  p r o j e c t s  t e n d e d  t o  t a k e  l o n g e r  in  s i t u a t i o n s  where 
t h e  n a t i o n a l  government  e x p e c t e d  a f a v o u r a b l e  e l e c t r i c i t y  
supply-demand ba lance  in n a t i o n a l  e l e c t r i c i t y  spheres .  The 
r e s p o n s e  of  t h e  n a t i o n a l  g o ve rnmen t  i s  i m p o r t a n t  in  t h e  
s e t t l e m e n t  p rocess  as i t  dec ides  whether p r o j e c t s  are  given 
D enchS sh in  a p p r o v a l  or  n o t .  Chubu E l e c t r i c  d i s c u s s e d  th e  
p r o j e c t  w i t h  t h e  EPA, b u t  t h e  Agency r e s p o n d e d  n e g a t i v e l y .  
A s i m i l a r  s i t u a t i o n  o c c u r r e d  in  t h e  s i t i n g  of  Hokkaido 
E l e c t r i c ' s  K y o w a - T o i a r i  p r o j e c t  which i s  t h e  s u b j e c t  of  
Chapter  8. The n a t i o n a l  government was u n w i l l i n g  to  suppor t  
Kyowa-Toimari p r o j e c t  s t r o n g ly  because of  the  h igh economic 
c o s t s  involved  in c o n s t r u c t i n g  the  p r o j e c t .  These two cases  
a r e  u s e f u l l y  compared w i t h  a s i t i n g  d i s p u t e  over  t h e
36. Chubu E l e c t r i c  h a d  an a g r e e m e n t  w i t h  K a n s a i  and 
Hokuriku E l e c t r i c  Power Companies, the o the r  two power 
c o m p a n i e s  i n  t h e  C e n t r a l  E l e c t r i c i t y  S p h e r e ,  t o  
purchase  e l e c t r i c i t y  in t imes  of  expected s h o r t f a l l s .  
I n fo rm a t io n  r ece iv ed  from MITI, 1983.
37. The EPA, w h i c h  i s  r e s p o n s i b l e  f o r  c o - o r d i n a t i n g  
p r o p o s a l s  f o r  D ench5sh in  a p p r o v a l ,  j udged  t h a t  t h e  
power  company had n o t  met t h e  n e c e s s a r y  c r i t e r i a  f o r  
s u b m i s s i o n  of  t h e  p r o j e c t  f o r  D enchosh in  a p p r o v a l .  
T h e s e  i n c l u d e d  a g r e e m e n t  f ro m  l o c a l  m a y o r s ,  t h e  
p r e f e c t u r a l  governor and f i s h i n g  c o - o p e r a t i v e s  over the  
r e l i n q u i s h m e n t  of p r o p e r ty  r i g h t s .  See Chapter  2 for  a 
d i s c u s s i o n  o f  c r i t e r i a  n e c e s s a r y  f o r  D e n c h o s h i n  
approval  to c o n s t r u c t  energy power p l a n t s .  In fo rmat ion  
r ec e i v ed  from Economic Planning Agency (EPA), 1983.
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Electric Power Development Company's (EPDC) Matsushima coal 
project which is discussed in Chapter 7. In that dispute, 
the national government, because of energy security and 
regional electricity sharing objectives, provided subsidies 
to the regional electorate to facilitate the settlement 
process. The reluctance in the past of the central 
government shaped Chubu Electric's approach to reaching a 
settlement with the Ashihama electorate.
Limitations of prefectural influence
Unable to get support from the central government, the power 
company relied more heavily on the prefectural government to 
enter into the conflict in a way which would assist in the 
settlement process. Chubu Electric persuaded Tanaka to 
adopted a more positive attitude toward the development of 
the project. He had lost support at the prefectural level, 
but thought that he could regain that support if he could 
reach a suitable agreement between the affected parties on 
the project. Tanaka also knew that failure on that front 
would jeopardise his chances in the 1967 election which were 
at that stage only'two years away. He felt that if he were 
going to take a risk, then he would have to seek agreement 
and seek it as quickly as possible.^®
The prefectural government in co-operation with Chubu 
Electric devised a two tier strategy for attempting to 
change the attitude of the Central Committee towards the
38. Information obtained in an interview with Diet member, 
1983.
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nuclear power plant. The prefectural government initiated 
an investigation into the impact of waste water on the 
marine environment and stated that it would provide a 
subsidy for regional development. The investigation was 
aimed at reducing fishermen's concern about the project by 
using marine experts to suggest that the environmental 
impact of the plant was not as large as anticipated by the 
Central Committee. The subsidy was aimed at increasing the 
expected benefits of accepting the project to both 
communities in Kisei and Nanto.
Commissioned by the prefecture, marine experts, commenced 
the investigation in October 1965 and, in December that 
year, they published an interim report. The report was 
favourable to the power company's position; it stated that 
the discharge of waste water would only increase the 
temperature of the ocean in the vicinity of the outlet pipes 
and that this would not adversely effect the fishing 
industry. It concluded that the prefecture should discuss 
the results of the report with representatives of the 
Central Committee so that further investigations could take 
place.
The Central Committee, however, rejected a proposal for 
meeting with prefectural officials and issued a declaration 
on the interim report. The declaration contained three major 
criticisms of the report published by the prefecture. 
First, the Central Committee argued that the researchers 
involved in the investigation were selected personally by 
Tanaka and, therefore, conducted the investigation on the 
presumption that the project would be developed. They
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rejected the results, suggesting that they would only
provide background information which could be used to
promote the nuclear power plant. Second, they argued that
it was impossible to obtain even intermediate results in a
two month period. Any investigation, they concluded, should
take at least a year, on the grounds that the impact of
waste water may differ according to the given varying ocean
temperatures and currents of different seasons. Third, they
criticised the report for not considering specifically the
effects of waste water on pearl cultivation. They argued
that pearl cultivation was critical to the Nanto economy and
that any investigation which did not take into account fully
the impact of the nuclear project on pearl cultivation would
39not be accepted by the Central Committee.
The second component of the prefectural strategy was aimed 
at providing a subsidy for regional development. On 15 
November, the Mie prefectural government published a plan
I
for regional development which incorporated a subsidy for 
the development of social and economic infrastructure and 
for the development of the fishing industry. The prefecture 
hoped that the provision of such benefits would intensify 
support for the project in Kisei town and among farming and 
commercial interests in Nanto town, thus isolating and 
perhaps weakening the opposition stance of the Central 
Committee.^ 0
39. See Nakamura K.,op.cit., pp.94-120 and pp.146-150.
40. Information received from personnel of the Chubu 
Electric Power Company, 1983.
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The subsidy which was to be funded by the prefecture 
amounted to 6700 million yen. Its use was proposed for the 
development of social infrastructure and the promotion of 
local industry, such as fishing, in Nanto, Kisei and 
Nagashima. While Kisei and Nagashima were willing to accept 
the subsidy, the Nanto assembly rejected the offer. They 
claimed that the value of the local pearl industry was 
approximately 3000 million yen and that this was expected to 
increase in the future. They argued that the subsidy, while 
providing benefits to the regional community, did not 
provide direct benefits to fishing interests which expected 
to be affected directly by the project.
The Nanto town assembly responded to this economic pressure 
from the prefectural government by strengthening the 
structure of the opposition movement. On 20 November 1965, 
the town assembly established the Nanto cho genpatsu hantai 
senraku kyogi kai [Nanto Strategy Committee for Opposing the 
Nuclear Power Plant]. This Committee comprised assemblymen 
and decided on a budget, drawn from town funds, to finance a 
petition to be sent to the prefectural government. In the 
middle of December, a petition with 8023 signatures was sent 
to the prefectural government stating that Nanto residents
were opposed to the development of the Ashihama nuclear 
41project.
The prefectural government had virtually no success in 
persuading the local community in Nanto to accept the 
project. The continued resistance by Nanto to the nuclear
41. See Nakamura K., op.cit., pp.120-128.
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project forced Tanaka again to adopt a very cautious posture 
toward promoting the project. The political cost of further 
pressure from the prefecture had become high. The 
prefectural assembly was split over the issue. The 1967 
prefectural election was only a year away and Tanaka as well 
as the majority of LDP assembly men felt that further 
conflict between the prefecture and Nanto town would have 
significant electoral implications.
Despite its enthusiasm in principle for the project, the 
prefecture now sought to end it. On 22 May 1966, Chubu 
Electric announced that it wished to commence investigations 
which were necessary for Dench5shin approval and complete 
those investigations by June. The prefectural government 
knowing that any action by the power company was politically 
risky and would probably intensify opposition to the 
project, attempted to persuade the power company to delay 
executing the investigations. Chubu Electric nevertheless 
commenced preparations. After executing those preliminary 
investigations on 8 August, it declared, on the 25th of that 
month, that it would start full-scale investigations in 
September. A key element in the inability of the Mie 
prefectural government to overcome local opposition, 
regardless of the size of subsidies offered, was its lack of 
a workable conduit into the local political process. The 
leadership had no backing from politicians such as Ishikawa 
and Satonaka, who had political connections with local 
fishing interests and who were actually opposing the 
project. The leadership, therefore, had no inroad into 
local political processes and this prevented the prefecture
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from playing a decisive role in resolving the conflict 
between Chubu Electric and the Central Committee and led it 
ultimately to block the project to avoid further political 
fallout. Chapter 6 provides an illustration of the 
importance of the structure of the regional political 
organisation and the skill of the political leadership in 
reducing the settlement time at Chubu Electric's subsequent 
Hamaoka site.
The abandonment of the project
The Chubu Electric Power Company was, however, confronted 
with the need to develop the project as quickly as possible 
to avert expected electricity shortages. It attempted to 
gain support from Yoshida, the Kisei town mayor, for a 
change in the design of the project, and persuade the 
national government to exert pressure on the Central 
Committee. This strategy further intensified opposition by 
Nanto fishermen who successfully resisted pressure from 
national politicians. A misappropriation allegation led to 
a recall movement in Kisei and Yoshida was ousted from 
power. The company then had no choice but to abandon the 
project.
Power company strategies
Thwarted even at the prefectural level, where political 
support was the strongest, the power company turned to the 
local level in an attempt to isolate the Central Committee 
politically. It decided to seek support from Yoshida to 
change the design of the project and to persuade the
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national government to enter the conflict and exert its 
political muscle. Chubu Electric knew now that it could not 
rely on strong prefectural support for the project, but, it 
hoped that this strategy, which by-passed the prefecture, 
would be sufficient to isolate the Central Committee from 
bargaining processes necessary to strike an agreement over 
the project. The power company did not wish to bargain with 
the Nanto co-operative over the transfer of fishing rights. 
It judged that the co-operative would demand at least 3000 
million yen in compensation for the exchange of their 
property rights. The power company was only willing to pay 
approximately 240 million yen in accordance with conditions 
stipulated in the 'Compensation Standards'.^^ The payment 
of 3000 million yen would have increased the construction 
cost of the project by approximately 10 per cent and this 
would have substantially reduced the economic viability of 
the plant.^ Because the Ashihama project was expected to be 
the first nuclear plant in Japan, Chubu Electric was worried 
that the payment of a large amount of compensation might
42. Personnel from the Chubu Electric Power Company told 
the author that they were only prepared to pay 
compensation in accordance with the Compensation 
Standards. The figure of 240 million yen was
calculated from the formulae contained in the 
standards. (See Chapter 2) While this may not be the 
exact amount the power company was willing to pay for 
the transfer of property rights, it provides a broad 
indication of the divergence between what the power 
company was willing to pay and what the Nanto Fishing 
Co-operatives were willing to accept to reach 
settlement over the relinquishment of the fishing 
rights.
The figure of 10 per cent was -calculated from data 
relating to the construction cost of the Ashihama 
project obtained from the Chubu Electric Power Company, 
1983.
43.
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become a precedent for other siting disputes, thus inciting 
criticism from other power companies. The company felt that 
such trends toward larger payment for property right 
transfer might be detrimental to the development of the 
nuclear power industry. An important element in the 
evaluation of delay is therefore an assessment of demands by 
property right owners and the impact of those demands on 
other siting disputes and on the economic feasibility of 
projects. Chapter 8 illustrates a similar case where 
Hokkaido Electric was forced to change the location of the 
Kyowa-Tomari nuclear power plant. Given the Central 
Committee's concern about the impact of waste water and its 
powerful bargaining position, the power company decided to 
change the design of the project. As 70 per cent of the 
site was in Kisei, the company decided to change the 
proposed placement of the containment vessel from the 
boundary of Nanto and Kisei to solely within Kisei. It also 
planned to change the location of the waste water outlet 
pipes to a position closer to Kisei. Chubu Electric hoped 
that this strategy would weaken the Central Committee's 
bargaining position as the relinquishment of their property 
rights would not be necessary to reach an agreement over the 
project.
Officials of the power company, moreover, had developed good 
relations with the Yoshida-Taniguchi faction in Kisei town. 
It was through Yoshida and Taniguchi that Chubu Electric 
attempted to implement the local component of this strategy.
44. Information received in an interview with a consultant 
to the electric power industry, 1983.
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Yoshida believed that this change in design would bring more 
benefits to Kisei as the containment vessel would be solely- 
located in Kisei and, therefore, that town would be the sole
Irecipient of fixed assets taxes. He thought that these 
increased financial benefits would enhance his political 
position vis-a-vis Sakaguchi, and persuaded Taniguchi to 
allow full scale investigations to commence. On the 25 
August, the Sasaki Fishing Co-operative stated that it would 
allow investigations, if the fishing co-operatives in Nanto 
town gave their approval, despite strong opposition by the 
Sakaguchi-Nakaseko faction. Two days later, Yoshida 
announced, without the approval of the Central Committee, 
that Kisei town would issue Chubu Electric with an 
investigation permit.
Chubu Electric also persuaded influential national dietmen 
to visit the area. It thought that a visit by national 
politicians would persuade the Central Committee that the 
nuclear project was in the national interest in terms of 
catching up with the west technologically. On the 7 
September, the House of Representatives Science and 
Technology Promotion Policy Committee, chaired by Nakasone 
Yasuhiro of the LDP, decided to visit the area in order to 
persuade assemblymen in Nanto town of the need to develop 
the project. While the national government was not willing 
to strongly support the project, Nakasone had a particular 
interest in the development of the Ashihama plant. He had 
been an architect of the decision to introduce nuclear power
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into Japan and wanted to see nuclear development proceed as
45quickly as possible.
Mobilisation of economic interest groups
The Central Committee had been concerned about Chubu 
Electric and the prefectural government entering the local 
area and conducting siting investigations necessary for 
Dench5shin approval. Members of the Committee set out to 
stop those investigations. They had been conducting 
training exercises to monitor and stop vessels entering the 
area. They conducted daily surveillance operations with the 
use of local fishing boats off the Kumano coastline. 
Lookouts were set up to monitor shipping movements and to 
sound warnings should unidentified vessels enter the area.
The Central Committee established a policy of dealing with 
the entry of foreign vessels into the area on 21 June 1966. 
It created seven mobilisation groups, called the Seven 
Samurai, after Kurosawa Akira's movie of the same name. 
These groups would be called into action to surround alien 
vessels. Each group had a specific function. For example, 
one group would monitor foreign vessels in particular areas, 
another would intercept those vessels. The leaders of the 
committee were concerned that some groups may resort to 
violence after stopping outside vessels. To minimise this 
possibility, they established rules which stipulated that a 
decision to intercept a vessel had to be made by the
45. See Sato H., op.cit., pp.10-13
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Chairman of the Central Committee and that violence could
4-6not be used under any circumstances.
A decision to bring the mobilisation force into action was 
made on 18 September, in response to a visit planned by 
Nakasone. Nakasone's visit resulted in the Nagashima 
Incident, the largest demonstration conducted by fisherman 
in the post-war period. Hundreds of fishing boats from 
Nanto surrounded and stopped a Maritime Defence Agency 
patrol boat off Nagashima city. Members of the Central 
Committee boarded the patrol boat and reaffirmed their 
opposition to the Ashihama nuclear plant. The attempt by 
the national politicians to exert political pressure on the 
Nanto Fishing Co-operatives had failed.
Factional power struggle
While this was going on, the power company continued its 
attempts to win agreement from Kisei to develop the project. 
On 15 November 1966, Kisei town signed an agreement with 
Chubu Electric which allowed the power company to commence 
full-scale investigations. The power company had, 
reportedly, been giving financial contributions to Kisei 
town. The contributions were apparently being channelled to 
Taniguchi so that he could persuade fishermen in the 
Nakaseko faction to accept the project. During the latter 
part of December and the beginning of January 1967, local 
residents in Kisei town became aware that these 
contributions had been given to the town and became
46. See Nakamura K., op.cit., pp.167-185.
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concerned about the misappropriation of those 
contributions.^
Residents, particularly in Kashinozaki, became concerned 
that Yoshida, by transferring large financial contributions 
to Taniguchi, was promoting the project for the good of 
Sasaki at their expense. Earlier expectations that the 
development of the project would benefit them were 
shattered. Subsequently, they started a movement to receive 
compensation from the town and Chubu Electric. On 24 
January, eight assemblymen from Kashinozaki resigned from 
the Kisei town assembly. The Sakaguchi-Nakaseko faction, 
seeing this as an oppportunity to seize power in Kisei, 
joined forces with the assemblymen from Kashinozaki town and 
commenced a recall movement to oust Yoshida. Yoshida lost 
the vote by 1344 to 2242 votes, and on 28 April, Sakaguchi 
was elected mayor of Kisei town. Sakaguchi, subsequently, 
announced a policy of opposition to the project.^7®
Chubu Electric was then confronted with opposition to the 
project by both Nanto and Kisei town assemblies. The 
prefecture was not willing to support the project, nor could 
the national government exert any pressure on the local 
electorate to accept the proposal. The power company had no 
choice but to abandon the Ashihama project and consider an 
alternative location on which to site its first nuclear 
power plant.
47. Interviews with consultant to electricity power 
industry and Chubu Electric Power Company, 1983.
48. Information received from a Diet member, 1983.
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Interest groups and project delay
The existence, structure and representation of regional 
interest groups is an important factor determining 
settlement times over the construction of energy power 
projects. The existence of large and powerful interests who
expect to be adversely effected by project developments
\
and who either have or can successfully gain access to 
decision making is likely to lead to delay in the settlement 
process. Even if promoters place a high value on projects, 
they may not be capable of compensating adequately large and 
powerful interests who expect to incur costs as a result of 
project implementation.
Fishing co-operatives in Nanto opposed the Ashihama project. 
They had been experiencing a boom in the pearl industry 
which was a major pillar in the local economy. The economic 
structure of the pearl industry, which required 
specialisation in production and established relationships
I
between fishing co-operatives, facilitated the formation of 
an alliance which formed the basis of their opposition. 
Specialisation in the production process meant that the 
adverse impact of the project was expected to spread evenly 
across the fishing industry in Nanto. The economic 
structure of the fishing industry was a critical factor 
explaining the strength and tenacity of the resistance by 
the fishing community. The Central Committee had important 
political connections with prefectural politicians and 
persuaded them to oppose the project at the prefectural 
level. It also persuaded local farmers to resist the 
project. The ability of fishing interests to gain the
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support of farmers and to strengthen their representation in 
the local political process enabled them to establish an 
anti-nuclear town policy and improve their bargaining 
position vis-a-vis Chubu Electric.
Revised company projections increased the importance of 
installing the project to avert expected electricity 
shortages. The power company, however, was not willing to 
compensate fishing interests adequately. The amount of 
compensation that was required to strike a settlement was 
measurable, but payment of that compensation would have 
substantially increased the cost of the Ashihama plant. 
Chubu Electric could not control the outcome of the 
settlement process. It sought to persuade the prefectural 
and national governments to influence regionaldecision- 
making processes. It also sought to change the design of 
the project so that it would not have to negotiate with 
Nanto Fishing Co-operatives over the transfer of fishing 
rights. The company hoped that this strategy would , to a 
large extent, isolate Nanto fishing interests from 
bargaining processes necessary to strike a settlement over 
the construction of the project.
The ability of the prefecture to influence the fishing co­
operative's stance on the project was severely limited. The 
government placed a high priority on the project to attain 
social and economic policy objectives. It sought to provide 
a subsidy for regional economic development. A major 
objective was to create broader regional support for the 
project against narrower sectoral fishing interests. The
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subsidy, however, did not provide adequate remuneration to 
fishing interests and only served to intensify their 
opposition. The use of a broadly based subsidy approach to 
the dispute was not effective because it did not provide 
direct benefits to fishing interests.
The conflict over the development of the project led to a 
split within the prefectural LDP between fishing interests 
and pro-development interests. This made strong prefectural 
support for the project difficult because of perceived 
ramifications in the coming elections. The political costs 
in terms of LDP party stability and a possible electoral 
backlash became higher than the economic benefits stemming 
from the project and immobilised the prefecture from playing 
a positive role in the settlement process.
The national government was not willing to support strongly 
the development of the project. There was a favourable 
electricity supply and demand situation in the Central 
Electricity Sphere and there was, therefore, no powerful 
economic justification for supporting the project. In 
contrast, national politicians, such as Nakasone, who had 
been involved in the introduction of nuclear technology in 
Japan, did not wish to see nuclear development impeded by 
local interests. They attempted to visit the area and 
persuade local fishermen of the national interest in the 
project in terms of catching up with the west 
technologically. This was rejected by local fishermen who 
placed a higher priority on local rather than national
interests.
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Historical conflict between competing interests in Kisei 
also hampered the settlement process at Ashihama. Chubu 
Electric had developed good relations with the ruling 
Yoshida faction and sought to change the location of the 
project to a position solely in Kisei. It was content to 
rely on the Yoshida faction to deliver community agreement. 
Yoshida's major objective in promoting the project was to 
enhance his political power within the town. He sought to 
provide benefits from the project to the Sasaki Fishing Co­
operative, his major support base. This approach was 
reflected in the misappropriation allegation, after which 
local residents particularly in Kashinozaki, became 
concerned that they might not benefit from the project. 
This provided an opportunity for the opposing Sakaguchi 
faction to win the support of dissatisfied residents and 
oust Yoshida from power.
The Ashihama project was delayed and ultimately abandoned 
by the Chubu Electric Power Company because of strong 
opposition by local economic and political interest groups. 
These groups expected to incur large losses from the project 
development and were able to gain access to key’ local 
decision-making centres. The national and prefectural 
governments were not capable of persuading local interest 
groups to accept the project. Under these conditions, the 
cost of reaching a settlement with the local - electorate was 
unacceptably high and the power company decided to abandon 
the project in favour of an alternative location at Hamaoka. 
Chapter 6 considers the settlement process at Hamaoka and 
examines why Chubu Electric was able to reach a relatively
2 0 6
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THE INFLUENCE OF SOCIAL VALUE
The value that project promoters place on the development of 
energy power plants can be a critical element influencing 
the speed at which settlements can be reached over the 
implementation of projects. Settlements are likely to be 
short in situations where promoters, such as power companies 
and the regional political organisation, attach a high 
priority to project development and where they have similar 
interests and objectives. Promoters who wish to construct 
power stations quickly can act together in weakening 
ideological resistance movements. They can facilitate 
settlements by isolating the opposition from the negotiating 
process and providing a bargaining table at which project 
promoters and regional interests can strike a settlement.
The Chubu Electric Power Company successfully located a 
nuclear power plant in the town of Hamaoka in Shizuoka 
prefecture in 1969. The time taken to reach settlement over 
the project was 23 months, and was substantially shorter 
than the average public acceptance times for initial nuclear 
and f os s i 1-f uel led plants.'*' After Kansai Electric's Oi 
nuclear project, it was the quickest settlement reached for 
an initial nuclear power plant in Japan.
Chubu Electric under-estimated the time necessary to reach 
an agreement by 17 months. The statistical models developed
1. Average public acceptance times per initial nuclear and 
fossi1-fuelled plants are 82.0 months and 38.3 months 
respectively. See Chapter 2.
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in Chapter 4 provide a better basis on which the public 
acceptance time could have been estimated. The predictive 
model over-estimates the settlement time by 1 month. In 
contrast, the evaluative model under-estimates the time by 8 
months. The statistical models take into account, 
explicitly, the expected distribution of costs and benefits 
of the project and, therefore, appear able to provide a 
better basis for assessment of the time required to win 
approval for the project than that upon which Chubu 
Electric relied.
The expected distribution of costs and benefits were 
structured in a way which facilitated a quicker than average 
settlement at Hamaoka. Chubu Electric and the national 
government placed a high value on the installation of the 
nuclear power plant to avert electricity shortages which 
were expected in regional electricity spheres. Income 
growth was relatively high in Shizuoka prefecture and there 
was a strong community desire for further expansion. Social 
attitudes placed relatively little weight on the risks 
involved' in accepting the nuclear plant. Models that 
capture those influences appear to explain adequately the 
time required for Chubu Electric to reach agreement with the 
community in Shizuoka. The willingness of Chubu Electric 
and the regional political organisation to develop project, 
as measured through the statistical analysis, coincides with 
their ability to weaken a leftist anti-nuclear movement 
which emerged and to negotiate a settlement relatively
2. Refer to Chapter 4 for a more complete discussion of 
relationship between these factors and settlement times 
for energy projects.
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quickly. An analysis of the value that promoters place on 
project development and the extent to which their interests 
and objectives are similar is a critical element in the 
evaluation of settlement times. Assessments can be improved 
marginally by taking into account the ability of the 
regional political organisation to create a bargaining 
environment which minimises outside interference on the 
negotiating process.
After learning of the proposal to site a nuclear plant in 
Hamaoka, fishing co-operatives joined forces with a leftist 
anti-nuclear movement and attempted to impede the 
implementation of the project. This resistance did not 
succeed in substantially delaying the project. The regional 
political organisation promoted the project to attain 
regional social and economic objectives and responded very 
quickly to the emergence of opposition. Backed by Chubu 
Electric, the leadership was able to weaken the alliance by 
causing a split between the leftist movement and fishing 
interests, thereby preventing the leftist movement from 
sucessfully hampering negotiations between the power company 
and regional interests over compensation and property rights 
transfer arrangements. Project promoters then removed the 
leader of the fishing interests, who was opposing the 
project, and installed a new leader who was more willing to 
negotiate a settlement.
Economic and political support
In July 1967, the Chubu Electric Power Company internally 
made a decision to locate a nuclear power plant in Hamaoka
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and anticipated that it would be able to submit the project 
for Denchoshin approval by December that year. The speed 
at -which the power company wished to locate the plant was 
directly attributable to an expected electricity supply 
shortage. Chubu Electric's assessment of the supply 
situation strongly influenced its approach to reaching 
social and political settlement with the community in 
Hamaoka. The power company, through the prefectural and 
local government, was able to create substantial interest in 
the project. The regional government was willing to accept 
a nuclear power plant in order to attain social and economic 
policy objectives.
Expected electricity shortfalls
During 1966, the Chubu Electric Power Company was facing 
substantial opposition to the siting of the Ashihama nuclear 
power plant which it proposed to build on the border of 
Nanto and Kisei towns in Mie prefecture. In 1966, Nanto 
town opposed the project as a result of fishing co­
operatives gaining electoral access to the town assembly. 
In early 1967, the mayor of Kisei town, who had been a key 
figure in promoting the project, was forced to resign as a 
result of a misappropriation allegation which led to a 
recall movement. It was then clear to the power company 
that the Ashihama project would have to be abandoned for the 
forseeable future.
3. See Sankei Shinbun [Sankei Newspaper], 5 July 1967. A 
chronology of the major events in the siting of the 
Hamaoka nuclear project is contained in Appendix 4.
211
Chubu Electric's siting options were becoming increasingly-
limited and appeared to the power company to be restricted
to Shizuoka prefecture. Chubu Electric's supply sphere
consists of Nagano, Gifu, Aichi and Mie in addition to
Shizuoka prefectures. Nuclear and fossil-fuelled plants
could not be constructed in the inland prefectures of Nagano
and Gifu,^ and the availability of sites for large-scale
hydroelectric capacity was virtually exhausted. The
emergence of pollution problems in Aichi prefecture was
causing major difficulties in obtaining agreement from
communities to locate power stations in that prefecture.
Attempting to locate additional nuclear or fossil-fuelled
capacity in Mie prefecture was politically risky given the
5sensitivity of the Ashihama issue.
The Hamaoka nuclear plant became essential to Chubu Electric 
in averting major electricity supply shortages. Between 
1966 and 1967, expected electricity demand calculated in the 
power company's five year forecast had increased steadily 
from 4950 Megawatts (MW ) to 7840 MW. Actual supply for the 
same period had increased from 4950 MW to 5345 MW. Chubu 
Electric had been relying on the development of the Ashihama 
power plant alongside the development of Nishi-Nagoya and 
the Atsumi fossi1-fue11ed plants which were under
4. As noted in Chapter 2, it is not generally possible to 
locate nuclear and fossi1-fuelled projects in inland 
areas because of the existence of mountainous terrain 
and a lack of cooling water.
5. Information received in interviews with personnel 
from the Chubu Electric Power Company, 1982.
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construction to fill approximately 50 per cent of the 
expected shortage in supply. The abandonment of the 
Ashihama project, however, placed the company in a position 
of expecting a shortfall of approximately 1900 MW in supply 
capacity on forecast demand by 1972.
From 1967 to 1969, expected electricity shortages on five 
year forecast demand declined a little from 1400 MW to 1374 
MW • This shortage was only a little greater than the average 
shortage of 1297 MW experienced by other power companies 
which have developed projects in Japan.^ Although the power 
company placed some importance on the development of the 
project, the extent of the expected electricity shortage was 
not a critical factor explaining why the settlement time at 
Hamaoka was relatively shorter than at other areas.
The critical factor, rather, was the expected supply 
situation in the Central Electricity Sphere which comprises 
Chubu, Kansai and Hokuriku Power Companies. Between 1967 
and 1969, expected electricity shortages were increasing at 
a rate of 26.25 per cent per annum. This was substantially 
higher than the average of 5.92 per cent per annum in other 
regional electricity spheres where projects were developed.^ 
Given the relatively large expected electricity short fall 
in the Central Electricity Sphere, it might not have been
6. Data compiled by the Tokyo Electric Power Company and
Shigen enerugii chö köeki jigyö bu,Dengen kaihatsu no 
gaiyö: sono keikaku to kisö shiryö, [An Outline of
Plant Development in Japan: Plans and Basic Data],
Tokyo, various issues.
7. Data complied by the Tokyo Electric Power Company and 
Shigen enerugii chö köeki jigyö bu,op.cit., various 
issues.
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possible to purchase all of the required electricity from 
other power companies such as the Tokyo Electric Power 
Company. The Hamaoka project was, therefore, necessary in 
order to balance electricity supply and demand in the 
Central Electricity Sphere. The priority that both Chubu 
Electric and the national government placed on the project 
was important to the speed at which they attempted to reach 
agreement with the electorate in Shizuoka prefecture to 
install the plant.
Creating political support
The top management of Chubu Electric was particularly 
worried about the posibility of electricity shortages. In 
early 1967, Kato Osaburo, president of the company, 
discussed a proposal to site a nuclear power plant in 
Shizuoka prefecture with Mizuno Shigeru, President of the 
Sankei Shinbun [Sankei Newspaper], and an influential 
businessman in Shizuoka.® Mizuno subsequently took the idea 
to Maruo Kenji, a prefectural assemblyman affiliated with 
the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP). Mizuno and Maruo were 
close friends and had both been born in Hamaoka in a hamlet 
called Sakura. They both felt that Sakura would be an ideal
Qlocation for the project. Map 6.1 illustrates the location
/of the Hamaoka nuclear plant, surrounding areas and the 
structure of property rights in the region. Mizuno and 
Maruo played an important role in cultivating an interest in
8. Information received from Chubu Electric, 1982.
9. Information received in an interview with a previous 
mayor of Hamaoka, 1982.
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the proposal at the prefectural level and it was thought 
that the construction of a nuclear power plant could form a 
major pillar in the prefecture's economic development plans. 
The government had already published the seventh prefectural 
development plan in 1966. That plan had three important 
economic policy priorities. The first was to sustain the 
high level of economic growth in the prefecture. The second 
was to increase electricity self-sufficiency in the 
prefecture. The third was to promote balanced regional 
development. The proposed nuclear project was consistent 
with achieving these social and economic prior it ies.^ -O
During the immediate post-war period, Shizuoka lagged behind 
the rest of Japan in terms of economic growth. By the late 
1960s, however, the prefecture had entered a high economic 
growth. Per capita income was increasing at an annual rate 
of 11.18 per cent and the prefectural government wished to 
expand this growth even »further. With the average per 
capita income growth rate for other areas with energy 
projects at 12.6 per cent per annum.H it was easy to 
persuade the prefectural government to accept a nuclear 
power plant. The government was not greatly concerned about 
the impairment of the environment which would result from 
the development, or the risk involved in accepting the 
nuclear project.
10. Information received from an official of the Shizuoka 
prefectural government, 1982.
11. Calculated from Asahi shinbun sha, Asahi nenkan [Asahi 
Yearbook], Asahi shinbun sha, Tokyo, various issues,
' 1966-1970.
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In Shizuoka prefecture, electricity demand had been
increasing at a relatively fast rate. The development of
hydroelectric capacity, the major source of electricity
supply in this prefecture, had not kept pace with demand
increases. In the early 1960s, Shizuoka was a net exporter
of electricity to other regions. By 1967, electricity self-
sufficiency had declined to 85 percent.12 As a result,
Shizuoka had been purchasing electricity from other areas,
such as Tokyo and Kanagawa. As electricity demand in those
areas increased, however, the prefectural government thought
that it would become increasingly risky to rely on outside
13sources of electricity.
Shizuoka prefecture is divided economically into eastern, 
western and southern regions. The eastern and western 
regions had been experiencing rapid growth. They were 
geographically close to Keihin and Kansai districts which 
had been growing very rapidly. The high demand for goods 
and services in the Keihin and Kansai districs provided 
stimulus to the eastern and western Shizuoka. The southern 
region had, however, lagged behind the rest of the 
prefecture. In 1966, this region'comprising the towns of 
Hamaoka , Omaezaki, Sagara and the city of Yoshida, had 
been designated as an underdeveloped region under the 
criteria set out in the Law for the Promotion of Industrial
12. Refer to Nihon enerugii keizai kenkyujo, Chiiki betsu 
enerugii juyo tokusei no bunseki [Characeristics of 
Energy Supply and Demand in Japan by Prefecture], Nihon 
enerugii keizai kenkyujS, Tokyo, 1980.
13. Information obtained from a previous deputy-governor of 
Shizuoka prefecture, 1983.
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Development.1  ^ The government wished to stimulate economic 
development in the southern part of the prefecture.
The power company, through Maruo, established connections
with Kamogawa Tadaichi, an important figure with substantial
political influence in Hamaoka. Kamogawa, like Maruo and
Mizuno, had been born in Sakura hamlet, and had been an
influential land owner before the Pacific War. He
subsequently became the inaugural mayor of Hamaoka town when
it was formed in 1955, and was head of the Sakura nOkyö
[Sakura Agricultural Co-operative]. He also had a personal
interest in the development of the project, since the Sakura
Agicultural Co-operative was having financial difficulties
and Kamogawa saw the sale of land as a way of stabilising
15the financial structure of the co-operative.
Kamogawa also thought the project would provide a good 
stimulus to the town economy by providing a stronger tax 
base and an expansion of employment opportunities. Hamaoka, 
like the rest of the local areas in the southern part of 
Shizuoka, was economically underdeveloped. Approximately 60 
per cent of the workforce was employed in agriculture. The 
town had no industrial base. Many young people were leaving 
the town in search of better employment opportunities. The 
tax base of the town was weak. The town was 80 per cent
14. This law encouraged industry to locate projects in 
specified underdeveloped areas so that balanced 
regional economic growth would be possible. The main 
criteria for a region being designated as 
underdeveloped was that it had a financial index of 
less than 0.30. Information received from the Ministry 
of International Trade and Industry (MITI), 1983.
15. Interview with previous mayor of Hamaoka, 1983.
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dependent on prefectural and national government finances 
and the development of social and economic infrastructure 
had suffered.1^
In early 1967, Chubu Electric undertook secret surveys of 
the area to ascertain the response of the Hamoaka electorate 
to the project. These surveys concluded that the local 
community was facing economic hardships and that the town 
administration would be more than willing to facilitate the 
development of the project. Power companies in Japan tend 
to attempt location of nuclear projects in areas which are 
facing social and economic difficulties. This approach to 
site selection presumes that the local government will 
provide the necessary administrative support in the 
settlement process. The local government in Hamaoka, as in 
Nanto and Kisei towns, initially played very important roles 
in creating the necessary support for the implementation of 
the project.
Kamogawa suggested to power company officials that the 
proposal should not be raised until after the local 
government elections scheduled for March 1967. There had 
been considerable community dissatisfaction with mayor 
Shinozaki's social and economic development plans, and 
Kamogawa thought the project might be jeopardised if it were 
to become an election issue. He felt that Shinozaki would
16. See Hamaoka cho yakuba, Hamaoka: Shizuoka ken hamaoka 
ch5 chosei y5ran [Hamaoka Town: A Survey], Hamaoka cho 
yukuba, 1982 and Jichi sh5 zaisei kyoku shid5 ka, 
Shichöson betsu kessan jökyo shirabe [An 
Examination of Local Financial Accounts], Jichi sho 
zaisei kyoku shido ka, Tokyo, 1968. ,
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use the issue to regain support which he had lost amongst
local politicians for failure to implement an economic
development policy for the town. Kamogawa assessed that
raising the nuclear issue might lead to infighting within
the local LDP and that such conflict might hamper the
17development of the project.
Chubu Electric accepted this advice without hesitation. The 
power company had a bitter experience with political 
infighting in the siting of the Ashihama project. As noted 
in Chapter 5, the failure of the company to recognise and 
manage effectively factionalism within the Kisei LDP was a 
major reason for the abandonment of the Ashihama project. 
Chubu Electric had learnt a valuable lesson and top 
management could not afford a similar situation occurring in 
the context of the implementation of the Eamaoka project. 
Even though there were expected electricity shortages, Chubu 
Electricpreferred to delay project implementation so that 
Kamogawa could create a political situation which was 
conducive to ultimately reaching a quicker settlement. The 
Ashihama experience had taught the company that pushing too 
quickly for a settlement could lead to substantial 
opposition to project development.
In the March 1967 elections, Kamogawa successfully supported 
Kawarazaki Mitsugi who had also been born in Sakura and was 
a school colleague of Maruo. Kamogawa believed that 
Kawarazaki, although uncertain politically as a newly 
elected mayor, would support the power plant proposal given
17. Interview with previous mayor of Hamaoka, 1983.
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his relationship with Maruo. Kawarazaki was surprised to
learn of the plan to develop a nuclear project in Hamaoka.
He immediately spoke, however, to Maruo who convinced him
that the project would be in the best interests not only of
the town but also the prefectural economy. Maruo also
18pledged his support for the development of the project.
Kawarazaki's first task was to create political and 
administrative support for the project. He established the 
Hamaoka chö kaihatsu cliosa iinkai [Hamaoka Development 
Investigation Committee; hereafter referred to as the 
Investigation Committee]. This committee, chaired by 
Kamogawa and comprising town politicians and officials, 
considered the physical feasibility of siting a nuclear 
power plant in Sakura. These investigations concluded that 
there was adequate land in Sakura on which to locate a 
project and that the land was geologically stable enough to 
cope with a relatively large earthquake.^
Emergence of regional opposition
Chubu Electric's plan to locate a nuclear power plant in 
Hamaoka was leaked to the Sankei shinbun [Sankei Newspaper] 
on 5 July. The newspaper article revealed that the power 
company, along with town officials, had been secretly 
conducting a preliminary study of the suitability of Hamaoka 
as the possible location for a nuclear power plant. It also
18. Interview with a number of influential politicians in 
Hamaoka, 1983.
19. Information received from Chubu Electric, 1982.
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stated that Chubu Electric wished to reach an agreement to
20site the project by December 1967.
Subsequently, opposition by leftist political parties and 
their affiliates, local residents in Hamaoka and fishing co­
operatives from neighbouring areas rapidly emerged. By 
October, these groups had formed an alliance and, although 
financially weak, geographically dispersed and diverse in 
ideology, they were in a strong position to jeopardise the 
project. The promoters did not foresee the emergence of this 
opposition nor did they anticipate the speed at which the 
movement would develop an organisational base from which to 
impede the implementation of the power plant. The 
unexpected emergence of opposition to the plant was the 
major reason for Chubu Electric under-estimating the time 
required to win approval over the development of. the 
project.
Ideological and citizen resistance
Groups with ideological objections to nuclear power, such as 
the Japan Socialist Party (JSP), Sohyo [The Regional Council 
of Trade Unions] and the Japan Communist Party (JCP) quickly 
became vocal on the issue not only in Hamaoka but also in 
surrounding areas, such as in Ogase city. These groups were 
concerned with two major nuclear safety issues. The first 
was that Hamaoka was relatively more densely populated than 
other areas such as Fukushima and Mihama towns, where
20. See Sankei shinbun, [Sankei Newspaper], 4 July 1967 and 
Asahi shinbun: shizuoka ban [Asahi Newspaper: Shizuoka 
Edition], 5 July 1967, evening edition.
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nuclear power plants were also being proposed. The second
was that a fault line ran to the north of Hamaoka and there
were doubts about the ability of the containment vessel to
21withstand a large earthquake.
Other opposition groups consisted of local residents of 
Hamaoka and included lawyers, shopkeepers, school teachers, 
housewives and some local farmers. An important figure in 
the movement was Ono Yasuhiro, a lawyer and historian who 
had compiled a radical interpretation of the history of 
Hamaoka. The town had rejected his work as the official 
history of the town which had further cemented his anti- 
establishment attitude. Ono was later to become an 
important figure in the alliance with the fishing co­
operatives. These citizens groups, like their ideological 
counterparts, were concerned with the risk involved in 
living close to a nuclear power plant.
21. Shizuoka chunichi shinbun [Shizuoka Central Newspaper],
16 August 1967 and Asahi shinbun: enshu ban [Asahi
Newspaper: Enshu Edition], 19 September 1967 and
interviews with members of the anti-nuclear movement in 
Hamaoka town. See Kogai taisaku shizuoka ken renraku 
kaigi, Kogai to shizuoka kenmin, [Pollution and the 
Shizuoka Community], No. 6, Kogai taisaku Shizuoka ken 
renraku kaigi, Shizuoka, 1980, pp.76-91 for a history 
of the movement opposing the siting of the Hamaoka 
nuclear power plant. Mori S., Genpatsu no machi kara: 
tokai daijishintai j5 no hamaoka genpatsu, [From a 
Nuclear Town: The Hamaoka Nuclear Power Plant Located
on the Tokai Fault], Hatatashoten, Tokyo, 1982, 
contains an analysis of the earthquake issue as it 
relates to the siting of the Hamaoka nuclear power 
plant.
22. Interviews with officials from Hamaoka town, personnel 
in Chubu Electric and officials from S5hy5, 1983.
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Economic resistance
To the east of Hamaoka the Hainan Fishing Co-operative 
operates. It comprises the Omaezaki, Sakai hirata, Sagara, 
Jittogata and Yoshida Fishing Co-operatives. This co­
operative, while being smaller than the Nanto co-operative 
in Mie prefecture, was the largest in Shizuoka and unlike 
the Nanto co-operative, it included a high proportion of 
deep sea fishermen. Approximately 70 per cent of the catch 
was deep sea tuna while the remainder was made up of coastal 
fish, predominantly white bait. The coastline from Hamaoka
eastward to Yoshida is endowed with a shallow shore reef
2 3which provides an ideal environment for white bait. 
Coastal fishermen relied heavily on white bait for their 
livelihood, and had developed special drag nets to increase 
production.^
Chubu Electric knew about the existence of the Hainan 
Fishing Co-operative to the east of Hamaoka, but had been 
unaware, at the time of the newspaper leak, that this co­
operative had inherited the fishing rights of the then- 
defunct Sakura Fishing Co-operative in Hamaoka.^ This had 
come about through the amalgamation, in 1962, of the Sakura 
co-operative with the neighbouring Omaezaki Fishing Co­
operative. In 1963, as a result of changes to the National 
Fishing Law, five co-operatives had further amalgamated to
23. Information received from the Omaezaki Fishing Co­
operative, 1983.
24. Ibid.
25. Information received from Chubu Electric, 1983.
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form the Hainan Fishing Co-operative. The Hainan co­
operative thus had a legal and legitimate claim for 
compensation in the settlement process.
Many fishermen were worried about the environmental impact 
of the project. The major concern amongst the fishermen was 
the effect of radiation and waste water on the marine 
environment and the possible reduction in the value of their 
catch as a result of the operation of the power plant. They 
argued that waste water discharged from the plant would 
increase the temperature of the water around the shore reef, 
the breeding ground for white bait. Fishermen suggested 
that changes to the marine environment would adversely 
effect white bait breeding and that this would effect the 
longer term viability of the fishing industry.
These worries found a leader in Hata Toju of the Sagara 
Fishing Co-operative. This co-operative was particularly 
dependent on white bait trawling on the shore reef in front 
of Hamaoka and stood to lose the most from the development 
of the project.^ At the same time, Hata himself was also 
ideologically opposed to the nuclear power plant. Hata had 
spent time in Manchuria during the Pacific War and, after 
returning to Japan, joined the JCP in 1955. He
- subsequently became chairman of the Ogase JCP in 1958 before
28becoming head of the Sagara Fishing Co-operative in 1963.
26. Interview with personnel from the Omaezaki Fishing Co­
operative and Chubu Electric, 1983.
27. Interview with member of the Sagara Fishing Co­
operative, 1983.
28. Interview with officials of the Ogase branch of the 
JCP, 1983.
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In July, Hata led a small group of fishermen on a visit 
to Ashihama to study the opposition strategies of the 
successful Nanto Fishing Co-operative. He concluded that 
the underlying factor in the success at Nanto was the 
formation of an alliance between the co-operatives. Upon
returning, he established the Hamaoka chö settchi
\
hantai kyogokai [Alliance for Opposing the Development of 
the Hamaoka Nuclear Power Plant; hereafter referred to as 
the Fishing Alliance] which included the Omaezaki, Sakai 
hirata, Sagara, Jittogata and Yoshida co-operatives and he 
was elected its leader. The Fishing Alliance adopted a 
policy of absolute opposition to the development of the 
nuclear power plant. 9^
Alliance formation
Meanwhile, by September 1967, Chubu Electric, together with 
the political leadership of Hamaoka, had proceeded to the 
s^age of negotiations with land right owners. The Fishing 
Alliance and the other anti-nuclear groups were concerned 
with this development and decided to join forces to oppose 
Chubu Electric and the Hamaoka town administration. On 3 
October 1968, Hata and Ono, the leaders of the main 
opposition formed the Genpatsu hantai ky5t5 kaigi [Anti­
nuclear Struggle Committee; hereafter referred to as the 
Struggle Committee]. The views of Hata and Ono were similar. 
Both opposed nuclear energy on ideological grounds,
29. See Shizuoka chunichi shinbun [Shizuoka Central 
Newspaper], various issues, 4-9 October 1967 and 
Haraguchi I., Gy5gyo to genpatsu [The Fishing Industry 
and Nuclear Power], Kumano genpatsu chosa kenkyukai, 
Mie, 1973.
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regarding it as a technology that was still in the 
experimental stage and could be introduced commercially. 
Their followers, by contrast, were less compatible 
ideologically. Fishermen are extremely conservative in 
their outlook in Japan and tend to distrust leftist groups 
and their ideology.^ Both interests however, regarded the 
situation in Hamaoka with concern. Hata and many coastal 
fishermen, felt that Chubu Electric and Hamaoka were 
developing the project at their expense. These fishermen 
were, therefore, willing to trade ideology for an improved 
bargaining position against the promoters of the nuclear 
power project.
Both Hata and Ono saw the alliance as providing the most 
efficient way of increasing their political capacity to 
oppose the project. They assessed that each group had 
weaknesses which would inhibit its ability to oppose the 
project successfully if it were to act unilaterally. The 
citizens and leftist movement was relatively small and did 
not possess a strong support base in Hamaoka. The movement 
was financially weak and was dispersed geographically. While 
the citizens groups were based in Hamaoka, the leftist 
political groups were being organised from outside Hamaoka, 
especially by the Ogase branch of the JCP and S5hy5. There 
was only one Communist Party assemblyman in the Hamaoka 
assembly, while the JSP had no representation in the 
assembly. The movement, therefore, only had limited
30. This observation was based on interviews with members 
of the Hamaoka anti-nuclear movement and the Zenkoku gyögyö rengökai [National Federation of Fishing Co­
operatives], 1983.
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access to centres of decision-making. Hamaoka town did not 
ha v e  a h i s t o r y  of labo u r  m o v e m e n t s  or r u r a l  
uprisings.
The local leftist movement had little political, moral and 
financial support from political parties at the prefectural 
level. The JSP and JCP jointly held approximately 40 per 
cent of the seats in the prefectural assembly, and this was 
20 per cent higher than their average representation in 
other areas which subsequently developed nuclear projects. 
Leftist political parties, however, had lost five seats in 
the 1966 election^ and were uncertain about electoral 
implications of opposing the nuclear plant which was being 
portrayed as in the community's economic interest.
Hata, on the other hand, found difficulties in mobilising
the majority of fishermen in the Fishing Alliance. Only a
quarter of the total fishermen in the Hainan Co-operative
were involved in the demonstration at Sagara in August 1967. 
This reflected not only the ideological differences, but
also the economic structure of the Hainan Co-operative. The
project, while unfavourable to coastal fishermen, did not
affect adversely the operations of deep sea fishermen whose
catch consisted predominantly of tuna from waters in the
Oceania region. The expansion of the deep sea fishing
industry had put the many deep sea fishermen in debt and
31. Interviews with members of the Hamaoka anti-nuclear 
movement, 1982.
32. See Sörifu t5kei kyoku, Nihon t5kei nenkan, [Japan 
Statistical Yearbook], Nihon t5kei ky5 kai and Mainichi 
shinbun sha, Tokyo, 1968.
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they were borrowing heavily to pay off and maintain large
fishing vessels. While they were interested, therefore, in
obtaining generous compensation for the project, they were
not at all intent on preventing it. The financial base of
the co-operative, like that of their ideological
33counterparts, was also weak.
\
To have a chance of success, Hata and Ono needed to move
quickly. They knew that Chubu Electric's bargaining
position would be enhanced greatly after the completion of
land negotiations. The power company would own the land and
could, therefore, with the permission of the town, commence
detailed investigations and preliminary construction. The
strategy of the anti-nuclear groups, thus, was to try to
hamper the land negotiations by sensitising the nuclear
safety issue. They hoped that some landowners would not
sell their land if they could be convinced of the dangers
associated with the installation of a nuclear project. They
distributed pamphlets, conducted1 car parades and boat
demonstrations; collected signatures from local residents
• 34and appealed to local and prefectural and assemblies.
The size, structure and strategy of the Hainan fishing co­
operative was different from that of the Nanto co-operative 
in the Ashihama dispute. The Nanto co-operative was larger, 
employing 70 per cent of the local population in Nanto. In 
contrast, the Hainan co-operative only employed
33. Interviews with officialsfrom Omaezakitown andthe 
Omaezaki Fishing Co-operative.
34. Information received from the Hamaoka anti-nuclear 
movement, 1982.
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approximately 30 per cent of the regional population. 
Prospects in the two co-operatives also differed. The 
annual value of the pearls in Nanto was approximately 1200 
million yen and, as the industry was experiencing a pearl 
boom, this was expected to increase in the future. The 
annual value of fish caught by the Hainan Co-operative, on 
the other hand, totalled approximately 300 million yen and 
there were no prospects for rapid expansion of the fishing 
industry there.
The impact of the nuclear project differed within both co­
operatives. In Nanto, the expected adverse effects of waste 
water discharged from the project were evenly spread across 
the entire industry. It will be recalled from Chapter 5 
that the pearl industry was based on specialisation in the 
production process. The project was, therefore, perceived 
to have a large negative impact on the whole pearl industry. 
In contrast, the impact of the project differed for the co­
operatives comprising the Hainan Fishing Co-operative. 
While waste water was expected to affect coastal fishermen 
adversely, it was not perceived to have a negative impact on 
deep sea fishermen.
The differing size and economic structure of the co­
operatives influenced their approaches to improving their 
respective bargaining positions with Chubu Electric. The 
Nanto co-operative did not rely on leftist political 
elements in the formation of the alliance. The Hainan co­
operative was in a weaker bargaining position with the power 
company and, therefore, felt that the formation of an
230
alliance with the leftist anti-nuclear movement was 
essential to opposing the project successfully.
Isolating ideological resistance
Chubu Electric, as well as the political leadership at both 
the prefectural and local levels, were worried by the 
emergence of resistance to the project. They did not expect 
fishing co-operatives from neighbouring areas to take a 
position of opposing the nuclear power plant and they had 
not anticipated that the fishing co-operatives would join 
forces with leftist political elements. The promoters were 
also concerned that the anti-nuclear movement might be able 
to impede negotiations over the transfer of land rights. 
The political leadership, in conjunction with the power 
company, responded quickly by addressing the safety question 
and attempting to weaken the influence of the leftist 
movement thus isolating that force from property right 
owners.
Town leadership
The emergence of the anti-nuclear movement in Hamaoka had 
heightened awareness within the community about the 
potential environmental hazards associated with nuclear 
energy. Chubu Electric devised a strategy to alleviate the 
concern about nuclear safety and persuaded the town to 
implement the strategy. The leadership responded by 
organising groups of local residents to visit other areas, 
such as Tokai-mura and Mihama, where nuclear power plants 
were either operating or under construction. At the time,
these areas were undergoing rapid development due to the 
construction of nuclear projects. Moreover, the Tokai-mura 
nuclear plant had a good safety record. Groups taken on 
these trips discussed safety and regional development issues 
with relevant people including personnel from other electric 
power companies. Finance for these trips was provided by 
the power company. The ordering of visits was structured 
from the top levels of society down. Town politicians and 
officials, heads of chönaikai [Neighbourhood associations], 
hamlets within the town, and other regional groups, such as 
housewives and school children, were taken in that order.
The town, in conjunction with Chubu Electric, also held a
number of public lectures and visited local residents to
discuss safety issues. These activities were not only a way
of providing information supportive of the nuclear project.
They also allowed the promoters to assess the response
patterns of different sections of the community toward the
project. Those sections of the community regarded as
important were then persuaded to visit power plants in other 
35regions.
!
This approach was critical in changing community perceptions 
about the risk and benefits attached to nuclear power. It 
demonstrated to the community that large-scale benefits 
would be obtained from the construction of a nuclear power 
plant. It also convinced the community in Hamaoka that 
other regions had accepted the risks involved in nuclear 
projects. During the late 1960s, moreover, the company was
35. Interview with personnel in Chubu Electric, 1983.
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fortunate in not having to deal with an articulate 
environmental movement. Emphasis during these years was 
placed on the expansion of social and economic opportunities 
and less weight was given to the risk and environmental 
degradation expected to accrue from energy project 
developments. Given those societal attitudes, the visits 
were extremely successful in reducing community concern 
about nuclear risks and weakening one critical base of the 
anti-nuclear movement.
Chubu Electric's approach to dealing with the community 
concern about safety differed from the anti-nuclear 
movement's approach. Whereas Chubu Electric provided 
finance and persuaded the town administration to implement 
its well-structred strategy, the anti-nuclear movement had 
very little political and administrative support at the 
local and prefectural- level. It was not endowed with 
finance to take local groups to areas, such as Tsuruga, 
which had experienced nuclear accidents. The anti-nuclear 
movement's approach of relying only on lectures, 
demonstrations and the distribution of pamphlets was 
countered by the ability of project promoters to use the 
demonstration effect in a structured way.
Having weakened its opponents, the Chubu Electric Power 
Company proceeded to make its first offer to land owners, 
through the town, on 5 February 1968. This offer injected 
an instability into the settlement process between Chubu 
Electric and the Sakura hamlet over the distribution of 
compensation. Non-property right owners argued that they 
would incur equal risks from the project and yet were
Z J J
receiving no benefits. Land owners were certain to receive
actual benefits in the form of compensation once
negotiations were complete. Non-property right owners would
not receive benefits until construction commenced, and the
nature and extent of those benefits was uncertain. These
groups argued that they would not receive specific or direct
benefits such as compensation, and that there was no
guarantee that they would even accrue indirect benefits,
such as the expansion of employment opportunities, once
36project construction commenced.
The town created the Sakura chiku taisaku kyogikai [Sakura 
Hamlet Policy Committee; hereafter referred to as the Sakura 
Committee] on the 11 February 1968. This committee, chaired 
by Kamogawa, considered the demands of groups within the 
hamlet, and proposed to Chubu Electric that it provide 
community compensation which would be used to develop the 
hamlet. This led to the Sakura kaihatsu ni kansuru y5bo 
ketsugi [Resolution of Demands Concerning the Development of 
the Sakura Region] which was agreed upon by the hamlet and 
Chubu Electric on 25 October 1968. It covered community 
compensation for the development of social and economic 
infrastructure and guaranteed employment opportunities for 
locals. This strategy had the effect of providing specific 
benefits to non-property right owners within the hamlet and, 
therefore, reduced their resistance to the project. Chubu 
Electric was willing to take into account fully the uneven 
distribution of costs and benefits across different
36. Information obtained from an influential landowner in 
Sakura hamlet, 1983.
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interests in Sakura in the management of compensation 
policy. The company had failed to do this at Ashihama and 
it will be recalled that residents in Kisei town opposed the 
project arguing that they should also receive compensation.
I
The power company, despite the need to win a quick 
settlement over the project, wished to delay the actual 
payment of community compensation until the major part of 
land negotiations were complete. The company argued the 
immediate payment of compensation might improve the 
bargaining position of land owners who might delay the 
project as a tactic for increasing their demands in 
relinquishing their property rights. Chubu Electric, 
therefore, wished to schedule the payment of community 
compensation and property right transfer arrangements at 
roughly the same time. The town provided the necessary 
guarantees to Sakura hamlet that community compensation 
would, at a later date, be paid. As a interim measure, the 
town borrowed finance from the prefecture to construct a 
cultural centre, which was completed on 31 August 1968.
This showed the community that actual benefits would result
37from their acceptance of the project.
Chubu Electric followed its first offer to land owners on 5 
February with a second on 10 March 1968. These offers were 
made through the town but both were rejected by landowners. 
There remained a difference between what the power company
37. Interviews with prefectural and local government 
officials, 1983.
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was prepared to pay and what the landowners were prepared to
accept for the relinquishment of their land rights. The
power company had based its offer on the 'income derived
39payment formula' contained in the Compensation Standards. 
The property right owners based their demands on the 
'similar situation derived payment formula' also contained 
in the Compensation Standards and demanded roughly the same 
amount as that paid in the settlement between the 
prefectural government and landowners over the construction 
of the Tokai Expressway. The landowners in the Tokai 
Expressway case had received a higher payment than Chubu 
Electric was initially prepared to pay for the transfer of 
their property rights.
While these differences reflected the nature of
institutionalised property right transfer arrangements, they
also partly reflected the different interests of landowners 
in Sakura hamlet. The cost of losing property rights was
not spread evenly amongst landowners, and the motivations of 
various property right owners differed substantially. The
- landowners in Sakura can be categorised into four types. The
first consisted of those individuals whose land was very
unproductive and were willing to sell at a very low price.
The second group consisted of farmers specialising in
agriculture. These specialist farmers were generally
38. For details of the negotiations see Sankei shinbun 
[Sankei Newspaper], Chunichi shinbun [Chunichi 
Newspaper], Shizuoka shinbun [Shizuoka Newspaper] and 
Shizuoka chunichi shinbun [Shizuoka Central Newspaper], 
various issues between March and July, 1968.
39. Refer to Chapter 2 for a fuller description of the 
Compensation Standards.
opposed to losing their land rights. The third group 
consisted of landowners who wished to delay the proposal 
simply to bargain for more payment. The fourth group 
comprised of individuals who were uncertain as to whether 
they should sell or not.^
The lack of homogeneity amongst land owners provided an 
opportunity for the leftist anti-nuclear movement, among 
whom were some farmers, to influence and delay the land 
negotiations. It was rapidly becoming clear that the 
implementation of the project would depend largely on the 
successful acquisition of land by the company. Chubu 
Electric and the town were very concerned about the 
possibility that too much delay would affect the 
negotiations with Sakura hamlet over community compensation. 
They thought that resistance by non-property right owners in 
the hamlet might emerge if community compensation, which had 
been guaranteed by the company, were not delivered 
quickly.41
The town leadership responded to the activities by the anti­
nuclear movement by establishing the Yöchi köshö iinkai 
[Land Negotiation Committee] on 6 May 1968. The head of 
this committee was Kurebayashi Matsutaro, deputy director of 
the Sakura Agricultural Co-operative and a close colleague 
and friend of Kamogawa.42 This comittee played a crucial 
role in the land negotiation process. First, it isolated
40. Interview with influential landowner in Sakura hamlet, 
1983.
41. Information obtained from Chubu Electric, 1982
42. Interview with Chubu Electric and influential landowner 
in Sakura hamlet, 1983.
the majority of property right owners from the Struggle 
Committee, and, therefore allowed land owners to rely on 
the organisation to resolve conflict over the economic 
valuation of their property. Second, the social decision­
making rules of the hamlet, which placed an emphasis on 
working together for the good of the hamlet as determined by 
the leadership, allowed Kamogawa and Kurebayashi to 
influence landowners. - Third, it created a unified partner 
with which the power company could bargain, relatively free 
from external interference.
Leadership change in the Fishing Alliance
The emergence of the Struggle Committee worried the 
prefectural government about the possible reaction in the 
community to concerns about radiation. Yaezu city, in 
Shizuoka prefecture, was the location where Kubokawa 
Aiikichi, a telecommunications officer, had died as a result 
of radiation exposure incurred in the Bikini test in 1954 
while on an expedition in the vicinity of the explosion.^ 
In Shizuoka, given this historical experience with nuclear 
weapons, there was a potential for stronger community 
concern about the risk of radiation than in other regions 
such as Fukushima and Mihama, where nuclear projects were
43. Nihon genshiryoku sangyo kaigi, Genshiryoku kaihatsu 
10-nenshi, [A Ten Year History of Nuclear Power in 
Japan], Nihon genshiryoku sangyö kaigi, Tokyo, 1965. 
See also Lesbirel S.H., Factors Influencing Long Term 
Uranium Demand in Japan with Special Reference to 
Nuclear Siting, unpublished Honours Thesis, Griffith 
University, Brisbane, 1980, Chapter 4 for a fuller 
discussion of the impact of the Bikini tests on the 
development of the anti-nuclear movement in Japan.
being developed. The struggle Committee attempted to 
sensitise the prefectural community to the risks of nuclear 
power.
The prefectural administration also wished to weaken the
influence of the leftist movement but could not, however,
give the appearance of strongly promoting the nuclear power
plant. In' 1967, the prefectural administration had tried
to pressure local residents in Numazu city to accept an oil
combinant. That had resulted in immense resistance by the
local community and the prefecture was forced to abandon the
project in that same year. The leadership felt that similar
tactics might engender local resistance to the project,
44providing additional stimulus to the Struggle Committee.
The prefecture, therefore, responded politically rather than 
administratively. On 27 December 1968, the prefectural 
branch of the LDP established the Genpatsu tokubetsu iinkai 
[Special Nuclear Energy Committee; hereafter referred to as 
the Special Committee]. This committee, chaired by Sano 
Kakicki, the Speaker of the Assembly, and consisting of 
prefectural assemblymen was set up to consider the safety of 
nuclear p o w e r . T h e  Special Committee also had another 
more important objective. This committee sought to break 
the nexus between the Fishing Alliance and the leftist anti­
nuclear movement. Its major aim was to remove Hata from 
the leadership of the Fishing Alliance. Given Hata's
44. Interviews with Shizuoka prefectural government 
officials, 1982.
45. Information obtained from a Diet member, House of 
Representatives, 1983.
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■«deological position, this appeared to be the only available 
option in promoting the project. Chubu Electric could not 
commence negotiations with the fishing co-operatives as the 
leftist movement could block those negotiations through 
Hata's position in the fishing co-operative. The strategy 
consisted of a number of carefully considered steps which 
had to be portrayed as originating from the local level.
The first step was to establish the Genpatsu taisaku 
shingikai [Omaezaki and Sagara Nuclear Committee; hereafter 
referred to as the Nuclear Committee]. The Nuclear 
Committee was established on 20 January 1968. It comprised 
two groups. The first group consisted of local residents 
from Omaezaki and Sagara towns. The second group comprised 
members of the five Hainan Fishing Co-operatives. Both 
groups studied the safety of nuclear energy and the role of 
nuclear energy in regional development. A major thrust of 
the policy of the Nuclear Committee was based on conducting 
the affairs of the region independently of outside leftist 
influence such as S5hy5 and the JSP.^
There was considerable concern amongst decision makers at 
the local and prefectural level about the possibility of the 
emergence of resident opposition in Sagara and Omaezaki to
46. Ibid.
47. See Suzuki H., Hamaoka genshiryoku hatsuden sho mondai
ni kansuru shingikai kaichö chosa [Deliberative 
Council Investigations on Problems Relating to the 
Hamaoka Nuclear Power Plant], Hamaoka genshiryoku 
hatsuden sho mondai taisaku shingikai, 1969 and Suzuki 
H., Hamaoka genshiryoku hatsuden to watashi tachi no 
kurashis sono anzen sei to kangae kata [The Hamaoka 
Nuclear Power Plant and Our Lives: Safety _and a Way of
Approaching Safety Issues], Dennyoku shinpo sha, Tokyo, 
1977.
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the project. The merits of the project to both these towns 
were substantially less than those of Hamaoka. Sagara and 
Omaezaki would not develop as quickly as Hamaoka which could 
expect a boom in activity once the construction of the power 
plant was commenced. The risk of the nuclear power plant 
was, on the other hand, not limited to the administrative 
boundaries of Hamaoka. There was concern in surrounding 
areas about the potential environmental effects from the 
project, particularly on mandarins and sake [Japanese rice 
wine], which were important to the economy of those areas. 
It was, therefore, necessary to provide a forum whereby 
decision makers and the community could discuss the safety 
of nuclear power and the role of the project in regional 
development. The effect of this move was to forestall 
potential attempts by the anti-nuclear alliance to recruit 
local interests in Sagara and Omalyaki to their cause or to 
lay the ground for the further extension of outside 
interests from local decision making.
The second step to promote a change of attitudes within the 
Fishing Alliance. This was done through Yanigahara Seiji, a 
member of the Special Committee who had important personal 
connections with Kawaguchi Yuzo, head of the Omaezaki 
Fishing Co-operative and president of Kawaguchi Tekko, a 
steel company in Shimizu city, and Haraguchi Inaichi, head 
of the Jittogata Fishing Co-operative. He persuaded 
Kawaguchi and Haraguchi to adopt the necessary measures to 
oust Hata. Yanagihara, while being a prefectural
48. Information received from a previous mayor of Sagara, 
1983.
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assemblyman, owned the Shin Yanagihara Boat Factory in 
Yoshida, a city neighbouring Sagara to the north. Both 
Kawaguchi and Haraguchi had been employed in the Shin 
Yanagihara Boat Factory. Yanagihara provided financial 
assistance to Kawaguchi in establishing his steel factory. 
He had also provided political support to Haraguchi in the 
fishing co-operative elections.^
Kawaguchi and Haraguchi were critical in engineering a shift 
in the attitude of the Fishing Alliance in favour of the 
project, by appealing to deep sea fishing groups. The deep 
sea fishing groups had been giving support to coastal 
fishermen but this had mainly been a gesture of solidarity. 
The proposed power plant was unlikely to affect greatly the 
fortunes of deep sea fishermen. Furthermore, they had been 
receiving subsidies from the prefectural government for the 
purpose of constructing port facilities to expand their 
industry. The perceived costs of not supporting prefectural 
policies in terms of jeopardising these subsidies was high 
and'allowed Kawaguchi and Haraguchi to use the support of 
deep sea fishermen to shift the attitude of the Fishing 
Alliance as a whole.50
On 27 March 1968, Kawaguchi and Haraguchi set up the 
Genpatsu kenkyü rijikai [Board of Director's Nuclear Study 
Deliberative Committee; hereafter referred to as the 
Director's Committee] which consisted of the Heads of the 
Five Hainan Fishing Co-operatives. The Director's Committee
49. Interviews with officials of the Omaezaki and Sagara 
Fishing Co-operatives, 1983.
50. Information received from prefectural government 
officials, 1983.
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spent two months in close consultation with the Prefectural 
Fishing Bureau investigating the major concerns of coastal 
fishermen. The success of this strategy was reflected in a 
memorandum published on 27 May 1968. The memorandum 
stated that the Fishing Alliance would not oppose nuclear 
energy if it could be proven to be safe and that an 
independent investigation of the impact of the nuclear 
proposal on the regional fishing industry should be 
conducted in conjunction with the Nuclear Committee. This 
memorandum, therefore, represented a compromise between the 
concerns of coastal fishermen and the needs of deep sea 
fishermen to institute an attitudinal change within the 
Fishing Alliance. This shift in attitude isolated Hata and 
weakened his position of opposing jointly with leftist 
elements.
The third step was to oust Hata, as leader of the Fishing 
Alliance, to install a new leader and finally to bring the 
Alliance into the Nuclear Committee where it could be 
isolated from leftist elements. Haraguchi persuaded 
Nakamoto Ichiro to attempt to change Hata's position on the 
project. Nakamoto was one of the Directors of the co­
operative and had extremely close links with Hata. He had 
supported Hata through his entire career and was crucial in 
engineering support for him in fishing co-operative and 
assembly elections. Nakamoto persuaded Hata to participate
51. See Hamaoka genshiryoku hatsuden shö kensetsu hantai 
gySmin kyögikai, Hamaoka genpatsu ni taisuru gyomin no 
toitsu kenkai [A United Fishermen's View of the Hamaoka 
Nuclear Power Plant], Sagara, 1968.
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in the independent fishing investigation, a proposal arising
52out of the May 1968 memorandum.
The pressure on Hata from within the Fishing Alliance and 
within the Sagara co-operative was immense. Given the 
change of attitudes in the Fishing Alliance, Hata was 
isolated from the mainstream position which stressed an 
independent investigation of the impact of waste water on 
the marine environment, and on 15 August, he was defeated in 
a general election. Onada Shosaku, a cousin of Kawaguchi, 
was elected head of the Fishing Alliance. The ousting of 
Hata effectively broke the nexus between the Fishing 
Alliance and the leftist anti-nuclear movement.
The Director's Committee was not only a body to investigate 
the concerns of coastal fishermen; it was also a body 
designed to start fishing right transfer and compensation 
arrangements with Chubu Electric. Soon after the 
publication of the May memorandum, this committee changed 
its name to the Genpatsu kankei gyoyö g5d5 kaigi [United 
Fishermen's Council on Nuclear Energy; hereafter referred to 
as the Fishermen's Council]. This council, despite 
continued resistance by coastal fishermen, commenced 
preliminary negotiations with the Chubu Electric Power 
Company in March 1968.
The structure of the regional political organisation in 
Shizuoka was able effectively to weaken the influence of 
Hata who was the link between the anti-nuclear movement and
52. Information obtained from Chubu Electric and a previous 
mayor of Sagara, 1983.
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the Fishing Alliance. Prefectural politicians and other 
local actors had important relationships with property right 
owners. The leadership, through these established 
relationships, was able to oust Hata from his position of 
influence. In contrast, the political organisation in Mie 
prefecture did not have the capacity to influence the Nanto 
Fishing Co-operatives. Certain .sections of the leadership, 
such as Ishihawa who was Head of the Mie Prefectural Fishing 
Co-operative and Satanoka who was the Speaker of the 
Assembly had strong relationships with the fishing industry, 
and took anti-nuclear attitudes. The power company did not 
have key relationships with leaders who could influence the 
Nanto co-operative's position toward the project.
National government response and Denchöshin approval
By late 1968, Chubu Electric had reached broad agreement 
with the Fisherman's Council over the transfer of fishing 
rights and had obtained approval from the prefectural 
governor and local mayors for the development of the 
project. It had, therefore, completed the requirements for 
submission of the proposal to DenchSshin. By this stage, 
the power company expected an electricity supply shortage of 
approximately 1450 MW on five year forecast demand and 
wished to start construction of the nuclear plant quickly. 
It argued that further delay would lead to an electricity
c oshortfall in the company's electricity sphere and appealed 
to the national government to give Dench5shin approval to
53. Data compiled by Tokyo Electric and Shigen enerugii cho 
k5eki jigyo bu, op.cit.f 1969.
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develop the plant. The national government was receptive to
the proposal from Chubu Electric since the supply situation
in the Central Electricity Sphere had worsened since 1967
and the government was worried about possible future
electricity shortages. In the Central Electricity Sphere,
demand had increased 13.1 per cent from 12976 MW in 1967 to
14684 MW in 1968. In 1968, electricity demand was forecast
S4to increase by 20.6 per cent to 20549 MW in 1972. The 
national government was eager to give approval so that Chubu 
Electric could commence applying for the necessary permits 
to construct the project.
Nonetheless, the national government was concerned about 
continued resistance by the leftist movement and coastal 
fishermen in Shizuoka. Fishing rights transfer arrangements 
were still in the negotiating stage and coastal fishermen 
were still opposing the project. The government remembered 
very clearly the Nagashima Incident at Ashihama in 1967. It 
did not want a similiar situation arising with coastal 
fishermen in Shizuoka. It also thought that formal approval 
of the Hamaoka project might destabilise property right 
negotiations. The government was worried, too, that an 
intensification of opposition by coastal fishermen might 
cause difficulties during the licensing process when Chubu 
Electric would be required to receive permits relating to
the use of the ocean for transporting components in the
55construction of the plant.
54. ibid.
55. Information Obtained from an official of the Economic 
Planning Agency, 1983.
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The national government, however, placed more importance on
the risk of potential electricity shortages than on the risk
of affecting property right negotiations. On 23 May, it
granted conditional Dench5shin approval subject to the
satisfactory completion of fishing rights negotiations.
This allowed Chubu Electric to commence licensing and
preliminary construction while property right transfer
56arrangements were being simultaneously conducted.
Social value and project delay
The value that project promoters, such as power companies, 
the regional political organisation and the national 
government, place on the development of projects in an 
important element which requires consideration in the 
assessment of project settlement times. The settlement 
process at Hamaoka was relatively short because project 
promoters placed a high priority on the development of the 
project and because promoters had the ability to weaken 
effectively a leftist-based resistance movement which 
emerged.
Chubu Electric and the national government faced a potential 
supply shortage in the regional electricity sphere. 
Forecast demand was increasing at a faster rate than the 
expected development of energy projects. The power company 
was willing to compensate regional interests and provide
56. Information received from Chubu Electric, 1983.
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community compensation in return for agreement to the 
project. The national government gave approval for the 
project despite continued resistance by some local fishermen 
and a leftist anti-nuclear movement. The supply situation
Istrongly influenced the approach to reaching a quick 
settlement at Hamaoka.
The regional government at both the prefectural and local 
levels placed a high priority on the development of the 
project. The installation of the nuclear plant was 
consistent with the prefectural community's expectations 
about the expansion of future social and economic 
opportunities, the need to become self-sufficient in 
electricity generation and the requirement for balanced 
regional economic development. At the local level, both 
Hamaoka and surrounding areas were interested in accepting 
the project to provide a stimulus to their local economies.
The strong prefectural and local government support was an 
important factor in winning a quick settlement over the 
development of the project. The political organisation in 
Shizuoka did assist in establishing a negotiating table at 
which Chubu Electric and regional interests could negotiate 
a settlement. It responded quickly to the unexpected 
emergence of opposition to the project and skillfully 
facilitated negotiations by weakening the leftist anti­
nuclear movement and isolating that movement from the 
negotiations between Chubu Electric and regional interests. 
The leadership was involved at all stages of the 
negotiations over the transfer of land and fishing rights 
and community compensation arrangements. The power company
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could, therefore, negotiate an effective settlement with 
minimal outside interference.
The skill of Chubu Electric was, to a certain extent, 
important in the settlement process. The power company had 
learnt from its failure to implement the Ashihama project. 
The major lesson from that experience was the need to 
consider the varying impact of projects on different 
community interests in the effective management of 
compensation policy. This was clearly reflected in the 
company's approach to the payment of compensation to non­
property right owners in Sakara Hamlet. They opposed the 
project because they felt that land owners would receive 
benefits at their expense. Chubu Electric responded quickly 
and used Kamogawa to assist in the settlement over community 
compensation.
The weakness of the leftist anti-nuclear movement also 
allowed the leadership to promote the project. Social and 
economic attitudes did not place a high priority on the 
preservation of the environment and the maintenance of 
nuclear risk-free society; rather they stressed further 
economic growth. The leftist movement could not 
successfully sensitise environmental and risk issues to 
create community opposition to the project. The leftist 
movement was, in addition, not structured in a way which 
allowed strong resistance. Leftist prefectural political 
parties were not willing to jeopardise their relatively 
strong representation in the prefectural assembly by 
opposing the project. Consequently, there was a lack of 
external support for the opposition movement. The movement
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could not create a base in Hamaoka because of the 
conservative nature of the town and a community desire to 
foster economic development.
The major problem for the supporters of the project was to 
isolate the influence of the anti-nuclear movement from 
property right owners. In Hamaoka, the influence of 
Kamogawa was critical in establishing a land negotiation 
committee. In the Hainan Fishing Co-operative, the skill of 
Kawaguchi, Haraguchi and Nakamoto was important in ousting 
Hata from the Fishing Alliance. They appealed to deep sea 
fisherman who did not expect to be adversely affected by the 
project. This approach isolated the leftist movement from 
influencing property right owners.
The ability of project promoters to set up negotiating 
committees was critical to reaching agreement over the 
transfer of property rights and compensation arrangements. 
These committees facilitated negotiations because they 
effectively isolated property right and other community 
interests from the influence of the anti-nuclear movement, 
and allowed the political leadership to influence the 
negotiating process. The formation of these committees 
created a relatively unified partner with which Chubu 
Electric could negotiate with regional interests in a way 
which minimised outside interference.
The structure of regional politics, personal relations 
between leaders and the skill of those leaders plays some 
role in the settlement process between power companies and 
regional communities. The political organisation in
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Shizuoka established a negotiating table at which Chubu 
Electric could negotiate a settlement with regional 
interests relatively free from external ideological 
interference. The skill of that leadership appears to have 
weakened the leftist anti-nuclear movement and facilitated 
the settlement process more effectively than in other areas.
The ability to assess public acceptance times that is 
offered by statistical models developed in Chapter 4, which 
take into account the distribution of benefits and costs, 
can be improved to a certain extent by a consideration of 
the nature of the regional political organisation. In 
Hamaoka, the analysis of the nature and skill of the 
political leadership could have provided a marginally better 
assessment of time required to reach settlement over the 
project. This finding suggests that, in general, the 
structure of the regional political organisation is fairly 
similar at all locations in Japan and therefore is not a 
critical determinant of the variation in settlement times.
Chapters 5 and 6 have considered the relative importance of 
interest groups and the social value of projects in the 
assessment of power plant settlement times. Chapter 7 
considers the importance of revised energy policy priorities 
on the national and regional level on settlement outcomes. 
Chapter 8 then focusses on the importance of project costs 
on the willingness of promoters to negotiate settlements 
over the development energy projects.
7
THE IMPACT OF REVISED ENERGY POLICY PRIORITIES
Revised energy priorities, which stress national security 
and regional electricity policy objectives, can be a
significant element influencing the ease with which project
\promoters can negotiate settlements over the development of 
energy power projects. The revision of energy policy 
priorities may lead to a national government participating 
in regional decision-making processes and facilitating a 
settlement between conflicting interests in the course of 
settlement. This will be particularly important in 
situations where project promoters do not have the ability 
to compensate regional interests unilaterally. The national 
government can provide compensation and subsidies to 
affected parties to facilitate the bargaining process.
The Electric Power Development Company (EPDC) won approval
to1 locate the Matsushima coal-fired plant on a small island
called Matsushima, located off the coast of Ooseto town in
Nagasaki prefecture in 1977. The time taken to reach a
settlement was 44.0 months which is a little longer than the
average public acceptance time for initial fossil-fuelled
plants and approximately half the time required to obtain
1public acceptance for initial nuclear projects.
The EPDC, like other power companies analysed in this 
thesis, under-estimated the time required to win approval
1. Public acceptance times for initial nuclear and fossil- 
fuelled power plants are 82.0 and 38.3 months 
respectively. See Chapter 2.
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for the project. Both the predictive and evaluative models 
developed in Chapter 4 both, on the other hand over­
estimated the settlement time by 24 months. The statistical 
models do not provide a reliable basis upon which the public 
acceptance time could have been estimated at Matsushima. It 
is important to explore the reasons why the promoters of the 
Mutsushima project, given the distribution of expected costs 
and benefits from the project, were able to reach a 
settlement effectively and relatively quickly.2
The way in which the distribution of benefits and costs fell 
in the case of the Matsushima project suggests that there 
would have been a longer than average settlement time for 
the project. In Kyushu, expected electricity shortages were 
declining and there was no need to develop quickly 
additional capacity. Social attitudes also placed more 
emphasis on the preservation of the environment than on 
economic growth. Incomes were increasing relatively 
quickly, but the community was more concerned about of the 
impairment of the environment that was expected to result 
from the project. At the same time, leftist political 
parties placed emphasis on the development of the fossil- 
fuelled project. The favourable electricity supply and 
demand situation, however, dominated these other influences 
and the statistical models suggest that settlement time 
would have been relatively long.3
2. Refer to Appendix 2 for a comparison of residuals for 
the Matsushima project relative to other projects.
See Chapter 4 for a fuller analysis of the impact of 
these influences on the variation in public acceptance 
times.
3 .
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The models which consider the impact of these influences on 
settlement times do not adequately explain the actual time 
required to reach agreement over the Matsushima project. 
The statistical analysis fails to allow for the impact of 
revised energy policy priorities on the settlement process. 
The accurate assessment of public acceptance times for power 
stations requires an analysis of the stability of energy 
policy objectives and the impact of changes in those 
objectives on bargaining between and amongst promoters and 
regional interests over the development of those projects.
Although the Nagasaki prefectural community was willing to 
accept the project, the EPDC faced considerable opposition 
from Kyushu Electric and the Ministry of Finance (MOF) 
because of the high expected economic costs of the project. 
This initially delayed the project. During the course of 
settlement, the national government, in response to the oil 
crisis, started to stress the importance of energy security 
and regional electricity policy objectives. The increased 
social value of the project allowed the national government 
to provide subsidies and compensation to affected parties, 
such as Kyushu Electric and the local community, thus 
effectively striking an early settlement.
Site selection and regional energy policy
In April 1973, the EPDC began internal evaluation of 
Matsushima island as a possible location on which to 
construct a coal-fired power station.^ Matsushima is a
4. Appendix 5 contains a detailed chronology of events in 
the siting of the Matsushima project.
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small island located off Ooseto town in Nagasaki prefecture 
in Kyushu. The island is part of Ooseto town and lies 
within the administrative jurisdiction of that town. The 
EPDC, while not publicising their intention to locate a 
plant in Matsushima, received considerable support for the 
project from prefectural officials. The prefecture was 
eager to develop a coal-fired project in order to sustain 
high levels of economic growth and to provide an outlet for 
the ailing coal industry.
The planned location of the project was in Kyushu 
Electric's electricity sphere. Kyushu Electric opposed the 
development of the Matsushima project. It argued that there 
was no electricity supply and demand rationale for adding 
capacity to the existing grid in Kyushu and that the project 
would lead to a costly excess capacity situation. It also 
resisted the EPDC's plan because it felt that the coal 
project would heighten concern about pollution problems and 
that this would adversely affect negotiations at other sites 
being concurrently undertaken by the power company.
EPDC and site selection
The EPDC was established in 1952 amidst a tight electricity 
supply and demand situation in Japan. It is a public 
company and 70 per cent of its finance is provided by the 
national government; the remaining 30 per cent is provided 
by the nine electric power companies.  ^ The EPDC, unlike the 
nine electric power companies, does not supply electricity
5. Information received from personnel of the EPDC in 1983
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directly to industrial and residential users. It assists 
the electric power industry in meeting electricity supply 
objectives in situations where shortfalls are expected to 
occur. The EPDC, therefore, acts as a public insurance 
company aimed at reducing the risk of electricity shortages 
in Japan.
Up until the late 1950s, the EPDC developed mainly hydro­
electric power stations. By this time, large-scale hydro­
electric sites had become exhausted and the power company 
expanded its role in national energy policy, starting to 
develop coal-fired plants. It subsequently became a major 
pillar in the national government's policy of supporting the 
domestic coal industry. The EPDC developed coal-fired 
projects and provided an outlet for domestic coal from
Hokkaido and Kyushu, the two major coal producing areas in
T 6 Japan.
Coal was the major form of energy used in Japan in the 
immediate post-war period. In the mid 1950s, however, large 
discoveries of oil in the Middle East reduced the relative 
price of oil. At that stage, the Japanese economy was 
starting to show signs of rapid economic growth. The 
national government saw a cheap oil supply as a necessary 
condition for continued economic growth. Although there was 
strong opposition by the coal industry, it adopted a policy 
of importing oil from the Middle East. It provided 
subsidies to Japanese oil companies and developed taxation 
policies conducive to expanding the use of oil in the
6 . Information received from the EPDC, 1983.
256
Japanese economy. In response to these market and policy 
incentives, the power industry substituted out of coal into 
oil.^ In the course of Japan's rapid economic development, 
coal production declined from 52.6 million tonnes in 1960 to 
20.9 million tonnes in 1973. The number of operating mines 
also declined noticably from 622 in 1960 to 37 in 1973.^
The decline in the use of coal did not take place without 
social costs. It created employment problems in coal 
producing areas. While aggregate employment consequences 
were not large, there were some adjustment problems 
particularly in Hokkaido and Kyushu, the two major coal 
producing regions in Japan. Maintenance of the coal 
industry became an important social and economic policy 
priority in those areas.
In response to adjustment problems in the coal industry, the 
national government developed a coal policy, with the aim of 
subsidising the use of domestic coal and thus restraining, 
to a certain extent, the declining use of coal. Between 
1953 and 1972, the government formulated five such coal 
policies, each of which aimed to set production targets for 
coal. These production targets, however, were never met, 
largely because of the unwillingness of the power and
7. See Ikuta T., 'Japan Energy Policies', Enerugii keizai
[Energy Economics], Vol. 9, October 1984, pp.9-11.
8. See Shigen enerugii chö, Sögö enerugii tökei [Energy 
Statistics] Shigen enerugii chö, various issues, 1960- 
1974.
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industrial sectors to consume relatively more expensive
. 9 coal.
By the early 1970s, the situation in coal producing areas 
had deteriorated and, in June 1972, the government announced 
its fifth coal policy which set the coal production target 
at 20 million tonnes. This fifth coal policy differed from 
previous policies in that consumption targets were also 
established. The nine electric power companies were asked 
to consume a total of 3.5 million tonnes of coal in the 
period 1973-78. The EPDC would consume approximately 3 
million tonnes. Other industries, such as the steel 
industry, were asked to purchase 11 million tonnes. The 
EPDC, therefore, was expected to become the largest consumer 
of coal in the power industry.^
Unlike the nine electric power companies, the EPDC does not 
possess a specific regional sphere to which it supplies 
electricity exclusively. As noted earlier, it supplies 
electricity to the nine electric power companies and other 
public utilities. In principle, the company is able to site 
power plants anywhere in Japan. General site selection 
criteria, such as the availability of cooling water, apply 
to projects developed by the EPDC.H Criteria for public
9. For a brief summary of the contents, objectives and 
target and actual coal production levels, see Hokkaido 
shCkö kankyö bu, Hokkaido enerugii gaiyö [Energy in 
Hokkaido] Hokkaido shöko kankyö bu, Hokkaido, 1983, 
pp.154-57.
10. ibid.
11. See Chapter 2 a fuller discussion of site selection 
criteria in the development of power plants in Japan.
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acceptance of EPDC's projects, however, differ from those 
applying to other power companies. In addition to general 
criteria, such as agreement by local mayors, prefectural 
governors and property right owners, the EPDC must also 
obtain consent from the relevant power company which is 
operating in the area where the project development will
take place.12
The EPDC had sited coal-fired plants in Kanagawa, Hyogo and
Hiroshima prefectures. The company decided to attempt
location in Hokkaido or Kyushu. The cost of transporting
coal from these two areas particularly to plants in Honshu
had been a factor in the escalation of the cost of
electricity generated by coal-fired plants. In order to
improve the competitiveness of coal projects, the EPDC felt
that it was necessary to minimise transport costs by
locating projects as close as possible to coal producing 
13areas.
Although the two major candidate prefectures were Hokkaido 
and Kyushu, the EPDC assessed that it would be difficult to 
develop a fossil-fuelled project in Hokkaido. During the 
early 1970s, the Ministry of International Trade and 
Industry (MITI) and the Hokkaido government were already 
putting considerable pressure on Hokkaido Electric to 
develop a coal-fired plant to increase the demand for
12. Information received from the EPDC, 1983.
13. ibid.
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domestic coal in Hokkaido.14 Hokkaido Electric itself was 
confronted with substantial opposition to its Kyowa-Tomari 
nuclear project from local fishing co-operatives and an 
ideologically based anti-nuclear movement, as will be 
discussed in the next chapter. The company decided to 
postpone the nuclear project and develop the Tokoma-Atsuma 
coal-fired and the Date oil-fired projects. The 
development of the Tokoma-Atsuma and Date plants and the 
subsequent development of the Kyowa-Tomari nuclear project 
was expected to place Hokkaido Electric in a favourable 
electricity supply and demand situation. Accordingly, MITI 
persuaded the EPDC not to attempt location of a coal-fired 
project in Hokkaido.
The EPDC subsequently focussed its attention on Kyushu and 
started site selection investigations in early 1973. These 
investigations revealed a suitable site at a small hamlet 
called Uchiura on Matsushima island off the coast of Ooseto 
town. Map 7.1 illustrates the location of the project and 
surrounding areas and the structure of property rights. 
There was a deep port which would allow access by vessels 
transporting coal and there was, therefore, no need to 
construct a costly port. There was adequate land on which a 
coal-fired project could be developed. Seventy per cent of
14. See Igarashi T., Kojima ni dekita hatsuden shöj 
denpatsu matsushima sekitan karyoku [The Power Plant 
That was Constructed on a Small Island: The Matsushima
Coal-fired Plant], Nikkei jigyö, Tokyo, 1982 pp.7-13. 
Igarushi's book provides a wealth of information on the 
dispute over the Matsushima project. The analysis is, 
however, very descriptive and focusses on the social 
responsibility of the EPDC in the siting of the 
project. It should be noted that the funding for the 
research was provided by the EPDC.
MAP 7 .1
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this land was owned by Matsushima Kosan, a company which had 
developed coal mines on a number of Nagasaki's offshore 
islands. The area had a relatively low population density. 
Furthermore, Matsushima island was located approximately 
midway between Nagasaki and Sasebo and relatively close to 
Kyushu Electric's transmission network which serviced those 
areas. The cost of setting up a transmission network to 
feed into Kyushu Electric's grid was not, therefore, 
expected to be high.1^
Community and power company response
In June 1973, the EPDC announced that it would reach 
agreement with the community in Kyushu within approximately 
20 months. 16 The power company felt that it could win 
support for the project from the Nagasaki government and the 
local c o m m u n i t y  because of a strong interest in the 
development of coal projects. The EPDC also knew that it 
would have to negotiate with Kyushu Electric to construct 
site and the project before MOF would be willing to provide 
project development finance. The assessment of 20 months 
reflected the expected difficulties in negotiating with 
Kyushu Electric over the development of the project.
The EPDC devised a strategy for bargaining with Kyushu 
Electric. It attempted to create local and prefectural 
support for the project and to persuade regional interests,
15. Information obtained in discussions with personnel from 
the EPDC, 1983.
16. ibid.
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such as the prefectural government, to appeal to MITI and 
MOF to accept the project. It felt that regional and 
national government support for the project would weaken 
Kyushu Electric's opposition to the project. This strategy 
had a considerable measure of success on the regional level, 
but Kyushu Electric was in a strong bargaining position and 
was able to persuade MOF that the project was uneconomical.
Community response
The EPDC set out to create regional support for the project. 
In February 1973, after discussions with EPDC officials, the 
Nagasaki ken tankyo shichöson rengökai [Nagasaki Regional 
Liaison Committee for the Coal Industry; hereafter referred 
as the Liaison Committee] expressed an interest in the 
development of a coal-fired project. This committee 
consisted of local mayors from coal producing areas and was 
a powerful lobby group in Kyushu. It was concerned about 
the local employment consequences of the declining use of 
coal in Kyushu. The Liaison Committee sent petitions to a 
number of local governments, which included Ooseto town, 
requesting them to consider their areas as possible 
locations for a project. In April that year, the committee 
also sent a request to MITI and the Kyushu branch of MITI 
requesting co-operation in the location of a project.17
17. Ishikawa S., Sekitan senkö karyoku hatsuden sho no 
kensetsu ni taisuru yöbösho [Community Demands 
Regarding the Development of the Matsushima fossil- 
fuelled Plant], Nagasaki ken tangyö shichöson rengo 
kai, Nagasaki, 1973.
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The prefectural government also took positive action in 
supporting the project. Incomes in Nagasaki were growing at 
an average annual rate of 12.1 per cent and this was much 
higher than an average of 7.8 per cent for other areas 
accepting fossil-fuelled projects.18 A major finding in 
Chapter 4 was that fossi1-fue1led projects have longer 
leadtimes in prefectures where incomes are growing 
relatively rapidly. The community in those areas places 
more weight on the physical environmental impairment 
attached to fossi1-fue11ed projects and less on the 
expansion of income generated by those projects. The 
Nagasaki government, however, responded favourably toward 
the development of coal-fired projects because they could be 
expected to assist the ailing coal industry. The attainment 
of regional coal policy objectives, therefore, overcame the 
concern about the quality of the environment in Nagasaki. 
This is one important element in explaining why the 
statistical models developed in this thesis over-estimate 
the time required to reach agreement of the Matsushima 
project.
In June 1973, Governor Kubo sent a request to MOF and other 
relevant ministries, such as the MITI, to obtain finance for 
the development of the project. The request contained five 
reasons justifying finance for the project. The first was 
the devastating economic impact of mine closures in local 
coal producing areas. The second was the need to guarantee
18. Calculated from data contained in Asahi shinbun sha, 
Asahi nenkan [Asahi Yearbook], Asahi shinbun sha, 
various issues, 1969-1974.
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a stable demand for domestic coal for social policy reasons. 
The third was the need to develop coal-fired plants for the 
long-term economic viability of the coal industry. The 
fourth was the need to maintain employment of the 25000 
people engaged in the industry. The fifth was the need to 
stabilise the coal industry to contribute to regional 
economic development. 19
There was no reference to the electricity supply and demand 
situation in Kyushu in the appeals by the Liaison Committee 
and the prefecture to the national government. The project 
was not seen in terms of prefectural energy policy. 
Nagasaki prefecture was in a favourable electricity 
situation. From 1970 to 1973, electricity self-sufficiency 
had increased in Nagasaki from 122 to 161 per cent and the 
prefecture was a net exporter of electricity to other areas 
in Kyushu.20 Regional interests, therefore, attempted to 
promote the project in the context of regional industrial 
policy. They saw the project as playing a role in 
facilitating the recovery of the coal industry in Kyushu.
Power company response
Despite the strong support by the community in Nagasaki 
prefecture, the Kyushu Electric Power Company opposed the
19. See Kubo S., Sekitan senkö karyoku hatsuden sh5 
kensetsu ni kansuru yöböshö [Demands Regarding the 
Construction of the Matsushima Coal-fired Project], 
Nagasaki, 1973.
20. Nihon enerugii keizai kenkyöjo, Chiiki betsu enerugii 
juyö tokusei no bunseki [Characteristics of Energy 
Supply and Demand in Japan by Prefecture], Nihon 
enerugii keizai kenkyüjo, Tokyo, 1980.
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development of the plant.21 Kyushu Electric was uncertain 
about the economic costs of the EPDC project given a 
favourable expected electricity supply and demand situation 
in Kyushu. It was also worried about the impact of the 
project on the scheduling of its site development plans. 
This uncertainty was exacerbated because Kyushu Electric 
perceived that it would have no control over the speed of 
development of the project.
In 1973, there was no urgency in the development of a coal- 
fired project to supplement the existing grid in Kyushu. 
The company argued that the Matsushima project would lead to 
excess capacity. In that year, actual supply by Kyushu 
Electric was 5716 Megawatts ( MW) and five year projections 
indicated that electricity demand would increase to 
approximately 8210 MW. Kyushu Electric, however, had 
substantial capacity in the licensing stage and under 
construction. This capacity included the Sendai and Buzen 
fossil-fuelled plants and the Genkai nuclear plant and 
totalled 2974 MW. This implied that the power company 
expected to be in a favourable position with respect to 
electricity supply in the period 1973 to 1978.22
21. This section on Kyushu Electric's response to the 
Matsushima project is based on extensive interviews 
with personnel of the Kyushu Electric Power Company, 
1983 and various issues of Yomiuri shinbun [Yomiuri 
Newspaper], Nagasaki shinbun [Nagasaki Newspaper,] and 
Nikkan kögyö shinbun [Nikkan Industrial Newspaper], 17- 
18 May 1974, and Igarashi T., op.cit., pp.68-74.
22. Information received from the Tokyo Electric Power 
Company, 1984 and Shigen enerugii chö köeki jigyö bux 
Dengen kaihatsu no gaiyo: sono keikaku to kiso shiryo 
[An Outline of Power Plant Developments in Japan: 
Plans and Basic Data], Tokyo, various issue's, 1965- 
1982.
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The structure of the electricity grid in Kyushu also 
influenced Kyushu Electric's response to the project. As 
the grid was interconnected with the Honshu grid only by a 
small transmission line, Kyushu Electric argued that it 
would not be possible to distribute any excess capacity to 
the mainland. Kyushu Electric felt that it would be 
pressured by the EPDC to purchase the bulk of electricity 
generated by the project. The company did not wish to be 
put in a position of having to purchase costly excess 
electricity which it could generate more cheaply itself.
The company also argued that there would be no stability in 
the supply of local coal to the project. Coal mines had 
been closing down rapidly in Kyushu and efforts to use 
imported steaming coal to assure security of supply would be 
rejected by the coal industry. Furthermore, Kyushu Electric 
had previously experienced such coal supply problems and, as 
a result, had been forced to modify a number of existing 
coal-fired plants so that they could burn a combination of 
oil and coal fuels. The cost of such design changes were 
relatively high, compared with the cost of initially 
developing an oil-fired plant.
Kyushu Electric was also worried about the impact of the 
Matsushima project on electricity tariffs in Kyushu. The 
price of coal produced in Kyushu was high relative to that 
of imported oil. Even with government subsidies, the price 
of coal had been increasing in Kyushu. The major element in 
the escalation of the price was the increased scarcity of 
surface coal. The coal industry had entered into deeper 
underground coal bodies and this had increased the
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extraction cost. The higher cost of coal was a major factor 
leading to higher electricity prices in Kyushu and, by the 
early 1970s, electricity tariffs were the highest in Japan. 
As fuel costs are a major component of the total costs of 
coal-fired plants, Kyushu Electric was concerned that the 
development of a coal-fired plant would put further upward 
pressure on electricity prices.
There were also environmental considerations. Coal produced 
in Kyushu has a high sulphur content, and Kyushu Electric 
was concerned about the environmental impact of the 
Matsushima plant on Ooseto town. It argued that the project 
might lead to the emergence of strong local environmental 
resistance to the project as Ooseto town had a relatively 
high population density. It felt that the development of 
the project would stimulate and intensify anti-pollution 
movements which had been emerging in Kyushu since the early 
1970s. Kyushu Electric felt that this would increase the 
difficulty of siting power projects elsewhere in Kyushu.
As the Matsushima project was expected to lead to an excess 
supply situation, Kyushu Electric also saw a high cost in 
the necessary rescheduling of its project development plans. 
The rescheduling of projects was expected to lead to 
negotiating problems with local communities, where the 
leadership had created support for projects by fostering 
expectations about the expansion income and employment 
Kyushu Electric was concerned that delay in delivering those 
benefits might result in public opposition to its projects.
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The power company was also worried about the cost of 
delaying projects in the construction stage. Kyushu 
Electric was borrowing heavily to finance the Genkai nuclear 
project and delay would have increased the repayment burden. 
In the early 1970s, inflation had increased and this was 
also expected to add to the construction cost of the 
projects should they be excessively delayed.
Kyushu Electric also disapproved of the project because of 
strong parochial and territorial feelings. Since the late 
1960s, there had emerged a trend among the larger power 
companies to develop projects in the electricity spheres of 
other smaller power companies. Site availability for large 
power companies had become limited because of strong urban 
environmental resistance and competing uses for land. Large 
power companies began to consider sites in more rural areas 
where smaller electric power companies were operating. 
Tokyo Electric had developed the Fukushima nuclear project 
and was developing the Kashiwazaki-Kariwa nuclear project in 
Tohoku Electric's sphere. Kansai Electric had also 
developed the Oi, Mihama and Fukui nuclear projects in 
Hokuriku Electric's sphere. Kyushu Electric felt that large 
power companies from Tokyo and Osaka should not be 
developing scarce rural sites at the expense of smaller 
power companies.
Kyushu Electric, therefore, opposed the project because it 
faced a choice between the high costs of both excess 
capacity and the rescheduling site management plans. Its 
response to the EPDC project differs significantly from the 
responses of other power companies in similar situations
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such as those in Honshu. For example, Hokuriku Electric did 
not oppose the development of Kansai Electric's Mihama and 
Oi nuclear projects. The grid beetwen Hokuriku and Kansai 
was interconnected thus allowing excess electricity from 
those projects to be transferred to Kansai Electric. In 
addition, Hokuriku Electic was having major difficulties in 
locating the Noto nuclear power plant.23 it saw major 
benefits in Kansai Electric's projects as it would be able 
to purchase cheaper electricity when necessary.
Kyushu Electric was in a strong bargaining position with the 
EPDC. The cost of the Matsushima project was high and 
Kyushu Electric appealed to MOF not to support uneconomical 
projects. Furthermore, the negotiation process between the 
EPDC and the Nagasaki prefectural government and Ooseto 
local government, on the one hand, and the prefecture and 
MOF, on the other, was being conducted secretly at this 
stage. Both the prefecture and EPDC perceived that 
resistance in Ooseto town might emerge if it were revealed 
that the prefecture, the EPDC and MOF had been negotiating 
over the development of the project without their knowledge 
of it. The EPDC decided to delay the project and not 
pressure Kyushu Electric into publicising the dispute.
23. See Nagashu shinbun sha, Jinmin shöri no kiroku 
[Records of the People's Victory], Nagashu shinbun sha, 
Shimonoseki, 1978 for a detailed analysis of the 
dispute over the siting of the Noto nuclear power 
plant.
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Revised energy priorities and project development
In October 1973, the oil crisis occurred and there emerged a 
strong interest in Japan in the development of alternative 
energy sources, such as coal, to enhance energy security. 
The oil crisis had a major impact on the negotiations over 
the Matsushima project. It put the EPDC in a stronger 
bargaining position with Kyushu Electric and the company 
decided to seek agreement from the regional community to 
conduct an Environmental Assessment and proceed with 
negotiations over the project development.
The EPDC and revised energy priorities
The 1973 oil crisis caused considerable concern in the
national government and power companies over the future
price and availability of oil supplies. The national
government revised its existing energy policy and aimed to
reduce dependence on imported oil. A major pillar in the
new energy policy was the development of alternative energy
sources such as nuclear, coal and LNG projects. The
national government, therefore, came to place considerable
importance on the speedy development of the Matsushima 
. 24project.
The EPDC's place in national energy policy expanded from the 
peripheral social role of providing an outlet for the 
domestic coal in Japan to an important role as a major 
developer of coal-fired projects to reduce Japan's
24. Denki shinbun [Electricity Newspaper], 4 October 1974.
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vulnerability to oil supply interruptions. This role was 
reflected in the EPDC's five year plan which was announced 
on 13 March 1974. In that plan, the company announced that 
it would develop three coal-fired plants, one of which would 
be the Matsushima project.
The importance of the development of coal-fired plants was
enhanced because of expected delays in the development of
nuclear power projects. Many of Japan's nuclear projects
had encountered stiff regional opposition and, as a result,
nuclear power plant leadtimes were showing noticeable
increases. The national government placed high importance
on the development of nuclear projects, but the expected
delays meant that they could only play a role in the longer
term in reducing dependence on imported oil. Coal-fired
projects were expected to have shorter gestation times and,
therefore, were seen as a major source of electricity until
25nuclear projects could be brought on stream.
Despite the change in energy policy priorities, the EPDC 
still had to start negotiatons with regional interests, such 
as the prefectural government, the local community in 
Ooseto, and Kyushu Electric as well as the national 
government, in order to obtain the necessary funds to 
develop the project. In March 1974, the company announced 
that it wished to start construction by mid-1975. As the 
national budget is passed annually in January, the EPDC 
attempted to negotiate simultaneously with the community in 
Ooseto town, Kyushu Electric and the national government.
25. Asahi shinmbun [Asahi Newspaper], 13 March 1974.
272
The company judged that in order to commence construction in
mid-1975, it would be required to obtain Denchöshin approval
by late 1974, thus leaving approximately six months to
obtain appropriate licenses and permits. This implied that
the EPDC was allowing approximately one and a half years to
2 6win approval for the project.
Environmental Assessment
In February 1974, the EPDC applied to the Nagasaki 
prefectural government for the necessary permits to conduct 
an Environmental Assessment. The prefecture was only too 
eager to give the company permission to commence the 
assessment. Since the oil crisis the prefecture had 
intensified its support for the project. Nagasaki prefecture 
was particularly hard hit by the recession after the oil 
crisis. The world wide recession caused major adjustment 
problems for the ship-building industry which had been a 
major pillar in the prefecture's economy. The prefectural 
government was, therefore, very interested in the 
development of the Matsushima project to stimulate regional 
economic growth.
The prefecture did not wish environmental opposition to 
emerge in Ooseto town and consequently it placed three 
conditions on the conduct of the Environmental Assessment as 
it related to the EPDC's siting policy at Matsushima. The 
first was that the company was required to publicise all
26. Information obtained in an interview with personnel 
from the EPDC, 1983.
273
results of the investigation. The second was that the 
project would be abandoned if the results of the 
investigation indicated that there would be an adverse 
impact on the physical environment in Ooseto town and in
I
surrounding areas. The third condition state that the 
company would not start land, fishing right transfer and 
community compensation negotiations until after the 
assessment had been completed and publicised.
The EPDC promised, publicly, to abide by these conditions
and, therefore, attempted to separate the environmental
investigation from the actual construction of the project.
That is to say, the company wanted to be perceived to be not
promoting the project until after the investigation had
revealed that the project was sound environmentally. The
EPDC also wanted to minimise the local concern about the
environmental impact of project. Furthermore, it could not
start the formal negotiations with the community until it
had received approval from Kyushu Electric and MOF on the
construction of the plant. The company felt that the
emergence of resistance to the project would destabilize
negotiations it was planning to conduct concurrently with
27Kyushu Electric and MOF.
Regional community response
The Ooseto town assembly agreed formally to the
Environmental Assessment in July 1974. In mid-1973, the
EPDC had approached mayor Nagata about the possiblity of
27. See Igarashi T., op.cit., pp.38-57 and information 
received from officials of the Environmental Planning 
Agency, 1983.
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developing the coal-fired plant on Matsushima Island. 
Nagata felt that the local community would readily accept 
the project. The EPDC, however, wished to delay publicising 
their intention to develop the project because of opposition 
by Kyushu Electric. The power company persuaded Nagata to 
keep the project proposal secret.
At the local level, too, the oil crisis had raised hopes for 
a resumption of the project. The mayor, Nagata, sought to 
promote the project by creating local support for the 
project. His strategy was to create expectations for 
regional development by proposing the construction of a 
paper pulp project. Such a project was less environmentally 
obstrusive and Nagata felt that he could create a consensus 
quickly. He planned to change the proposal to a coal-fired 
project after a development mood had been created in the 
town. Nagata had the view that the community would be less 
worried about the environmental implications of the project 
if there was a strong push for regional development in the 
town.28
Nagata persuaded local residents from Uchiura hamlet on 
Matsushima island to promote the paper pulp project. On the 
5 January 1974, thirty-six residents from Uchiura sent a 
request to Nagata urging him to support the development of a 
paper pulp project. The assembly subsequently formed the 
Kigyö yuchi tokubetsu iinkai [Special Committee for Inviting 
the Development of Industry; hereafter referred to as the
28. Information received from a journalist who reported the 
developments in the siting of the Matsushima project, 
1983.
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Special Committee] which was to consider the development of 
the paper pulp project. The Special Committee, while 
considering the paper pulp project, attempted to create a 
development mood amongst residents living on the island. 
The town assembly supported unanimously the development of 
the paper pulp project and this was critical in stimulating 
an interest in regional development.29
Subsequently, the committee abandoned the paper pulp project 
and proposed a coal-fired project. As expected by the 
leadership, this change in plan was received with enthusiasm 
from island residents. There was little prospect for 
regional development in Matsushima. During the Taisho 
period, Matsushima island was a major coal producing area, 
and the island economy was highly dependent on the mining 
industry. Approximately 15000 people had been employed in 
that industry. In 1934, however, a flash flood forced the 
closure of the largest mine on the island and, by 1963, the 
other smaller mines were exhausted.30 As there was no other 
industry which could absorb the workforce, many young people 
started to leave the island in search of employment 
opportunities. The community in Matsushima felt that the 
development of a project would stimulate the island economy 
and that young people would return to the island.31
29. Interviews with personnel in the EPDC, 1983.
30. Omi K., eds., 'Matsushima sekitan karyoku hatsuden sho 
richi o kaerimiru' [Reflecting on the Development of 
the Matsushima Coal-fired Plant], Denpatsu [The EPDC 
Bulletin], Dengen kaihatsu kabushiki gaisha, Tokyo, 
January 1978, p.18.
31. Honma U., 'Machi ni waka tachi ga kaette kita' [The 
Youth have Returned], Enerugii Fuoramu [Energy Forum], 
Tokyo, February 1981, pp.67-70.
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Matsushima also lagged in the development of social and 
economic infrastructure. The outflow of young people had 
led to an ageing population and there was a severe shortage 
of welfare services. There were no hospitals and the only 
means of transportation to mainland hospitals was by a 
dilapidated ferry which operated only once or twice a week. 
On numerous occasions, elderly people had failed to receive 
medical treatment because of a lack of clinics and 
transportation to hospitals on the mainland. The lack of 
welfare services had become a major social issue amongst the
island community.32
As noted in Chapter 2, the national government established 
the Three Laws in 1974. These laws provide finance for the 
development of public goods, such as hospitals, to 
communities accepting power plants. In his discussions with 
local residents in Matsushima, Nagata stressed that these 
benefits would accrue to the island community. The local 
public, therefore, saw the coal-fired project as a means of 
achieving the expansion of welfare services for the aged. 
At the same time, there was some concern about the 
environmental cost associated with the development of the 
coal-fired project. The community, however, was not overly 
worried about the impairment of the environment resulting 
from the project. As the island had been historically a 
mining area, there was a high degree of familiarity with 
environmental problems associated with coal use. The 
community in Matsushima was willing to accept the
32. Information obtained from a journalist covering the 
siting of the Matsushima project, 1983.
277
environmental risks in return for the social and economic 
benefits expected from the project development.
On the mainland, there was also strong community support for
the project. Ooseto had been left behind the rest of the
prefecture in economic development and this had caused major
financial difficulties. From 1965 'to 1973, the town's fin­
ancial index declined from 0.20 to 0.16. ^  The town
anticipated that there would be substantial financial,
income and employment benefits from accepting the project.
Moreover, the environmental costs were perceived to be
concentrated mainly on the island. The geographical
location of the project was also important in the mainland
community's support. The community expected to receive
substantial benefits from the construction of the project
yet the costs were to be borne predominantly by the
community on Matsushima island.
On 20 May, the EPDC explained the details of the project to
I
the four fishing co-operatives in Ooseto town. They were 
the Matsushima, Ooseto, Taira and Yukiura Fishing Co­
operatives. Maekawa Hidekatsu, head of the Yukiura Fishing 
Co-operative and speaker of the town assembly played an 
important role in winning agreement for the Environmental 
Assessment from fishermen. There was little coastal fishing 
conducted near Matsushima and the majority of fishermen were 
engaged in off-shore fishing. Maekawa argued that waste
33. Jichi shö zaisei kyoku shidö ka, Shichöson betsu kessan 
jökyö shirabe [An Examination of Local Financial 
Accounts], Jichi shö zaisei kyoku shidö ka, various 
issues, 1965-74.
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water discharged from the project would not affect fishing 
and that the co-operatives should allow the Environmental 
Assessment to take place so that any adverse effects could 
be identified. Despite some concern about the impact of 
waste water on the marine environment, the fishing co­
operatives gave their consent to the Environmental 
Assessment on 27 July 1974.34
An important characteristic of the community response at 
both the local and prefectural level was the lack of 
organised economic resistance toward the project. This 
differs from other nuclear and fossi1-fue11ed siting 
disputes where resistance generally emerged in the initial 
stages of project development. The community in Ooseto 
attached importance to the benefits, such as the provision 
of public goods and the recovery of the coal industry, 
expected to accrue from the project. It placed less 
emphasis on the environmental risk associated with coal 
because of the familiarity with coal mining operations.
A second feature of the dispute was the lack of ideological 
resistance to the project. ^  One major conclusion of Chapter 
4 was that nuclear project leadtimes tend to be longer in 
areas where there is a relatively high representation of 
leftist political parties in the prefectural - assembly. In 
Nagasaki, there was bipartisan support of the project. Both 
the Liberal Democratic Party and the Japan Socialist Party, 
the two major parties in Nagasaki, saw the project as an
34. See Igarashi T., op.cit. pp.98-104.
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integral part of the prefecture's industrial policy which 
was aimed at expanding the demand for coal produced in 
Nagasaki. In contrast to other areas, economic and 
ideological resistance toward the power plant did not 
emerge.
Bargaining between promoters
The oil crisis, together with the expected electricity 
shortages in the Western Electricity Sphere, increased the 
importance of the project to the EPDC and MITI. Kyushu 
Electric, however, still opposed the project because of the 
high cost of excess capacity in Kyushu. MOF was also 
reluctant to provide the necessary finance because of a 
macro-economic policy objective of curtailing public 
expenditure to curb inflationary trends in the Japanese 
economy. The EPDC and MITI had a strong bargaining position 
given the emphasis on energy security. They were able to 
reach a settlement by proposing the development of 
transmission lines which would interconnect the Kyushu and 
Honshu grids. This enhanced the economic viability of the 
project and alleviated Kyushu Electric's concern about 
excess capacity in Kyushu. The agreement by Kyushu Electric 
isolated MOF. The EPDC subsequently used Diet members to 
exert pressure on MOF to incorporate the project into the 
national government budget.
Negotiations between power companies
As soon as the EPDC obtained community consent to undertake 
the Environmental Assessment, the Kyushu Electric Power
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Company began to oppose the project publically. The public
opposition by Kyushu Electric was a reflection of its eroded
bargaining position vis-a-vis the promoters of the project.
Since the oil crisis, the economic justification for
opposing the project had weakened. The costs of coal-fired
plants were now lower relative to oil and there was the
added concern about energy security. Coal projects became
an economically viable option for diversifying away from oil
and the national government relaxed coal import restrictions
35to enhance security of supply.
Despite the concern about energy security, Kyushu Electric 
saw no need to develop the project. Between 1973 and 1974, 
Kyushu Electric's supply capacity increased by 8 per cent 
from 5716 MW to 6175 MW. During the same period, demand had 
increased by only 4 per cent from 5378 MW to 5553 MW. The 
expected recession arising out of higher oil prices, caused 
a revision in five year electricity demand projections. 
These were cut back by 1.8 per cent from 8,210 MW in 1973 to 
8060 MW in 1974. In response to recessed demand, supply 
targets were also revised downward from 9735 MW to 9271 MW.
Although Kyushu Electric expected to be in a favourable 
supply situation, the Western Electricity Sphere which 
comprises Kyushu, Chugoku and Shikoku Electric Power 
Companies expected electricity shortfalls. In the Western 
Electricity Sphere, five year electricity demand projections 
were revised downward by 2.9 per cent from 19600 MW in 1973
35. See Tokyo shinbun [Tokyo Newspaper], 19 April 1974.
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to 19020 MW in 1974 due to the post-oil crisis recession. 
Despite these revisions, supply capacity, particularly in 
the Chugoku Electric sphere, had not kept pace with 
electricity demand increases. This led to an expected 
supply shortage for the western sphere. In 1974, actual 
supply in the sphere was 14623 MW . Expected demand for 1979 
was 19620 MW. The three companies in the sphere had 
capacity totalling approximately 3525 MW which could be 
expected to come on stream within the five year period. 
This implied that, if no additional plants were brought on 
stream by 1979, there would be an electricity shortfall of 
approximately 850 MW. The Matsushima project was therefore 
more important in equilibrating the electric market in the 
western sphere as a whole than in Kyushu Electric's 
sphere.36
Up until early 1974, the EPDC had been negotiating 
bilaterally with Kyushu Electric over the construction of 
the Matsushima project. The EPDC decided that, given the 
different excess supply situations in Kyushu and in the 
Western Electricity Sphere, it would develop transmission 
lines to the mainland and use the project to supply the 
electricity from Kyushu to other power companies in the 
western sphere. The EPDC decided to discuss the project in 
regional electricity policy terms and persuaded Chugoku and
36. The figures for this analysis were calculated from 
information received from the Tokyo Electric Power 
Company and Shigen enerugii ch<7 kGeki jigyo bu, 
op.cit., various issues, 1973-1974.
282
Shikoku Electric Power companies to exert pressure on Kyushu
37Electric to accept the project.
From early 1974, the Nishi chiiki denryoku kyagi kai 
[Western Electricity Sphere Deliberative Council; hereafter 
referred to as the Electricity Council] met several times to 
discuss the Matsushima project. The EPDC, by appealing to 
the Electricity Council and discussing the benefits of the 
project in a regional context, was able to weaken the 
resistance by the Kyushu Electric Power Company to the 
project. The Chugoku and Shikoku Electric Power Companies 
were eager to accept the Matsushima project. They could not 
economically develop large projects because of the 
relatively small size of their grids. They, therefore, 
weighed highly the benefits of being able to purchase 
electricity from Kyushu in order to meet expected 
electricity shortages. They would also incur no costs, such 
as compensation, necessary to implement the project. The 
EPDC and the Chugoku and Shikoku Electric Power Companies 
were thus able to focus on the regional benefits of the 
project, and exert pressure on Kyushu Electric by arguing 
that the company should be giving priority to broader 
regional interests rather than narrow sectoral company 
interests.38
Existing transmission lines were only capable of 
distributing small amounts of electricity from Kyushu. As a 
result, two major issues had to be resolved in the context
37. Interviews with personnel of the EPDC, 1983.
38. Information received from personnel of Chugoku and 
Shikoku Electric Power Companies, 1983.
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of negotiations over the development of transmission lines 
to the mainland. The first involved the number of plants 
the EPDC would construct and the proportion of electricity 
/each of the three private companies would take from the 
Matsushima project. The second was the proportion each 
company should pay for the construction of the transmission 
lines.39
In September 1974, the Electricity Council agreed on the 
construction of a single coal-fired plant. The EPDC had 
wished to obtain agreement for two projects, but Kyushu 
Electric had argued that one project would be sufficient to 
meet supply objectives in the western sphere. The Council 
agreed that the EPDC would only build one project at this 
time, and that a future proposal for a additional plant 
should be considered in the light of subsequent regional 
electricity supply and demand considerations.
The Matsushima project had a capacity of 500 MW and each of 
the three private companies agreed to contract with the EPDC 
over the up-take of electricity generated by the plant. The 
up-take quantities were based on the need for electricity 
and the size of respective grids. Although Chugoku Electric 
had a smaller grid, it agreed to take a 40 per cent share 
because of its greater need to purchase electricity. Kyushu 
Electric also agreed to take 40 per cent because its grid
39. For various analyses of the dispute, see Denki shinbun 
[Electric Newspaper], 21-25 September 1974, Nihon 
keizai shinbun [Japan Economic Newspaper], 20-22 
September 1974, Nikkan kögyö shinbun [Nikkan Industrial 
Newspaper], 21 September 1974 and Nishi nihon shinbun 
[West Japan Newspaper], 20 September 1974.
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was the largest in the western sphere. Shikoku Electric had 
both a smaller grid and less of a need to purchase 
electricity and, therefore, agreed to purchase the remaining 
20 per cent.
The expected cost of developing the electricity distribution 
network was approximately 11700 million yen. This included 
new transmission lines and extensions and renovations to 
existing lines. Chugoku Electric and the EPDC agreed to 
finance the major part of the cost involved in constructing 
transmission lines. Chugoku Electric agreed to pay 4600 
million yen for the development of transmission lines 
through Hiroshima and Okayama prefectures. The EPDC agreed 
to provide 6100 million yen for all other major transmission 
lines necessary to complete the distribution network in the 
Western Electricity Sphere.40
The costs of the transmission lines were charged against the 
project development. The benefits of the Matsushima 
project, in terms of energy security and regional 
electricity concerns, outweighed these costs and, therefore, 
increased the social value of the project. The EPDC was 
able to reach agreement with Kyushu Electric by providing 
benefits to the company for accepting the project. Together 
with Chugoku Electric it provided indirect compensation to 
Kyushu Electric by subsidising the development of the 
transmission network between Kyushu and the mainland. The
40. See Matsushima richi jimushö, Matsushima karyoku 
hatsuden sho kensetsu keikaku: keii to genjo [The
Construction of the Mutsushima Power Plant: Details
and the Present Situation], Dengen kaihatsu kabushiki 
gaisha, Tokyo, 1977, p.5.
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transmission network reduced the potential for an excess 
supply situation. Furthermore, it improved substantially 
the reliability of the grid in the sphere and reduced the 
risk of shortages in the event of plant malfunctions and 
unexpected increases in electricity demand. Kyushu Electric 
incurred no costs for the increased reliability of the grid.
Project financing and inter-ministry conflict
By October 1974, the EPDC had developed substantial regional 
support for the project. It had also reached agreement with 
the Kyushu Electric Power Company over the construction of 
the Matsushima project. It had commenced the Environmental 
Assessment and planned to complete that in the latter half 
of 1975. The company appeared to be in a good position to 
appeal to MOF to incorporate the project into the national 
government budget and obtain the necessary funds to 
compensate the community and then construct the project.
The EPDC appealed to MITI to promote the project. MITI's 
Public Utility Bureau was interested in the project because 
of a concern about energy security. It had played a major 
role in the development of Japan's energy policy and was 
critical in the formulation of Japan's policy of 
diversifying away from oil after the 1973 crisis. The Coal 
Bureau which is located in the Agency for Natural Resources 
and Energy (ANDRE) also promoted the project because of its 
desire to provide outlets for domestically produced coal. 
The coincidence of interests between these two bureaus
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allowed MITI and ANDRE to present a united front in
41attempting to persuade MOF to accept the project.
The Budget Bureau in MOF, however, took a more cautious 
stance toward the project. In accordance wi^th Prime 
Minister Miki's economic policy objectives, the ministry was 
attempting to formulate a budget which reduced the national 
deficit by restraining public spending. One of Miki's major 
economic priorities was to reduce the budget deficit in 
order to curb spiralling inflation after the oil crisis. 
Among other things, he sought to restrain government 
spending so that aggregate demand in the economy could be 
reduced. MOF saw the Matsushima project as one impediment 
to the attainment of macro-economic policy goals.42
In late 1974, the EPDC requested MOF to provide finance in 
order to compensate the community so that a settlement could 
be reached. It asked for 200 million yen for the 
Environmental Assessment and the other preliminary 
investigations, and for negotiations over the transfer of 
property rights and community compensation arrangements.^^ 
A necessary criterion for receiving a budget to construct 
the project was agreement with the regional electorate over 
the development of the project. The company thought that 
obtaining this negotiation budget would allow the 
commencement of community negotiations after the completion
41. Information obtained from MITI, 1983.
42. Interview with officials from MOF, 1983.
43. Nihon keizai shinbun [Japan Economic Newspaper], 13 
January 1975.
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of the Environmental Assessment and the company would, 
therefore, be able to present MOF with a proposal to 
construct the plant in the latter half of 1975 for the 1976 
budget.
MOF argued that it would be politically risky to provide 
finance for compensation given that the Environmental 
Assessment had not been completed. It noted the conditions 
that the prefecture had placed upon the completion of the 
Environmental Assessment and community negotiations. It 
argued that the provision of a negotiation budget prior to 
the completion of the Environmental Assessment would lead to 
opposition by environmental groups at the national level and 
might create resistance to the Matsushima project at the 
local level. MOF, therefore, did not approve the subsidy 
for the Environmental Assessment and other investigations.^
MOF's decision placed the EPDC in an unfavourable position 
with respect to the commencement of negotiations with the 
local community. It did not wish to wait until the 1976 
budget as this would delay project implementation. MITI 
however, stepped into the breach by providing a subsidy to 
the EPDC so that the company could start negotiations. This 
allowed the company to conduct community compensation and 
property right transfer negotiations during 1975.
By late 1975, the EPDC had prepared a proposal for a number 
of projects to be incorporated into the 1976 budget. These 
included the Matsushima project as well as the development
44. See Igarashi T., op.cit., pp.74-80.
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of High Temperature Gas Reactor (HTGR). The company 
requested a total budget of 7750 million yen, of which 820 
million yen was for the Matsushima project and 900 million 
yen was for the construction of transmission lines. 
However, MOF was only prepared to provide 4030 million yen. 
Although the company had 1030 million yen in equity capital, 
MOF's proposal left the EPDC approximately 2700 million yen 
below its budget request. This meant that the power company 
would not be able to develop both projects and would have to 
choose between the development of the HTGR or the Matsushima 
project.45
MITI responded by arguing that the Matsushima project was 
important in simultaneously attaining national policy 
priorities such as energy security and domestic coal policy. 
It stressed that energy security considerations were 
paramount and that investment by the electric power industry 
would contribute, significantly, to regional economic 
development and recovery. After the oil crisis, Nagasaki 
prefecture experienced a severe depression. In addition to 
problems in the coal industry, the prefecture's other main 
industrial pillar, the shipbuilding industry, had been hit 
hard by the recession. MITI and the prefecture, therefore, 
exerted considerable pressure on MOF to provide the 
necessary budget for the Matsushima project.
The EPDC also appealed to national dietmen to support the 
project. They persuaded both LDP and JSP members of the
45. See Denki shinbun [Electricity Newspaper], Nikkan Kogyö 
shinbun [Nikkan Industrial Newspaper] and Nihon keizai 
shinbun [Japan Economic Newspaper], 7 January 1976.
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House of Representatives to stimulate discussion in the 
national diet. The debate in the Diet centred on the 
importance of energy security. Many of the members argued 
that, given siting difficulties, it was odd for MOF to 
reject projects particularly when regional communities were 
supporting them vigorously. There was bipartisan support 
for the project on the national level and this exerted 
considerable pressure on MOF to accept the project.^ Under 
this pressure, MOF agreed in January 1976, to finance the 
Matsushima project. The EPDC was successful in reaching 
agreement with Kyushu Electric over the development of the 
project and then persuading MITI and the Diet to pressure 
MOF into accepting the Matsushima coal-fired plant. The 
company skilfully created substantial support for the 
project and this weakened MOF's position. Energy security 
and regional electricity and industrial policy objectives 
outweighed budgetary objectives in the development of the 
project.
Compensating regional communities
This impressive success at the national level, however, 
brought the EPDC difficulties in its bargaining with the 
Ooseto community over the project. The EPDC had completed 
the Environmented Assessment, but had not published the 
results. Furthermore, since the middle of 1975, the company 
had been conducting land transfer investigations which, in 
the community mind, presumed that the project would go
46. See Nihon keizai shinbun [Japan Economic Newspaper], 13 
December 1975, and information obtained from MITI, 
1983.
290
ahead. The negotiations between MOF and the power company
over project finance were, therefore, seen by some segments
of the community as breaking the company's promise of
waiting for the community’s response to the results of the
Environmental Assessment. It injected instabilities into
47the settlement process on the local level.
\
Some community interests, such as residents on Matsushima 
island, responded by opposing the project so as to improve 
their bargaining positions with the EPDC. They knew that 
the EPDC would receive subsidies from the national 
government for the development of the project and wished to 
extract a share of those subsidies. Although there were 
benefits, such as the provision of public goods from the 
Three Laws, some community interests wished to receive 
compensation directly from the EPDC in return for their 
agreement for the project. They justified their positions 
by arguing that the company broke its promise over the
I
conduct of the Environmental Assessment. '
In September 1975, a group led by Kamoura Fusahiko, an 
influential resident of Uchiura, formed the Seikatsu kyögi 
kai [Life Deliberative Council].Kamoura was a leader of 
a small group of residents in Uchiura. He had been a 
fisherman but after his father's death left the island and 
attempted to study architecture. Not doing so well at this,
47. Igarashi T., op.cit., pp.80-91 and interviews with 
personnel from the EPDC, 1983.
48. See Matsushima richi jimushö, op. cit., p.24 and 
Igarashi T., op.cit., pp.109-111.
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he decided to return to Matsushima and, while engaging in 
some farming, lived a 'Robinson Crusoe' style of existence 
in an abandoned mine owned by Matsushima Kosan. Kamoura and 
five other people had signed contracts with Matsushima Kosan 
allowing them to live in the area where the plant was now 
being proposed. After 1969 the company had not renewed 
these contracts but had allowed Kamoura and a few other 
people to remain living in the area. Kamoura was upset with 
the EPDC. He had helped company officials conduct surveys 
in the early part of 1974. From the middle of 1975, company 
officials had started to enter what he regarded as his land 
and conduct land transfer investigations without his 
consent. He knew that the EPDC would have to negotiate 
with him to reach a settlement and wished to extract as much 
compensation out of the company as possible.49
The opposition by Kamoura was also important in changing the 
attitude by local residents in Matsushima. They also wanted 
to receive a share of the benefits of the project and felt 
that they could bargain with the power company to receive 
community compensation. They argued that they would incur 
all the environmental costs of the project while communities 
in Kyushu, Honshu and Shikoku would be receiving all the 
benefits. 50
The fishing co-operatives in Ooseto town, while not 
developing any organised opposition movement against the
49. Interview with journalist covering the siting of the 
Matsushima project.
50. Information obtained from personnel of the EPDC, 1983.
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project, placed requests with the power company demanding 
adequate compensation. A major conclusion of the 
Environmental Assessment was that waste water discharged 
from the project would affect some coastal fishing. 
Fishermen knew the power company required their consent to 
constructing the project and attempted to improve their 
bargaining position vis-k-vis the EPDC.51
The EPDC as well as the town was worried that these changes 
in community expectations might lead to intense bargaining 
among various groupings to increase their respective shares 
of compensation. A further concern was that this bargaining 
might lead to the emergence of opposition movements against 
the project as the company could not satisfy all the 
competing compensation claims. The EPDC responded by 
conducting a series of discussions in Ooseto to ascertain 
community attitudes and demands. These investigations 
revealed that the community in Matsushima and the fishing 
co-operatives were in favour of the project provided that 
their welfare, as they perceived it, would be enhanced by 
the development of the project. This implied obtaining 
adequate compensation.
The EPDC, in conjunction with the town, devised a strategy 
to obtain community approval for the project by using the 
provisions of the Three Laws. They felt that the community 
approach to compensation would restrain the emergence of any 
opposition to the project. The negotiations commenced in 
February 1976. The EPDC and the town negotiated with the
51. See Matsushima richi jimushö, op.cit., pp.22-32.
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four villages which had been amalgamated to form Ooseto 
town. These were Ooseto, Matsushima, Yukiura and Taira 
villages. They also negotiated with the fishing co­
operatives to provide funds for the development of the 
fishing industry. 52
The town and the EPDC proposed a plan which was aimed at 
providing benefits to the community in general. The initial 
plan envisaged a substantial proportion of community 
compensation going to Ooseto town as a whole (27.9 per cent) 
and to Ooseto village (27.2 per cent). The relatively large 
share that was proposed for Ooseto village reflected the 
population of the village and its proximity to the 
Matsushima project. In contrast, Matsushima and the fishing 
industry were to receive 14.1 per cent and 8.6 per cent of 
community compensation respectively. The town felt that 
these two sectors of the community would receive substantial 
benefits from the project with the transfer of their 
property rights. The remainder of the community 
compensation was to be directed to the Yukiura and Taira 
areas.
The initial plan, while attempting to provide general 
community compensation, did not reflect the allocation of 
bargaining power within the town. Matsushima and the 
fishing co-operatives had strong bargaining positions with 
the EPDC, and they used their positions to increase the 
share of community compensation at the expense of the town 
community. These negotiations continued until September.
52. Information received from MITI, 1983.
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Although the overall amount of compensation did not change, 
town compensation declined from 17.4 per cent to 10.5 per 
cent. Compensation to the Ooseto area declined from 27.3 
per cent to zero per cent. In contrast, Matsushima's share 
increased by 22.7 per cent to 37.2 per cent. Fishing 
development compensation increased by 28.2 per cent to 36.8 
per cent. Matsushima and the fishing co-operatives, 
therefore, were to receive 73.6 per cent of community 
compensation in return for their support for the project. 
The share of compensation going to the Yukiura and Taira 
areas declined marginally.53
The EPDC also influenced community expectations by providing 
direct funds for the additional development of social 
infrastructure and changing the design of the project. The 
additional compensation increased the benefits of the 
project. The power company decided to build a clinic as 
sick and elderly people had to go to the mainland for 
treatment. It also agreed to build a public hall on 
Matsushima island. During negotiations with the locals, the 
EPDC was persuaded to construct a ferry terminal so access 
to and from the island would be easier. In addition to 
those benefits, the company also announced a policy of 
employing half of the construction workforce from the local 
population.54
53. Information contained in a document entitled Matsushima 
jiten shuhen chiiki seibi köfukin haibun [The 
Distribution of Compensation for the Development of 
Public Facilities in Ooseto], collated by the EPDC, 
1987.
54. See Dengen kaihatsu kabushiki gaisha, Matsushima 
denpatsu kensetsu ni taisuru matsushima chiiku jümin no 
jöken yobo, [Community Demands and Conditions Regarding 
the Matsushima Coal-fired Plant], 1976.
295
A number of changes were also made to the design of the 
project so as to reduce the impact of the plant on the 
environment. The risk of accidents between ocean going 
vessels and fishing boats was perceived to increase with the 
increase of large vessels entering the Uchiura port. As the 
port in Uchiura was expected to become quite congested with 
ocean going coal vessels, the EPDC agreed to build a 
substitute port for fishermen at a nearby area. The company 
decided to shorten the length of the breakwater from 650 
metres to 550 metres. This provided a better escape route 
for fishermen using the port in the event of an accident 
between large coal vessels and fishing boats. The design 
of the waste water outlet pipes was also changed. The 
initial construction plan envisaged the outlet pipe pointing 
to the west. As the Matsushima Fishing Co-operative used 
the area to the west of the island for coastal fishing, the 
outlet pipe was changed to point to the east.55
While concluding the community compensation negotiations, 
the EPDC was negotiating simultaneously with landowners. 
Kamoura's opposition destabilised the land negotiating 
process. He attempted to persuade other land owners not to 
sell their land or to demand large payment in return for the 
transfer of land rights. In order to isolate the majority 
of landowners from Kamoura the EPDC persuaded the town to 
form the Chikensha iinkai [Landowners Committee] in June 
1976. The company felt that this would facilitate land 
negotiations as Kamoura's influence would be weakened.
55. See Matsushima richi jimushö, op.cit., p.12.
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Persistent opposition by Kamoura prevented the committee 
from acting as a single negotiating body and, in July, the 
committee decided to increase the price for land transfer. 
The prefecture as well as the town and the EPDC had visited 
Kamoura on several occasions to persuade him to accept the 
project. He continually opposed it. In response, the EPDC 
decided to negotiate individually with landowners and during 
July and August completed successfully the major part of 
land transfer negotiations.^
On 10 October 1976, the EPDC started negotiations with the 
fishing co-operatives in Ooseto town. The power company 
made offers to the fishing co-operatives based on the 
Compensation Standards. It offered 420 million yen to the 
Matsushima Fishing Co-operative, 98 million yen to the Taira 
Fishing Co-operative and 75 million yen to the Yukiura 
Fishing Co-operative. Although the fishing co-operatives 
had given their approval to the project, these offers were 
rejected as being too low. The fishing co-operatives 
perceived that their bargaining positions were enhanced 
because the EPDC had just about finalised other compensation 
and land right transfer negotiations. They felt that they 
could demand large amounts of payment as failure to win 
their approval would substantially delay or even cause 
abandonment of the project. 7^
Despite the emergence of problems regarding the finer 
details of property right transfer arrangements, the EPDC
56. Interview with personnel from the EPDC, 1983.
57. Igarashi T., op.cit., pp.118-124 and pp.145-153.
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wished to submit the proposal to Denchöshin by December.^ 
Failure to do so would delay the project by a further six 
months until the Denchöshin committee convened again. It 
also wanted to obtain national government approval of the 
project before the next budget was passed in January 1977, 
as MOF might revise its earlier decision to finance the 
project. The prefecture as well as mayor Nagata assessed 
that adequate community approval had been reached although 
some land transfer and fishing right transfer negotiations 
were still being conducted. On 17 December, the town 
assembly gave permission for the project to be submitted to 
Denchöshin. A week later the prefectural government 
approved the project and, in late December, Denchöshin 
approval for the Matsushima project was given.
Revised energy priorities and project delay
The revision of energy priorities is an important element in 
assessing the speed at wh-ich settlements can be reached 
between promoters and regional interests over the 
development of energy projects. Changed energy policy 
objectives, which stress energy security and regional 
electricity policy objectives can increase the expected 
value of projects. This will enhance the willingness of 
promoters, such as the national government, to compensate 
parties adversely affected by projects development. Revised
58. See Denki shinbun [Electricity Newspaper], 26 July 
1976, Nihon keizai shinbun: Kyushu ban [Japan Economic 
Newspaper: Kyushu Edition], 19 November 1975 and Nishi
nihon shinbun [Western Japan Newspaper], 28 December 
1976 for a discussion of the events leading up to 
Denchöshin approval for the Matsushima project.
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energy policy objective can, therefore, facilitate the 
settlement process.
In the settlement over the development of the Matsushima 
project, the EPDC faced considerable opposition by the 
Kyushu Electric Power Company. The EPDC valued the project 
in terms of regional coal policy objectives, as it was a 
major pillar in the government's policy of supporting the 
coal industry by providing outlets for domestic coal. 
Kyushu Electric viewed the project in electricity supply and 
demand terms. It expected a favourable electricity 
situation and assessed the costs of the project relatively 
highly. There was a substantial disparity in the value of 
the project between the EPDC and Kyushu Electric.
The EPDC required Kyushu Electric's consent to develop the 
project. Kyushu Electric expected the project to lead to a 
costly excess supply situation in Kyushu. The regional 
electricity grid was not interconnected with the Honshu grid 
and it did not want to be put in a position of having to 
purchase relatively costly electricity from the EPDC. 
Kyushu Electric was also concerned that it would have to 
reschedule its existing site development plans and did not 
wish to incur the site management costs involved in such 
rescheduling.
The community in Nagasaki promoted the project because of 
the importance of the coal industry to the regional economy. 
Like the EPDC, the prefecture valued the project in domestic 
coal policy terms. The decline in the use of coal was 
causing problems, such as unemployment, in the regional
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economy. The prefectural government felt that the 
construction and operation of the project would facilitate 
the attainment of important social and economic policy- 
objectives.
I
There was relatively little concern about the environmental 
implications of the project on either prefectural or local 
levels. During the settlement process, there was a strong 
emphasis being placed on preservation of the environment and 
improved welfare. This attitude differed in Nagasaki 
prefecture. The prefecture was historically a coal 
producing area and there was, therefore, a familiarity with 
the risk involved in the use of coal. Perhaps more 
important was the fact that the project was located on 
Matsushima island. This locational characteristic meant 
that any impairment of the immediate environment would be 
concentrated in one area away from population centres.
Another salient feature of the settlement over the 
development of the Matsushima project was the lack of 
organised ideological resistance. Both the LDP and the JSP 
wished to see the development of the project as it would 
assist the ailing coal industry in Nagasaki. This situation 
constrasts markedly with the siting of nuclear power 
stations. Ideological resistance generally emerges in the 
development of nuclear projects.
The EPDC required a budget from the national government to 
develop the project. Although the regional electorate 
supported the project and appealed to MOF to provide the 
necessary finance, Kyushu Electric's bargaining position was
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relatively stronger. It appealed to MOF not to allow the 
development of costly energy projects. MOF was not willing 
to provide finance for inefficient projects. Economics 
dominated regional politics in the determination of MOF's 
stance on the project.
The oil crisis of 1973 and an expected electricity shortage 
in the Western Electricity Sphere added a new dimension to 
bargaining over the Matsushima project. It increased the 
expected benefits of the plant in terms of enhancing energy 
security and averting electricity shortfalls. These revised 
expectations placed the EPDC in a much stronger bargaining 
position with respect to Kyushu Electric and MOF and the 
power company skilfully weakened their resistance to the 
project. It stressed the regional interest in the project 
in terms of averting electricity supply shortfalls in the 
Western Electricity Sphere and persuaded Shikoku and Chugoku 
electric power companies to exert pressure on Kyushu 
Electric to accept the project. A key element in the 
negotiations was the EPDC's proposal to develop and finance 
transmission lines to Honshu. This strategy reduced the 
concern about an excess supply situation in Kyushu. It also 
enhanced the longer term reliability of the grid in the 
Western Electricity Sphere and this was also expected to 
benefit Kyushu Electric. The EPDC, by assuring the 
provision of the major proportion of development finance, 
was able to compensate Kyushu Electric for losses expected 
to be incurred from the project development.
After the oil crisis, the EPDC also persuaded MITI and the 
national diet to exert pressure on MOF to provide finance
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for the project. MOF showed a lack of willingness in 
supporting the project. The Budget Bureau stressed the need 
to restrain public exenditure to curb inflation in Japan. 
MITI and the ANDRE were, however, concerned with developing 
alternative sources of energy and fostering the regional 
coal industry in Nagasaki. The importance placed on energy 
security and regional industrial policy objectives 
outweighed macro-economic considerations in the budgetary 
process and MOF agreed on financing the project.
The budgetary negotiations on the national level injected 
instabilities into the settlement process on the local 
level. Community interests sought to improve their 
bargaining positions so as to extract as much compensation 
out of the EPDC as possible. The EPDC and the town used 
skilfully the provisions of the Three Laws, which provide 
funds for public goods, to negotiate a settlement with the 
community in Ooseto town. Other interests, such as Kamoura 
and fishing co-operatives, attempted to demand large amounts 
of payment from the EPDC. These interests were not large 
and powerful and could not rely on ideological resistance to 
enhance their bargaining positions.
The dispute over the siting of the Matsushima coal-fired 
project highlights the importance of revised energy policy 
priorities on the time required to win approval over the 
development of energy projects in Japan. An analysis of 
energy priorities on both the national and regional levels 
appears to be important in improving the reliability of
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Statistical models which assume that preferences remain 
stable during the negotiating period.
There is a trend in Japan for larger power companies, such 
as the EPDC and Tokyo Electric, to locate projects in the 
electricity spheres of other smaller power companies. In 
these situations the settlement process will require 
agreement from smaller companies in addition to regional 
interests. It will, therefore, be necessary to consider the 
responses of those smaller companies in the assessment of 
settlement times. Energy demand growth in Japan has slowed 
down and it is likely that smaller companies will see the 
development of projects as leading to costly excess 
capacity. Consequently, they are likely to resist such 
proposals. At the same time, recent energy policy has 
started to give more stress to economic efficiency 
considerations. The national government is not likely to 
provide strong support for these projects unless there is 
renewed concern about energy security.
This chapter has considered the importance of revised energy 
policy priorities in the assessment of settlement times. 
The following chapter illustrates a case where a power 
company intentionally delayed the siting of a nuclear 
project because the costs of the project were high and were 
expected to increase. The power company preferred to meet 
electricity supply objectives by giving priority to an 
alternative less costly fossil-fuelled project.
8
THE IMPEDIMENT OF RISING PROJECT COSTS
The economic cost of projects is an important factor 
influencing the settlement process between promoters and 
regional communities over the development of energy 
projects. Power companies may not be willing to enter into 
negotiations over compensation and property right transfer 
arrangements with regional interests in situations where 
project costs are high and are expected to increase. Under 
these circumstances, project developers will prefer to delay 
costly projects intentionally and to give priority to the 
development of less costly alternatives to meet capacity 
expansion targets.
The Hokkaido Electric Power Company obtained Denchoshin 
approval to construct the Kyowa-Tomari nuclear project in 
1982, 156 months after it had approached and asked the
I
Hokkaido government to accept the project. The settlement 
process was one of the longest in Japan and took 86 months 
longer than the average time to reach agreement over the 
installation of nuclear projects.1 The siting dispute at 
Kyowa-Tomari is important in the context of the assessment 
of project settlement times in Japan. Despite resistance by 
fishing co-operatives and an anti-nuclear movement to the 
project, Hokkaido Electric intentionally delayed negotiating 
with local interests because relatively low expected 
electricity demand growth did not justify the cost of the 
project.
1. Refer to Chapter 2.
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After 1973, Japan entered a period of recessed energy demand 
growth. Economic growth slowed down considerably and higher 
energy prices and strong conservation efforts by government 
curtailed the expansion of energy demand. Changes in the 
structure of the economy away from energy intensive to less 
energy intensive industries also played an important role in 
reducing the speed of energy demand growth. The recessed 
growth in demand has reduced the need to develop energy 
projects quickly. Power companies, on numerous occasions, 
have preferred to delay project implementation because of 
the high cost of too much excess capacity. The siting 
dispute over the Kyowa-Tomari nuclear project provides 
important insights into the assessment of the times required 
to locate and construct energy projects.
Hokkaido Electric assessed that it would reach agreement 
with the local community in Hokkaido in approximately 40 
months. The public acceptance time for the project was 168 
months and the power company thus under-estimated the 
approval time for the project by 128 months. The siting 
models developed in Chapter Four provide a "batter basis on 
which the settlement time could have been assessed. The 
predictive model under-estimates the public acceptance time 
by 46 months. In contrast, the evaluative model which also 
takes into account social and economic conditions during the 
course of settlement, under-estimates the public acceptance 
time by 25 months. The evaluative model, provides a more 
accurate assessment of the time required to reach agreement 
over the project.
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The statistical models would have suggested that the
settlement time at Kyowa-Tomari would be longer than
average. Electricity demand, in both the national and power
company electricity spheres, was increasing at a relatively
slow rate and there was no powerful electricity market
justification for developing the project. Incomes in
Hokkaido were growing at a slow rate compared with the rest
of Japan and there was no strong development push for the
project. In Japan, pollution problems emerged in the late
1960's and early 1970's and regional communities started to
place a higher priority on preservation of the environment
2and improved welfare.
Statistical models which incorporate these influences under­
estimate the time required to develop the project. This 
suggests that there were other influences impeding the 
negotiation process. The most important of these factors 
was the unexpectedly high cost of the project. Electricity 
demand did not grow as quickly as expected and the 
installation of the project was expected to lead to a costly 
excess supply situation. Furthermore, the development of a 
large project to obtain economies of scale was also 
perceived as likely to reduce the reliability of the grid in 
Hokkaido. Nor did the power company foresee the relatively 
large compensation claims by local fishing interests which, 
if paid, would have reduced the economic viability of the 
project. The design of the project, moreover, opened the 
possibility of a successful terrorist attack, and there was
2. Refer to Chapter 4 for a fuller analysis of the impact 
of these influences on the variation in settlement 
times.
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concern that this would reduce the ability to manage the 
operation of the project effectively. These factors 
increased the cost of the Kyowa-Tomari project and the power 
company responded by developing less costly fossil-fuelled 
projects to meet electricity supply objectives.
Minimising economic cost in site selection
On 29 September 1969, the Hokkaido Electric Power Company, 
together with the Hokkaido government and the Sapporo branch 
of the Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI), 
decided officially to develop the Kyowa-Tomari nuclear power 
plant.3 The company's siting plan stated that the nuclear 
reactor would be located in Kyowa town and that the waste 
water pipes would stretch underground from the town through 
Tomari village to that village's coastline. The company 
projected that it would start construction in 1973 and 
commence commercial operations in 1977.  ^ This implied that 
the power company was aiming to reach a settlement with the 
local community in Kyowa town and Tomari village within a 
three to four year period. The relatively long planning 
horizon was directly attributable to the power company's 
motivation for developing the project. Hokkaido Electric 
saw the project as a technology research project and did not 
see it as an economically viable option for balancing
5electricity supply and demand in Hokkaido.
3. Appendix 6 contains a detailed chronology of events on 
the siting of the Kyowa-Tomari nuclear project.
4. Denki shinbun [Electricity Newspaper], 31 March 1969.
5. Hokkaido shinbun [Hokkaido Newspaper], 28 June 1969.
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MITI, in an effort to promote nuclear energy in Hokkaido, 
had been considering candidate sites since 1967, and had 
offered subsidies to the Hokkaido Electric Power Company 
within an established framework of providing subsidies for 
nuclear power development. The power company was eager to 
develop a nuclear project. Other power companies, such as 
Tokyo, Kansai and Chubu Electric, were pushing forward with 
nuclear energy and Hokkaido Electric was concerned at being 
left behind in the development of nuclear technology. ' A 
major incentive for the promotion of the project was to be 
seen to be developing a nuclear project so as to obtain 
national government subsidies.  ^ Top management within the 
company regarded the project as a research project involving 
nuclear technology.
In the late 1960s, there was no supply-demand justification 
for developing a nuclear plant in Hokkaido. In 1970, the 
power company estimated that electricity demand in the 
following five year period would increase to 2230 MW. 
Installed capacity at that time was 1694 MW and the power 
company had an additional 1200 MW in the licensing stage and 
under construction. The company, therefore, expected to 
have an over-supply of approximately 560 MW by 1975. The 
speedy development of the Kyowa-Tomari plant (350 MW ) would 
have put the company in a position of having costly excess 
capacity in the range of 910 MW, or approximately 40 per
It will be recalled from Chapter 5, which analysed the 
siting dispute over the Ashihama project, that Chubu 
Electric was also competing for subsidies from the 
national government to develop nuclear energy.
6 .
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cent more capacity than was required based on forecast 
demand.^
Nuclear energy was not competitive with other forms of 
energy in Hokkaido, such as coal-fired and hydro-electric 
power. The expected size of the grid was relatively small,8 
preventing the company from developing a large scale plant 
and reaping economies of scale. Furthermore, the grid in 
Hokkaido was interconnected with the Honshu grid only by a 
small transmission line. The company would thus be unable to 
sell excess electricity from a large plant to consumption 
centres in Honshu. Given the size of the grid any major 
project would supply a large proportion of Hokkaido's 
electricity supply, and it was pointed out that this would 
reduce the reliability of the grid in the event of an 
accident at that project.9
The power company, in order to improve the competitiveness 
of nuclear energy, sought to minimise the construction cost 
of the project as much as feasible. The selection of the 
Kyowa-Tomari site reflected an assessment of the economic
7. Information received from the Tokyo Electric Power 
Company, 1984 and Shigen enerugii chö köeki jigyö bu, 
Dengen kaihatsu no gaiyo:“ sono keikaku to kisö shiryö 
[An Outline of Power Plant Development in Japan: Plans 
and Basic Data], Tokyo, 1971.
8. Hokkaido shinbun [Hokkaido Newspaper], 28 June 1969.
9. Information obtained from the Hokkaido Electric Power 
Company, 1983.
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costs involved in developing the project.10 in 1968, MITI 
and the Hokkaido government had selected Tomari village and 
Hamaeki village as the most suitable candidate sites. 
During 1967 and ' 1968, Hokkaido Electric had also been 
conducting independent site selection investigations at 
Kyowa village.
Although there were some political considerations, economic 
factors were dominant in the selection of the Kyowa-Tomari 
site. Map 8.1 illustrates the proposed location of the 
project, the structure of property right ownership and 
surrounding areas. It also shows Hokkaido Electric's siting 
plan after 1978 when the power company decided to change the 
location of the project. Hamaeki village was too far away 
from major electricity consumption areas in central 
Hokkaido, and development of a plant in that village would 
have required the construction of expensive transmission 
lines and costly improvements to existing port facilities. 
The Kyowa and Tomari sites were closer to consumption areas, 
but location in Tomari would have required substantial 
excavation. The Kyowa site, although two kilometres inland, 
offered a less costly siting package than the other two 
areas. The town, acting as the agent of the power company, 
had already purchased the land on which to build the plant. 
The land required no excavation and was located close to a
10. This section on the selection of the Kyowa-Tomari site 
was based on the following newspaper articles: Nihon
keizai shinbun: hokkaido ban [Japan Economic Newspaper: 
Hokkaido Edition], Nikkan kögyo shinbun [Japan 
Industrial Newspaper], Hokkaido taimuzu [Hokkaido 
Times],Asahi shimbun: hokkaido ban [Asahi Newspaper: 
Hokkaido Edition], and Hokkaido shinbun [Hokkaido 
Newspaper], various issues,, 29-30 September 1969 and 
interviews with personnel from Hokkaido Electric 1983.
MAP 8 .1
LOCATION OF KYOWA-TOMARI NUCLEAR PLANT AND 
STRUCTURE OF PROPERTY RIGHT OWNERSHIP
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major highway which was to be used as a transportation route 
to and from the large port in Iwanai, located to the south 
of Kyowa town.
While the containment vessel housing the reactor was to be 
placed in Kyowa town, the company did not wish to lay cooling 
water pipes directly to the south west, the most direct 
route to the ocean because of anticipated resistance by 
farmers. Farmers in Kyowa town used the Karifuto river as a 
source of water, and the power company expected that 
opposition to the project would emerge within the farming 
community. Those farmers had water usage rights and would be 
concerned about the potential effects of a decline in the 
availability of river water and the discharge of cooling water 
on agricultural production.
The power company decided to lay the cooling water inlet and 
outlet pipes underground through Tomari village to the 
ocean. Tomari had been promoting the project and this 
project design, although never before contemplated in Japan, 
would allow the village to receive fixed asset taxes and 
other compensation for providing the land for the 
underground pipes. The company felt that this would 
mitigate any resistance from Tomari village which might 
arise if Kyowa town were to receive all the benefits from 
the project at the former's expense. Hokkaido Electric's 
design strategy enabled the benefits expected from the
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project to be more evenly distributed than if the project 
had been solely located in Kyowa.
Rescheduling project development
On 30 September 1969, Kyowa village, Tomari village and 
Iwanai town signed memorandums with Hokkaido Electric 
promising co-operation in siting the Kyowa-Tomari nuclear 
plant. Despite strong administrative and political support 
for the project, powerful economic resistance, centring on 
the Iwanai Fishing Co-operative and a more broadly leftist 
based anti-nuclear movement emerged. The fishing co­
operative and the anti-nuclear movement were particularly 
concerned about the impact of the project on the regional 
fishing industry. Their opposition to the project was 
intense and in July 1972 Iwanai was forced to freeze the 
memorandum it had signed with Hokkaido Electric. The power 
company, at this time, was confronted by an expected 
electricity shortage and was forced to postpone the nuclear 
plant in favour of the Date oil-fired plant in order to 
balance the electricity market in Hokkaido.
Economic resistance
The first signs of resistance to the Kyowa-Tomari plant 
emerged on 28 March 1970 when fishermen from Iwanai 
established the Genpatsu setchi hantai taisaku iinkai 
[Policy Committee for Opposing the Construction of a Nuclear 
Power Plant; hereafter referred to as the Policy Committee].
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This Policy Committee was to form the basis of resistance to 
the nuclear project."*-^
The Iwanai Fishing Co-operative, located to the south of 
Kyowa town and Tomari village, had fishing rights in Iwanai
port and those rights stretched to the border of Kyowa town.
\
The power company needed to acquire a section of their 
property rights in order to use the Iwanai port for 
transporting construction components and nuclear fuels. In 
Iwanai town, there were prospects for a continued expansion 
of the fishing industry. Between 1965 and 1971, the value 
of fishing had increased from 160 million yen to 300 million 
yen and the co-operative projected that this value would 
increase to 600 million yen in the coming five year period. 
The most important types of fish to the co-operative were 
walleye pollack caught near the coast and salmon trout 
caught by deep-sea fishermen in Soviet territorial waters. 
The co-operative regarded prospects in coastal fishing as 
relatively more important than those in deep-sea fishing. 
The Soviet Union, in the context of establishing a 200 mile
11. See Tanaka K., 'Genpatsu richi to chiiki shakai - 
hokkaido: iwanai' [Nuclear Siting and Regional
Society: Hokkaido] in Inuta T. and Nagatani K., eds., 
Chiiki funso no kenkyü: jichi tai no yakuwari to göi 
keisei no joken [Research on Regional Conflict: The 
Role of Local Administration and Conditions for Public 
Acceptance], Gakuyö shöbö, Tokyo, 1981 for an analysis 
of the dispute over the siting of the Kyowa-Tomari 
nuclear project. Tanaka's analysis focusses on the 
ability of Iwanai town to manage resistance to the 
project by the Iwanai fishing co-operative. His 
interpretation, therefore, stresses the importance of 
interest group resistance in delaying the settlement 
over the project. Tanaka does not consider Hokkaido 
Electric's response to the development of the project.
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economic zone, had begun to limit trout fishing in its
waters. The co-operative, expecting further restrictions and
a subsequent decline in trout fishing, was investing in the
12development of coastal fishing.
In addition, the Iwanai Fishing Co-operative was also
involved heavily in the processing of fish. In 1971, the
value of fish processing was 400 million yen. The Iwanai
co-operative was the major marketing centre for the fishing
industry in the Ganu region and processed and distributed
all the fish going to other areas in Japan as well as all
the fish coming into the Ganu region from other areas. The
Iwanai Fishing Co-operative processed fish from the other
three fishing co-operatives in the Ganu region which
included Tomari and Sakazuki Fishing Co-operatives in Tomari
village and the large Kamoenai Fishing Co-operative in
13Kamoenai village.
The prospects for the fishing industry, in terms of the 
increasing importance of coastal fishing and the role of 
Iwanai as a distribution centre for the region, heightened 
the concern about the potential impact of waste water on the 
fishing industry. This concern was exacerbated as the 
Iwanai co-operative argued that the power company was 
attempting to develop the project in a nearby area without 
taking into account their interests. The development of the 
project was seen as providing benefits to Kyowa and Tomari 
villages at the expense of the Iwanai Fishing Co-operative.
12. Information obtained from Hokkaido Electric, 1983.
13. Data received from Hokkaido Electric, 1983.
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Hokkaido Electric did not anticipate the emergence of 
opposition by the Iwanai Fishing Co-operative. The 
selection of the Kyowa-Tomari site did not take into account 
the differing impact of the project between Iwanai, on the 
one hand, and Kyowa and Tomari, on the other. The power 
company failed to realise that the use of the Iwanai port 
required the transfer of a section of the Iwanai co­
operative's fishing rights. Furthermore, Hokkaido Electric 
did not assess accurately the structure of the fishing 
indusry in Ganu and the important role that the Iwanai 
Fishing Co-operative played in that industry.14 As noted in 
earlier chapters, the failure to assess the uneven impact 
of projects across different administrative units and 
interest groups is a major reason for delay in the 
implementation of energy projects in Japan.
The Policy Committee attempted to form an economic alliance 
with other co-operatives in the Ganu region to improve its 
bargaining position with the power company. On 25 June 
1970, it established the Genpatsu setchi hantai gyökö rengo 
iinkai [Fishing Co-operative Alliance for Opposing the 
Construction of the Nuclear Plant; hereafter referred to as 
the Fishing Alliance]. In November, the Fishing Alliance 
sponsored a series of lectures on nuclear safety and ocean 
pollution in Iwanai. These lectures aimed at creating more 
local public awareness of the risks of nuclear energy.
Other co-operatives from the Ganu region entered into the 
alliance to improve their bargaining positions with the
14. Interviews with personnel from Hokkaido Electric, 1983.
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power company over property right transfer and compensation 
arrangements. The Fishing Alliance, however, was only 
shortlived. The impact of the project differed for the 
four fishing co-operatives in the region. The Kamoenai co­
operative did not have property rights in the area where 
waste water would be discharged into the ocean. 
Furthermore, it was located ten to fifteen kilometres from 
the proposed waste water pipes and would not be affected by 
waste water. The relatively small Sakazuki and Tomari 
Fishing Co-operatives, while having some interest in coastal 
fishing, were developing offshore fishing which would not be 
affected adversely by waste water. The Sakazuki Co­
operative promoted the project. The major part of the co­
operative's catch was derived from off-shore fishing. The 
Tomari co-operative decided to undertake an investigation on
the impact of waste water as a higher proportion of their
.1
catch originated from coastal fishing.15
The ability of the Fishing Alliance in Ganu to oppose the 
project was relatively weaker than the ability of the Nanto 
Fishing Co-operatives to delay the Ashihama project. The 
size of the industry in Ganu was relatively small. The
adverse effects of the Ashihama project were evenly 
distributed amongst the fishing co-operatives in Nanto. It 
will be recalled from Chapter Five that the pearl industry 
required specialisation in the production process and that 
it was perceived that the entire industry would be
15. Information obtained in an interview with officials 
from the Tomari Fishing Co-operative, 1983.
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jeopardised if the Kowaura co-operative were adversely 
affected by the Ashihama project. In contrast, the effects 
of the project did not fall flatly across the four co­
operatives in Ganu. For example, the Sakazuki Fishing Co­
operative promoted the project because they weighed highly 
the benefits of receiving compensation and, given the 
importance of off-shore fishing, did not concern themselves 
with the impact of waste water on coastal fishing.
Ideological Resistance
There also emerged a leftist party based movement which 
opposed the Kyowa-Tomari plant. This movement called itself 
the Gosha Kyötö [Five Member Struggle Committee] and 
consisted mainly of the Japan Socialist Party (JSP) and its 
affiliates based outside the Ganu region. The movement was 
very concerned about the risks of the nuclear project.^ In 
Japan, a considerable degree of opposition to environmental 
pollution had emerged in the late 1960's and early 1970's. 
The Kyowa-Tomari nuclear plant was not immune from this 
increased concern about the quality of the environment. 
Leftist elements were particularly worried about the 
failure of an Emergency Core Cooling System (ECCS) 
experiment in the United States and the Tsuruga nuclear 
accident. The promoters of nuclear energy had been 
stressing the safety of nuclear technology and both of these
16. See Hokkaido shinbun [Hokkaido Newspaper], 14 March 
1971 and Hokkaido taiiuzu [Hokkaido Times], 14 March 
1971.
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accidents led to considerable distrust in the nuclear
17administration in Japan in the early 1970s.
The movement had another interest in opposing nuclear
energy. Hokkaido, alongside Kyushu, is the major coal
producing area of Japan. The Hokkaido Socialist Party, in
conformance with the JSP's national policy, promoted the
utilisation of domestic coal in Hokkaido. The production of
steaming coal in Hokkaido had, however, declined from 15
million tonnes in 1965 to 10 million tonnes in 1971 and
there was concern that coal production would decline even
further in the coming years.18 Tfte development of the
nuclear plant appeared to represent a move away from coal
utilisation in Hokkaido. There was therefore considerable
resistance within the JSP to any further reduction in the
use of coal as this was likely to reduce employment
19opportunities in the region substantially.
The leftist movement attempted to sensitise the local 
community to the risk involved in the development of nuclear 
power. From early 1971, the Struggle Committee sponsored a 
series of meetings in Iwanai town, and sent petitions to the 
power company, the prefectural assembly and the four towns 
and villages in the Ganu region. The anti-nuclear movement
17. See Lesbirel S.H., Factors Influencing Long Term 
Uranium Demand in Japan with Special Reference to 
Nuclear Siting, unpublished Honours Thesis, Griffith 
University, Brisbane, 1980, especially Chapter 4.
18. See Hokkaido shökö kankyö bu, Hokkaido enerugii gaiyö
[Energy in Hokkaido], Hokkaido shokö kankyö bu, 1983,
pp.161-162.
19. Information received from an official of the Hokkaido
government and a party member of the JSP, 1983.
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sought to persuade the community that the risks of nuclear 
power should be given more attention in deciding whether to 
accept the project or not. This approach, together with 
opposition by the Iwanai Fishing Co-operative, had a 
considerable amount of success in sensitising the public to 
the risks of nuclear power.
The leftist movement also sought to create political support 
in Kyowa town and Tomari village, but did not have 
measurable success. These areas were predominantly rural 
and were dominated by conservative governments. The local 
governments, as well as their publics, supported the 
development of the project for regional development 
purposes. Hence, there was no economic, political or 
ideological foundation on which to stimulate community 
resistance in those areas. As in the siting of the Hamaoka 
project, the leftist anti-nuclear movement had considerable 
difficulty in mobilising the community to oppose the project.
At the prefectural level, the movement was successful in 
appealing to the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) to delay the 
project. The LDP, like the JSP, had a policy of protecting 
the domestic coal industry and the party leadership was 
worried that strong support for the project might create 
conflict within the LDP. With the JSP's strength in the 
Hokkaido assembly having increased to a little less than 
half of the assembly seats20 there was a risk that the JSP
20. See Asahi shinbun sha, Asahi nenkan [Asahi Yearbook], 
Asahi shinbun sha, Tokyo various issues, 1965-1972.
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would be able to capitalise on such conflict in the coming 
election.^
The prefectural government was, therefore, not willing to 
play a major role in facilitating the settlement process and 
Hokkaido Electric was faced with a lack of enthusiasm on the 
part of the prefecture to support the project openly and to 
perform a mediatory role between Hokkaido Electric and the 
Iwanai Fishing Co-operative. This situation contrasts with 
that of the siting of the Matsushima coal-fired project in 
Kyushu, another coal producing area. In that settlement, 
which was analysed in Chapter 7, there was bipartisan support 
for the project by the LDP and the JSP. Both political 
parties felt that the project would facilitate the recovery 
of the ailing coal industry. It would appear that 
prefectural governments in coal producing areas, are 
generally likely to support the development of coal-fired 
plants over nuclear projects.
Impact on town politics
The Iwanai town leadership did not expect the emergence of 
such intense opposition to the nuclear project. Mayor 
Nagahama saw the project as a means of assisting economic 
development in the town. Although Iwanai was the biggest 
town in the Ganu region, its economywas facing several 
problems. The town's Financial Index had declined from 0.35
21. Information received from an official of the Hokkaido 
branch of the LDP, 1983.
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in 1968 to 0.26 in 197222 an(j Nagahama was worried about the 
town's ability to supply necessary public goods, such as 
hospitals, in order to facilitate social development. He 
felt that the development of the nuclear project, while 
benefiting Kyowa and Tomari, would also stimulate growth in 
the regional economy and that Iwanai would also share in the 
benefits of that growth. In particular, Nagahama argued 
that the town's construction and service industries would 
greatly benefit from the project. 23
Nagahama set out to foster business support for the project. 
The Iwanai Town Chamber of Commerce and Industry and the 
Iwanai genpatsu sokushin kyö [Group for the Promotion of 
Nuclear Power], consisting of local conservative 
politicians, played an important role in creating the 
necessary support for the project by sponsoring lecture 
series on the safety of nuclear power and had been taking 
community groups to visit areas in Honshu where nuclear 
plants were being developed or were in operation. These 
two groups mobilised commercial and political support for 
the project and appealed to the Iwanai assembly to accept
the project.24
The views of both opponents and supporters of the projects 
were registered with the Iwanai cho gikai sangyo jonin 
iinkai [Standing Committee for Iwanai Town Industry;
22. See Jichi sho zaisei kyoku shidö ka, Shichöson betsu 
kessan jökyö shirabe [An Examination of Local 
Accounts], Jichi shö zaisei kyoku shidö ka, various 
issues, 1968-1973.
23. Interview with official from Iwanai town, 1983.
24. Information obtained from Hokkaido Electric, 1983.
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hereafter referred to as the Standing Committee]. This 
committee consisted of local politicians and had substantial 
political clout in the town. In 1969, it had been
Idesignated by the assembly to consider development 
strategies for the town. By early 1972, it was clear to the 
Committee that the town was split over the nuclear issue and 
that the opposition forces were gaining considerable 
strength. On 24 June, the Standing Committee decided to 
adopt a policy of opposing the Kyowa-Tomari nuclear plant.25
Nagahama was worried about the Standing Committee decision 
and on 20 February 1973 froze the memorandum which the 
town had signed with Hokkaido Electric in 1969. Nagahama 
was an independent candidate and had won the election in 
1969, uncontested, with the backing of the Regional Council 
of Trade Unions and the Iwanai Fishing Co-operative. Their 
backing was critical to his position as Mayor of Iwanai. 
Nagahama was concerned that continued promotion of the 
project, while being in the interests of the commercial 
sector, would make it difficult for him to obtain the 
support of fishermen and trade unions in the coming 1973 
elections.26
Nagahama's declaration contained three major points. The 
first was that the town would oppose the Kyowa-Tomari
25. See Asahi shinbun: Hokkaido ban [Asahi Newspaper:
Hokkaido Edition], Mainichi shinbun: Hokkaido ban
[Mainichi Newspaper: Hokkaido Edition], Hokkaido
taimuzu [Hokkaido Times] and Hokkaido shinbun [Hokkaido 
Newspaper], various issues from 21 February to 9 March 
1973.
26. Information received from an official of Iwanai town, 
1983.
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nuclear plant until there was agreement in the town over 
nuclear safety. The second was that the town would examine 
a new memorandum with Hokkaido Electric if the safety of 
nuclear energy could be guaranteed by the power company. 
The third was that the town would continue with its five 
year plan for expanding the Iwanai port, but would not 
construct facilities for loading materials related to the 
construction and operation of the nuclear plant as long as 
there was opposition by f i sher men. 2 7 position, thus, 
represented a compromise between the opponents and 
supporters of the project in order to maintain his electoral 
backing. He needed to be seen to be delaying the project 
but also wanted to leave open the option of project 
development in the future.
Promoter response
The freezing of the memorandum by Nagahama surprised the 
Hokkaido Electric Power Company. It put the company in a 
difficult position with respect to electricity supply and 
demand. By 1973, Hokkaido Electric was expecting a 
shortfall on five year forecast demand. Between 1970 and 
1973 forecast electricity demand had increased by 8.0 per 
cent per annum from 2240 MW to 2820 MW. Actual supply in 
1973 was 1993 MW. The Tokoma-Atsuma fossil-fuelled plant, 
which was in the licensing stage, was expected to add 350 MW 
of capacity to the existing grid. The company, therefore, 
expected a shortfall of 474 MW on five year forecast
27. See Hokkaido shinbun [Hokkaido Newspaper], 16 July 
1973.
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demand.28 T^ he only two large scale plants which could be 
expected to fill this expected supply/demand gap were the 
Kyowa-Tomari nuclear plant and the Date oil-fired plant. 
The power company was put in a position of choosing
I
between these two plants in order to meet expected increases
29in electricity demand.
Hokkaido Electric had been negotiating with Date city over 
the development of the oil-fired plant. Fishing co­
operatives in Date city strongly opposed the siting of the 
fossil-fuelled plant. The major problem surrounding the 
negotiations was racial conflict between the Date Fishing 
Co-operative, consisting of Japanese, and the Usu Fishing 
Co-operative, consisting of Ainu, over the transfer of 
property rights. The construction of the project only 
required the relinquishment of the Date Fishing Co­
operative's fishing rights. Hokkaido Electric was, 
therefore, not prepared to pay compensation to the 
neighbouring Usu Fishing Co-operative. The Ainu felt that 
Hokkaido Electric and the Date city administration were not 
taking their interests into account in the development of 
the project. The JSP was supporting the Ainu in their 
claims for compensation and the issue became a prefectural 
political issue in the early 1970s.
28. Information received from, Tokyo Electric Power 
Company, 1984 and Shigen enerugii chö koeki jigyö bu, 
op.cit., various issues, 1970-1974.
29. This section on the choice between the development of 
the Kyowa-Tomari nuclear project and the Date oil-fired 
plant is based on extensive interviews with personnel 
from Hokkaido Electric, 1983.
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The power company, faced with substantial resistance at both 
sites, decided to give priority to the Date plant. This 
scheduling strategy was a reflection of the increased 
economic and political costs of developing the Kyowa-Tomari 
nuclear plant. The power company decided to postpone the 
development of the nuclear plant by two years. Hokkaido 
Electric now planned to start construction of the nuclear 
plant in 1976 and commence commercial operations in 1981.
The initial estimate of the construction cost of the 350 MW 
Kyowa-Tomari plant was approximately 25000 million yen. By 
early 1973, that cost had increased to 35000 million yen. 
In contrast, the construction cost of the Date project, 
which comprised two plants, totalled 39990 million yen in 
1973. The major element in the cost escalation of the 
nuclear plant was the increased size of the plant to 550 MW 
which meant a longer construction leadtime and, therefore, 
higher interest rate repayments on borrowed capital. 
Hokkaido Electric was particularly worried about the 
potential impact of higher construction costs on already 
increasing electricity tariffs in Hokkaido.
The higher cost of the nuclear project reduced the 
compensation pool which Hokkaido Electric could use to reach 
a settlement with the community in Ganu. The power company's 
bargaining position, was weaker vis-a-vis the community in 
Ganu relative to its bargaining position with the community 
in Date city. Reaching a quick settlement in Date was 
expected to be less costly than in Kyowa-Tomari. The power 
company had received information that the Ganu Fishing Co­
operatives would demand, cumulatively, 2500 million yen for
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the transfer of property rights and necessary compensation. 
This demand was based on a claim being made by the Onagawa 
Fishing Co-operative over the transfer of property rights in 
the development of Tohoku Electric's Onagawa nuclear 
project. Such a payment was expected to increase the cost 
of the Kyowa-Tomari project by approximately 9 per cent. At 
the same time, the Date and Usu Fishing Co-operatives were 
requesting a total of 900 million yen in payment for their 
acceptance of the project. The power company calculated 
that this would increase the cost of the oil-fired project 
by 2.5 per cent. In contrast to the Date project, the 
amount of compensation necessary to win agreement for the 
Kyowa-Tomari plant would have substantially reduced the the 
economic viability of the nuclear plant.
The power company also expected a settlement to take longer 
in the case of the Kyowa-Tomari nuclear plant. The Iwanai 
assembly had adopted an anti-nuclear resolution, and it 
would take some time to shift the assembly position. On the 
other hand, Hokkaido Electric had already started 
negotiations with the Date Fishing Co-operatives. 
Furthermore, Date city was promoting the plant and was 
acting as a mediator between the power company and the 
fishing co-operatives in that city. The doors to bargaining 
were open in Date but not in Iwanai.
Hokkaido Electric chose to develop the less costly project 
in order to meet expected increases in electricity demand. 
This strategy of postponement differs noticeably from the 
approach adopted by Chubu Electric in Mie Prefecture in the
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1960s. Chubu Electric, when faced with a similar situation, 
attempted to use political power to influence opposition by- 
local fishermen in Nanto. This was reflected in Nakasone's 
visit to the region, and the pressure exerted on the Yoshida 
faction to allow investigations to commence. The use of 
power did not succeed and Chubu Electric had ultimately to 
abandon the project. In contrast, Hokkaido Electric did not 
use power, but adopted a market strategy of developing an 
alternative project which was less costly. Hokkaido 
Electric's management of the dispute allowed the company to 
meet supply targets and, at the same time, kept open the 
possibility of developing the Kyowa-Tomari project at a 
later date.
Plant site modification
Although Hokkaido Electric intentionally postponed the 
Kyowa-Tomari nuclear power plant, it saw the development of 
the plant as essential in the longer term. By 1977, both 
Hokkaido Electric and the Ganu community were more willing 
to negotiate a settlement. Between 1974 and 1977 the 
promoters of the project were facing electricity shortages, 
and placed considerable importance on the project because of 
security concerns which emerged from the 1973 oil crisis. 
Important energy policy changes at the national level, such 
as the establishment of the Three Laws increased the value 
of the project to the Ganu region. Subsequently, however, 
the economic and political cost of the project increased 
substantially because of the establishment of a 200 mile 
economic zone by the Soviet Union and the possibility of a
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terrorist attack on the nuclear installation. The company 
was required to change the site for the reactor to Tomari 
village, thereby delaying the development of the project 
even further.
Revised electricity projections and the oil crisis
\
Although Hokkaido Electric originally planned to postpone 
development of the nuclear plant at Kyowa-Tomari by only two 
years, it was not until 1976, four years after the mayor of 
Iwanai had signed the memorandum between his town and 
Hokkaido Electric, that the company seriously pushed ahead 
with the project. This resumption was a product of 
unforeseen changes in the expected electricity supply and 
demand situation in Hokkaido. During the period from 1974 
to 1977 actual electricity demand in Hokkaido increased by 
11.0 per cent per annum compared with an 8.0 per cent 
increase in the period 1970-1973. This was directly 
attributable to an upswing in economic activity in Hokkaido 
and the development of large industries, such as the motor 
car industry, in southern Hokkaido. Electricity supply by 
contrast increased at 3.3 per cent annually during 1974-77 
and this was a slower rate of growth than in the 1970-73 
period when supply increased by 5.5 per cent per annum. The 
slower growth in supply was caused by a delay in fishing 
negotiations over the implementation of the Date thermal 
plant.30
30. Shigen enerugii ch5 köeki jigyö bu, op.cit., 
various issues, 1974-1978 and information received from 
Hokkaido Electric and the Hokkaido government, 1983.
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The changes led the power company to revise its expectations 
about electricity supply and demand in Hokkaido. Between 
1974 and 1977, five year forecast demand projections 
increased from 2920 MW in 1979 to 3660 MW in 1982. This 
represented a 5.8 per cent per annum increase in forecast 
demand. Capacity supply, however, was only expected to 
increase at a rate of 4.2 per cent per annum and the power 
company became concerned that electricity demand would 
outstrip supply in the mid-1980s.31 Hokkaido Electric had 
earlier promoted the project as an experiment in nuclear 
technology so as to receive subsidies from the national 
government. The changed electricity supply and demand 
situation increased the value of the project in terms of 
equilibrating the electricity market in Hokkaido.
The importance of the Kyowa-Tomari plant also increased 
because of the heightened concern about oil supply 
disruptions in the 1973 oil crisis. Up until the early 
1970's, Hokkaido's electricity supply capacity consisted 
mainly of fossil-fuelled plants fueled by domestic coal and 
hydroelectric power. The Date oil-fired plant was important 
in Hokkaido Electric's policy of supply diversification away 
from domestic coal. The 1973 oil crisis caused concern in 
Hokkaido not only about the price of oil but also the 
availability of oil supplies. Energy policy in Hokkaido 
started to reflect this concern and subsequently stressed a
31. Shigen enerugii cho koeki jigyo bu,op.cit, various 
issues, 1974-1978.
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more balanced approach to regional energy policy which
32allowed for diversification into nuclear power.
The power company perceived that the need for a nuclear 
power plant was greater in Hokkaido because of its greater 
vulnerability to electricity supply disruptions compared to 
other parts of Japan, such as Honshu. In Honshu, the 
electricity grid was interconnected amongst power companies. 
It was, therefore, possible to purchase electricity from and 
supply electricity to other power companies in the event of 
shortages. As noted earlier, Hokkaido was only connected to 
the mainland by a small transmission line, and the power 
company could not rely on purchasing or borrowing 
electricity from other power companies should electricity 
shortages occur.
The power company, in response to these changed 
expectations, attempted to speed up the development of the 
Tokoma-Atsuma coal-fired plant. This gave the power company 
some breathing space, but it decided that it would have to 
submit the nuclear proposal for Denchoshin approval by 1977, 
or at the latest 1978, if it were to avert expected
electricity shortages.33
External events and community expectations
The Japanese government, in response to the oil crisis, 
revised national energy policy and gave more emphasis to the
32. See Hokkaido shöko kankyö bu, op.cit., pp.109-123 for a 
more detailed statement of Hokkaido's energy policy.
33. Information obtained from Hokkaido Electric, 1983.
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development of alternative energy projects, such as nuclear, 
LNG and coal projects. In 1974, it instituted major policy 
and administrative reforms which were designed to facilitate 
the development of energy projects at the regional level. 
The first was the establishment of the Three Laws in 1974. 
The second was the development of tighter safety measures by 
restructuring the nuclear administration in the same year. 
These two policy changes facilitated bargaining between 
Hokkaido Electric and the Ganu community.
The Three Laws increased the expected benefits of 
accepting the project. As noted in Chapter 2, they provide 
large benefits in the form of social overhead capital to 
localities accepting projects and their surrounding areas. 
Kyowa town expected to receive approximately 1000 million 
yen during the construction stage while Iwanai, Tomari and 
Kamoenai jointly expected to obtain about 2000 million 
yen.34 Kyowa town and Tomari and Kamoenai villages were 
promoting the project for regional development purposes. 
They felt that continued opposition by Iwanai town would 
delay the delivery of project benefits and impede regional 
economic development. The local governments in Kyowa, 
Tomari and Kamoenai had been creating expectations among 
their respective communities that promotion of the project 
would bring social and economic benefits quickly. The 
establishment of the Three Laws further intensified the 
community desire for a quick settlement over the 
construction of the project. The leadership was, concerned
34. Information received from MITI, 1983.
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that resistance might emerge if community expectations were 
not fulfilled. ^
Changes in the nuclear administration reduced the perceived 
risk of nuclear power to the regional community. The 
Science and Technology Agency (STA) established the 
Genshiryoku anzen iinkai [Nuclear Energy Safety Committee] 
within the Genshiryoku iinkai [Nuclear Energy Committee]. 
The former was concerned with nuclear safety, while the 
latter was to continue promoting nuclear energy. The 
government was able to reduce the expected risks of nuclear 
power by instituting a system of measures designed to double 
check the safety of nuclear plants. The national government 
was able to persuade the Ganu community that it could 
guarantee the safety of nuclear power and this reduced the 
concern in the community about the risks of the project.
The renewed and stronger regional interest in the project 
put pressure on Iwanai town and the Iwanai Fishing Co­
operative to accept the nuclear power plant. Other areas to 
the north of Iwanai argued that the benefits of the project 
had increased while the risks had been reduced. 
Furthermore, they argued that continued opposition in Iwanai 
would be at the expense of attaining important regional 
social and economic policy objectives. The broader regional 
interest in the project was a major element in weakening the 
opposition to the project in Iwanai.
35. Interviews with Mayor of Tomari town, 1983.
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Power company bargaining strategies
The establishment of the Three Laws and the strengthening 
of the nuclear administration also expanded the power 
company's compensation pool which could be used in 
negotiating a settlement with the community. The Three 
Laws reduced the power company's need to provide regional 
development compensation. The ability of the national 
government to guarantee nuclear safety reduced the amount of 
compensation necessary to justify the risks of the project. 
Hokkaido Electric was, therefore, more willing to enter 
negotiations with the community over a settlement.
The power company perceived that the major restraint to the 
development of the project was opposition in Iwanai town and 
in particular, resistance by the Iwanai Fishing Co­
operative. The Iwanai Fishing Co-operative's bargaining 
position was strong. It had property rights which had to be 
relinquished for the use of the port in Iwanai town. Its 
position was enhanced because the town assembly had frozen 
the memorandum with Hokkaido Electric. The company attempted 
to isolate the resistance by the co-operative by commencing 
negotiations with areas to the north of Iwanai town. The 
key element in Hokkaido Electric's strategy was to commence 
negotiations with the Tomari Fishing Co-operative and then 
attempt to sign a new memorandum with Iwanai town. It was 
felt that success in these two strategies would improve the 
power company's bargaining position with the Iwanai Fishing 
Co-operative.^
36. This section on Hokkaido Electric's strategies for 
isolating the Iwanai Fishing Co-operative is based on 
interviews with personnel from the power company, 1983.
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I n  1 9 7 4 ,  t h e  p o w e r  company  commenced  n e g o t i a t i o n s  w i t h  t h e  
T o m a r i  F i s h i n g  C o - o p e r a t i v e .  A t  t h e  s t a r t  o f  t h e  
n e g o t i a t i o n s ,  t h e r e  was  a s u b s t a n t i a l  gap b e t w e e n  what  t h e  
p o w e r  compan y  was  p r e p a r e d  t o  p a y  and what  t h e  f i s h i n g  c o ­
o p e r a t i v e  was  p r e p a r e d  t o  a c c e p t  i n  r e t u r n  f o r  t h e  t r a n s f e r  
o f  f i s h i n g  r i g h t s .  The p o w e r  company b a s e d  i t s  o f f e r  p r i c e  
o n  t h e  C o m p e n s a t i o n  S t a n d a r d s .  The  T o m a r i  F i s h i n g  Co­
o p e r a t i v e  b a s e d  i t s  d e m a n d  p r i c e  o n  t h e  a m o u n t  b e i n g  
d e m a n d e d  b y  t h e  O n a g a w a  F i s h i n g  C o - o p e r a t i v e  i n  M i y a g i  
P r e f e c t u r e .  The p o w e r  company  p e r c e i v e d  t h a t  i t s  b a r g a i n i n g  
p o s i t i o n  w a s  r e l a t i v e l y  w e a k  v i s - a - v i s  t h e  T o m a r i  c o ­
o p e r a t i v e .  H o k k a i d o  E l e c t r i c ,  u n l i k e  o t h e r  p o w e r  c o m p a n i e s  
i n  J a p a n ,  c o u l d  l o c a t e  p l a n t s  i n  o n l y  o n e  p r e f e c t u r e ,  n a m e l y  
H o k k a i d o .  H o k k a i d o  i s  u n d e r  t h e  o n e  a d m i n i s t r a t i o n  a n d ,  
t h e r e f o r e ,  t h e  c o m p a n y  c o u l d  n o t  i n d u c e  c o m p e t i t i o n  a mo n g  
d i f f e r e n t  p r e f e c t u r a l  g o v e r n m e n t s  t o  p r o v i d e  an a l t e r n a t i v e  
s i t e  f o r  t h e  n u c l e a r  p o w e r  p l a n t .  Th e  c o m p a n y  c o n s i d e r e d  
a l t e r n a t i v e  l o c a t i o n s  b u t  a s s e s s e d  t h a t  i t  w o u l d  b e  m o r e  
c o s t l y  t o  c h a n g e  t h e  l o c a t i o n  f ro m t h e  Ganu r e g i o n .  C o o l i n g  
w a t e r  was  n o t  a v a i l a b l e  a l l  y e a r  ro u n d  i n  t h e  n o r t h e r n  p a r t  
o f  H o k k a i d o  a s  t h e  o c e a n s  f r e e z e  d u r i n g  w i n t e r  m o n th s .  The  
h i g h  c o s t  o f  t r a n s m i s s i o n  l i n e s  t o  t h e  s o u t h e r n  p a r t  o f  
H o k k a i d o  p r e v e n t e d  t h e  d e v e l o p m e n t  o f  a n u c l e a r  p r o j e c t  i n  
e a s t e r n  H o k k a i d o .
Th e  b a r g a i n i n g  p o s i t i o n  o f  t h e  T o m a r i  c o - o p e r a t i v e  w a s  
s t r o n g  b e c a u s e  o f  t h e  s t r o n g  o p p o s i t i o n  b y  t h e  I w a n a i  
F i s h i n g  C o - o p e r a t i v e .  Th e  l e a d e r s h i p  p e r c e i v e d  t h a t  i t s  
p o s i t i o n  o n  t h e  p r o j e c t  w a s  t h e  k e y  t o  H o k k a i d o  E l e c t r i c ' s  
s t r a t e g y  t o  w i n n i n g  a g r e e m e n t  o v e r  t h e  i m p l e m e n t a t i o n  o f  t h e
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project. It knew that the power company would have to 
negotiate with the Tomari co-operative in order to improve 
its bargaining position with the the Iwanai Fishing Co­
operative. The leadership judged that the bargaining 
position of the Iwanai co-operative would be greatly 
enhanced if the Tomari Fishing Co-operative undertook a 
policy of opposing the project.37
Hokkaido Electric, in negotiating with the Tomari and Iwanai 
co-operatives, also had to consider ongoing negotiations 
between other power companies and fishing co-operatives. 
The power industry in Japan was exerting considerable 
pressure on Tohoku Electric not to pay large sums of 
compensation to the Onagawa Fishing Co-operative, as this 
would increase the demands by all fishing co-operatives in 
Japan. Hokkaido Electric had also been criticised by other 
power companies in its negotiations with the fishing co­
operatives in Date. It wished to avoid affecting adversely 
other power companies by paying high amounts of compensation 
to both the Tomari and Iwanai Fishing Co-operatives.
A major concern of the power industry in Japan in the 1970's 
was the increase in compensation claims consequent upon the 
development of nuclear power plants. The industry thought 
that the role of the Compensation Standards in 
facilitating energy project developments would be reduced if 
fishing co-operatives relied on the 'similar .situation 
formula' instead of the formula based on the value of the 
property right in negotiations over project development. As
37. Information received from personnel of the Tomari 
Fishing Co-operative, 1983.
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noted in Table 2.2, the similar situation formulae contained
in the compensation standards allows property right transfer
payments to be based on previous settlements. The power
industry perceived that compensation claims would increase
as each fishing co-operative would base its demands on the
highest claim that* was previously made. There was concern
that the demands made by the Onagawa co-operative would
38reduce the economic viability of nuclear power in Japan.
In this way, Hokkaido Electric faced a dilemma in 
negotiating a settlement with the Tomari Fishing Co­
operative. The company responded by negotiating first on 
fishing development compensation and leaving property right 
transfer arrangements for a later date. On 9 October 1976, 
Hokkaido Electric signed an agreement with the Tomari 
Fishing Co-operative to pay 90 million yen compensation for 
fishing development. The agreement stated that payment 
wo,uld be made after the conclusion of property right 
transfer arrangements with the co-operative.^ The power 
company thus was able to attain three objectives 
simultaneously. The first was keeping the Tomari co­
operative at the negotiating table over the transfer of 
property rights. The second was to improve its position 
vis-a-vis the Iwanai Fishing Co-operative. The third was
38. See an interesting supplement in Nihon keizai 
shinbun [Japan Economic Newspaper], 4 December 1978 
for details of a number of negotiations over the 
transfer of fishing rights in the context of siting 
energy power plants in Japan.
39. See Hokkaido shinbun [Hokkaido Newspaper], 9 October 
1976.
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not to affect property right transfer negotiations at other 
sites in Japan.
/
The power company had earlier persuaded the prefecture as 
well as the Tomari Fishing Co-operative to undertake 
investigations on the impact of waste water on the marine 
environment. The major conclusion of those investigations, 
which were published in 1972, was that the impact of the 
project on the Iwanai fishing industry would be 
substantially greater than that of the effect on other 
fishing co-operatives in the region. The impact on the 
Iwanai Fishing Co-operative stemmed from waste water 
increasing the temperature of the ocean in an area used by 
walleye pollock as a breeding ground. Fishermen were 
concerned that the temperature increases would reduce the 
reproductive capacity of the pollock.40
In response, the power company decided to change the 
location of the waste water pipes so as to reduce the impact 
on the Iwanai Fishing Co-operative. This strategy involved 
a technical fix to a political and economic bargaining 
problem. The proposed location of the pipes was shifted 
two kilometers to the north, and the mouth of the pipes were 
extended approximately 800 meters out to sea. These changes
40. See Nihon keizai shinbun: Hokkaido ban [Japan Economic 
Newspaper: Hokkaido Edition], Hokkaido taimuzu
[Hokkaido Times], and Asahi shinbun: Hokkaido ban
[Asahi Newspaper: Hokkaido Edition], various issues, 
20-21 April 1972 and Asahi shinbun [Asahi Newspaper], 
Hokkaido taimuzu [Hokkaido Times], Mainichi shinbun: 
Hokkaido ban [Mainichi Newspaper: Hokkaido Edition], 
Yomiuri shinbun: Hokkaido ban [Yomiuri Newspaper:
Hokkaido Edition], and Hokkaido shinbun: Shiribeshi ban 
[Hokkaido Newspaper: Shiribeshi edition], various
issues, 19-21 August 1972.
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were designed to minimise the impact of waste water on the 
pollock's breeding ground which was located in shallow water 
close to the coastline.41
The power company's position was also enhanced by the 
increase in oil prices after the 1973 oil crisis. The deep- 
sea fishermen in the Iwanai co-operative used 'A' grade oil 
and the price of this oil increased markedly after 1973. As 
noted earlier, the majority of Iwanai fishermen were 
involved in deep-sea fishing. The higher operating costs 
caused financial problems for the co-operative and it had 
developed a large debt.^2 Hence, the benefits of the 
nuclear project to the co-operative in terms of fishing 
development compensation and other compensation for the use 
of port facilities increased.
The increased cost of deep-sea fishing and the perceived 
decline in the risk of accepting the project led in 1976 to 
the emergence of the Genpatsu to gyögyö o kangaeru kai 
[Committee for Considering Nuclear Energy and the Fishing 
Industry; hereafter referred to as the Fishing Industry 
Committee]. The Fishing Industry Committee consisted mainly 
of deep-sea fishermen and emerged as a force within the 
Iwanai Fishing Co-operative. The Committee commenced 
preliminary negotiations with Hokkaido Electric over the 
transfer of property rights for the use of the Iwanai port
41. Information received from Hokkaido Electric, 1983.
42. Information obtained in interviews with personnel from 
the Tomari Fishing Co-operative, 1983.
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and compensation for fishing development.43 The emergence 
of the Fishing Industry Commitee was similar to the 
emergence of the Director's Committee in the siting of the 
Hamaoka nuclear power plant. In both disputes the effects 
of the power plant on deep-sea fishermen differed from the 
effects on coastal fishermen. Deep-sea fishermen saw 
compensation as a means of reducing large debts which their 
co-operatives had incurred. This incentive was a major 
factor facilitating the negotiating process.
Hokkaido Electric also initiated measures to increase the 
benefits of the project to Iwanai town over and above those 
expected to accrue from funds provided for by the provision 
of public goods by the Three Laws. In 1977, the power 
company bought land, owned by the town, at a cost of 4000 
million yen. This was to assist the town in overcoming 
financial difficulties. This land was bought for the
purpose of building apart ments in which to hou s e
construction workers. The influx of
iskilled workers,
particularly during the construction process, was expected
to increase the demand for goods and services within Iwanai 
town. Furthermore, the company promised to give priority to 
purchasing goods and employing unskilled labour from the 
town.44
The weakening of the opposition by the Iwanai Fishing Co­
operative and the community in Iwanai town was a critical
43. See Hokkaido taimuzu [Hokkaido Times] and Hokkaido 
shinbun [Hokkaido Newspaper], various issues, 9 
February to 13 February 1976.
/44. Information received from Hokkaido Electric, 1983.
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factor in the re-election of Nagahama in July 1977. The JSP 
opposed the nuclear plant and saw the election as a means of 
winning power in the local assembly. The election was 
fought between Nagahama and a JSP party candidate over the 
issue of whether or not the nuclear project should be 
developed. Nagahama won the election overwhelmingly. 
Nagahama's victory reflected this changed attitude in Iwanai 
and allowed him to recommence promoting the project.
After the election, Nagahama set out to create a consensus,
so that the assembly could be persuaded to accept the
project. He sent a questionnaire to Hokkaido Electric which
consisted of questions about nuclear safety, radiation
monitoring and co-operation money for the development of
industry in Iwanai town. Nagahama used the power company's
willingness to compensate the community to create support
for the project. On 12 March 1977, he declared his
intention to sign a new memorandum with power company to
45allow the construction of the plant.
Increasing plant cost
Although the Fishing Industry Committee had started 
negotiations with Hokkaido Electric, there was still 
considerable resistance to the project by coastal fishermen. 
The conflict between deep-sea and coastal fishermen was over
45. For details, see Hokkaido taimuzu [Hokkaido Times], 
Asahi shinbun: Hokkaido ban [Asahi Newspaper: Hokkaido 
Edition], Mainichi shinbun: Hokkaido ban [Mainichi
Newspaper: Hokkaido Edition], Yomiuri shinbun: Hokkaido 
ban [Yomiuri Newspaper: Hokkaido Edition], and Hokkaido 
shinbun [Hokkaido Newspaper], various issues, 12 March 
to 17 March 1977.
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the distribution and use of compensation received from the 
power company. Coastal fishermen argued that the waste 
water would directly affect the walleye pollock breeding 
ground despite the change in the location of the waste water 
pipes. The coastal fisherman felt that the deep-sea 
fishermen would receive a larger share of compensation 
despite the fact that they were incurring no costs from the 
project. They argued that the compensation would be used to 
alleviate the financial burden of deep-sea fishermen and 
that coastal fishermen would receive no direct benefits for 
approving the project.46
In April 1977, the Soviet Union established a 200 mile 
economic zone. This had a major impact on the Iwanai 
Fishing Co-operative's attitude toward the Kyowa-Tomari 
nuclear plant. The forty per cent of the co-operative's 
catch which had been caught in Soviet waters was now in 
jeopardy. The importance of coastal fishing to the co­
operative increased markedly. Many deep-sea fishermen 
became worried about future prospects for the fishing in 
Soviet waters, and felt that they would have to embark on 
the development of coastal or offshore fishing. This 
concern led to the defeat of a motion put forward from the 
Fishing Industry Committee in March 1978 to change the co­
operative's policy to one of negotiating with the power 
company. The co-operative was faced by an increasing
46. See Mainichi shinbun: hokkaido ban [Mainichi Newspaper: 
Hokkaido Edition], Yomiuri shinbun: hokkaido ban
[Yomiuri Newspaper: Hokkaido Edition], and Hokkaido
taimuzu [Hokkaido Times], various issues, 4 March to 6 
March 1978.
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financial debt and the possibility of a reduced catch. The 
defeat of the motion was a tactic to improve its bargaining 
position with the power company so as to increase the 
property right transfer price and fishing development 
compensation.
In early 1978, the power company was also confronted by the 
risk of a future terrorist assault on the plant. Leftist 
radicals, who attacked and bombed the control tower at the 
Narita International Airport, stated that the Kyowa-Tomari 
nuclear plant would be next on their agenda. The statement 
caused immediate concern not only to the power company, but 
also to the Hokkaido government and MITI. The power company 
was concerned that any attack on the plant would be costly 
in terms of the operation and management of the plant. The 
prefectural government and MITI were anxious about not being 
able to guarantee the safety of the nuclear plant. MITI was 
also concerned that the terrorist issue would become a 
central element in the safety dispute and would 
significantly impede the development of nuclear power in 
Japan.
The promoters of the plant perceived that the Kyowa-Tomari 
project was extremely vulnerable to a terrorist attack and 
took seriously the threat of the attack on the nuclear 
plant. Geographically, the power plant was spread over a 
wide area and would require extensive and costly 
surveillance. As illustrated in Map 8.1, there were three 
features of the design of the plant which were vulnerable to 
a terrorist attack. The first was in loading materials and
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components at Iwanai port. The second was in transporting
those materials and components to and from the plant. The
third, and perhaps most important, was in the extreme
vulnerability of the waste water pipes which stretched
approximately 6000 metres from the containment vessel to the 
47ocean.
The continued opposition by the Iwanai Fishing Co-operative 
and the possibility of a terrorist attack increased the 
expected compensation and management cost of developing the 
project at Kyowa-Tomari. The power company decided to 
change the location of the reactor to Tomari village. 
Such a major design change had never before been 
contemplated in Japan, but the power company calculated that 
the benefits of such a change outweighed the costs. The 
cost included further delay of the project, the development 
of port facilities at Tomari village and the acquisition of 
land in Tomari. The benefits comprised a reduction in the 
risk of a terrorist assault on the plant alongside a 
weakening of the bargaining position of the Iwanai Fishing 
Co-operative.
By 1978, electricity demand had increased to 2505 MW and 
this represented a 7.5 per cent per annum increase from 
1974. Hokkaido Electric had Date Number One and Two plants 
ready to commence operation. The Tokoma-Atsuma coal-fired
47. Interviews with personnel from Hokkaido Electric and 
officials from Hokkaido government and MITI, 1983.
48. See Hokkaido shinbun [Hokkaido Newspaper] and Hokkaido 
taimuzu [Hokkaido Times], various issues, 30 September 
to 1 October 1978.
344
plant and Shiriuchi oil-fired plants received Denchöshin
approval in 1977 and 1978 respectively and were expected to
start supplying power within three years. Although demand
was expected to increase to 3660 MW in the coming five
years, the power company had sufficient capacity in the
49pipeline to equilibrate electricity markets in the future.
\
In 1978, Hokkaido Electric decided to delay further the 
project and stated that it would postpone the commencement 
of construction to 1983.^0
Changing the location of the reactor would require 
developing a port and buying land at Tomari. The cost of 
port construction, which included substantial reclamation 
and the acquisition of land, was perceived to be less than 
accepting a higher risk of a terrorist assault on the plant. 
At the Tomari location the power company assessed that it 
could concentrate the reactor and waste water pipes in the 
same location and, therefore, minimise the risk of a
Iterrorist attack on the plant. The geographical 
concentration of the project was critical to the effective 
operation and management of the plant.
The development of a nuclear plant at Tomari would also 
expected to reduce the bargaining power of the Iwanai 
Fishing Co-operative. The development of a port in Tomari 
would nullify the need to purchase property rights for the 
use of the port in Iwanai and the power company would only
49. Shigen enerugii chö köeki jigyö bu, op.cit., various 
issues, 1974-1979.
50. Hokkaido taimuzu [Hokkaido Times], 12 October 1978.
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be required to pay regional development compensation. This 
was regarded as an important benefit given the uncertainty 
involved in attempting to negotiate a settlement with the 
Iwanai Fishing Co-operative.
The power company made calculations of the costs and
benefits of the design change which included the expansion
of the project to two plants. These calculations suggested
that the site change would save the power company
approximately 4100 million yen. The major part of this
saving, which totalled 3500 million yen, stemmed from
economies of scale derived from the construction of two
projects. A saving of 700 million yen in compensation was
expected because the power company would not have to
negotiate with the Iwanai Fishing Co-operative over the
transfer of property rights. The site change also meant
that Hokkaido Electric would not have to construct a special
road for transporting large construction components and
nuclear fuels. This was estimated to save the power company
approximately 50 million yen. On the other hand, the
construction of a plant and the acquisition of land in
Tomari was expected to add 150 million yen to the cost of
the project. The net benefits of the site change were even
greater than this monetary value if account is taken of the
reduced risk of a terrorist attack on the project and the
relative cost of other projects capable of meeting expected
51electricity demand increases.
51. Information received from Hokkaido Electric, 1983.
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Community negotiations
-While the site change weakened the bargaining position of 
the Iwanai fishing Co-operative, it did not greatly enhance 
the negotiating position of Tomari village. Tomari village 
was already, particularly eager to accept the project 
expecting to obtain relatively large benefits from the 
project development. These included more fixed asset taxes 
and a larger share of the funds provided for by the Three 
Laws. The power company's position was relatively strong 
vis-a-vis Tomari village as it was not in a position of 
having to develop the project quickly to meet expected 
increases in electricity demand. Between 1978 and 1980, 
electricity demand increases tapered off as a result of 
higher energy prices in Hokkaido arising from the second oil 
shock. Expected increases in five year forecast demand 
declined from 3870 MW (for 1984) in 1979 to 3720 MW (for 
1986) in 1981.52
Hokkaido Electric wished to commence negotiations with the 
Tomari Fishing Co-operative while its bargaining position 
was relatively strong and did so in June 1981. While 
negotiations were proceeding, the Three Mile Island nuclear 
accident occurred in the United States in 1979. The 
accident caused some concern about the safety of nuclear 
energy on the regional level. Negotiations at the Tomari 
site were halted for approximately nine months while MITI 
considered the possibility of such an accident in Japan.
52. See Shigen enerugii chö köeki jigyo bu, op.cit., 
various issues, 1978-1980.
347
The community in Tomari, however, was eager to accept the 
project and the accident only delayed the negotiating 
process temporarily.53
Despite the willingness of Tomari to accept the project,
there emerged resistance to the site change in Kyowa town.
The community in that town had high expectations about the
benefits accruing from the construction of the power plant.
The site change meant that their share of benefits from
fixed asset taxes and the Three Laws would be reduced
substantially. Residents commenced a recall movement to
oust the local mayor. Hokkaido Electric was concerned that
a new mayor might oppose the project and delay the
negotiating process. The power company responded by
offering to pay 200 million yen to compensate the town for
54the loss of benefits expected from the site change.
In June 1981, Hokkaido Electric commenced negotiations with 
the Tomari Fishing Co-operative. The choice of Tomari 
reflected the company's negotiating strategy which was two­
fold. The first related to the ordering of negotiations 
between fishing co-operatives in Ganu and the second related 
to the structure of compensation payment. In order to 
construct the plant, the power company was legally required 
to acquire the property rights only from the Tomari Fishing
53. Information received from Hokkaido Electric, 1983.
54. See Hokkaido shinbun [Hokkaido Newspaper] 2, December
1978 and Mainichi shinbun: hokkaido ban [Mainichi
Newspaper: Hokkaido Edition], 1 February 1979.
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Co-operative. The power company decided accordingly to 
negotiate initially with the Tomari co-operative. This was 
a continuation of the company's earlier strategy of 
isolating potential resistance and was designed to improve 
the company's position vis-a-vis the other Ganu fishing co­
operatives with which it would negotiate over compensation 
for fishing development.55
The ordering of negotiations with the other three co­
operatives was Sakazuki, Kamoenai, then, Iwanai. The 
Sakazuki co-operative was located in Tomari village and, 
therefore, could be persuaded to agree to the project along 
the same lines as the Tomari co-operative. Although the 
Kamoenai Fishing Co-operative was larger than the two co­
operatives in Tomari village, the prefecture had decided to 
provide a subsidy for fishing development. The power 
company, therefore, was able to maintain roughly the same 
levels of development compensation to all three co­
operatives. Hokkaido Electric assessed that the completion 
of negotiations with these three co-operatives could be used 
to exert considerable pressure on the Iwanai Fishing Co­
operative to accept the project.
The negotiations with the Tomari Co-operative took place 
between 10 and 18 June 1981. They centred on the relative 
share of payment for fishing rights and fishing development 
compensation. The power company offered 180 million yen 
which comprised of 90 million yen for property rights and 90
55. Information obtained in interviews with personnel from 
Hokkaido Electric 1983.
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million yen for fishing development. The co-operative, 
basing its demands on Onagawa situation, demanded between 
600 and 700 million yen. The power company subsequently 
offered 220 million yen, thereby, increasing the amount for 
property rights by 30 million yen. The co-operative, in 
response, demanded 500 million yen. On 18 June, the 
prefectural government intervened and an agreement was 
reached for 300 million yen, comprising of 200 million yen 
for property rights and 100 million yen for fishing 
development. The power company was able to keep the amount 
for fishing development at 100 million yen by paying more 
for the relinquishment of the fishing rights.^
This provided the company with a good position to enter 
negotiations with the other three co-operatives over fishing 
development compensation. On 26 June 1981, Hokkaidc 
Electric reached an agreement with the Sakazuki co-operative 
for 78 million yen.57 Subsequently, on 1 March 1982 the 
company reached a compromise with the Kamoenai co-operative 
for 68 million yen.5  ^ The power company did not compensate
56. For a discussion of the events leading up to the
negotiations and the actual negotiations, see Hokkaidc 
shinbun [Hokkaido Newspaper], Hokkaido taimuz 
[Hokkaido Times], Yomiuri shinbun: hokkaido ban,
Mainichi shinbun: hokkaido ban [Mainichi Newspaper; 
Hokkaido Edition], and Nihon keizai shinbun: hokkaidc 
ban [Japan Economic Newspaper: Hokkaido Edition]
various issues, 9 May to 19 June 1981.
57. Asahi shinbun: hokkaido ban [Asahi Newspaper: Hokkaidc
Edition], 27 June 1981.
58. Hokkaido shinbun [Hokkaido Newspaper], Asahi shinbun
hokkaido ban [Asahi Newspaper: Hokkaido Edition], anc
Yomiuri shinbun: hokkaido ban [Yomiuri Newspaper
Hokkaido Edition], 1 March 1982.
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the Iwanai Fishing Co-operative until after the Denchöshin 
permit was issued on 26 September 1982.
Power plant costs and project delay
The cost of projects is an important element in the 
assessment of times required to reach settlement over the 
development of energy projects. Project promoters are 
likely to delay negotiations with regional interests in 
situations where project costs are high and are expected to 
increase. Under those circumstances, promoters will 
reschedule project negotiations. They will prefer tc 
postpone costly projects and will give priority to the 
development of alternative less costly projects.
The siting of Hokkaido Electric's Kyowa-Tomari project was 
substantially delayed because the power company originally 
under-estimated the costs involved in the implementation of 
the project. Slow electricity demand growth did not justify 
the development of the project. The installation of a large 
project to obtain economies of scale was expected to lead tc 
a costly excess supply situation. Hokkaido Electric was not 
willing to pay the necessary compensation to win community 
approval and intentionally delayed the negotiating process.
The relatively small grid and slower demand growth ir 
Hokkaido meant that any large energy project would supply c 
large proportion of Hokkaido's electricity. A smallei 
nuclear plant was considered economically infeasible. The 
company wished to develop a relatively large project ir 
order to reap economies of scale. The development of c
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large project was, however, expected to reduce the 
reliability of the grid. An accident at that plant, for 
whatever reason, would threaten a relatively large 
proportion of the supply capacity. There was an increased 
risk that an accident would lead to major shortfalls in the 
supply of electricity. The grid in Hokkaido was not 
interconnected with the Honshu grid. There was also the 
added concern that it would not be possible to purchase 
electricity from Honshu in the event of a supply shortage.
The high economic costs of the project reduced the amount oi 
compensation that Hokkaido Electric was willing to pay ii 
order to reach a settlement with the Ganu community. This 
was particularly important in the context of opposition b^  
the Iwanai Fishing Co-operative. Although the power company 
wished to use the port facilities at Iwanai for th< 
construction and operation of the project, it did not assesi 
accurately the structure of fishing rights and th< 
importance of the Iwanai co-operative in the Ganu fishin< 
industry. The use of the port required the acquisition o 
a section of the Iwanai co-operative's fishing rights. Th 
power company was, therefore, put in a position of having t 
negotiate with the Iwanai Fishing Co-operative over th 
development of the project.
The Iwanai co-operative was the largest co-operative in th 
Ganu region. It was also the major marketing an 
distribution centre for the regional fishing industry. Th 
power company was surprised at the relatively stron 
opposition by the co-operative. It did not expect that th 
co-operative, together with an ideologically based anti
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nuclear movement, could force mayor Nagahama to adopt a 
cautious policy which delayed the negotiations. Hokkaido 
Electric, in the initial costing of the project, did not 
take into account the existence of the Iwanai co-operative 
and the co-operative's ability to demand successfully large 
compensation claims for their approval of the project.
Given the high cost of the project, the payment of large 
amounts of compensation would have further reduced the 
economic viability of the plant. The power company was 
forced to reschedule its site development plans. It chose 
to give priority to the rapid implementation of the smaller 
Date oil-fired project. The Date plant was less costly than 
the Kyowa-Tomari plant in terms of construction cost, grid 
reliability, compensation claims and the time required to 
negotiate a settlement. Hokkaido Electric chose to minimise 
project cost in expanding supply capacity to meet expected 
electricity demand increases.
During the course of settlement, external events outside the 
control of the participants to the bargaining process 
injected instabilities into the negotiations. At different 
times, these instabilities acted to facilitate and impede 
the negotiations. The 1973 oil crisis increased the 
importance of developing nuclear power to ensure energy 
security. The national government responded by establishing 
the Three Laws and strengthening the nuclear administration. 
The policy changes at the national level improved the 
bargaining position of the power company. They increased 
Hokkaido Electric's compensation pool by providing direct
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subsidies to the region and attempting to allay concern 
about the risks involved in accepting a nuclear power plant.
While the oil crisis and the policy response to the crisis 
facilitated bargaining, other events, such as the 
establishment of a 200 mile economic zone by the Soviet 
Union and the threat of a terrorist attack on the project 
subsequently destabilised the negotiations. These events 
added to the compensation and management costs of developing 
the Kyowa-Tomari project. In response, the power company 
chose to institute major changes in the design of the 
project. It decided to alter the location of the project, 
so that it was solely within the Tomari village and to 
develop two nuclear plants. These modifications allowed for 
economies of scale and reduced the need to negotiate with 
the Iwanai co-operative over the transfer of fishing rights. 
They thus increased the amount of compensation which could 
be used to negotiate a settlement with Tomari. At the same 
time, the power company was in no hurry to develop the 
project as electricity demand was not expected to increase 
at a rapid rate. The change in the location of the project 
placed the power company in a relatively strong bargaining 
position and it was able to negotiate a settlement with the 
Ganu community.
Power companies are not likely to be willing to negotiate 
quick settlements with regional communities over costly 
projects. In situations where electricity demand is not 
expected to increase rapidly, promoters will prefer to delay 
project implementation. They will choose to minimise 
implementation costs and develop less costly alternatives to
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meet supply targets. At present, Japan is experiencing slow 
electricity demand growth and the cost of nuclear projects 
has risen. It would appear that nuclear project leadtimes 
may continue to be long as project promoters may 
intentionally delay negotiating settlements and may prefer 
to develop less costly thermal projects to meet supply 
objectives.
9
THE PREDICTABILITY OF PROJECT DELAY
This thesis set out to develop a way of explaining the 
leadtimes required to develop energy facilities in Japan. 
The particular focus was on identifying and analysing the 
determinants of the variation in times necessary to reach 
social and political agreement over the development of 
large-scale nuclear and fossi1-fuelled power plants in 
Japan. The study examined the pattern of resistance to and 
support for energy power plants, the effectiveness of 
economic and other instruments in shortening delay and the 
effect of these factors on the relative rates of expansion 
of different types of energy facilities.
A key interest in the study was in the provision of a more 
reliable basis upon which to evaluate power plant leadtimes. 
Project leadtime is one important determinant of energy fuel 
demand. It influences the demand for energy fuels by 
affecting the rate of expansion of capacity and the mix of 
capacity embodied in that expansion. Consumers as well as 
suppliers have not been able to assess, with any degree of 
precision, capacity expansion targets and there is a need to 
develop ways of providing better assessments of project 
leadtimes.
Project development consists of site selection, electricity 
supply and demand forecasting, and an implementation stage 
which comprises public acceptance, licensing and 
construction. Despite the observed variation in total 
leadtimes, energy planners in Japan confront both
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predictable and unpredictable hurdles in project 
implementation. Public acceptance times are extremely 
variable and are the major source of unpredictability in the 
assessment of project leadtimes. The times required for 
licensing and construction do not significantly affect 
variation in project start-up times. Confidence in the 
assessment of leadtime increases substantially after public 
acceptance has been negotiated. The ability to make 
assessments of project leadtimes, therefore, requires the 
development of a way of evaluating public acceptance 
leadtimes.
The approach to the evaluation of settlement times 
developed in the thesis extends standard Cost Benefit 
Analysis (CBA) and argues that the explanation of public 
acceptance times requires an analysis of distributional 
effects and the effectiveness of compensation mechanisms. 
The settlement process involves bargaining over an 
acceptable distribution of costs and benefits expected to 
accrue from project development. Promoters will be required 
to compensate regional interests for losses expected to be 
incurred as a result of project implementation. Settlements 
are likely to take longer in a situation where compensation 
mechanisms do not operate effectively or cannot be easily 
established to take into account adverse effects of projects 
upon the parties participant to the settlement.
A model has been developed to provide some quantification of 
the importance of distributional effects on the variation 
in times required to win agreement over the development of 
energy projects. The results of applying this model to the
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analysis of settlement times suggest that the responses of 
both project promoters and regional communities are 
important determinants of public acceptance times. More 
specifically, the results suggest that the effects of: 
expected electricity shortages, the need to expand social
and economic opportunities, opportunities in the rural
\sector, the need to provide public goods, the strength of 
leftist political party representation, the time period in 
which the settlement was conducted and the relative risks of 
different types of projects are major determinants of the 
variation in settlement times.
A major finding of the study is that there is a reasonable 
amount of predictability in settlement times given 
expectations about social, economic and political conditions 
at the beginning of the negotiating process. The evaluation 
of public acceptance times, however, can be improved 
substantially by monitoring social and economic conditions 
during the course of settlement. There may be a need to 
review earlier assessments of settlement times should 
expectations change during the negotiating period. The 
model also provides a reference point for evaluating the 
importance of other factors such as: the structure and use 
of political power, the skill with which bargaining 
strategies are employed, uncertainty about outcomes and 
changing expectations which will also affect settlement 
outcomes in a way which cannot be easily incorporated into 
quantitative analysis. The predictability of public 
acceptance times improves if one can assess these factors 
rather than merely observing statistical variables.
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These determinants of leadtime variation in Japan appear to 
have a considerable amount of applicability to the analysis 
of factors which will influence delay in the installation of 
economic projects in general. The nature and relative 
importance of these determinants will vary, however, 
according to the nature of projects, the nature of interests 
participant to the settlement process, the structure of 
property ownership rights and the nature of political 
decision-making in the country where the particular project 
under consideration is located. There is, therefore, a need 
to test the applicability of these general influences with 
empirical evidence for a wide range of economic projects 
both in Japan and in other countries.
Toward a theory of project delay
Standard CBA provides a convenient theoretical departure 
point for the analysis of project delay. The technique 
specifies and then aggregates all relevant costs and 
benefits associated with project development. It suggests 
that projects should be developed, on efficiency grounds, if 
aggregate benefits exceed costs, or there is an expected 
economic surplus, and individuals disadvantaged by the 
project could, in principle, be compensated by those who 
were advantaged by it and still remain at least as well off 
as before the change. This approach would rank projects in 
terms of economic efficiency criteria and would yield a 
theoretical scheduling of project development; projects 
being ordered in accordance with net benefit-cost ratios.
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This approach is useful for identifying high return projects 
independently of the management of compensation requirements 
and other 'non-economic' factors. If it is assumed that 
compensation is delivered appropriately and settlements are 
instantaneous and that licensing and construction times are 
relatively constant, it would be expected, other things 
being equal, that the highest yielding project and, 
therefore, the project selected first would start operation 
before the second project and so on. Under these 
conditions, the schedule of project commencement would be 
closely associated with the schedule of project completions.
In reality, however, there is a need for a settlement 
process whereby project promoters will be required to 
compensate regional interests and, hence, social and 
political factors which are not included in promoter cost- 
benefit calculations will influence the schedule of project 
completions. The provision of a reliable basis for 
assessing project delay, therefore, requires analysis of the 
social and political factors that influence the effective 
management of compensation requirements.
The need for a settlement process arises out of a disparity 
between the value of a project to promoters and its value to 
regional interests. The process is characterised by 
bargaining over who wins and who loses from project 
implementation. Bargaining occurs at many levels of 
government and between a multitude of actors including the 
national government, regional electorates, power companies, 
property right owners and other interests. Project 
developers will be required to compensate regional
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interests for losses expected to occur in order to reach a 
settlement.
Compensation mechanisms exist or may have to be established 
for redistributing some of the spoils of project development 
from promoters to regional interests in order to effect a 
settlement. ' Compensation can be paid through institutional 
and political mechanisms and can take a variety of forms. 
There are arrangements by which project developers pay 
compensation directly to interests, such as those possessing 
legally recognised property rights. There may be mechanisms 
by which other interests, such as prefectural or state 
governments, pay subsidies to local governments. There can 
also be arrangements by which redistribution takes place 
from national communities, who expect to benefit 
from projects, to local communities to compensate for losses 
expected to be incurred as a result of project development. 
The mere existence of compensation mechanisms does not 
necessarily increase the ease of settlement and 
predictability of settlement times. The extent to which it 
does will depend on the effectiveness with which 
compensation mechanisms and procedures facilitate a 
redistribution of benefits appropriate to the structure of 
costs expected to be incurred from the project development.
The effectiveness of compensation mechanisms is likely to be 
related to the pattern of distributional effects, 
uncertainty about outcomes, the allocation and use of 
bargaining power, the success of strategies employed by 
various interests and changing expectations of parties
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during the course of settlement. The evaluation of 
settlement times requires an analysis of the impact that 
these factors will have on the ease with which compensation 
can be managed. Delay is likely to occur in situations 
where compensation mechanisms are not operating effectively 
or cannot be easily established.
The distribution of costs and benefits will be one important 
factor influencing the ease with which compensation is 
managed. The extent of the divergence in the value of a 
project between promoters and regional interests may not be 
reflected adequately in simple costs and benefits as used in 
conventional CBA. These simple costs and benefits may not 
reflect the true value that is placed on projects by 
interests participant to the settlement. Distributional 
effects may not be neutral; project promoters and regional 
interests may, for a variety of reasons and under different 
circumstances, evaluate costs and benefits differently. The 
distributional effects of projects will be important in 
determining the extent to which benefits exceed costs or the 
economic surplus which is available for redistribution from 
project promoters to regional interests. Project 
implementation is likely to be delayed in situations where 
there is little surplus available for redistribution and 
where compensation mechanisms are not and cannot be 
effectively tuned to take into account adverse effects 
consequent upon a particular project development.
Even if compensation mechanisms are able to cope adequately 
with distributional effects, the speed of settlement may 
also depend on the spread of costs and benefits among or
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within organised interest groups. Settlements are likely to 
be contentious if, for example, certain regional interests 
are expected to make large gains in the form of compensation 
and other benefits at the expense of large losses by others. 
Under those circumstances, it may be more difficult for 
project developers to structure and institute the necessary 
compensation payments and this may influence the speed at 
which community approval is given.
The costs and benefits expected to accrue from a particular 
project development may not be known with certainty. 
Indeed, generally, there will be some uncertainty as to the 
expected social and economic value of projects. 
Compensation management may be more difficult if 
participants to the settlement are risk averse and attach a 
large weight to the costs of uncertainty. For example, 
project promoters may be uncertain as to the expected 
increases in demand for project output and, therefore, may 
not be willing to pay large amounts of compensation to 
regional interests. They may prefer to develop projects 
with smaller compensation requirements.
The degree of difficulty in reaching settlements may not be 
reflected simply in the distribution of costs and benefits 
even if they are evaluated accurately. Decision making 
processes may not be structured in a way which facilitates 
the use of compensation mechanisms. Certain interests, who 
expect to gain or lose from project implementation, may 
possess a disproportionate share of political power or may 
be in conflict with other interests over unrelated issues. 
The management of compensation is likely to be more
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difficult in situations where project developers do not or 
cannot take into account conflict between interests even if 
that conflict is independent of the social value of 
projects.
The skill with which various interests participant to the 
settlement employ bargaining strategies might affect the 
ease with which compensation can be executed. Bargaining 
strategies will include economic, political, technical and 
informational strategies or some combination of them. 
Whatever the strategy employed, it will be designed to alter 
the expected costs and benefits of projects to various 
interests and their bargaining positions. For instance, a 
technical strategy, such as project design modification, may 
reduce the adverse effects on particular regional interests 
and may obviate the need to negotiate with those interests 
in winning approval for project construction.
The revision of expectations about the value of projects may 
also affect bargaining outcomes. During the course of 
settlement, changes may occur and lead to a divergence 
between what was expected to occur and what actually occurs. 
Preferences may not be stable and interests may consequently 
revise their expectations about the costs and benefits of 
projects. Economic, political or policy related changes may 
introduce instabilities into bargaining. These changes may 
alter benefit-cost ratios and the bargaining positions of 
interests participant to the settlement and may, therefore, 
influence the ease with which compensation requirements can 
be managed.
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The evaluation of project delay requires extending standard 
CBA. The model developed in this thesis focusses on the 
distributional effects and, hence, the importance of 
management of the compensation process in evaluating why 
settlement for some projects takes longer than for others. 
The assessment of public acceptance times requires going 
beyond the simple aggregation of costs and benefits to 
analyse the social, political and institutional factors 
influencing bargaining outcomes, between promoters and 
regional interests over the development of economic 
projects.
Evaluating energy project leadtimes in Japan
A key objective of this study was to develop ways of 
evaluating the leadtime required to locate and construct 
energy facilities in Japan. Energy power plant leadtimes 
have become longer and are highly variable and casual 
empiricism might suggest that these characteristics would 
prevent any general assessment of leadtimes. An important 
finding of the thesis is that there is more predictability 
in the evaluation of power plant leadtimes than is intially 
apparent. There are methods which can be developed which 
will allow a systematic evaluation of energy project 
leadtimes.
Identifying sources of unpredictability
The placement of power stations involves site selection, 
electricity supply and demand analysis and an implementation 
process involving public acceptance, licensing and
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c o n s t r u c t i o n .  Energy p la n n er s  face both known and unknown 
h u r d le s  in  the  development  of energy f a c i l i t i e s .  The major 
source  of u n p r e d i c t a b i l i t y  stems from v a r i a t i o n  in t imes  a t  
t h e  f r o n t  end of  p r o j e c t  i m p l e m e n t a t i o n  a t  which  p o i n t  
s o c i a l  and p o l i t i c a l  agreement  i s  reached.  The back-end of 
t h e  s i t i n g  p r o c e s s ,  w h i c h  i n c l u d e s  l i c e n s i n g  and 
c o n s t r u c t i o n ,  does  no t  a p p e a r  t o  be a major  c o n t r i b u t o r  t o  
the  v a r i a t i o n  in energy power p l a n t  l e ad t im es .
Planning fo r  p r o j e c t  development  involves  the  s e l e c t i o n  of a 
minimum p r i v a t e  c o s t  s i t e  f rom a p o o l  of  c a n d i d a t e  s i t e s  
when e l e c t r i c i t y  supply and demand f o r e c a s t s  r ev e a l  the  need 
f o r  a d d i t i o n a l  c a p a c i t y .  The i n c l u s i o n  of  a s i t e  i n t o  a 
cand id a te  s i t e  pool  w i l l  be based on c r i t e r i a  such as:  the 
e x i s t e n c e  of  f l a t  and s t a b l e  t e r r a i n ,  t h e  a v a i l a b i l i t y  of  
coo l ing  water ,  p o pu la t i o n  d e n s i t y ,  access  to  t r a n s p o r t a t i o n  
r o u te s  and p ro x im i ty  to  load ce n t r e s .  Power companies w i l l  
make f i n a l  s i t e  c h o i c e s  by t r a d i n g  o f f  t h e  c o s t s  of  
ach iev ing  r e s p e c t i v e  s i t e  s e l e c t i o n  c r i t e r i a .
A f te r  power companies have made t h e i r  choice of s i t e ,  they 
w i l l  t h e n  a t t e m p t  t o  r e a c h  a g r e e m e n t  w i t h  r e l e v a n t  
e l e c t o r a t e s  over  t h e  i m p l e m e n t a t i o n  of t h e  p r o j e c t s .  
P u b l i c  a c c e p t a n c e  i n v o l v e s  b a r g a i n i n g  b e t w e e n  and among 
p r o j e c t  p romoters  and r eg i o n a l  i n t e r e s t s  over an e q u i t a b l e  
d i s t r i b u t i o n  of the  ga ins  and l o s s e s  expected to  be in c u r r e d  
f r o m  t h e  d e v e l o p m e n t s .  I t  o n l y  r e q u i r e s  t h a t  b r o a d  
a g r e e m e n t  be won on t h e  d e v e l o p m e n t  of  t h e  p r o j e c t s .  The 
i n s t a b i l i t y  of b a r g a in in g  outcomes i s  a major c o n t r i b u t o r  to  
the  v a r i a t i o n  in t o t a l  power p l a n t  l e ad t im es  in  Japan.
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Companies will then be required to license projects. 
Licensing involves government balancing the risks and 
benefits of developing projects. It is mainly concerned
with finer points, such as the actual completion of
I
negotiations over property right transfer and the issue of 
various permits. The time taken to settle these finer 
points is highly variable because negotiations regularly 
carry over into the licensing process and because site- 
specific characteristics can require different permits to be 
issued. The licensing stage is, however, relatively short 
and consequently does not appear to be a major determinant 
of leadtime variation.
In the final stage of project development, power companies 
try to minimise the cost of constructing projects subject to 
manpower and engineering constraints. The construction 
stage involves preliminary construction which prepares the 
site for construction and the stage of construction proper. 
All bargaining processes must have been complete prior to 
the commencement of construction proper. In contrast to 
earlier stages of project development, construction is less 
subject to economic and political bargaining processes. 
Construction time are relatively long, but display 
considerable stability and do not appreciably influence 
variation in total leadtimes.
At any one point in time, power companies will have projects 
that are in public acceptance, licensing and construction 
stages. Confidence in the assessment of power plant 
leadtimes increases substantially after public acceptance 
has been negotiated. In Chapter 2, it was shown that
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licensing and construction times were a predictable element 
in calculating power plant leadtimes in Japan.
Evaluating public acceptance times
Public acceptance times appear to be less predictable. The 
existence of institutionalised compensation and property 
right transfer arrangements, which redistribute some of the 
gains from project developers to regional interests, does 
not appear to guarantee consistency in the time necessary to 
win approval for the implementation of power projects. A 
critical element in the provision of a more reliable basis 
upon which to evaluate overall power plant leadtimes in 
Japan is the analysis of the factors that determine the 
effectiveness of compensation mechanisms in reaching social 
and political agreement over the development of energy 
projects.
, The ease with which project developers can manage 
compensation requirements will be influenced by the pattern 
of the distribution of costs and benefits, uncertainty about 
outcomes, the structure of decision making, the skill with 
which bargaining strategies are employed and changing 
excpectations in the course of settlement. A major finding 
of this thesis is that a systematic analysis of these 
factors can assist in understanding why agreement for some 
projects takes longer than for others and can provide a 
relatively sound objective basis upon which to evaluate the
variation in settlement times.
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The evaluation of settlement times requires an analysis of 
the divergence in the expected value of a project between 
project promoters and regional interests. The extent of 
that divergence will determine the economic surplus which is 
available for redistribution in order to affect a 
settlement. Compensation mechanisms are likely to work more 
effectively in bargaining environments where there is a 
large economic surplus available for redistribution and 
where those mechanisms are or can be adequately tailored to 
the structure of compensation claims consequent upon a 
particular project development.
The structure of the bargaining environment will be 
determined by the value that project promoters and regional 
interests place upon project developments and their 
responses to those developments. An important conclusion of 
the study is that there is a substantial amount of 
predictability in the pattern of responses to the 
development of energy projects and the impact of those 
responses on the variation in settlement times. The demand 
for project sites will be influenced by, amongst other 
things, the need for promoters, such as power companies and 
the national government, to meet expected electricity demand 
increases. The supply of projects will be influenced by 
such things as: expectations about social and economic 
opportunities, the size of the rural sector, the ideological 
orientation of communities, social attitudes towards 
preservation of the environment and the relative risks of 
different types of energy facilities. It is possible to 
provide some measure of the importance of these influences
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and their impact on settlement times through regression 
techniques. The development of quantitative models can be 
of use in the evaluation of settlement times.
The settlement process takes time and therefore expectations 
about costs and benefits at the beginning of negotiations as 
well as during the course of settlement are likely to be 
important in the assessment of public acceptance times. A 
major finding of the study, which was discussed in Chapter 
4, is that predictive models which incorporate information 
about expectations at the beginning of the settlement 
process explain 55.0 per cent of the variation in settlement 
times and, therefore, offer a considerable amount of 
predictability in public acceptance times. Expectations may 
change during the course of settlement and the assessment of 
public acceptance times can be enhanced considerably if 
social and economic conditions during the course of 
settlement are monitored carefully. Evaluative models which 
consider social and economic conditions prior to the 
commencement of settlement as well as during the course of 
settlement explain 76.0 per cent of the variation in public 
acceptance times.
The evaluation of settlement times requires an analysis of 
the need for project promoters, such as power companies and 
the national government, to develop additional projects to 
meet expected electricity shortages. These shortfalls can 
be measured by subtracting expected three year capacity from 
expected five years electricity demand. Expected shortages 
during the course of settlement appear to be a more 
important determinant of settlement times than expectations
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at the time when power companies declare their intentions to 
locate projects at particular locations. Power companies 
facing large expected electricity shortages will wish to 
develop sites relatively quickly. They will be more willing 
to and capable of compensating regional interests for losses 
expected to be accrued as a result of those developments.
The response of the national government will also be 
important in evaluating settlement times. The national 
government is concerned with meeting expected electricity 
shortages in broader regional electricity spheres. It is a 
critical factor in the settlement process in that it grants 
Denchöshin approval which allows the licensing stage of 
project development to commence. In situations where 
project demand is high, the national government is likely to 
be more willing to give its endorsement to power station 
developments.
I
An interesting finding of the ^tudy is that the national 
government appears to place more emphasis on initial 
packages compared with subsequent packages in periods of 
excess demand. It appears to presume that power companies 
will attempt to locate less costly subsequent packages, and, 
therefore, appears to be more willing to give approval for 
initial packages which will add significantly over the 
longer term to existing capacity.
The responses of regional electorates also requires careful 
consideration in the evaluation of settlement times. This 
entails analysing whether the structure of the community 
response will be more or less conducive to accepting energy
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power stations given information about the willingness of 
project developers to deliver compensation requirements. 
Regional interests who expect to be affected adversely by 
project development are not likely to give their approval 
for those projects if project developers are not willing to 
compensate them adequately.
Energy facilities are likely to be accepted more readily in 
areas where per capita incomes are rising relatively 
rapidly. Under these conditions, communities would be 
experiencing rapid development or even an economic boom. 
Having experienced the benefits associated with this 
development, communities may wish to see further expansion 
of those benefits. At the same time, there may be a lag in 
noticing the environmental impairment associated with that 
development. Consequently, electorates experiencing rapid 
income growth may place less emphasis on environmental 
quality and, therefore, may be more willing to accept energy 
projects.
The importance attached to environmental quality appears to 
be a stronger influence in lengthening fossil-fuelled 
project compared to nuclear project settlement times. In 
Japan, fossi1-fue11ed projects tend to be located in 
relatively high income areas close to major consumption 
centres. In contrast, nuclear projects are generally 
located in lower income areas away from major population 
centres. Regional electorates are likely to be less 
enthusiastic about accepting fossil-fuelled projects which 
will be seen to add to existing levels of pollution. As 
incomes are relatively high, they will place less emphasis
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on the incremental income benefits expected to accrue from 
such developments. A critical implication of this result is 
that the risk of nuclear projects may be given less weight 
by electorates which are experiencing rapid growth and wish 
to see that growth continue.
The response of the rural sector appears to be an important 
determinant of settlement times. Settlement times are 
likely to be longer for nuclear plants relative to fossil- 
fuelled plants in situations where the size of the rural 
sector, as measured by the ratio of primary income per 
capita to total prefectural income per capita, is relatively 
large. The rural sector appears to be more concerned about 
the potential hazardous effects of nuclear power stations as 
compared with fossil-fuelled plants. They tend to attach 
more riskiness to nuclear power projects because of a 
concern about the adverse effects that a large-scale 
accident might have on factors of production such as land 
and water and because of the longer term nature of those 
effects.
The attitude of primary producers may also differ with the 
type of package that is being developed. Rural interests 
tend to resist subsequent packages more adamantly than 
initial packages. They are concerned about initial projects 
because of a lack of familiarity with the environmental 
hazards involved in the development of power plants. The 
rural sector accepts initial packages because of 
expectations that they will benefit in terms of expanded 
income and employment opportunities from those projects.
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The construction of initial projects, however, delivers 
little direct benefit to the rural sector compared with the 
non-rural sector. It, therefore, appears to change its 
expectations about the value of subsequent packages which 
will be expected to further impair the environment.
The ability of local government to supply public goods, as 
measured by the ratio of the value of tax revenues from 
regional sources to the value of expenditure on public 
goods, will also affect the ease at which settlements can be 
reached over the development of energy projects. Local 
government tends to accept subsequent packages more readily 
when financial hardships are expected. Local electorates 
accrue large financial benefits in the form of fixed asset 
and other taxes with the construction of initial projects. 
These taxes are used to develop social overhead capital such 
as roads and hospitals. After the construction of initial 
projects has been completed, those taxes decline despite a 
need to maintain expenditure on such public goods. They, 
therefore, appear to be more willing to accept subsequent 
packages.
The ideological structure of prefectural communities is an 
important explanator of settlement times. The ratio of 
Japan Socialist Party (JSP) and Japan Communist Party (JCP) 
prefectural assembly seats to total assembly seats can be 
used as a measure of the strength of leftist party 
representation in regional electorates. Nuclear projects 
will take longer to implement than fossi1-fuelled projects 
in areas where there is relatively high leftist 
representation in prefectural assemblies. Leftist
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political parties tend to be concerned about the risks of 
nuclear projects and sensitise the public to those risks. 
In contrast, leftist political parties place less emphasis 
on the risks associated with fossil-fuelled projects, and as 
was illustrated clearly in the Matsushima case may even 
support coal-fired projects in order to provide assistance 
to the domestic coal industry. The lack of ideological 
conflict over the siting of fossil-fuelled projects appears 
to be an important reason for their relatively shorter 
public acceptance times.
The structure of local community and social attitudes and 
trends which may be prominent in particular time periods 
also need to be considered in the context of evaluating 
settlement times. During the period from the late 1960's to 
the early 1970s, pollution problems emerged in Japan and 
emphasis started to be placed upon preserving the 
environment and improving the level of welfare. The 
community in Japan started to attach less importance on the 
benefits associated with rapid economic development. 
Consequently, there was less community willingness to accept 
environmentally hazardous power projects from the early 
1970s.
An interesting finding of the study with respect to the 
community response to the riskiness of energy power plants 
is that it is not the nature of the technology itself which 
is the critical determinant of settlement times. The 
importance attached to projects with different 
characteristics will depend on social, economic and 
political conditions. The assessment of the response of
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communities toward projects, therefore, requires going 
beyond technological features of power plants and requires 
an analysis of economic and political characteristics of 
regional electorates.
The use of quantitative models in the analysis of settlement 
times does have limitations which need to be taken into 
account when evaluating the results of the study. These 
limitations are a function of data availability and 
measurement problems. For example, the variable which was 
used to measure expected electricity shortages presumes that 
project promoters base capacity expansion targets on the 
difference between expected five year electricity demand and 
expected three year capacity. Although five year 
electricity supply and demand forecasts were the only data 
available, project promoters might formulate siting plans on 
longer time horizons and this may distort the results of the 
thesis. These measurement problems need to be given 
consideration in the use of econometric models developed in 
the study for evaluating public acceptance times.
A critical conclusion of the study is that despite these 
shortcomings there is a predictable pattern of response by 
power plant promoters and regional interests toward the 
development of energy facilities. These influences are 
quantifiable and a model can be developed to provide some 
statistical measurement of the importance of these 
influences on the variation in energy construction start-up 
times. The statistical results presented in Chapter 4 do 
provide a reasonably objective basis upon which to evaluate 
settlement times. The models explain a relatively high
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proportion of the variations in public acceptance times. 
They are statistically significant and relatively robust. 
An application to unlicensed nuclear projects suggest that 
they can be lised in evaluating public acceptance times. As 
noted in the case study chapters, the models yield estimates 
of settlement times which were equal to or better than power 
company assessments.
The statistical models developed in this study are useful 
because they provide a set of general determinants which can 
be used in assessing public acceptance times for energy 
projects in Japan. The data used in the models is readily 
available and, therefore, it is relatively easy to generate 
estimates from the regression equations. The models provide 
a way of systematically examining general determinants of 
settlement times and deriving estimates which can be used in 
evaluating the times necessary to win agreement over the 
development of energy projects.
The assessment of settlement times does not, however, end at 
the stage of gathering an array of numbers and calculating 
estimated times from mathematical equations. The residuals 
of the models vary quite significantly and this suggests 
that other factors need to be considered in the context of 
assessing settlement times. Variation in the residuals 
implies that estimates generated by the model can either 
under or over-estimate public acceptance times even though 
the model in general provides a relatively good fit. 
Quantitative approaches to the assessment of public 
acceptance times make a number of important assumptions
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about the nature of other factors such as: the structure of
regional decision making, the effectiveness with which 
bargaining strategies are employed, uncertainty about 
outcomes and changing expectations. The importance of these 
factors also needs to be considered in the evaluation of 
settlement times.
The case history studies presented in the thesis provide a 
useful way of assessing the relative importance of these 
factors and illustrating the possibility of supplementing 
econometric models with qualitative analysis in the 
evaluation of settlement times. The models provide 
estimates of settlement times for each observation and line 
those estimates up against actual or observed public 
acceptance times. The residual, the difference between the 
actual and predicted times, acts as a summary measure of the 
importance of factors such as: changing expectations, which 
are not easily susceptible to quantification yet may 
influence bargaining processes in a complex way. The 
factors need to be explored in providing a more complete 
basis upon which to evaluate settlement times than could be 
provided simply by relying on estimates derived from 
econometric models.
The statistical models developed in the thesis presume that 
the adverse effects of projects are spread flatly or evenly 
across interests participants to the settlement. An 
important finding of the case study analyses is that in the 
development of projects some regional interest is usually 
expected to make large gains at the expense of large losses 
expected to be accrued by others. Of particular importance
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is the relative impact of energy projects across 
administrative boundaries. In Japan, fishing co-operatives 
located in areas adjacent to those accepting projects argue 
that they will incur large losses from project development 
and invariably present stiff opposition. Resistance by 
interests outside administrative units accepting projects is 
one important pattern of response to the development of 
those projects.
The extent to which an uneven spread of costs and benefits 
from project development will cause variation in delay will 
depend on the relative impacts and strengths of interests 
participant to bargaining. As was clearly illustrated in 
Chapter 5, large interests who expect to be affected 
adversely by project development can substantially delay 
settlement processes. Economic interests whose production 
is relatively high and who are experiencing a boom in 
economic activity will offer considerable resistance to the 
implementation of projects. Redistributive mechanisms are 
not likely to function effectively in situations where large 
and powerful interest groups are operating in the regional 
economy.
The spread of costs and benefits within interest groups can 
also influence the speed at which settlements can be 
reached. A critical factor in assessing the ability of 
interests to oppose projects successfully is the extent to 
which the adverse effects of projects are evenly spread 
within interest groups. Interests groups which specialise 
in the production of economic output are likely to be 
effected in the same way by projects and, therefore, will be
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able to mobilise resistance to projects more effectively. 
In situations where the effects of projects benefit some 
interests at the expense of others, interest groups are 
likely to be less capable of mounting sustained resistance 
movements. Under these conditions, it will be more 
difficult for interests opposing projects to rely on 
resistance from those who expect to gain from the 
implementation of projects.
Even if the structure of adverse effects both across and 
within interests are fully taken into account, the 
evaluation of settlement times requires considering the 
degree of uncertainty prevailing in bargaining environments. 
Uncertainty can increase the costs of projects and, 
therefore, reduce the economic surplus which is available 
for redistribution. Hence, a high degree of risk 
averseness can impede the development of compensation and 
property right transfer arrangements.
Uncertainty can influence the willingness of promoters to 
develop energy projects. As illustrated in Chapter 7, 
project promoters may be uncertain about the costs of 
project implementation in terms of: the possibility of high 
levels of excess capacity, the costs of community 
compensation and property right transfer and political costs 
such as electoral implications of pressuring regional 
interests into accepting projects. An important finding of 
the study is that promoters facing uncertainty are likely to 
respond by delaying certain projects and giving priority to 
the development of less costly projects. The evaluation of 
settlement times for particular projects therefore requires
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an assessment of the degree of uncertainty prevailing at 
alternative locations and the impact of this uncertainty on 
the willingness of power companies to re-schedule site 
development plans.
A major assumption of the quantitative models developed in 
the study is that the structure of decision making in the 
regional political organisation impacts on bargaining in the 
same way at all locations. The regional decision-making 
structure may, however, vary and, therefore, the assessment 
of settlement times requires an analysis of the impact of 
the structure of decision-making on the management of 
redistributive mechanisms. The regional political 
organisation is important in settlement processes because it 
plays a role in creating a bargaining environment which 
facilitates negotiations between project promoters and 
regional interests. The case study analysis suggests that 
the structure of political conflict and institutional access 
to pow^r are critical factors influencing the variation in 
project settlement times.
Political conflict at the regional level, even if it exists
for reasons which are independent of projects, can affect
the management of compensation. As noted in Chapter 5,
intense factionalism within ruling parties can substantially
delay settlement processes. Opposition factions may see the
development of energy projects and the subsequent economic
benefits arising from those projects as weakening their
*political position vis-a-vis ruling factions. Those in 
ruling factions may be concerned about the political and 
electoral implications of developing projects too quickly
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and this may weaken their role in facilitating bargaining 
processes.
The degree of institutional access to key decision-making 
centres may also affect the ability of regional government 
in playing a mediatory role in dispute settlement. As 
illustrated in Chapter 8, opposition groups with 
institutional access, such as that acquired through 
membership of regional government committees, can immobilise 
or prevent the leadership in the regional political 
organisation from mediating in siting disputes and can 
substantially erode the bargaining positions of project 
developers.
During the course of settlement, promoters and opponents 
will employ a variety of strategies to improve their 
bargaining positions. The quantitative analysis in the 
study assumes that the pattern and effectiveness of these 
strategies is similiar in all circumstances. The evaluation 
of settlement times, therefore, requires an analysis of the 
nature and success of bargaining strategies employed by 
participants to the settlement process. These strategies 
include informational, economic, political and technical 
strategies and are designed to facilitate or impede 
bargaining by changing the value of projects and the 
allocation of bargaining power.
Interest groups opposing project development attempt to 
prevent or destabilise bargaining by sensitising the public 
to the risks involved in energy projects forming alliances 
and attempting to gain institutional or electoral access to
382
decision making processes. Project promoters respond by 
trying to address risk issues and splitting or isolating 
negative agents from bargaining processes. The evaluation 
of settlements requires monitoring the development of these 
strategies and assessing their impact on bargaining 
processes.
Opposition groups usually attempt to impede bargaining by 
heightening concern about the environmental risks associated 
with project developments. This is achieved by conducting 
demonstrations, distributing pamphlets and appealing to 
interests at the regional and national levels. A key 
element in this strategy is attempting to increase the 
expected costs of projects to regional publics and other 
targeted interests. Opposition groups see this tactic as 
important in trying to create resistance and stimulate 
communities to demand larger amounts of compensation, thus 
increasing the costs of bargaining to project developers.
In many cases, interests resisting project development will 
join forces or form alliances with each other to improve 
their bargaining positions with project promoters. Two 
patterns of alliance can emerge in siting disputes in Japan. 
The first are alliances between economic interests such as 
between fishing co-operatives. The second is the alliance 
between economic interests and ideological interests such as 
leftist political parties and their affiliates. The ability 
of members of these alliances to delay bargaining will 
depend on the impacts of projects on interests within the 
alliance, motivations, ideological compatibility, tactical 
goals and established relationships with other interests
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outside the alliance. Those interested in providing 
assessments of public acceptance times will need to consider 
the type of alliance which are formed and the ability of 
those alliances to delay bargaining.
An interesting conclusion that can be drawn from the case 
study analysis is that economic-ideological alliances iqay 
be less capable in general than economic alliances in 
opposing project development successfully. As noted in 
Chapter 6, the weak position of fishing interests led them 
to form an alliance relationship with a leftist based 
movement. The economic-ideological alliance was not, 
however, capable of substantially delaying negotiations 
because some fishing interests saw the costs of such 
opposition as being relatively high in terms of ideological 
incompatibility and the possibility of reduced finances from 
the prefectural government. On the other hand, economic 
interests which were discussed in Chapters 5 and 8 did not 
form alliances with ideological interests. They saw their 
positions as being relatively strong because the impact of 
energy projects was large and spread relatively evenly 
across their membership. They did not perceive any need to 
join forces with other interests as they could mobilise 
substantial resistance unilaterally. The lack of 
willingness to enter into alliances with ideological 
interests may be a good measure of the strength of economic 
interests opposing project development.
Interests which do not have institutional or electoral 
access to decision-making may seek to acquire access in 
order to imprdve their bargaining positions. Success in
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this objective can prevent regional government from 
assisting in settlement processes and can even lead to 
opposition by regional government to projects. A key 
finding of the study is that projects can be delayed and may 
even be abandoned if large and powerful interests , which 
are opposed to project development, are capable of gaining 
electoral access to regional government.
During the course of settlement, project promoters will 
respond to the emergence of resistance and will develop 
strategies which will facilitate the use of redistributive 
mechanisms. An underlying objective of promoter strategies 
is to create a bargaining environment in which negotiations 
can take place by weakening resistance and minimising 
outside interference on the conduct of negotiations. There 
is a general pattern to the strategies employed by promoters 
and it is important to monitor the nature and success of 
these strategies in the evaluation of settlement times.
An important strategy employed by project promoters is to 
address the risk issue. There is a variety of methods used 
in alleviating concern about environmental ri.sk. These 
include: lecture series and expert inquiries but the most 
important appears to be the use of the demonstration effect. 
Promoters usually take certain community interests to 
regions where projects are under construction or operating. 
This strategy attempts to show those interests that there 
are large expected benefits from accepting projects and that 
these benefits offset any costs that might also be incurred.
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A second strategy generally employed by project promoters is 
isolating negative agents from negotiating processes so as 
to weaken their bargaining positions. This is particularly 
important in situations where ideological interests are 
influencing property right owners and where particular 
property right owners are strongly resisting project 
development. Power companies try to mobilise the regional 
political organisation to form regional committees and have 
property right owners and other interests participate in 
those committees. In some cases, they may also modify 
project design so as to reduce the impact of projects on 
affected parties with veto power and thereby erode their 
bargaining positions. In other cases, promoters will 
commence negotiations with weaker interests so as to put 
pressure on stronger interests opposing project development.
An important conclusion of the study is that the skill with 
which these bargaining strategies are employed in different 
project developments does not substantially affect estimates 
generated by statistical models, developed in the thesis. 
As noted in Chapter 5, power companies usually attempt to 
mobilise the regional political organisation to facilitate 
negotiations. Chubu Electric was very skilfull in utilising 
the regional political leadership to weaken and isolate 
resistance to the project. Even though the company had 
learnt several valuable lessons from its earlier Ashihama 
experience, the skill with which it developed siting 
strategies does not appear to have been a major factor 
speeding up the settlement process.
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The statistical models developed in this thesis also make an 
assumption that expectations are changing in a constant 
direction during the settlement process. Expectations may/ 
however., fluctuate. A critical element in the evaluation of 
settlement times is monitoring expectations and changes in 
those expectations. Changes in expectations can arise 
because of such factors as: changes in energy policy
priorities, electricity market conditions, and policies of 
other countries. These changes can influence the value of 
projects and therefore can affect the settlement process by 
either increasing or decreasing the benefits which can be 
redistributed in order to win approval from affected 
parties.
An interesting finding of the case study discussed in 
Chapter 7 was that monitoring changes in national energy 
policy can be very important in the evaluation ofsettlement 
times. The Matsushima case illustrated the increased 
importance of coal-fired projects after 1973 in order to 
reduce dependence onimported oil. The re-direction of 
energy policy towards stressing the development of non-oil 
projects allowed the Electric Power Development Company and 
MITI to reach a settlement with Kyushu Electric and MOF over 
the implementation of the project. The increased security 
value of the project allowed the promoters to develop 
transmission lines which reduced the concern of Kyushu 
Electric and MOF about the economic viability of the project.
An important assumption of the statistical analysis in the 
study is that the nature of compensation and other financial 
instruments, such as subsidies, used in negotiating
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settlements is the same in all situations and that those 
redistributive mechanisms are equally effective in the 
resolution of energy project siting disputes. The case 
study analysis suggests that the type of redistribution does 
have a bearing on the extent to which project promoters can 
shorten settlement times. The assessment of public 
acceptance times does require a consideration of the nature 
of compensation and its impact on the negotiating process.
An important conclusion of the case studies is that indirect 
or broad based subsidies in the form of prefectural grants 
and subsidies provided under the provisions of the Three 
Laws are used to create regional public support for projects 
against interest groups which oppose project development. 
As illustrated in the Ashihama case, broad based subsidies 
do not appear to be effective in shortening delay when large 
and powerful interests oppose the siting of projects. The 
Matsushima case suggests that subsidies are only likely to 
be effective in reducing opposition when they are structured 
to provide direct benefits to interests which have property 
rights or are in strong bargaining positions.
A critical conclusion of this study is that there are ways 
of evaluating energy project leadtimes in Japan and that 
there is more predictability in leadtime variation that 
might be expected from casual observation. The major 
stumbling block to providing reasonably accurate assessments 
is found in the public acceptance stage of site development. 
The quantitative models developed in this study do provide a 
useful basis upon which to make some objective evaluation of
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Settlement times. There is, however, a need to go beyond 
econometric techniques and consider explicitly social, 
political and institutional factors in providing a more 
complete assessment of settlement times.
General applicability to economic projects
The major conclusions of the study appear to have some broad 
applicability to the evaluation of public acceptance times 
for other energy and non-energy projects in Japan as well as 
economic projects in other countries. The important 
determinants of settlement times for energy projects in 
Japan appear to be of more general use in the assessment of 
the degree of difficulty in the placement of economic 
projects. The extent of this general applicability can only 
be assessed accurately by considering other economic 
projects in Japan and elsewhere in the light of the 
framework developed in this thesis. It is, however, 
possible to make some broad observations which may be 
suggestive of the scope for future research in the 
evaluation of delay in project development.
The leadtime to develop economic projects is one measure of 
the degree of ease or difficulty a country faces in 
achieving social and political objectives which require the 
development of those projects. The analysis of delay in 
project implementation is therefore critical to the 
formulation of policy in so far as policy makers and others 
interested in policy will need to know the extent to which 
objectives can be accomplished.
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Standard CBA is useful for ranking projects in terms of 
economic efficiency criteria and this approach assists in 
the identification of high return projects which are
developed first. This approach ranks project development
/
independently of compensation requirements and other non­
economic factors and therefore assumes zero implementation 
costs in reaching settlements over the development of 
projects. Policy makers will be interested in the 
implementation costs of developing certain projects as this 
may affect their ability to achieve objectives. The social 
and political costs involved in reaching agreement over 
projects will need to be set alongside other more narrowly 
defined economic costs and assessed in project policy 
formulation.
The conceptual basis of the framework developed in this 
study extends CBA and considers bargaining over the 
distribution of costs and benefits expected to accrue as a 
result of project development. All economic projects will 
benefit some interests and will confer costs on others. 
There is, therefore, a need to consider the distribution of 
costs and benefits and the adequacy of redistributive 
mechanisms in examining why some projects take longer to 
implement than others.
There are several criteria which can be used to assess the 
degree of general applicability of the framework developed 
have in the assessment of delay in project implementation. 
These include: the nature of projects, the nature of 
interests participant to the settlement process, the 
structure of property right ownership, the existence of
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institutionalised redistributive mechanisms and the 
structure of political decision-making.
The conclusions of the thesis are likely to be of relevance 
in assessing the determinants of delay for a wide range of 
environmentally hazardous projects in Japan and elsewhere. 
These may include petro-chemical plants and other public 
projects such as airports and highways. The environmental 
impacts of projects may differ; some projects may impair the 
physical environment while others may do more damage to the 
social environment. Independently of the effects, there 
will be a divergence in the value of projects between 
project promoters and those interests being asked to accept 
projects and, therefore, project implementation will require 
bargaining over an equitable distribution of costs and 
benefits expected from the project. It would be of interest 
to extend the coverage of the thesis and to undertake cross­
country comparisons of bargaining over the implementation of 
economic projects. Such studies should shed light on the 
nature of bargaining in different countries and the impact 
on project implementation times.
The settlement process requires that promoters compensate 
interests being asked to give their concurrence to project 
development. Irrespective of the nature and location of the 
project, there will be a set of general determinants which 
wil influence the management of compensation and other 
redistributive mechanisms. On the site demand side, the 
importance attached to project output to supply markets will 
be an important factor influencing the promoters response to
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developing projects. On the site supply side, general 
determinants, such as expectations about future social and 
economic opportunities,the structure of political party 
representation and the ability of local government to supply 
public goods, will influence the community response to 
accepting projects. These general determinants can be used 
in assessing the ease with which redistributive mechanisms 
can be established or used in winning approval for project 
development.
The structure of property ownership rights will also 
determine the degree of general applicability of the 
framework developed in this study. Japan is unique in 
respect of the existence of fishing co-operatives whose 
legally recognised property rights need to be relinquished 
in developing economic projects which have an impact on the 
marine environment. There is, however, a structure of 
property rights for land owners which will be consistent 
within Japan and the development of any economic project in 
Japan will require the relinquishment of those rights. In 
other countries, there are likely to be interests who 
possess property rights and their consent will be required 
in the development of economic projects. There is, however, 
a need to compare more fully the structure of property right 
ownership in Japan and other countries and its impact on 
settlement processes involved in developing economic 
projects.
The existence of institutional arrangements which facilitate 
compensation and property right transfer will also influence 
the broad applicability of the approach in this study to
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analysing delay in reaching agreement over economic projects 
in general. Institutional arrangements which exist for 
power plants will also exist for other types of projects in 
Japan. Similar arrangements do not appear to exist in other 
countries, such as America, Europe and Australia. An 
important future area of research is the analysis of the 
extent to which established institutional arrangements in 
Japan facilitate settlement of economic projects compared 
with other countries where project developers are required 
to establish their own independent compensation mechanisms.
The extent to which the settlement process requires 
bargaining between project promoters and regional interests 
will also depend on the broad structure of decision-making 
and national-regional relations. Regional electorates have 
veto power over projects in Japan and, therefore, their 
agreement must be obtained in developing economic projects 
of any kind. This will apply to other democratic countries 
where regional electorates have veto power over the 
development of economic projects in their localities. In 
countries where authoritarian or communist regimes rule, the 
responses of regional electorates to economic projects are 
likely to be far less relevant in bargaining over the 
development of economic projects. There is considerable 
scope for undertaking comparative studies on the impact of 
the structure of national-regional relations and decision­
making more generally on the delay in the implementation of 
projects.
Bargaining between promoters, such as the national 
government and those given responsibility to develop
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p r o j e c t s  o v e r  t h e  g a i n s  and l o s s e s  of  p r o j e c t  d e v e l o p m e n t  
may, however,  be an im por tan t  de t e rminan t  of de lay  in non- 
d emocra t i c  regimes.  The framework developed in t h i s  s tudy  
might have to  be modif ied to  t ake  i n t o  account  the  p o l i t i c a l  
s t r u c t u r e  of b a r g a in in g  envi ronments  in c e r t a i n  c o u n t r i e s .  
The i m p a c t  of  b a r g a i n i n g  b e t w e e n  p r i v a t e  and g o v e r n m e n t a l  
i n t e r e s t s  a t  t h e  n a t i o n a l  l e v e l  on p r o j e c t  d e l a y  was 
a d d r e s s e d  i n  t h e  s t u d y ,  b u t  i t  would be u s e f u l  t o  d e v e l o p  
r e s e a r c h  on c o u n t r i e s ,  such as Korea and Taiwan,  where  
b a r g a i n i n g  a t  t h e  n a t i o n a l  l e v e l  a p p e a r s  t o  be more  
impor tan t  in the  d e t e r m in a t i o n  of p r o j e c t  l e ad t im es .
T h i s  s t u d y  f o c u s s e d  on t h e  s o c i a l  and p o l i t i c a l  f a c t o r s  
i n f l u e n c i n g  v a r i a t i o n  i n  p u b l i c  a c c e p t a n c e  t i m e s  f o r  t h e  
development  of energy p r o j e c t s  in  Japan.  I t  only cons ide red  
b r i e f l y  t h e  q u e s t i o n  o f  d e l a y  i n  t h e  l i c e n s i n g  and  
c o n s t r u c t i o n  s t a g e s  o f  p r o j e c t  d e v e l o p m e n t .  The  
( j u s t i f i c a t i o n  f o r  t h i s  e m p has i s  was t h a t  l i c e n s i n g  and 
c o n s t r u c t i o n  t imes  for  energy p r o j e c t s  d id  not  s i g n i f i c a n t l y  
i n f l u e n c e  t h e  v a r i a t i o n  in  o v e r a l l  power  p l a n t  l e a d t i m e s  
and, t h e r e f o r e ,  could be taken  as given in the  e v a l u a t i o n  of 
t o t a l  l e ad t im es .  There i s  a need to  examine t h i s  assumpt ion  
in  the  assessment  of o v e r a l l  l e ad t im es  for  economic p r o j e c t s  
in  genera l .
I n  J a p a n ,  t h e  n a t u r e  o f  p e r m i t s  n e c e s s a r y  f o r  e n e r g y  
p r o j e c t s  i s  l i k e l y  t o  d i f f e r  f o r  o t h e r  economic  p r o j e c t s .  
For example,  some l i c e n c e s  r e q u i r e d  for  the  development  of 
n u c l e a r  p r o j e c t s  w i l l  be r e s t r i c t e d  t o  t h o s e  p r o j e c t s .  On 
t h e  o t h e r  hand,  s i m i l a r  l i c e n c e s  and p e r m i t s  a r e  l i k e l y  t o
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be required in other countries developing nuclear projects. 
An important issue which could provide scope for future 
research would be the impact of the structure of licensing 
processes on the variation in leadtimes for economic 
projects in general.
Construction times for energy projects in Japan are 
relatively stable. An important factor explaining this 
stability is likely to be the nature of labour contracts in 
Japan which allow power companies to plan for strikes which 
occur in spring each year. Labour relations in Japan, at 
least for large construction companies, is based on lifetime 
employment and, therefore, there is a considerable degree of 
stability in labour-management relations. It is likely that 
construction times for other large-scale economic projects 
in Japan would be relatively stable given the institutional 
characteristics of labour markets. A useful and interesting 
question which could be addressed in future research would 
be the extent to which industrial relations problems in 
other countries affects the variation in construction times 
for large-scale economic projects. It is possible that 
project developers in other countries would not face a 
similar degree of predictability in project construction 
times as the Japanese do.
In the study there was an emphasis on the delay in locating 
initial as opposed to subsequent packages. While the 
statistical analysis addressed both categories of plants, 
the case studies did not tackle the question of why public 
acceptance times for subsequent packages are generally 
shorter than times for initial packages and why some
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subsequent packages take shorter times than others to 
implement. There is a need to supplement the study with 
research on the impact of initial packages on the regional 
political economy. Such an analysis would provide further 
insights into the nature of bargaining processes involved in 
siting subsequent packages and their impact on settlement 
times.
The framework developed in the thesis appears to have a 
considerable amount of applicability to the assessment of 
delay in project implementation in general. There is, 
however, a need to use the major conclusions of this study 
as a starting point for the analysis of delay in the 
implementation of economic projects. There will be a need 
to undertake case studies, such as those outlined above, 
for other projects in Japan and elsewhere in order to 
consider the extent to which the major determinants of 
project delay in Japan are of use in evaluating economic 
project leadtimes in general.
Implications for energy forecasters
The results of this study have important implications for 
those in the energy fuel trade attempting to assess capacity 
expansion targets in Japan and in other countries. The 
leadtime required to develop energy facilities is a major 
determinant of the rate of expansion of capacity. The 
assessment of leadtime is, therefore, critical in making 
judgments about the ability of a country to achieve its 
capacity expansion targets. An important characteristic of
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the energy commodity trade is the long and variable 
leadtimes in the development of projects. This presents 
major problems for suppliers because of the uncertainty 
involved in making investment decisions today that will not 
start to bring an economic return for a considerable amount 
of time. The costs of wrong or mis-informed investment 
decisions can be very high given the high capital intensity 
of mining projects and degree of bilateral monopoly in the 
energy trade.
Capacity expansion targets in consumer countries, such as 
Japan, have consistently been revised downward particularly 
since the 1973 oil crisis. Those revisions have caused 
major problems for supplier countries, such as Australia, 
which face declining profitability and uncertainty about 
future investments. In some instances, supplier countries 
have argued that consumer countries have intentionally over­
estimated capacity targets in order to create an over-supply 
situation so that they can improve their bargaining 
positions in bilateral negotiations. Among other things, 
this proposition presumes that planners in countries reliant 
on traded energy goods have perfect information and are, 
therefore, capable of assessing accurately capacity 
expansion targets and the determinants that will influence 
the attainability of those targets.
There are methods of evaluating project leadtimes in 
countries such as Japan. Supplier countries need not rely 
solely on capacity forecasts published by authorities in 
consumer countries. It is possible for them to evaluate 
particular projects ih which they have an interest and
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monitor the development of those projects. The cost of 
providing independent evaluation of project start-up times 
is likely to be less than costs which might be associated 
with simply relying on published capacity targets. 
Complaining about the intentions of consumer countries when 
capacity targets have not been met is not appropriate when 
these alternatives to monitoring demand forecasts are
available.
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Nihon keizai shinbun: nagasaki ban [Japan Economic: Nagasaki 
Edition]
Nihon keizai shinbun: hokkaido ban [Japan Economic: Hokkaido 
Edition]
Nihon kogyo shinbun [Japan Industrial]
Nikkan kensetsu tsüshin [Nikkan Construction]
Nikkan kogyo shinbun [Nikkan Industrial]
Nikkei sangyo shinbun [Nikkei Industrial]
Sankei shinbun: enshu ban [Sankei: Enshu Edition]
Sankei shinbun: kyushu ban [Sankei: Kyushu Edition]
Seinichi shinbun [Seinichi]
Shakai shinpo; tökai ban [Social News: Tokai Edition] 
Shizuoka minpo [Shizuoka Peoples]
Shizuoka shinbun [Shizuoka]
Shizuoka chunichi shinbun [Shizuoka Central]
Shizuoka mainichi [Shizuoka Mainichi]
Tokyo shinbun [Tokyo]
Yomiuri shinbun: hokkaido ban [Yomiuri: Hokkaido Edition]
/
472
Yomiuri shinbun: kyushu ban [Yomiuri: Kyushu Edition] 
Yomiuri shinbun: shizuoka ban. [Yomiuri: Shizuoka Edition]
List of Institutions Visited
Agency for Natural Resources and Energy
Atomic Energy Safety Commissiony
Central Electric Power Research Institute
Chubu Electric Power Company
Chugoku Electric Power Company
Clean Earth Party
Democratic Socialist Party
Economic Planning Agency
Electric Power Development Company
Environmental Protection Agency
Japan Congress Against Atomic and Hydrogen Bombs
Hamaoka Town Office
Hokkaido Electric Power Company
Hokkaido Prefectural Office
Hokuriku Electric Power Company
Institute of Energy Economics
Institute for Policy Sciences
Iwanai Fishing Co-operative
Iwanai Town Office
Japan Atomic Power Company
Japan Communist Party
Japan Socialist Party
Jittogata Fishing Co-operative
Kansai Electric Power Company
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Kashiwazaki City Office 
Kashiwazaki Prefectural Office 
Kariwa Village Office 
Kyowa Town Office 
Kyushu Electric Power Company 
Liberal Democratic Party
Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries 
Ministry of Finance 
Ministry of Home Affairs
Ministry of International Trade and Industry
National Council for Trade Unions
National Federation for Fishing Co-operatives
New Energy Development Organisation
New Liberal Party
Omaezaki Fishing Co-operative
Omaezaki Town Office
People's Energy Research Institute
Prefectural Council for Trade Unions
Sagara Fishing Co-operative
Sagara Town Office
Science and Technology Agency
Shikoku Electric Power Company
Shizuoka Prefectural Office
The Japan Siting Centre
Tohoku Electric Power Company
Tokyo Electric Power Company
Tomari Fishing Co-operative
Tomari Town Office
